

**FAMILY**PLATFORM

## **Existential Field 1:**

# **Family Structures & Family Forms – An Overview of Major Trends and Developments**

**Working Report (April 2010)**



Loreen Beier, Dr. Dirk Hofäcker, Elisa Marchese, Dr. Marina Rupp

State Institute for Family Research at the University of Bamberg

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## **Working Reports**

Funded by the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme and co-ordinated by Technical University Dortmund, FAMILYPLATFORM gathers a consortium of 12 organisations working together to articulate key questions about the family for the *European Social Science and Humanities Research Agenda 2012-2013*.

There are four key stages to the project. The first is to chart and review the major trends of comparative family research in the EU in 8 'Existential Fields' (EF). The second is to critically review existing research on the family, and the third is to build on our understanding of existing issues affecting families and predict future conditions and challenges facing them. The final stage is to bring the results and findings of the previous three stages together, and propose key scientific research questions about families to be tackled with future EU research funding.

This *Working Report* has been produced for the first stage of the project, and is part of a series of reports, as follows:

- EF1. Family Structures & Family Forms**
- EF2. a) Family Developmental Processes  
b) Transition into Parenthood**
- EF3. Major Trends of State Family Policies in Europe**
- EF4. a) Family and Living Environment  
b) Local Politics – Programmes and Best Practice Models**
- EF5. Patterns and Trends of Family Management in the European Union**
- EF6. a) Social Care and Social Services  
b) Development of Standards for Social Work and Social Care Services**
- EF7. Social Inequality and Diversity of Families**
- EF8. Media, Communication and Information Technologies in the European Family**
- CSO Civil Society Perspective: Three Case Studies**

## Contents

Working Reports.....	2
<b>List of figures.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>List of tables.....</b>	<b>6</b>
I Introduction.....	7
II Methodological approach .....	8
III Fertility and demographical development .....	10
<b>3.1 Postponement of first childbirth .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>3.2 Postponement of first marriage .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>3.3 Share of out-of-wedlock births .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>3.4 Trends in Fertility .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>3.5 Summary.....</b>	<b>18</b>
IV Development and change of family types.....	20
<b>4.1 Developments in marriages and divorces .....</b>	<b>20</b>
4.1.1 Decreasing marriage rates .....	20
4.1.2 Increasing divorce rate .....	22
4.1.3 Increasing re-marriage rate .....	23
<b>4.2 The development of institutionalized family relationships.....</b>	<b>24</b>
4.2.1 The decrease of the “middle class nuclear family” .....	24
4.2.2 Increase of other types of family life .....	26
4.2.2.1 Lone-parents.....	26
4.2.2.2 Stepfamilies .....	27
4.2.2.3 Cohabiting families .....	28
<b>4.3 Summary.....</b>	<b>28</b>
V New and rare family types .....	30
<b>5.1 Foster and adoptive families.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>5.2 Rainbow families .....</b>	<b>32</b>

<b>5.3</b>	<b>Multi-generation households .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>5.4</b>	<b>Families without common household: Living apart together and commuter-families .....</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>5.5</b>	<b>Patchwork families .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>5.6</b>	<b>Summary .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>VI</b>	<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>41</b>
	<b>Appendix .....</b>	<b>43</b>
	<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>51</b>

## List of figures

Figure 3.1: Average age of women at first childbirth, 1970-2005, by country .....	10
Figure 3.2: Average age of women at first childbirth, 1970-2006, by regions.....	11
Figure 3.3: Average age of women at first childbirth, by cohorts and regions .....	11
Figure 3.4: Average age of women at first marriage, 1970-2004, by country .....	12
Figure 3.5: Average age of men at first marriage, 1970-2003, by country .....	13
Figure 3.6: Share of out-of-wedlock births in European regions, 1970-2006, by regions .....	14
Figure 3.7: Share of out-of-wedlock births and total fertility rates, 2005 .....	14
Figure 3.8: Total (period-specific) fertility rate in European countries, 1965-2007, by region.....	15
Figure 3.9: Total (cohort-specific) fertility rate in European countries, 1965-2007, by region .....	16
Figure 3.10: Individual estimates of the ideal number of children in general ('ideal') and for the respondent ('personal'), 2006.....	17
Figure 4.1: Development of the marriage-rate in the EU-27, 1965-2005 .....	20
Figure 4.2: Marriage per 1000 persons in the EU-27 countries, 2008 .....	21
Figure 4.3: Development of divorce-rate in the EU-27, 1965-2005.....	22
Figure 4.4: Divorce-rate in the EU-27 countries, 2008.....	22
Figure 4.5: Share of re-marriages of divorcés as the percentage of all marriages in European countries, 1960 and 2006.....	23
Figure 4.6: Share of number of children in European family households (2008) .....	24
Figure 4.7: Share of family-types in the EU-27 countries, 2007.....	25
Figure 4.8: Share of lone-parents on all family-households in the EU-27 countries, 2007.....	26
Figure 5.1: Newly registered partners in Sweden, 1995-2008, by sex.....	33
Figure 5.2: Percentage of living apart together families, 2005 .....	38
Figure A – 1: "Do you agree with the authorization of child adoption by homosexual couples throughout Europe?" Answers: Absolutely agree/ Rather agree, 2004 .....	50

**List of tables**

Table 5.1: Percentage of adoption and foster families on households with children, 2005 ..... 31

Table 5.2: Persons aged 16+ years which are members of families with more than two generations as a percentage of all persons aged 16+ years old, 1994-2001..... 36

Table A – 1: Development of marriages per 1000 persons in the EU-27, 1950 -2008..... 43

Table A – 2: Development of divorces per 1000 persons in the EU-27, 1950 -2008 ..... 44

Table A – 3: Family-households according to their number of children, 2008, in 1000 and percentage ..... 45

Table A – 4: Pair-family-households according to their number of children, 2008, in 1000 and percentage..... 46

Table A – 5: Lone-Parent-family-households according to their number of children, 2008, in 1000 and percentage..... 47

Table A – 6: Newly registered partnerships (couples) in Denmark and newly registered partners (individuals) in Sweden, 1995-2009 ..... 48

Table A – 7: Acceptance of the authorization of child adoption by homosexual couples throughout Europe, 2004 ..... 49

## I Introduction

In the recent past, public debates about the role of the family in modern societies have loomed large within the countries of the European Union. Indeed, family structures and family forms have changed considerably throughout Europe since the 1960s and 1970s. Most prominently, the overall *size* of families has declined, following a general decrease in total fertility levels across virtually every European nation. Partly connected to this trend, the *structure* of families in Europe has changed. Recent studies point to the fact that the idea of one standard “nuclear family model” more and more is becoming replaced by a variety of different alternative family forms and lifestyles (Kapella et al. 2009).

However, despite the existence of some general trends across Europe, changes in family structures and family forms have taken place at very different magnitudes and with a notable cross-national variation in “outcomes”. It thus may still be oversimplifying to speak about the European family ‘as such’. Instead, research appears to indicate that we are still observing a large variety of different, nationally or regionally specific patterns, often strongly connected to different cultural backgrounds or family policy models (see the respective report of Existential Field 3).

Against this background, the report at hand intends to give a brief and concise overview of major developments in family forms and structures throughout recent decades for the presently 27 countries of the European Union. In doing so, the report considers three different topical areas: It starts by reviewing the development in fertility and related demographic processes. Subsequently, it turns to an overview of major changes in the structure of European families by considering the major changes in family types that have occurred throughout recent decades, specifically in the development of institutionalized family relationships, i.e. union formation and dissolution (chapter IV). While until now, family research initially largely has concentrated on these major processes, more recently attention has shifted towards newly emerging family forms, such as foster and adoptive families or multi-generational households. Even though data about these new family forms oftentimes appear to be rather scarce, chapter V summarizes major trends in their development.

## II Methodological approach

Conducting research on families oftentimes turns out to be a difficult endeavor, especially if undertaken on an international scale. First of all, family life and related processes make up a rather intimate sphere of life which is only to a limited extent accessible to either social survey research or administrative data collection. At many times, data restriction laws legitimately protect the integrity of the family, but at the same time make it difficult to arrive at a representative overview of relevant family forms and processes. In comparative family research, the mere *number* of available indicators thus often is inherently restricted.

Furthermore, most survey and administrative analyses, largely focus on the household as the main statistical unit. More differentiated family relationships, e.g. those in commuter families, patchwork families or those families where the different generations live separate from each other, are often difficult to grasp. Only very few surveys specifically focus on the family unit, but often are not repeated at regular intervals and thus are inadequate to establish meaningful time series. Family relationships that go beyond the mere household unit thus oftentimes remain a “blind spot” in contemporary family research in Europe.

However, even if indicators are available, *cross-national comparability* of data on families frequently proves to be a problem due to the frequent need to employ data from different statistical sources. Administrative data initially often originates from various nation-specific statistical offices that frequently differ in the definition of central terms and concepts due to the application of different “statistical traditions” in data gathering and collection (Desrosières 1996). Survey research, e.g. through direct interview with respondents on a representative scale, occasionally represents a methodological alternative to overcome these restrictions of administrative data, but this form of data collection again is inherently faced with own problems, such as desired response behavior or difficulties in access to specific target groups.

Even if on an international scale, data are available using similar or cross-nationally comparable concepts, their *availability* oftentimes differs significantly between countries as well as time periods. This problem is especially pronounced for the countries of the former ‘Eastern bloc’ where data are not or only scarcely available for the time period before the system transformation in the 1990s.

In order to cope with the above mentioned problems, this report largely concentrates on cross-nationally comparative data sources provided by supra-national statistical organizations such as the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). In doing so, we aim to achieve a possibly high cross-national comparability of the data used in this report. While the majority of our analysis thus draws back to available secondary data from large-scale data sources, we occasionally supplement these data with own analyses of the UN’s Gender and Generation Survey (GGS), a most recent study conducted in a number of different European countries around 2006, that offers a previously unknown richness of data on family relations. In order to cope with the fact that even when using these two data sources, there will remain “lacks” in the available data, we occasionally draw back to evidence from either topically related research projects, partly financed by the European Union, or from country-specific case studies.



All in all, within our report, we aim to provide data for the universe of all 27 EU countries, wherever data availability allows for it. Given the broad range of topics, however, a detailed overview of developments in every single country would most likely go beyond the scope of a synthesis report of major trends. For illustrative reasons, we thus often discuss the development of trends in different country groups following established cross-national classifications (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990), differentiating between Northern European, Southern European, Central European, Anglo-Saxon/liberal and Eastern European/post-socialist countries. Even though this classification of countries may reflect a 'simplification' or reduction of complexity, it oftentimes makes up a good perspective to identify regional patterns within Europe. In order to account for the naturally still existing within-group heterogeneity, we supplement this general overview by country-specific evidence where applicable. The interested reader may find more detailed information on a country-specific level in the statistical annex to this report.


Finally, concerning the time frame, wherever data allows for it, we try to focus on developments since the 1960s and 1970s. Especially demographic processes have proven to be highly inertial in the short run, and thus providing reasonable arguments for a long-term perspective on trends and developments across larger time spans.

### III Fertility and demographical development

#### 3.1 Postponement of first childbirth

To start with, we shall focus on changes in fertility processes and related demographic developments, especially the timing of family formation and childbirth. The timing of family formation varies considerably between European countries. The medium age of women when giving their first birth is lowest in Eastern Europe with average ages at first childbirth ranging between 24.9 (Bulgaria, 2006) and 26.9 years (Hungary, 2006). In contrast, highest average ages of first childbirth are observed in the UK and Switzerland where the average age of women at first childbirth is 29.8 (UK, 2005) and 29.5 (Switzerland, 2006) respectively. Southern European and German-speaking countries show similarly high ages, while only Portugal with a comparatively early age of 27.4 years appears to deviate from this Southern European pattern.

Figure 3.1: Average age of women at first childbirth, 1970-2005, by country




Source: OECD 2009

A look at the development of average ages over time, i.e. between 1970 and 2005 (Figure 3.1), indicates that in all countries, average ages of women at first birth have risen, though at a different speed and on different levels. Increases appear to have been most pronounced in Central European and Scandinavian countries (except Sweden), with increases of up to 5.1 years since the 1970s (Germany). Notably, Eastern European countries partly followed this trend after 1990 with a time-lag, as reflected in substantial increases in the age of women at first childbirth since the mid-1990s. Differences reach from plus 3.3 years (Czech Republic) to 2.0 years (Poland) in the time span from


1995 to 2005. Overall, Ireland shows more modest changes (plus 1.5 years in the time span 1970-2005), which may be partly due to already higher ages of first childbirth in the early 1970s.

Figure 3.2: Average age of women at first childbirth, 1970-2006, by regions



Source: destatis 2009

Figure 3.3: Average age of women at first childbirth, by cohorts and regions



Source: destatis 2009


As Frejka et al. (2008) show, this postponement of births on an individual level in fact has contributed to lower overall fertility rates in Europe (see also section 3.3 for a more elaborate discussion). However it does not necessarily lead to a decline of fertility across a woman's lifetime, because of

the trend of recuperation of births in older ages, especially in Northern and Western Europe, where “an early childbearing pattern – typical of the baby-boom period of the 1950s and 1960s, and retained in Central and Eastern Europe until the mid-1990s - was being replaced by a late pattern, characterized by a pronounced delay of entry into parenthood” (Frejka et al., 2008: 6) until their late 20s and 30s. This extent of recuperation, in turn, has been weak in Eastern European countries, especially among second and third order births (ibid.).

### 3.2 Postponement of first marriage

For many decades, first birth strongly has been related to marital patterns across Europe. In recent years, however, these two processes increasingly have decoupled. Unlike the age pattern for births in Europe, the medium age of first marriage of *women* in Europe (see Figure 3.4) shows a very distinct country-specific pattern in relation to welfare state regimes, with women in the Scandinavian countries displaying the highest average age (Sweden 31.1, Denmark and Finland 29.2), followed by the central European countries (France 28.0 to the Netherlands 28.9), Southern European and liberal countries (Portugal 26.4 to Ireland 27.9). In international comparison, women in Eastern European countries display the comparatively lowest average ages at marriage (Lithuania 24.7 to Hungary 26.3, except Slovenia 27.9).


Figure 3.4: Average age of women at first marriage, 1970-2004, by country



Source: OECD 2009

The pattern in the postponement of first marriages of *men* (Figure 3.5) is not as clear. In fact, as for women, average marriage ages of men have risen, though at somewhat higher age levels, reflecting the well-known age differences between married spouses. However, regarding cross-national differences, the pattern appears to be less clear. Whereas men in Eastern European countries again are the youngest and Sweden and Denmark are the oldest to marry, the pattern in the centre of Europe appears to be more mixed.

Figure 3.5: Average age of men at first marriage, 1970-2003, by country




Source: OECD 2009.

### 3.3 Share of out-of-wedlock births

The trend towards “later marriages” is also reflected in the development of out-of-wedlock births (Figure 3.6): Since the 1970s, their share first started to rise in France and in the Scandinavian countries, with Denmark and Sweden showing most pronounced increases, resulting in rates of 46% and 47%, respectively, already in the 1990s. Since then, the trend has largely flattened out and remained at a largely stable level until 2006. Following the above developments in marriage and first birth ages, the share of out-of-wedlock births started to increase Eastern European countries only after the 1990s<sup>1</sup>. The Central and Southern European countries followed a development somewhat in between: their share of out-of-wedlock births increased steadily since the 1970s reaching a low in Cyprus and Greece with below 10% in 2007 and a high of more than 50% in the Netherlands.

<sup>1</sup>Though these countries generally show a high diversity of the rate of out-of-wedlock births in 2007 (ranging from Slovenia with 50.80 to Poland with 19.46).


Figure 3.6: Share of out-of-wedlock births in European regions, 1970-2006, by regions



Source: Eurostat 2009

Notably, nowadays, those countries with a high incidence of out-of-wedlock births, i.e. those where the relationship between marriage and childbirth has weakened most, are those countries with the highest fertility levels. The postponement (or even foregoing) of marriage thus cannot be seen as a major driver of declining fertility in modern European societies. Indeed, it is the countries of Southern Europe, where the incidence of out-of-wedlock children is among the lowest in Europe, that simultaneously display the lowest level of fertility (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7: Share of out-of-wedlock births and total fertility rates, 2005




Source: OECD 2009

### 3.4 Trends in Fertility

The above analyses already have referred - either implicitly or explicitly – to general trends in the development of fertility levels over time. Figure 3.8 explicitly outlines these trends by showing the period-specific fertility rate<sup>2</sup> for the time period from the mid-1960s until recent years, ordered by the above-mentioned country clusters. It impressively demonstrates that over time, fertility rates have declined from values of two to three children per woman to less than two children in all of the country groupings. These developments have been most pronounced in Northern and Central Europe where fertility fell from around three children per woman in 1965 to less than 1.8 in the mid-1990s. Southern European countries appeared to follow this general trend with a ten-year time-lag and most pronounced falls of fertility levels in the 1980s and 1990s. In Eastern Europe, fertility levels started to decline only after the transition from state socialism to market economies in the early- resp. mid-1990s. In both latter country groups, recent declines have resulted in very low fertility levels of less than 1.2 children per woman, that have made demographers describe these countries as displaying “lowest-low fertility” (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2006). In recent years, the trend in fertility levels largely has “flattened” with only marginal changes since the 1990s. Some most recent research even points to partial recovery in period fertility levels since the turn of the century, especially in Northern and Central Europe (especially France and the Netherlands).

Figure 3.8: Total (period-specific) fertility rate in European countries, 1965-2007, by region




Source: Eurostat 2009

<sup>2</sup> Defined as the average number of children that would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age (CIA World Factbook 2010).

Regarding long-term fertility developments, the period-specific fertility rates presented above may, however, be partially misleading. While women in European societies indeed are increasingly postponing family formation and the birth of their first child to ever later ages (see above), it could, in principle, be assumed that women nonetheless are not generally reducing their overall lifetime fertility, but simply are shifting their “family phase” to later stages in their life course. Following this line of argument, women would then tend to have their desired number of children, but at later ages and in shorter successions between the single births. In order to account for this “tempo” effect, it appears sensible to look at “cohort-specific fertility rates” instead. In contrast to period-specific fertility rates – which are based on the fertility behaviour of women at one specific point in time – cohort-specific fertility rates look at how many children women of a specific birth cohort have had throughout their previous life-span up to the date of the respective survey or interview on which the figures are based. If one only considers cohort-specific rates of women that already have surpassed their fecundity (i.e. are that are around 45 years or older at the time of the survey), one thus arrives at an approximation of fertility behaviour of women over their entire life course.

Figure 3.9: Total (cohort-specific) fertility rate in European countries, 1965-2007, by region



Source: OECD 2009


Figure 3.9 thus presents the cohort-specific fertility rates of women born between 1930 and 1971 up to the present date. Especially women born 1965 or earlier nowadays can be considered as having concluded their “fertility cycle” so that their current number of children reflects the “final” number attained. In contrast, women born later may still be expected to increase their overall number of children through later births.

Considering cohort-specific fertility rates, the decline in overall fertility levels appears to be somewhat less pronounced than for period-specific fertility rates. Even though there is a decline in overall fertility levels over time, part of this process thus obviously appears to be compensated by a



postponement (rather than a foregoing) of births. Furthermore, cross-country differences appear to be less pronounced than for period-specific rates: in Northern and Central Europe, decreases mainly took place in the birth cohorts between 1930 and 1950 when average birth rates declined from 2.4 respectively 2.6 children (1930) to around two children in the 1960s. While in Northern Europe, the pattern thereafter remained at about 2.1 children, in central and Southern Europe fertility rates continued to decrease. Until now, declines in cohort fertility in Eastern Europe appear to be rather modest, falling from average values of 2.4 for the youngest birth cohort to around 1.8 for those born in the mid-1960s. However, it needs to be awaited how the fertility behaviour of younger cohorts who increasingly have postponed their family formation will develop. In this respect, the crucial determinant of future fertility levels in Eastern Europe thus will be in how far current postponement effects in childbearing are compensated for by recuperation of delayed births in later ages (Frejka et al. 2008).

Figure 3.10: Individual estimates of the ideal number of children in general ('ideal') and for the respondent ('personal'), 2006



Source: Eurobarometer 2006, own calculations

A possible indicator of future fertility trends respectively birth at later ages are childbearing preferences, as reflected in the individually perceived ideal number of children in a family, respectively the individual intention to have (further) children in the future. In recent years, various Europe-wide social surveys such as the European Value Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS) or the Eurobarometer have used questions to reconstruct these individual preferences. The figure below, based on a Eurobarometer survey in 2006, gives an exemplary overview of childbearing

preferences by representing the average number of children that women generally perceive as an ideal and those that they individually would favour.

As Figure 3.10 shows, in virtually any of the European countries under study, both the ideal as well as the personally favoured number of children exceeds an average of two children; in a number of Scandinavian and Southern European countries, it even ranks between 2.5 and 3 children per woman. In most European countries, fertility intentions thus appear to clearly outnumber actually realised fertility figure; a finding that recent sociological research (e.g. Blossfeld et al. 2005) oftentimes has interpreted as reflecting the personally perceived inability to start a family, e.g. due to rising individual uncertainties, despite generally high fertility aspirations. Alternative explanations have strengthened the role of a general value change towards more “postmaterial values” such as self-fulfilment, which have contributed to a decline in the importance of more “collectivist” family values (Inglehart 1990, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986). In contrast, the traditional view that low fertility trends are an outcome of increased female labour force can be dismissed since the relationship between employment and fertility has turned in the 1990s, i.e. nowadays it is those countries with a high share of employed women that simultaneously display highest fertility rates. It is thus not employment as such but the way in which the reconciliation between work and family is facilitated that drive women’s childbearing considerations (D’addio and D’Ercole 2005).

Notably, Austria and (especially Eastern) Germany deviate from the above pattern of childbearing preferences in as far as in these countries, also fertility aspirations nowadays are low. Expert demographers (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2006) have interpreted this finding as a result of a looming societal “diffusion” of low fertility levels. Following this line of argument, the comparatively long affectedness of these countries by low fertility levels since the early 1980s has led to the fact that low fertility levels nowadays are increasingly perceived a “normal” and thus are more and more also reflected in respective fertility aspirations. Given this increasing correspondence between fertility patterns and aspirations, it may become more and more difficult to reverse the current “low fertility trend” in these countries.

### **3.5 Summary**

Considering existing research, available knowledge on fertility and its demographic framework conditions has been rather extensive in terms of both, the availability of indicators as well as the countries and time span covered. Available data points to considerable shifts in demographic behaviour throughout recent decades. Taken together, the decision for both marriage and family formation has shifted to ever later ages in virtually every European country. Furthermore, data appear to indicate that especially in Northern Europe, marriage and family formation increasingly have become decoupled, as an increasing share of children is born out-of-wedlock. Nonetheless, as will be shown later (see chapter 4), non-marital unions often only make up a transitional phase, i.e. oftentimes couples tend to “institutionalize” their relationship by later marriages.

Due to the increasing postponement of family decisions, period-specific fertility rates in all European countries have declined throughout the last decades, in some countries even at a rather dramatic pace. Cohort-specific fertility rates appear to indicate that the postponement of having children at younger ages could be partially compensated by “recuperation” behaviour in later ages. Given the fact, that reliable data on cohort-specific fertility are available only up to the birth cohort 1965,

however, it appears to be too early to judge whether this recuperation effect will 'balance out' fertility rates in the long run, thus making the decline in overall fertility rates less dramatic.

Attitudinal data indeed suggests that European couples still intend to have at least two children or more. The future challenge in many European societies thus will be to enable parents to fulfil their fertility aspirations, e.g. through well-designed family policy packages. At the same time, however, data on Austria and Germany that suggest that lower fertility aspirations are increasingly diffusing within society may signal that there will only remain limited time for such measures.

# IV Development and change of family types

## Introduction


In virtually all European countries, family types in recent decades have become more diverse, and the incidence of the so called “middle-class nuclear family” (i.e. a household with married parents and the biological children of both spouses) has been decreasing. Especially in Northern- and Western European countries , the recent decline of the “golden age of marriage” with its high fertility and marriage rates, low divorce rates and an early start of family formation (Peuckert 2008: 341), was accompanied by an increase in less institutionalized relationships. This trend largely was driven by (i) an overall decrease and/or postponement of marriage, (ii) an increasing number of divorces, (iii) declining fertility and the postponement of family formation, as well as (iv) a rising number of children born outside marriages.

### 4.1 Developments in marriages and divorces

#### 4.1.1 Decreasing marriage rates

As Figure 4.1 below shows, since the mid-1960s, marriage rates (i.e. the number of marriages per 1000 people of the population) in Europe<sup>3</sup> have been declining and only recently have stabilized. While the marriage was at 7.64 marriages per 1.000 persons in 1965, it has fallen to as low as 4.87<sup>4</sup> in 2007 (Eurostat 2010).

Figure 4.1: Development of the marriage-rate in the EU-27, 1965-2005




Source: Eurostat 2010

<sup>3</sup>EU-27

<sup>4</sup>Figure is estimated.

Figure 4.2: Marriage per 1000 persons in the EU-27 countries, 2008



Source: Eurostat 2010  
 (p) provisional figure; \* Data from 2007

When comparing European nations (Figure 4.2), especially a number *Northern-European* countries nowadays display high marriage rates (e.g. Denmark with 6.81 in 2008), following modest increases since 2003. Although *Eastern European* countries often share a similar background regarding their past political development, they are rather heterogeneous with regards to marriage patterns: Some *post-socialist countries* like Romania, Latvia or Poland have a similar or even higher marriage rate (e.g. Latvia with a rate of 7.17 in 2008). In sharp contrast, some other Eastern European countries like Hungary, Slovenia or Bulgaria show by far the lowest marriage-rates in European comparison (e.g. Slovenia with 3.13<sup>5</sup> in 2008) (Eurostat 2010). One major reason behind this heterogeneity might be that in some Eastern European countries the influence of the Catholic respectively Orthodox Church is still significant, e.g. in Poland or Rumania. Since these religions advocate a closeness to a more traditional family model, it is not surprising that in comparison their citizens show the highest marriage rates within Eastern Europe. Despite this heterogeneity, marriage rates have declined strongly between 1990 and 1992 in all Eastern European countries (as well as in the Eastern part of Germany; see Eurostat 2010), most likely a repercussion of both rising insecurities following the break-down of the socialist regime, but also the discontinuation of political support for the “nuclear family” model (see Peuckert 2008: 358). Since the early 1990s, in many Eastern European countries marriage rates have continued to decline. Only in Rumania, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania rates have started to rise again since the beginning/ middle of the new century (see Eurostat 2010). In most *Central-European* countries marriage rates have been falling already since the early 1960s or lately 1970s and are now slightly below the European average (ibid.). In most *Southern European* countries


<sup>5</sup> Figure is estimated.

marriage rates also have fallen continuously and now are either well below the European mean (e.g. Italy, Spain or Portugal), or on a somewhat higher level.

#### 4.1.2 Increasing divorce rate


While marriage rates have decreased in Europe, divorce rates have been constantly on the rise, when they more than doubled from 0.8 (divorces per 1000 persons) in 1965 to 2.0 in 2005<sup>6</sup> (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Development of divorce-rate in the EU-27, 1965-2005



Source: Eurostat 2010

Figure 4.4: Divorce-rate in the EU-27 countries, 2008



Source: Eurostat 2010

(p) provisional figure; \* Data from 2007; \*\* data from 2006


<sup>6</sup>No actual data available.

Highest rates can be observed in Lithuania (3.1), the Czech Republic (3.0), Belgium (2.8<sup>7</sup>), Denmark and Latvia (each 2.7; see Figure 4.4). In Germany, Sweden and Slovakia, rates are rather moderate (each 2.3), whereas in Greece (1.2 in 2007), Italy (0.9<sup>8</sup>) and Ireland (0.8 in 2007), divorce rates are very low (Eurostat 2010). Taken together, there appear to be only little regional differences. The most obvious pattern is that lowest rates are observed in countries with a high importance of catholic denomination.

4.1.3 Increasing re-marriage rate

As divorce rates have risen, the relative incidence of re-marriages has been on the rise. According to Kiernan (2003) “men are (...) more likely than women to remarry and are also more likely to remarry more quickly after a divorce”. In nearly all European countries, the percentage of first-matrimonies as a share of marriages in total decreased while the share of re-marriages, explicitly of divorced individuals, increased through 1960 and 2006<sup>9</sup>. In contrast, the re-marriage of widowed persons hardly has changed over time. Cross-national comparisons between the countries (see Fig. 4.5) show, that the *Eastern-European* countries had the lowest increase in re-marriages. Here changes over time only account for about maximal 5 percent points<sup>10</sup>. In contrast, the *Northern European* states show increases of about 10 percent points. Central-European countries are more heterogeneous: Whereas Belgium, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg display a high increase of re-marriages, Germany and France show very little differences over time. *Southern countries* (except Portugal with a moderate increase) as well as Ireland show very low respectively no differences (Eurostat 2010; own calculations).

Figure 4.5: Share of re-marriages of divorcés as the percentage of all marriages in European countries, 1960 and 2006<sup>11</sup>



Source: Eurostat 2010, own calculations

<sup>7</sup>Figure is estimated.

<sup>8</sup>Figure is estimated.

<sup>9</sup> There is not an overall availability of data for these two points of time. Most post-socialistic countries just offer data since 1995 or later.

<sup>10</sup> Not taking into account, that the data rows are just available since the middle of the 1990s.

<sup>11</sup> Instead of 1960, the reference time is for Germany 1990, for France 1994, for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Rumania 1995, for Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 1996; Instead of 2006 the reference time is 2002 for the United Kingdom, 2004 in Belgium and 2005 for Ireland and Italy.


## 4.2 The development of institutionalized family relationships

### 4.2.1 The decrease of the “middle class nuclear family”

The previously described development (decreasing marriages and increasing divorces; see 3.1) may be summarized as a ‘decrease of the “middle class nuclear family”’, i.e. a decline in institutionalized family relationships such as marriages and a model of “living together till the death will do them apart”. Another major indicator of this trend is the increased share of ‘out-of-wedlock-births’, i.e. births outside marriage (see 3.3). This trend signals that over time, marriage has lost its central role as a precondition for family formation (see Kiermann 2004).

Another potential indicator for the development of the “nuclear family model” is the percentage of households with children resp. of people living in family-household and their development over the time respectively. Unfortunately, however, comparable data is available only since 2005. Based on this data, the percentage of people living in family-households and of households with children declined slightly in the last few years across all European countries (see Eurostat 2010). This trend was mainly caused by the decreasing number families with three or more children (see Spèder 2005).

Figure 4.6: Share of number of children in European family households (2008)



Source: Eurostat 2010

In this context figure 4.6 shows the distribution of the number of children in European family households<sup>12</sup>. As can be seen, the percentage of families with three or more children is low nowadays as compared to those with one child respectively two children. In the EU-27 as a whole there are about 13% of families with three or more, 39% with two children and 48% with just one child. Cross-national comparison shows no consistent regional differences, except for a high share of


<sup>12</sup> Though these numbers do not represent the final number of children in a family, they show a valid cross-section.



families with three or more children in Southern Europe (e.g. Portugal and Italy with 8%, Spain with 9%) and a comparatively low share of families with many children in Eastern European countries (e.g. Bulgaria with 4%, Lithuania with 9%, Czech Republic and Latvia with 10%). The proportion of families with many children is the highest in Ireland wither it makes up about 26% of all families, followed by Cyprus with about 21% and Finland with 20% (Eurostat 2010).

The move away from large families is also reflected in the development of the mean number of household-members. In Europe<sup>13</sup>, this figure declined from 2.8 persons per household in 1981 (Engstler/Menning 2003: 58f.) to 2.4 in 2008 (Eurostat 2010), but seemed to become largely stable since 2000. Decreases were most pronounced in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, where this figure was initially very high. Nevertheless, these countries today still<sup>14</sup> show the highest averages in European comparison with about 2.7 respectably 2.8 persons per household. In contrast, Sweden (2.0; data from 2000), Germany (2.1), Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands (each 2.2) show the lowest mean numbers, even though decreases in these countries have been rather moderate (ibid).

Figure 4.7: Share of family-types in the EU-27 countries<sup>15</sup>, 2007



Source: Labor Force Survey microdata 2007, ifb-calculations (unweighted data)

However, despite the developments outlined above, which indicate a move away from rather traditional family structures, the “nuclear-family-model” with married parents is still clearly dominant in all European regions (see Fig. 4.7). In this context, Peuckert (2008) differentiates three regional types with relative homogenous characteristics: the *Northern European* countries, where non-traditional styles of living (see below respectively chapter V) are more widespread; the *Western*

<sup>13</sup> EU-15

<sup>14</sup> In 2008

<sup>15</sup> For Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Malta and Sweden there was no data available. So the figure for the EU-27 depends on the other available countries.

*European* states with a dominance of the “modern nuclear-family-model” (even though it is decreasing); and the *Southern* states including Ireland, which are still mostly traditionally oriented (ibid; p. 368). As mentioned above, the *Eastern European* countries are more heterogeneous regarding the dominance of a specific family type, but in general seem to loose their inclination towards the traditional model.

#### 4.2.2 Increase of other types of family life

The described decline in institutionalized relationships goes along with an increase in other, previously less widespread forms of family life, such as lone-parenthood, step-families and cohabiting families.

##### 4.2.2.1 Lone-parents


Lone-parent families are households where “one parent lives with his/her children but without any partner. The household can however include other adults living in the same dwelling (for example, the parents of a sole mother)” (OECD 2009: 1). During the dominance of the “nuclear-family-model”, lone-parenthood often only resulted from the death of one partner, most often the husbands’. However, as a consequence of the recent decline in marriages and the rise of divorces, today there is a comparatively high percentage of unmarried as well as divorced (or separated) single-parents (mainly mothers) who live alone with their children (European Commission 2007: 13). Since the 1980s, the share of lone-parents rose from 10% to 27% in 1999 in the EU-15 and was at about 21% in 2008 in the EU-27.<sup>16</sup>

*Figure 4.8: Share of lone-parents on all family-households in the EU-27 countries<sup>17</sup>, 2007*

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<sup>16</sup> The above time series, however, need to be treated with care as data as data availability is scarce. Furthermore, occasional evidence points to substantial variations in data on lone parenthood between different data sources.

<sup>17</sup> For Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Malta and Sweden there was no data available. So the figure for the EU-27 depends on the other available countries.



Source: Labor Force Survey microdata 2007, ifb-calculations (unweighted data)

As shown in the figure above, high shares of lone-parents actually<sup>18</sup> are found a in the UK (30%), the Central European countries (like Belgium; 29%) or in Eastern European countries like Estonia (23%), Lithuania (24%) or Latvia (35%). Again, very low rates can be observed in Southern-Europe (e.g. in Cyprus (14%) or Greece (15%)), but also in Luxembourg (13%) (Rost 2009: 13).

Considering the composition of lone-parent families, especially Southern European countries show a very high share of divorced *mothers and widowed women*. In contrast, there are only few lone-parents who are unwed. In the Middle or Western European countries, e.g. France, Germany or the Netherlands there is a dominance of *divorced lone-mothers* and a moderate share of single unmarried ones. The highest proportion of this group can be observed in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and in East-Germany (European Commission 2007: 18f.)

#### 4.2.2.2 Stepfamilies

Another important issue with regard to the rising diversity of family forms is the increase in step-families. Most recent literature distinguishes several different types (see Peuckert 2008, Steinbach 2008):

- *simple step-families* with children from just one side (most common in this case is the “stepfather-family”)
- *complex step-families* with children from both sides or even with shared children
- *multi-fragmented families* with more diffuse family formations by multiple divorces and/or deaths of one parent.

<sup>18</sup>Data from 2007.

Complex step-families as well as multi-fragmented ones are both “patchwork-families” which include families with children from at least both spouses (see 5.5).

As comparative data show, it is less the sheer occurrence of step-families and lone-parent- families, but rather the substantial increase of their proportion over time that is new. Comparing the different countries available<sup>19</sup> in the Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) 2005, Germany nowadays displays the comparatively highest percentage of step-families with about 14%. On the other end, Bulgaria and the Netherlands have the lowest rates with about 4%. France takes an intermediate position with 8% (own calculations).

Notably, step-families play an important role in the context of fertility<sup>20</sup>: Oftentimes, they are more likely to have additional children, because, on the one hand, they mostly have the intention of building up an own family identity (“union commitment effect”) and, on the other hand, the motivation of the child-less partner to fulfill (mostly) his or her child-wish is rather high. This so-called “parenthood effect” positively affects the probability of having shared children (Prskawetz et. al 2003: 108). The magnitude of the effect varies depending on the number of children both spouses previously have had: Especially the number of children who are brought into the relationship is crucial, with the effect of stepchildren negatively affecting the likelihood of further shared children by itself (see Thomson 2004). Furthermore, women who bring their own biological children into the new relationship generally are more willing to have another shared child as compared to men.

#### 4.2.2.3 Cohabiting families

Like for the family forms discussed above, the percentage of cohabitation families also has risen over the time. Generally, cohabiting couples with children are most common in North Europe and in France, while they are again very rare in South Europe (see Kiernan 2004).

Notably, cohabitation often makes up a “preliminary” form of partnership before getting married, quasi as a pre-marriage form. This indicates that on the whole, getting or being married is still very important for most Europeans (see Kiernan 2003, Spéder 2005). Thus, of the number of (long-term) cohabiting couples with children is still low (as most couples enter into marriage until the child is three years old), but their number recently has been increasing. In most Northern and Western European countries (except West-Germany and the Benelux countries) more than 40% of cohabiting couples already have children<sup>21</sup>. The percentage of first-born children of cohabiting parents is much higher than for second- or later-born children, though if cohabiting mothers have their first child very early, the chance for the second one within a consensual union is higher.

### 4.3 Summary

The development and change of family types in recent decades, especially the *decline in institutionalized relationships*, such as the so called “middle class nuclear family” and the *increase of*

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<sup>19</sup>Bulgaria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Hungary, as well as Georgia and Russia which were both not recognized in this context, because they do not belong to the EU.

<sup>20</sup>That’s why most publications handle with this context and explicit data is rather rare.

<sup>21</sup>Under 15 years.

*other types of family forms*, is generally connected with *the decline in marriage rate*, on the one hand, and the *increase of the divorce rate* on the other.

Since the 1960s, the *marriage rate* in Europe has *declined* and only recently seems to have stabilized since the beginning of the new century. Considering the actual specific country rates, the Northern-European states show the highest marriage rates, whereas the Southern and some Eastern-European countries show the lowest rates. On the other hand, *divorce rates* have been *constantly rising* through the last decades and more than doubled in Europe as a whole. There are no homogeneous regional differences except for low rates in South-Europe and Ireland. As a consequence of the high divorce rate, one can also observe an *increase of re-marriages* among divorced persons.

These trends are inherently connected with a *decrease in institutionalized partnerships and families*. The *rising share out-of-wedlock-births*, suggests a declining importance of being married for family formation. In the Northern states, these rates already are considerably high with a share of over 40%, but some Eastern European countries even show higher percentages of more than 50%. In contrast, Southern European states have the lowest share of out-of-wedlock-births. As the *number of households with children has decreased* in the last decades, the *number of household with three or more children also has fallen* and the *average number of persons in a household has declined*. In the EU-15 this figure is now at 2.4, whereas it was about 2.8 at the beginning of the 1980s.

Taken together, the described developments indicate that despite its ongoing dominance, the “modern nuclear family” has declined and become supplemented by a *higher variation of other family types*, such as lone-parents, step-families and cohabiting families.

The *rising number of lone-parent-families* (which are mostly lone-mothers with their children) follows the development in marriage and divorce rates. From 1980 to 1999 the percentage of this family form rose from 10% to 27% in the EU-15 and was about 21% in the EU-27 (2008). Similarly, the *higher number of step-families* can be regarded as a consequence of rising divorce rates.

Finally, although the *number of cohabiting families* (with children in the household) is still relatively *low*, it has *increased* as well. The rates of this style of living is more common in the Northern European states and in France, but extremely low in the Southern countries. However, cohabitation often makes up only a “transitional form” before getting married. Being married thus is still important for most Europeans.

Although institutionalized relationships, such as the “modern nuclear family” still make up the dominant style of living among households with children in Europe, it could be shown that the representations of the term ‘family’ are more and more getting multifaceted. For future research, it thus will be important to continuously observe the development of the afore mentioned types, which are becoming more and more common.

## V New and rare family types

### *Introduction*

This chapter focuses on new and rare family types. A major commonality of the types presented in the following lies in the fact, that their data bases can be considered as rather fragmentary. Especially cross-national comparative data for all EU-members oftentimes is very incomplete. Hence, the following descriptions are largely based on country-specific data or comparative studies, which include only singular European countries. Given the sparse data basis, we concentrate on foster and adoptive families, multi-generation households, so called 'rainbow families', families without a common household and patchwork families. Naturally, this list of selected subjects cannot be considered as complete, but should rather be interpreted as a first step towards the state of the art within the field of new and rare family type research.

### **5.1 Foster and adoptive families**

Foster and adoption constitute two different types of families in which a child is not living in its family of origin. *Foster families*, refer to a situation in which a child is placed in the temporary care of another than its own family. Most of the time, this is the result of problems or challenges that are taking place within the birth family, before adoption or while critical elements of an adoption are being completed. For the period the child is placed in the family, the foster parents can receive nursing allowance. In contrast, from the moment onwards at which a couple adopts a child, this child is legally considered as the biological child of the couple for life.

The term '*adoption family*' comprises three different forms of families. First, children can be adopted by parents who are not related to the child. Another possibility for adoption is the adoption by relatives, where the parents and the adoptive parents are related to each other. Finally the term stands for adoption by stepparents, where the new partner of the biological parent decides to adopt the child (Peuckert, 2008: 221). Taken together, adoption thus constitutes a kinsmanlike relationship, whereas a child in foster families mainly remains under the guardianship of the biological parents or the youth welfare office (Textor 1993: 147).

Data for the description of adoption and foster families is scarce. Only the Gender and Generation Survey of the UN provides data on adoption and foster families, but until now only for a small sample of European countries. Furthermore, the different forms of adoption outlined above cannot be differentiated on this GGP database.

Table 5.1: Percentage of adoption and foster families on households with children, 2005

	Bulgaria	Germany	France	Netherlands	Hungary
<b>Adoption families</b>	0.5% (N=33)	0.4% (N=17)	0.9% (N=34)	1.0% (N=30)	0.4% (N=24)
<b>Foster families</b>	0.2% (N=16)	0.5% (N=19)	0.3% (N=10)	0.2% (N=6)	-

Source: United Nations 2005

Table 5.1 summarizes the overall incidence of adoption and foster families for the countries for which GGP data is available. As table 5.1 shows, adoption and foster families do not amount for more than 1% of all households with children. Since the percentages of adoption and foster families are quite similar, it seems that fosterage is considered as a serious alternative to adoption.

Existing research on foster and adoptive families that goes beyond an investigation of their mere incidence until now has concentrated on two levels, the institutional and the individual level.

The *institutional research* about foster families mainly focuses on the effects of changes in residential care on the incidence of foster care. In 1994, Colton and Hellinckx presented a first cross national study about general trends in Europe including data from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Their main findings conclude that the observable decrease in the number of residential provisions for children goes along with increasing number of places in foster care. The authors also observe a movement from large-scale residential institutions towards small-scale and individualized institutions situated next to children's home localities (Colton/Hellinckx: 1994). Even though these study results show a first cross country approach, Colton and Hellinckx still emphasize the academic void in this area and claim for further research (Colton et al.: 2006).

On the *individual level*, research largely has concentrated on how the (former) parents and the children experience the adoption and foster process and how (successfully) the new family is constituted. As already mentioned, most of the data are based on national studies<sup>22</sup>, and cross-national research about adoption families is very rare. Research projects are rather focused on the impact of adoption on family policy than on the family itself<sup>23</sup>.

Taken together, the research about adoption and foster families in Europe is far from being comprehensive, especially with regard to comparative studies.

<sup>22</sup> e.g. the Italian National Institute of Statistics presented in 2003 a short report on the socio-demographic characters of couples which asked for adoption (ISTAT 2005). Also Colton and his colleagues focused on the recruitment and retention of family foster-carers in an international and cross-cultural study (Colton et al: 2006).

<sup>23</sup> F.i. Parkes (2006): Celtic Fosterage: Adoptive Kinship and Clientage in Northwest Europe; Garrett/ Sinkkonen (2003): Putting Children first? A comparison of child adoption policy and practice in Britain and Finland; Ruggiero/Johnson (2009): Implications of Recent Research on Eastern European Adoptees for Social Work Practice.

## 5.2 Rainbow families

Rainbow families are defined “by the presence of two or more people who share a same-sex orientation (e.g. a couple) or by the presence of at least one lesbian or gay adult rearing a child” (Allen/ Demo 1995: 113). In the following, we shall focus on rainbow families, where at least one lesbian or gay adult raises a child. There are two main types of rainbow families: those where the child(ren) stem(s) from previous heterosexual relationships and those where the same-sex couples realize the desire for a child via reproductive medicine, adoption or fostering<sup>24</sup> (Wegener 2005: 53 ff.). Exemplary data for Germany indicates that up to now, the first type is most widespread, but in recent years also the second type to parenthood has become more and more frequent (Dürnberger et al. 2009: 15; Jansen 2010).

The legal recognition of same-sex couples shows a high variation between European countries. During the 1980s and 1990, the Nordic countries were forerunners to give same-sex couples the opportunity to legalize their unions. A new legal term, the *registered partnership*, was introduced and first passed in Denmark in 1989. Especially other Nordic countries also introduced this *new civil status* in the subsequent years (Norway in 1993, Sweden in 1995, Iceland in 1996), followed by a number of other European countries in later years<sup>25</sup>. For various reasons, the registered partnership does not assign the same legal rights to same-sex couples as marriage provides for heterosexual partners. Depending on the country, the rights of same-sex registered partners do not include the opportunity to jointly adopt a child, to have medically assisted insemination, defined forms of how to solemnize the partnerships, and requirements of legal residency in the country before entering partnership. Other countries, such as Belgium (2000), Slovenia, the Czech Republic (2006) and Hungary (2009) chose a more property- and inheritance-orientated construction to recognize same-sex couples (Verschraegen 2009: 434). In 1999, the French government chose a unique way and installed PACS (“Pacte civil de solidarité”) as a new social status and possibility for heterosexual as well homosexual cohabitantes<sup>26</sup>.

In 2009, Norway and Sweden completed their process of granting same-sex couples the same rights to marriage as those granted to couples of opposite sex. Norway and Sweden are the only States in Europe where fully gender-neutral marriage legislation is implemented, while other European countries as Italy, Ireland and Poland still have no institution to legally recognize same-sex couples at all (ILGA, 2010). As Banens points out in his recent analyses on trends and prevalence of registered partnerships in twelve European countries, the different European domestic statistics offices show a high variety concerning data collection and publication on registered partnerships and same-sex couples (Banens 2010: 11), which makes cross-country comparisons very difficult due to different sample standards. The following descriptions therefore are mostly based on selected national studies.

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<sup>24</sup> Other research projects differentiate between biological and non-biological parenthood on the one hand and rare forms as adoption and fostering on the other hand (Rupp 2009).


<sup>25</sup> The Netherlands and Spain in 1998, Germany and Portugal in 2001, Finland in 2002, England, Wales and Luxemburg in 2004 and Austria in 2010 (Banens 2010: 10; Biele-Woelki/ Fuchs 2002: 215 ff.; Verschraegen 2009: 433 ff.; Bundeskanzleramt 2009; Festy 2006: 419)

<sup>26</sup> This intermediate status, which is neither a union nor a contract, neither private nor public, expresses also the “French ambiguity of responding to increasing cohabitation” (Martin/ Théry 2001: 135).



In Scandinavia, an increasing feminization of the dynamics of same-sex marriages can be observed. While at the beginning, mainly men entered into the registered partnership, in recent years, women have become more prone than men to enter in both Denmark and Sweden. The following figure gives an exemplary overview of the development of registered partnerships in Sweden. The clear decrease in 2009 is due to the fact that by that time, Sweden decided to open up marriage as a legal institution also for same-sex couples.

Figure 5.1: Newly registered partners in Sweden, 1995-2008, by sex



Source: Statistics Sweden 2010

There also is an increasing prevalence of childbearing and parenthood in Scandinavia among same-sex couples. The means by which same-sex couples realize their childbearing aspirations, such as adoption<sup>27</sup> and the access to reproductive medicine, display a huge variation between countries (Verschraegen 2009: 434). In Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, England and Wales, Scotland, Belgium, Iceland and Finland, same-sex couples have the right to jointly adopt an unknown child while in other countries as Germany same-sex couples are not permitted to jointly adopt a child. In Germany only opposite-sex married couples or a single person can adopt a child<sup>28</sup>. Additionally in Germany, France and Denmark the registered same-sex couples have the right to a so called “stepchild-adoption”, where the (new) partner of the biological parent can “step-adopt” the child, unless the other biological parent is known and agrees to this procedure. In Norway, same-sex couples additionally have access to reproductive medicine (Verschraegen 2009: 434).

<sup>27</sup> The public acceptance of the authorization of child adoption by homosexual couples shows a high variety between different European countries. For further information see Table A-7 and Figure A-1 in the appendix.

<sup>28</sup> Given this legal clause same-sex orientated single persons who run for adoption always compete against opposite-sex couples, which effectively diminish his or her chances to adopt a child. Even in rare cases, where an adoption by a single person is successful, his or her same-sex partner has no possibility to a legally accepted parenthood of the (virtual common) child.

Given the different developments and forms of recognition of same-sex couples in European countries, cross-country data-collection on rainbow-families still can be described as scarce. Existing international research has mainly focused on legal and juridical aspects, such as the recognition process, the legal differences to marriage or the right to adoption (Biele-Woelki/ Fuchs 2002; Verschraegen 2009; Festy 2006). Furthermore, official statistics on rainbow families are based on very small case numbers, so that errors of estimation are very probable. The GGP provides data on rainbow-families only for five European countries: In Bulgaria 0.1% of all families are rainbow families (with children), in Germany and the Netherlands 0.7%, in France 0.5% and in Hungary only 0.02%<sup>29</sup> (United Nations 2005, own calculations).

In Germany, even though registered partnership was introduced in 2001, the microcensus<sup>30</sup> started to collect data on registered same-sex couples only in 2006. According to their data in 2008, there were around 5000 same-sex couples in Germany with children living in the same household<sup>31</sup>. At least 7200 children lived in those 'rainbow families'. However, these data have also to be considered with care, as the sexual orientation was not inquired directly. Living-apart-together couples (see 5.4) or same-sex orientated singles thus cannot be identified, and the same is true for children living in these types of households (see also 4.2.2.1). The available data thus possibly represents an underestimation of same-sex couples with children. However, the advantage of the German data set database is the direct comparability to heterosexual couples in one and the same survey. The comparison shows that in Germany, as compared to heterosexual partnerships, same-sex couples have a higher educational level and most of the couples share domestic and paid work more equally. These trends are also confirmed by the first representative German national study on registered partnerships with children "Children in same-sex partnerships" (Rupp 2009). A further study demonstrates additionally that in Germany most of the rainbow families are composed by same-sex orientated women and their children (Eggen/Rupp 2010).

In Europe, however, comparable data for same-sex couples with children are very rare. Furthermore there is almost no cross-country information about the way same-sex partners plan to have children, which is partly due to the afore mentioned huge cross-country differences in domestic legal conditions for adoption or access to reproductive medicine. While in some countries as Denmark or the Netherlands, lesbian couples can request for donor insemination, in other countries as Germany, only opposite-sex (married) couples have legal access to reproductive medicine (Beatens/ Brewaeyns 2001: 512 ff.). The majority of insemination centers in Belgium offer only insemination with anonymous donors (Beatens et al. 1996), which leads to a potential conflict between the general right of women to have a child and the right of children to know about their original parentage.

In this context, it should also be pointed out, that on both national and cross-national level, data and information of *reproductive families* in general are very scarce. A rare exception is a study by Golombok, Brewaeyns and their colleagues which study development, psychological well-being of children and the functioning in reproductive families in the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and The

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<sup>29</sup> This accords to only one case in Hungary. In all GGP observed countries the cases of rainbow families raise only up to 27 cases (Germany).

<sup>30</sup> The German MIKROZENSUS is an annual survey of 1% of the German population.

<sup>31</sup> From totally 69.600 cohabiting same-sex couples, which still should be interpreted as the minimal level due to underestimation because of refusals.

Netherlands<sup>32</sup>. Their findings underline that in all four countries, parents of children conceived by assisted reproduction interacted more with their child and reported less stress associated with parenting than parents who conceived their child naturally. No group differences were found for either the presence of psychological disorder or for children's perceptions of the quality of family relationships (Golombok et al 2009: 830ff.; Brewaeys et al 1997: 1349 ff.). Furthermore, there are some studies, that argue from a theoretical perspective that the increase of same-sex partnership and parenthood has to be considered as a general trend from the (biological) nuclear family to a "family-of-choice" or "community-family" (Maier 2009: 195 ff.).

Finally, statistical data based on same-sex parenthood has to be described as dissatisfying, owing to a lack of consequent and differentiated data collection<sup>33</sup>. Indeed, rainbow families are still a very rare phenomenon in Europe. Nevertheless, politically, further research on rainbow families and a homogenized cross-national method to collect data about these families is crucial, because there is a lack of information concerning important issues, as the way, how these families are constituted or how multinational same-sex couples and families are (legally) respected in their different countries of origin (Verschraegen 2009: 435)(see also 5.4). In addition, the research on rainbow families also holds a high potential for scientifically understanding families in general because all sex or gender related characteristics of both spouses are initially symmetrical in these families.

### **5.3 Multi-generation households**

Multi-generation households are composed of at least three generations, which are related to each other by parentage or adoption (Peuckert 2008: 300). As for the afore-mentioned family types, the data base on multi-generation households is mostly country-specific and therefore existing data varies in the extent of countries and the time span considered. With regards to generational relations, existing research has focused more on intergenerational support patterns than on multi-generation households. Most of these studies are concentrating on intergenerational transfers of time and money and the existing differences between welfare regimes<sup>34</sup>. Research results point to substantial difference between European countries.

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<sup>32</sup> They focused on in-vitro fertilization and donor insemination in comparison with control groups of families with a naturally conceived child and adoptive families.

<sup>33</sup> Further interesting results on rainbow families in Europe can be expected by a forthcoming book edited by Marina Rupp (Rupp 2010).

<sup>34</sup> E.g. Albertini/Kohli/Vogel (2007): Intergenerational transfers of time and money in European families: common patterns different regimes.; Rossi (2007): Development and Dynamics of the family in the Southern Europe.

*Table 5.2: Persons aged 16+ years which are members of families with more than two generations as a percentage of all persons aged 16+ years old, 1994-2001*

Country	Year							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Austria		14.1	11.3	12	12.1	11	11.4	10.5
Belgium	1.8	1.8	1.9	2	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.1
Germany	2.4	2.8	2.5	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.7
Denmark	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.1	0
Spain	10.3	12.2	13	13.3	13.4	13.7	13.8	13.2
France	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5
Finland			1	1.4	1.7	2	2.5	3
Greece	11	11	10.7	10.5	9.6	10.2	9.7	8.9
Italy	6.5	8.8	7.1	7.4	8	7.8	7.2	6.9
Ireland	5.3	4.7	4.1	4.3	4.2	3.8	4.8	6.3
Luxembourg	6	5.8	6	4.4	4	3.5	3.2	3.1
The Netherlands	0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Portugal	9.2	10.2	10.9	12.3	12.9	12.8	13.1	14
United Kingdom	1.9	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.8	2	2.3

Source: European Community Household Panel (ECHP), UDB - version of December 2003, Germany 1997-2001: SOEP; UK 1997-2001: BHPS; Luxembourg 1997-2001: PSELL

One major finding is that European countries differ primarily in the degree to which the 'nuclearization' of the family has occurred, i.e. the degree to which the elderly live by themselves either as a couple or alone. The European Quality of Life Survey, conducted in 28 European countries in 2003, found that in Italy 25% of all people over 65 still lived in a household with a child while more than 30% did so in Malta and Poland. In Hungary, Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus and Greece, still 20% of the elderly were living in these family arrangements. In contrast, in Denmark, Sweden, France and Germany those households represent only less than 5% (Saraceno et al. 2005: 17 ff.). Kalmijn and Saraceno point out that the presence of children in the household is not per se an indicator of care provided by the adult children (Kalmijn/ Saraceno 2008: 482). On the contrary, adult children may still be living in the parental household in order to receive financial and even caring support from their parents (Rossi 2009: 383 ff.). But undoubtedly, as parents age, the balance at least in care giving may shift within the household (Kalmijn/ Saraceno 2008: 482). Notably, only a small part of multi-generational households is due to the incidence of extended or multiple households, where more than one couple lives under the same roof. This incidence is minimal (around 2%) in 'old EU 15' countries, and only slightly higher in the Central and Southern European countries, where it lies around 10% (Kalmijn/ Saraceno 2008: 482).

Further evidence on the relation between generations is available from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 2004 which, among others, contains data on intergenerational transfers between parents and their children that do not live in the same household. Based on this data set, Brandt and Szydlik show that the level of intergenerational household help differs considerably between European countries, following a north-south gradient (Brandt/ Szydlik 2008: 317): While in the northern countries with well-developed welfare systems help occurs in over one third of the child-parent dyads, this only applies to around 15% of the cases in the Mediterranean countries. However, regarding the intensity of the help given, it can be shown that the relatively few adult children that provide help in the Southern countries spend far more time supporting their parents than in Northern Europe. Brandt and Szydlik thus postulate a “specialisation- thesis”, which predicts specific task-sharing between public services and families. Based on their results, they argue that the more social services alleviate the burden of intensive and regular care supplied by family members, the more adult children provide short-term support for their elderly parents (Brandt/ Szydlik 2008: 301).

Taken together, however, the research about multi-generation households in Europe is far from being extensive. The studies at hand show that the attention focuses much more on intergenerational exchange relations between family members, who don't share a common household. In contrast, there is only little information on multi-generation households and the motives for this way of live on a European-wide level.

#### **5.4 Families without common household: Living apart together and commuter-families**

Research on living apart together partnerships and families is a quite new phenomenon. By definition, a living apart together relationship is a couple which does not live in the same household. These people define themselves as a couple and they perceive that their close surrounding personal network does so as well (Levin 2004: 227 f.).

In accordance to living apart together couples, living apart together families are defined as families with children, where one partner does not live in the same household. This partner can be the biological parent of the child as well as the new partner of one the parent which lives with the child/children.


Data on living apart together couples do not exist on the European level. To some extent, the data of the Gender and Generation Survey provide a first data base to describe this family form, even though it is not possible to differentiate more specific details e.g. how long the partnership lasts or how often the partner is commuting. Furthermore with the GGP it is not possible to identify intermediate forms of living apart families, e.g. commuter families<sup>35</sup>.

Evidence from the GGP data (Figure 5.2) shows that living apart together couples with children still are a rare phenomenon. Their percentage in Europe varies between 1.4% in Bulgaria and Hungary to 4.1% in France.

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<sup>35</sup> Recent research on commuter families follows below.

Figure 5.2: Percentage of living apart together families, 2005



Source: United Nations 2005

Most recently, these data can be supplemented by representative results of the research project “Job Mobilities and Family-Lives in Europe” founded by the European Commission. This survey includes data from six European countries<sup>36</sup> and focuses on the relevance and diversity of job-related spatial Mobility<sup>37</sup> (Schneider/Meil 2008). The study points out that, at one time or another, during the professional career, half or more of the population has been confronted with mobility demands and experienced at least one of the forms of mobility studied (Meil 2008: 305). Meil also proves that the job mobility in Europe differs more among social groups than among countries (Meil 2008: 305ff.).

A number of results from the afore mentioned project appear to shed a critical light on the mobility term. While for a long time mobility was associated with new experiences and a promise of wealth and growth, Ruppenthal and Lück show, that sometimes mobility is the last option to avoid a decline in social status (Ruppenthal/Lück 2009: 5). They thus interpret mobility as a form of precarization, a conclusion shared by Recchi, who shows that only 8,5% of respondent stepped into a higher-rank social class when taking up their first job after migration (Recchi 2008: 218).

Especially commuter families feel the burden of simultaneously organizing private and professional life, as commuting reduces the available time which normally is spent with the family. On the individual level, mobility influences the family planning, constrains the career opportunities of the parents and leads to a retraditionalization of the division of household and care tasks. Further it is complicated to reconcile mobility and parenthood especially for woman (Ruppenthal/ Lück 2009: 4 f.).

While the data base on mobility in Europe in general can be considered as rather extensive and based on several studies<sup>38</sup>, the data on commuter families can only be described as incomplete.

<sup>36</sup> In Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Switzerland

<sup>37</sup> They differentiate various forms of mobility: *Residential mobility* (singular (mainly job-related) relocation) and *recurring mobility*, which follows a regularly rhythm as job-related overnights away from home (Limmer/Schneider 2008: 32)

<sup>38</sup> like the PIONEUR program (European Commission 2006)

Schneider and his colleagues made a first step into the field of the families without common households, which nevertheless has to be broadened.

### 5.5 Patchwork families

Patchwork families are defined as a special form of stepfamilies (see also 4.2.2.2) in which at least two types of children, for example stepchildren and biological children, live together (Nave-Herz 2004: 33). Research on patchwork families in Europe is very rare. Most of the studies entirely focus on stepfamilies and their risk of separation and their probability for having (another) child together depending on whether one or both partners brought children from previous relationships into a new partnership or not. Henz and Thomson show based on calculation on the Fertility and Family Survey in Austria, Finland, France and West-Germany that the “birth risk will be greater if the child is (a) the first in a union, (b) the first biological child for one of the partners, or (c) the second child in a union” (Henz/ Thomson 2004: 3). Beside this, especially cross-national research on patchwork families in Europe is very scarce.

### 5.6 Summary

In this sub-chapter, we presented a first list of the research on new and rare family types in Europe. Owing to the fragmentary data base, we focused on five types: foster and adoptive families, rainbow families, multi-generation households and families without common households. As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, these chosen subjects cannot be considered as an all-encompassing description of all new and rare family types.

The European research on *foster and adoptive families* primarily focuses on institutional and individual consequences of adoption and fosterage, about which cross-national data are very rare. The Gender and Generation Survey of the UN provides data on adoption and foster families, but only for a small sample of European countries.

The research on *rainbow families* in Europe is mainly a reflection of the huge cross-national variation in the legal recognition of same-sex couples and rainbow families. While Scandinavia clearly has played the role of forerunner in the granting of equal rights as compared to heterosexual couples, other countries such as Italy or Ireland do not have any legal recognition of same-sex couples. As a consequence, the quality and quantity of data on rainbow families differs highly between the European countries. Taken together, the information on rainbow families in Europe thus has to be described as fragmentary and further research on this family type is crucially needed.

Similarly, research on *multi-generation households* in Europe is not extensive and the data base is mostly country-specific. Even though many European research projects on intergenerational transfers and support exist, the knowledge about multi-generation households is rather scarce.

*Living apart together and commuter families* are relatively new research subjects in Europe. Whereas the data base on living apart together families in Europe must be considered as fragmentary, Schneider et al. (2009) presented a first cross-country study on mobility. Even though they focus on

mobility in general, they also discuss first aspects on how mobility expectation affects the families in Europe<sup>39</sup>.

Patchwork families constitute another central family form that has been much debated in both political and public discourse. However, especially in this field, data are virtually non-existing in Europe.

This chapter has pointed out that the European research about new and rare family types is rather limited. Next to other causes, this is due to the special characters of these kinds of family types, especially the fact that these new and rare family types cannot be considered as stable phenomena. New and rare family types alternate continuously, which makes further cross-country research more complicated. Nonetheless this first state of research on new and rare family types in Europe clearly points out that broader research is crucially needed.

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<sup>39</sup> Further interesting results on the impact between increasing mobility expectations and families' handling with it can be expected in their forthcoming second study.



## VI Conclusions

The previous analyses have given a concise overview of recent developments in family structures and family forms. Taken together, our results speak in favor of a comparatively high dynamic of family forms within European countries throughout the last decades. The major trends which have been outlined in more detail throughout the preceding chapters can be summarized as follows:

1. In virtually all countries studied there have been major demographic transformations. Most importantly, there has been a considerable postponement of first childbirth and first marriage from ages in the early- and mid-20s up to the late-20s and early 30s. As a major consequence of this postponement of family formation to later ages, overall fertility levels have declined and nowadays lie significantly below the “net reproduction level” of around 2.1 children per women, needed to sustain a stable population size. However, despite this decline in “real fertility”, individual fertility aspirations are still considerably high, suggesting that it is not the missing desire to have children that has caused fertility decline, but rather existing difficulties to either set up a family or to combine family tasks with (often financially needed) individual employment.
2. All in all, the importance of marriage as a “social institution” has declined considerably throughout the recent past. While being married oftentimes was considered as a precondition for family formation in the 1950s, the linkage between marriage and childbirth has weakened considerably in recent years. Throughout the last three to four decades, the marriage rate has declined considerably.
3. At the same time, the institution of marriage has become less stable as indicated by increasing divorce rates and increasing rate of re-marriages.
4. Owing to the above processes, a rising number of children is born out-of-wedlock. Surprisingly, however, it is the countries with highest out-of-wedlock rates that today display highest fertility levels.
5. From a more holistic perspective, one may argue, that over time the incidence of the “middle class nuclear family”, characterized by a model of “living together till the death will do us apart”, has declined. This decline has gone hand in hand with a simultaneous increasing in diversity of types of family life/ increase in new types of family life, such as lone parenthood, step- and patchwork families, cohabiting couples with children, foster families, multi-generation households, commuter families, or “rainbow families”.
6. However, despite this trend, in most European countries, the nuclear family model still makes up the dominant form of family life.

Despite the described uni-directionality of the above trends, the degree to which these transformations have materialized varies considerably between European countries. Opposing cases are represented by the *Scandinavian countries*, on the one hand, where there has been a considerable move away from the “traditional” family model, with late marriages, modest marriage rates and a high proportion of out-of-wedlock births, and the *Southern European countries*, on the other hand, where family patterns still are much in line with the traditional model (i.e. central importance of marriage, low divorce rates, low degrees of out of wedlock-births, little significance of new family forms). Notably, it oftentimes is in those countries with the highest degree of recent “de-standardization” that nowadays still display the highest fertility levels.

When outlining the above developments, we largely have relied on outlining long-term trends. This was driven by the acknowledgement of the high degree of temporal inertia in demographic

processes. Most of the outlined trends thus refer to developments over the last few decades. As most recent data, however, suggest, there may be some signs of a “flattening out” of previously highly dynamic processes, e.g. in the move away from the “traditional” family model or the development in marriage and divorce rates. However, data indicating a “flattening out” is often very recent and it is hard to say whether it can be indicative for a more general future trend. Furthermore, even though for some indicators, there indeed has been a tendency to stabilize in some of the countries analyzed, we assume that in the future, not a full reversal of previous developments will occur. E.g. even if fertility trends would stabilize, there will most likely be no “full return” to ratios above 2.5 children per woman on average. Similarly, even if the trend towards “new family forms” will halt, we would expect that there will likely be no return to a “nuclear family model”.

Finally, our previous discussion has also provided a schematic overview of the existing research in the different fields of interest regarding our topic. Both, data availability and academic interest, have been highest in the area of fertility research where a multitude of data is available (e.g. the Gender and Generation Survey, The Family and Fertility Survey, the Eurobarometer studies etc.) and previous research has focused on a large variety of research questions, both at the national as well as at the international level. In contrast, regarding the development of family forms and structures, research oftentimes has shown difficulties to “keep up the pace” with recent developments. Especially regarding newly emerging family forms, European comparative evidence is either scarce or virtually non-existent. Oftentimes, data availability varies considerably due to different national statistical traditions or different legal preconditions for specific family types. Especially these new family forms make up a major area where future research should concentrate on, not least as they are the most dynamic field of family development in contemporary Europe.

## Appendix

Table A – 1: Development of marriages per 1000 persons in the EU-27, 1950 -2008

	1950	1955	1958	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
EU-27	:	:	:	:	7.64	7.87	7.70	6.76	6.18	6.30	5.89	5.73	5.46	5.32	5.25	5.16	5.15	5.11	5.20	5.18	4.87	4.89	4.85	4.86	4.88	:	4.87	:	
Belgium	8.26	7.77	7.42	7.13	7.03	7.59	7.32	6.73	5.84	6.48	6.07	5.79	5.37	5.14	5.07	4.98	4.69	4.35	4.32	4.40	4.09	3.91	4.03	4.15	4.12	4.25	4.29	4.35	(p)
Bulgaria	:	:	:	8.76	8.03	8.61	8.59	7.87	7.44	6.87	5.66	5.25	4.72	4.49	4.38	4.40	4.18	4.31	4.33	4.30	3.99	3.71	3.92	3.99	4.33	4.26	3.87	3.64	
Czech Republic	:	:	:	7.72	8.36	9.19	9.68	7.60	7.80	8.80	6.98	7.18	6.39	5.66	5.32	5.22	5.61	5.35	5.20	5.39	5.12	5.17	4.79	5.04	5.06	5.15	5.53	5.03	
Denmark	9.10	7.89	7.48	7.84	8.76	7.38	6.28	5.16	5.73	6.13	6.03	6.22	6.10	6.78	6.64	6.83	6.48	6.55	6.66	7.19	6.82	6.92	6.50	6.98	6.67	6.71	6.70	6.81	
Germany	10.90	8.68	9.04	9.46	8.18	7.36	6.72	6.34	6.39	6.50	5.68	5.62	5.45	5.41	5.27	5.22	5.15	5.09	5.25	5.09	4.73	4.75	4.64	4.80	4.71	4.54	4.48	4.59	(p)
Estonia	:	:	:	9.99	8.18	9.08	8.71	8.78	8.41	7.50	6.59	5.79	5.18	5.04	4.88	3.90	3.99	3.92	4.06	4.01	4.14	4.31	4.21	4.45	4.55	5.18	5.23	4.57	
Ireland	5.40	5.64	5.28	5.47	5.89	7.03	6.67	6.39	5.31	5.08	4.93	4.68	4.70	4.63	4.32	4.45	4.25	4.52	4.93	5.04	4.98	5.23	5.08	5.07	5.13	5.13	5.17	:	
Greece	7.53	8.15	:	6.98	9.44	7.67	8.45	6.47	6.41	5.81	6.39	4.69	5.94	5.38	6.02	4.24	5.62	5.12	5.62	4.48	5.21	5.27	5.54	4.64	5.50	5.18	5.48	4.55	(p)
Spain	7.31	7.93	:	7.75	7.12	7.32	7.64	5.89	5.20	5.68	5.60	5.57	5.14	5.08	5.10	4.92	4.96	5.21	5.21	5.38	5.11	5.12	5.05	5.06	4.83	4.61	4.47	:	
France	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	4.41	9.10	4.82	4.87	4.64	4.87	5.03	4.84	4.65	4.56	4.46	4.51	4.34	4.30	4.26	(p)
Italy	:	7.54	7.55	7.72	7.66	7.35	6.74	5.72	5.27	5.64	5.50	5.50	5.32	5.13	5.10	4.90	4.88	4.92	4.93	4.99	4.58	4.65	4.48	4.28	4.23	4.13	4.21	4.12	(p)
Cyprus	:	:	:	:	7.61	8.61	13.08	9.47	12.20	10.86	11.65	9.18	10.77	9.70	10.25	8.71	10.71	11.40	13.22	14.08	15.07	14.48	7.69	7.23	7.76	6.80	7.53	:	
Latvia	:	:	:	11.02	8.84	10.17	9.99	9.80	9.32	8.87	8.43	7.23	5.69	4.59	4.46	3.92	3.98	4.00	3.93	3.88	3.93	4.16	4.30	4.48	5.45	6.39	6.80	5.71	
Lithuania	:	:	:	10.13	8.38	9.53	8.97	9.23	9.65	9.82	9.24	8.14	6.44	6.38	6.10	5.67	5.26	5.21	5.07	4.83	4.53	4.66	4.91	5.57	5.84	6.26	6.83	7.17	
Luxembourg	8.74	8.28	7.65	7.12	6.59	6.36	6.76	5.90	5.35	6.05	6.70	6.41	5.99	5.84	5.08	5.08	4.78	4.80	4.86	4.92	4.49	4.53	4.43	4.36	4.41	4.16	4.10	3.92	
Hungary	:	:	:	8.87	8.83	9.35	9.85	7.50	6.88	6.40	5.90	5.50	5.22	5.23	5.18	4.75	4.56	4.37	4.44	4.71	4.28	4.53	4.48	4.33	4.39	4.42	4.06	3.99	(p)
Malta	:	:	:	6.00	6.35	7.85	9.18	8.76	7.58	7.05	7.10	6.58	6.79	6.75	6.25	6.36	6.43	6.51	6.35	6.60	5.58	5.66	5.90	5.99	5.88	6.25	6.06	6.02	
Netherlands	8.22	8.28	8.18	7.76	8.83	9.48	7.32	6.37	5.71	6.40	6.30	6.17	5.77	5.39	5.27	5.48	5.45	5.54	5.66	5.53	4.97	5.20	4.86	4.51	4.52	4.35	4.34	4.61	(p)
Austria	9.32	8.16	7.93	8.30	7.80	7.07	6.14	6.15	5.93	5.89	5.69	5.83	5.69	5.45	5.40	5.31	5.20	4.91	4.94	4.90	4.25	4.52	4.58	4.71	4.75	4.46	4.33	4.22	
Poland	:	:	:	8.24	6.36	8.58	9.73	8.64	7.17	6.70	6.10	5.66	5.40	5.39	5.37	5.27	5.30	5.42	5.68	5.49	5.10	5.02	5.12	5.02	5.42	5.93	6.52	6.76	
Portugal	7.73	8.46	8.35	7.84	8.39	9.38	11.34	7.39	6.83	7.18	7.20	7.01	6.83	6.60	6.56	6.33	6.52	6.57	6.75	6.23	5.67	5.45	5.15	4.68	4.61	4.52	4.37	4.07	(p)
Rumania	:	:	:	10.74	8.63	7.19	8.84	8.21	7.08	8.30	8.06	7.83	7.26	6.94	6.95	6.81	6.68	6.46	6.23	6.05	5.87	5.92	6.16	6.61	6.56	6.79	8.78	6.95	
Slovenia	:	:	:	8.84	9.17	8.28	8.57	6.51	5.45	4.26	4.09	4.57	4.53	4.18	4.14	3.80	3.78	3.80	3.89	3.62	3.48	3.54	3.39	3.28	2.88	3.17	3.17	3.13	(p)
Slovakia	:	:	:	7.91	6.98	7.92	9.25	7.95	7.54	7.63	6.17	6.39	5.78	5.27	5.13	5.11	5.19	5.10	5.07	4.81	4.42	4.66	4.83	5.18	4.85	4.81	5.08	5.23	
Finland	8.53	7.71	7.19	7.41	7.94	8.84	6.70	6.15	5.25	5.01	4.93	4.67	4.87	4.89	4.65	4.77	4.56	4.66	4.70	5.05	4.79	5.19	4.95	5.61	5.58	5.36	5.58	5.84	
Sweden	7.73	7.19	6.85	6.70	7.75	5.38	5.38	4.52	4.59	4.73	4.27	4.29	3.90	3.90	3.81	3.79	3.65	3.57	4.03	4.50	4.02	4.26	4.36	4.79	4.92	5.02	5.24	5.46	
United Kingdom	8.05	8.05	7.56	7.51	7.77	8.46	7.66	7.43	6.95	6.56	6.09	6.18	5.92	5.72	5.55	5.39	5.32	5.21	5.13	5.19	4.84	4.94	5.14	5.20	5.23	:	4.43	:	

(p): figure estimated

Source: Eurostat 2010

Table A – 2: Development of divorces per 1000 persons in the EU-27, 1950 -2008

	1950	1955	1958	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
EU-27	:	:	:	:	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	:	:	:	
Belgium	:	:	:	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2	3.5	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Bulgaria	:	:	:	:	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.1	1.9	
Czech Republic	:	:	:	1.4	1.7	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.1	2.3	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.8	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	
Denmark	:	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.9	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.7	
Germany	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.9	1.8	2.3	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	
Estonia	:	:	:	2.1	2.3	3.2	3.4	4.1	4.0	3.7	3.7	4.3	3.9	3.8	5.2	4.0	3.8	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.6	
Ireland	:	:	:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	:	:	:	:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	:	
Greece	:	:	:	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	:	
Spain	:	:	:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.7	:	2.8	:	
France	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.2	:	:	
Italy	:	:	:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9
Cyprus	:	:	:	:	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.1	:	
Latvia	:	:	:	2.4	2.8	4.6	4.8	5.0	4.5	4.0	4.2	5.6	4.0	3.3	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.2	3.3	2.7	
Lithuania	:	:	:	0.9	0.9	2.2	2.7	3.2	3.2	3.4	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.0	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.1	
Luxembourg	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.6	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.0	
Hungary	:	:	:	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Malta	:	:	:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	:	0.0	0.0	:	:	:	0.0	0.0	:	:	:	
Netherlands	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.5	1.8	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	
Austria	:	:	:	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	:	
Poland	:	:	:	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.7	
Portugal	:	:	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.8	2.7	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	:	
Rumania	:	:	:	2.0	1.9	0.4	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	
Slovenia	:	:	:	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.1	
Slovakia	:	:	:	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.3	
Finland	:	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	
Sweden	:	:	:	1.2	1.2	1.6	3.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	
United Kingdom	:	:	:	0.5	0.7	1.0	2.1	2.6	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.6	:	2.4	:	

(p): provisional figure

Source: Eurostat 2010

Table A – 3: Family-households according to their number of children, 2008, in 1000 and percentage

	Total	1 child		2 children		3 or more children	
		total	percentage	total	percentage	total	percentage
<b>EU-27</b>	63885.4	30888.3	48.3%	24756.8	38.8%	8240.3	12.9%
<b>Belgium</b>	1485.7	634.9	42.7%	587.6	39.6%	263.1	17.7%
<b>Bulgaria</b>	861.6	515.2	59.8%	313.0	36.3%	33.4	3.9%
<b>Czech Republic</b>	1510.0	694.6	46.0%	668.8	44.3%	146.5	9.7%
<b>Germany</b>	9276.7	4849.7	52.3%	3390.6	36.5%	1036.4	11.2%
<b>Estonia</b>	199.0	105.4	53.0%	72.2	36.3%	21.4	10.8%
<b>Ireland</b>	637.2	240.6	37.8%	232.5	36.5%	164.1	25.8%
<b>Greece</b>	1263.3	560.4	44.4%	572.1	45.3%	130.7	10.3%
<b>Spain</b>	6362.6	3215.4	50.5%	2594.3	40.8%	553.0	8.7%
<b>France</b>	8483.6	3709.5	43.7%	3350.2	39.5%	1423.8	16.8%
<b>Italy</b>	7723.8	4018.0	52.0%	3085.9	40.0%	619.9	8.0%
<b>Cyprus</b>	116.0	45.1	38.9%	46.8	40.3%	24.0	20.7%
<b>Latvia</b>	325.6	186.7	57.3%	105.5	32.4%	33.4	10.3%
<b>Lithuania</b>	525.0	289.4	55.1%	188.9	36.0%	46.7	8.9%
<b>Luxembourg</b>	68.8	27.7	40.3%	28.7	41.7%	12.4	18.0%
<b>Hungary</b>	1344.6	650.8	48.4%	493.1	36.7%	200.7	14.9%
<b>Malta</b>	57.1	27.2	47.6%	22.2	38.9%	7.7	13.5%
<b>Netherlands</b>	2183.4	847.9	38.8%	954.5	43.7%	381.0	17.4%
<b>Austria</b>	997.8	493.8	49.5%	376.4	37.7%	127.6	12.8%
<b>Poland</b>	5754.0	2800.5	48.7%	2094.8	36.4%	858.8	14.9%
<b>Portugal</b>	1534.3	895.2	58.3%	529.7	34.5%	109.4	7.1%
<b>Rumania</b>	3191.6	1680.1	52.6%	1165.5	36.5%	346.0	10.8%
<b>Slovenia</b>	281.6	140.7	50.0%	109.7	39.0%	31.2	11.1%
<b>Slovakia</b>	722.1	326.4	45.2%	293.2	40.6%	102.5	14.2%
<b>Finland</b>	599.1	251.1	41.9%	226.5	37.8%	121.6	20.3%
<b>United Kingdom</b>	8381.0	3682.0	43.9%	3254.1	38.8%	1445.0	17.2%

Source: Eurostat 2010, own calculations

Table A – 4: Pair-family-households according to their number of children, 2008, in 1000 and percentage

	Total	1 child		2 children		3 or more children	
		total	percentage	total	percentage	total	percentage
<b>EU-27</b>	42616.0	17732.3	41.6%	18822.7	44.2%	6061.0	14.2%
<b>Belgium</b>	883.0	303.9	34.4%	393.9	44.6%	185.2	21.0%
<b>Bulgaria</b>	523.3	284.2	54.3%	221.6	42.3%	17.5	3.3%
<b>Czech Republic</b>	1052.3	395.3	37.6%	542.1	51.5%	114.8	10.9%
<b>Germany</b>	6444.5	2928.1	45.4%	2686.5	41.7%	829.9	12.9%
<b>Estonia</b>	120.6	56.2	46.6%	49.8	41.3%	14.6	12.1%
<b>Ireland</b>	422.9	126.5	29.9%	170.4	40.3%	126.0	29.8%
<b>Greece</b>	989.8	383.5	38.7%	493.7	49.9%	112.5	11.4%
<b>Spain</b>	4295.6	1828.6	42.6%	2073.2	48.3%	393.8	9.2%
<b>France</b>	6078.4	2300.0	37.8%	2617.9	43.1%	1160.6	19.1%
<b>Italy</b>	5631.9	2510.0	44.6%	2601.4	46.2%	520.4	9.2%
<b>Cyprus</b>	85.7	29.1	34.0%	37.6	43.9%	19.0	22.2%
<b>Latvia</b>	154.0	81.2	52.7%	55.4	36.0%	17.4	11.3%
<b>Lithuania</b>	294.6	142.9	48.5%	124.0	42.1%	27.7	9.4%
<b>Luxembourg</b>	52.9	18.0	34.0%	23.9	45.2%	11.1	21.0%
<b>Hungary</b>	831.4	336.7	40.5%	351.6	42.3%	143.1	17.2%
<b>Malta</b>	37.1	14.1	38.0%	17.1	46.1%	5.9	15.9%
<b>Netherlands</b>	1654.7	539.7	32.6%	794.9	48.0%	320.1	19.3%
<b>Austria</b>	647.3	270.6	41.8%	281.3	43.5%	95.4	14.7%
<b>Poland</b>	3277.8	1445.3	44.1%	1334.1	40.7%	498.4	15.2%
<b>Portugal</b>	1002.4	521.0	52.0%	405.0	40.4%	76.4	7.6%
<b>Rumania</b>	1861.5	875.2	47.0%	775.8	41.7%	210.4	11.3%
<b>Slovenia</b>	178.9	70.1	39.2%	83.7	46.8%	25.1	14.0%
<b>Slovakia</b>	421.8	159.9	37.9%	197.9	46.9%	63.9	15.1%
<b>Finland</b>	507.9	198.2	39.0%	203.8	40.1%	105.9	20.9%
<b>United Kingdom</b>	5165.7	1914.2	37.1%	2285.9	44.3%	965.6	18.7%

Source: Eurostat 2010, own calculations

Table A – 5: Lone-Parent-family-households according to their number of children, 2008, in 1000 and percentage

	Total	1 child		2 children		3 or more children	
		total	percentage	total	percentage	total	percentage
<b>EU-27</b>	8120.2	4629.6	57.0%	2591.6	31.9%	899.1	11.1%
<b>Belgium</b>	264.5	134.2	50.7%	91.4	34.6%	39.0	14.7%
<b>Bulgaria</b>	76.4	53.5	70.0%	19.4	25.4%	n.a.	4.6%*
<b>Czech Republic</b>	210.5	118.4	56.2%	74.7	35.5%	17.3	8.2%
<b>Germany</b>	1478.1	960.9	65.0%	416.5	28.2%	100.8	6.8%
<b>Estonia</b>	41.6	25.3	60.8%	13.1	31.5%	n.a.	7.7%*
<b>Ireland</b>	88.2	42.4	48.1%	27.2	30.8%	18.6	21.1%
<b>Greece</b>	66.9	39.7	59.3%	23.5	35.1%	3.7*	5.5%*
<b>Spain</b>	379.5	218.4	57.5%	130.7	34.4%	30.4	8.0%
<b>France</b>	1401.1	764.5	54.6%	484.7	34.6%	151.9	10.8%
<b>Italy</b>	551.8	362.2	65.6%	161.8	29.3%	27.7	5.0%
<b>Cyprus</b>	7.2	4.0	55.6%	2.4	33.3%	0.9*	12.5%*
<b>Latvia</b>	56.5	35.7	63.2%	17.2	30.4%	3.6	6.4%
<b>Lithuania</b>	94.7	60.3	63.7%	26.7	28.2%	7.7*	8.1%*
<b>Luxembourg</b>	7.2	4.4	61.1%	2.3	31.9%	0.5	6.9%
<b>Hungary</b>	147.5	84.0	56.9%	47.4	32.1%	16.1	10.9%
<b>Malta</b>	2.7*	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Netherlands</b>	321.2	171.2	53.3%	109.9	34.2%	40.1	12.5%
<b>Austria</b>	108.4	68.3	63.0%	31.9	29.4%	8.2	7.6%
<b>Poland</b>	522.0	302.2	57.9%	149.7	28.7%	70.1	13.4%
<b>Portugal</b>	115.5	69.8	60.4%	36.8	31.9%	8.9	7.7%
<b>Rumania</b>	143.5	94.9	66.1%	37.2	25.9%	11.3*	7.9%*
<b>Slovenia</b>	27.1	19.0	70.1%	7.5*	27.7%*	n.a.	2.2%*
<b>Slovakia</b>	51.1	28.0	54.8%	17.1	33.5%	6.1	11.9%
<b>Finland</b>	38.8	24.0	61.9%	11.0	28.4%	3.7*	9.5%*
<b>United Kingdom</b>	1918.2	942.9	49.2%	650.5	33.9%	324.8	16.9%

n.a.: Data not available; \* insecure data

Source: Eurostat 2010, own calculations

*Table A – 6: Newly registered partnerships (couples) in Denmark and newly registered partners (individuals) in Sweden, 1995-2009*

	Sweden		Denmark	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>1995</b>	498	167	n.a.	n.a.
<b>1996</b>	201	118	n.a.	n.a.
<b>1997</b>	158	104	n.a.	n.a.
<b>1998</b>	159	92	n.a.	n.a.
<b>1999</b>	154	133	160	136
<b>2000</b>	218	139	177	131
<b>2001</b>	195	186	178	169
<b>2002</b>	212	210	140	163
<b>2003</b>	240	257	148	172
<b>2004</b>	285	282	134	199
<b>2005</b>	244	349	167	218
<b>2006</b>	278	382	177	223
<b>2007</b>	262	388	189	236
<b>2008</b>	311	503	287	254
<b>2009</b>	63	85	n.a.	n.a.

n.a.: Data not available

Source: Statistics Sweden 2010, Statistics Denmark 2010




Table A – 7: Acceptance of the authorization of child adoption by homosexual couples throughout Europe, 2004

	Absolutely agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Absolutely disagree	dk/ na <sup>1</sup>	Agree	Disagree
<b>Belgium</b>	19%	28%	16%	34%	3%	47%	50%
<b>Denmark</b>	31%	23%	14%	31%	1%	54%	45%
<b>Germany</b>	26%	31%	19%	22%	2%	57%	41%
<b>Greece</b>	4%	6%	10%	77%	2%	11%	87%
<b>Spain</b>	24%	33%	17%	20%	6%	57%	37%
<b>Ireland</b>	10%	24%	23%	38%	5%	34%	61%
<b>Italy</b>	9%	16%	24%	50%	2%	25%	74%
<b>Luxemburg</b>	19%	30%	19%	31%	1%	49%	50%
<b>Netherlands</b>	39%	25%	17%	18%	2%	64%	35%
<b>Austria</b>	14%	18%	20%	38%	9%	33%	58%
<b>Portugal</b>	5%	20%	33%	37%	6%	25%	69%
<b>Finland</b>	13%	18%	19%	46%	5%	30%	65%
<b>France</b>	12%	27%	22%	38%	1%	39%	60%
<b>Sweden</b>	27%	16%	12%	38%	8%	42%	50%
<b>United Kingdom</b>	12%	23%	22%	38%	5%	35%	60%
<b>EU 15</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>55%</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	5%	9%	12%	64%	10%	14%	76%
<b>Cyprus</b>	3%	3%	4%	80%	10%	6%	84%
<b>Czech Republic</b>	9%	26%	23%	41%	2%	35%	63%
<b>Estonia</b>	9%	18%	14%	52%	8%	27%	65%
<b>Hungary</b>	13%	21%	14%	47%	6%	34%	60%
<b>Latvia</b>	2%	9%	9%	72%	8%	11%	81%
<b>Lithuania</b>	3%	10%	20%	55%	13%	13%	75%
<b>Malta</b>	3%	7%	12%	74%	4%	10%	86%
<b>Poland</b>	3%	7%	12%	63%	16%	10%	75%
<b>Romania</b>	5%	6%	8%	77%	4%	11%	85%
<b>Slovakia</b>	3%	14%	32%	51%	1%	17%	82%
<b>Slovenia</b>	12%	18%	7%	60%	4%	30%	66%
<b>Turkey</b>	1%	15%	30%	48%	6%	16%	78%
<b>EU 2004</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>57%</b>
<b>Swiss</b>	18%	29%	20%	31%	3%	47%	51%
<b>Norway</b>	12%	25%	26%	33%	5%	37%	59%

<sup>1</sup> Don't know/ no answer

Source: EOS Gallup Europe 2004

Figure A – 1: “Do you agree with the authorization of child adoption by homosexual couples throughout Europe?” Answers: Absolutely agree/ Rather agree, 2004



Source: EOS Gallup Europe 2004

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**ifb** Staatsinstitut für Familienforschung an der Universität Bamberg

  
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Email [info@familyplatform.eu](mailto:info@familyplatform.eu)