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Discussion Paper





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## Abstract

A central question in the empirical fiscal policy literature is the magnitude, in fact even the sign, of the fiscal multiplier. Standard identification schemes for fiscal VAR models typically imply positive output as well as labor productivity responses to expansionary government spending shocks. The standard macro assumption of decreasing returns to labor, however, implies that expansionary government spending shocks should lead to increasing output and hours, but to decreasing labor productivity. To potentially reconcile theory and empirical analysis we impose, amongst other sign restrictions, opposite signs of the impulse responses of output and labor productivity to government spending shocks in eight- to ten-variable VAR models, estimated on quarterly US data. Doing so leads to contractionary effects of positive government spending shocks. This potentially surprising finding is robust to the inclusion of variable capital utilization rates and total factor productivity.

**JEL Classification:** E32, E62, C32

**Keywords:** Fiscal policy, labor productivity, sign restrictions, structural VAR models

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# 1 Introduction

There is a large empirical literature (starting with Blanchard and Perotti, 2002) that uses structural VAR models to estimate the effects of shocks to government spending on the business cycle. A particular focus of this literature is on the identification of the fiscal multiplier, i.e., the effect of changes in government spending on aggregate output. Empirically, most studies find that an unexpected increase in government spending raises real output for at least a number of quarters, though the exact size of the multiplier is controversial. The central problem for the empirical fiscal policy literature is, of course, the problem of identification of exogenous changes in government spending. There is no consensus in the literature concerning which set of identifying restrictions should be used to disentangle government spending shocks from other shocks that affect cyclical variations in macroeconomic data.

In this paper, we propose to use the response of (hourly) labor productivity to help identify government spending shocks. The basic idea is straightforward: Consider the fiscal transmission mechanism that is embedded in most current DSGE models. If the government unexpectedly increases its spending, the resulting intertemporal tax burden imparts a negative wealth effect on households, which consequently expand their labor supply. Since the capital stock is predetermined in the short run, under a standard constant returns to scale aggregate production function there are decreasing returns to labor. As a consequence, the fiscal expansion should be associated with rising hours and output, but with decreasing hourly productivity.<sup>1</sup> Based on this stylized observation, we propose to use the restriction that output and labor productivity should respond with opposite signs as one of the identification conditions in a sign restricted VAR model.

We first review some popular alternative ways of identifying government shocks, namely that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who rely on a recursive ordering where government spending is assumed to be exogenous within the quarter; and the one proposed by Ramey (2011) who additionally controls for anticipation effects by estimating responses to the innovations to her narrative measure of the present discounted value of expected military expenditures. We demonstrate that either of these approaches implies an increase in labor productivity after a positive government spending shock in quarterly US macroeconomic data, opposite to the theoretical expectation based on the standard view of the fiscal transmission mechanism. Utilizing the above considerations on the relation between output and productivity responses to government spending shocks we estimate several variants of sign

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<sup>1</sup>We consider the alternative possibility that government spending is productive in the sense of immediately shifting the aggregate production function unlikely for reasons discussed in section 3.2.

restricted VAR models for US quarterly macroeconomic time series. Sign restrictions have been used earlier in the literature on fiscal policy effects, e.g., by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) or Pappa (2009). The distinctive feature of our approach is the use of a sign restriction invoking the response of labor productivity that forces the estimated government spending shock responses to be compatible with the existence of an aggregate production function with constant returns to scale. In particular, we identify a government spending shock through the restrictions that the resultant impulse responses lead to positive comovement between government spending and public deficits, positive comovement between hours and output, and negative comovement between output (or hours) and labor productivity.

Using these restrictions, we find that the median target impulse response, as defined in detail in appendix A, of private (non-farm business) output to a positive shock to government spending is negative. Since negative output reactions to government spending increases are in obvious contradiction to the consensus in the previous empirical literature, we undertake various robustness checks. In particular, we allow for cyclical capital utilization, and also include a measure of total factor productivity. The basic result remains: as soon as we impose that productivity and output have to comove negatively after government spending shocks, the median target impulse response implies a negative output reaction. Bootstrap confidence bands around the median target impulse response indicate that this negative response is statistically significantly different from zero for several periods.

Note that there are two possible interpretations of our result: First, it could be the case that government spending shocks do indeed have negative short run consequences for output and hours. In this case, one would have to assume that other identification schemes leading to the opposite result tend to confound the fluctuations due to government spending shocks with those due to other disturbances, e.g. technology shocks. Second, the transmission of government spending shocks needs to be analyzed in a setting featuring increasing returns to scale, since the data do not appear to be compatible with the combination of positive output effects of government spending and a constant returns to scale production function.

The empirical result that government spending seems to increase labor productivity is, of course, related to a finding emphasized earlier in the literature, viz., that positive government spending shocks appear to have a positive effect on the real wage rate (e.g., Perotti, 2007, Monacelli and Perotti, 2008). With decreasing returns to labor, the real wage is, from a theory perspective, expected to fall if a government spending shock induces increasing labor supply. However, several authors, e.g., Hall (2009), Monacelli and Perotti (2008), or Ravn et al. (2007), have pointed out that higher wages may be compatible with higher employment if

the price-marginal cost markup that imperfectly competitive firms charge declines in response to higher government spending. The point emphasized in the present paper is that even if declining markups make rising employment compatible with higher real wages, the increase in labor productivity that is also present in the data can still not be explained. Put differently, whatever the behavior of the markup is, it does not contribute to solving the question how sizably more output can be produced, following a government spending shock, with labor input changing only weakly.

Methodologically, we essentially use sign restrictions to impose a log-linear approximation to a standard neoclassical production function on the impulse responses. We propose to view this method as a combination of the a-theoretical nature of VAR modelling with a structural assumption concerning an aggregate production function underlying the US economy, whilst leaving all other equations unrestricted. This approach is similar in spirit to Arias et al. (2015), who use sign (and zero) restrictions to constrain impulse responses in a monetary VAR model such that they are compatible with a plausible central bank reaction function. Whereas Arias et al. (2015) require impulse responses to a monetary policy shock to reproduce a standard monetary policy rule, we impose a standard production function on the impulse responses to distinguish demand side disturbances, like government spending shocks, from supply side shifts in the production function itself. In both instances, the idea is to use only the structural information from relatively uncontroversial parts of a macroeconomic model that is implicitly thought of as the data generating process.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the sign restrictions that are used for identification of government spending shocks in more detail. In section 3, we first demonstrate the tendency for procyclical productivity responses under the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ramey (2011) identifications of government spending shocks. We then discuss possible interpretations and present our own results based on sign restrictions. Finally, we show the central result to be robust to the inclusion of cyclical capacity utilization and total factor productivity. When including both additional variables we combine sign restrictions with standard short run (point) restrictions. Section 4 concludes. Two appendices follow the main text. Appendix A presents some details of the econometric approach and appendix B contains some further results.

## **2 Government spending shocks and labor productivity**

Our main goal is to distinguish empirically between the effects of government spending shocks and of productivity shocks on the private business sector. To this end, we start by assuming

that private (i.e., non-farm business) sector output  $Y_t$  is generated by a constant returns to scale production function that is standard in macroeconomics, i.e.,

$$Y_t = F(Z_t, H_t, S_t), \quad (1)$$

where  $Z_t$  is unobservable technology,  $H_t$  is labor input (measured in hours worked in the non-farm business sector), and  $S_t$  are the services derived from the installed capital stock. We concentrate on a log-linear approximation to this production function, where log-deviations from the balanced growth path are denoted by lower case letters. The log-linear representation of the production function is:

$$y_t = z_t + ah_t + (1 - a)s_t, \quad (2)$$

with  $a \in (0, 1)$ . This representation is exact in the special case that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, whereas for more general functional forms it is a first order approximation. The parameter  $a \in (0, 1)$  is the production elasticity of labor input, which in the Cobb-Douglas case is equal to the share of labor in total output. For other constant returns to scale production functions, that do not imply constancy of the labor share, the parameter  $a$  can also assume other values in the interval between zero and one. Macroeconomic models typically calibrate values for  $a$  in the range from 0.6 to 0.7.

Now consider estimating a VAR model containing (among others) the variables from above. Then, following any shock hitting the economy, the estimated impulse responses of output, technology, hours worked and capital services should, to a first order approximation at least, be related to each other as the variables in (2). In the following we will repeatedly compare relations between impulse response functions of VAR models and log-linearized structural economic relations.

We use this idea to disentangle government spending shocks from other shocks, in particular from technology shocks. If in period  $t$  a shock that does not change technology occurs, then  $z_t = 0$  holds in this period and the impulse responses hence fulfill:

$$y_t - h_t = (a - 1)h_t + (1 - a)s_t. \quad (3)$$

However, capital services are typically not directly observable. We consider two alternative specifications to deal with this problem. The first assumes that capital services  $s_t$  are equal to the stock of installed capital (or are a fixed proportion of it), and the second assumes that

capital services are given by the product of a time variable utilization rate and the capital stock. We present the first specification in the current section, and defer the discussion of the second as a robustness exercise to section 3.4.

If capital services are identical to the capital stock, then – since the capital stock is predetermined in the short run and slowly moving in response to shocks in general – their contribution can be neglected as long as the focus is on the economy’s behavior in the immediate aftermath of a few quarters after a shock hits. Thus, the impact or short run effect of a non-technological shock on labor productivity is well approximated by:

$$y_t - h_t \approx (a - 1)h_t, \quad (4)$$

since  $s_t \approx 0$  on impact. Given the standard range of estimates of  $a \in [0.6, 0.7]$ , this implies that in the short run, if a non-technological shock increases hours worked by one percent, labor productivity should decline by between  $-2.5$  to  $-3.3$  percent. In the limiting case where  $a \rightarrow 1$ , the effect on labor productivity vanishes. Importantly, however, it cannot be positive for any value of  $a$  that implies decreasing or constant returns to labor in production.

While the exact value of  $a$  is unknown in general, (4) is nonetheless useful as the basis for identifying government spending shocks based on the signs of impulse responses. In particular, suppose we have estimates of a reduced form VAR model, and consider a particular candidate orthogonalization of the residuals in order to identify structural government spending shocks. Denote the impulse responses for the candidate orthogonalization at horizon  $j \geq 0$  to a government spending shock  $f_t$  by a tilde over variables (e.g.,  $\tilde{y}_j = \partial \log Y_{t+j} / \partial f_t$ ). Our maintained hypothesis is that government spending does not have a direct effect on technology (see below for further discussion of this point) and that the capital stock is predetermined in the short run. Therefore, a structural government spending shock should produce impulse responses that are compatible with (4) with  $a \in (0, 1)$  and that, hence, need to have the following properties:

- (i)  $\tilde{y}_j$  and  $\tilde{h}_j$  have the same sign;
- (ii)  $\tilde{y}_j$  and  $\tilde{y}_j - \tilde{h}_j$  have opposite signs.

Since these properties of impulse responses can be expected to be present, in the short run, after any type of non-technological (or demand side) shock that leaves total factor productivity unchanged, we need a further restriction to ensure that the particular demand side shock we identify is indeed a government spending shock. Therefore, letting  $\tilde{g}_j$  and  $\tilde{d}_j$



denote the impulse responses at horizon  $j$  of government spending and the deficit, respectively, we add:

(iii)  $\tilde{g}_j$  and  $\tilde{d}_j$  have the same sign.

Below, we make use of these properties in the form of sign restrictions on the impulse responses of VAR models to identify government spending shocks. Restriction (i) requires that output and labor must comove positively, which is a basic requirement if a non-technological shock is considered and capital is predetermined in the short run. In this case labor is the only variable factor that can adjust in the short run to produce more or less output. Restriction (ii) is crucial for our approach. It imposes the decreasing returns to labor property following from a constant returns to scale production function with predetermined capital. Under non-technological shocks, output can only rise if measured labor productivity declines, such that we observe a positive response  $\tilde{y}_j$  only if  $\tilde{y}_j - \tilde{h}_j$  declines at the same time, or vice versa. This restriction is pivotal in the present context, since it imposes the condition that a government spending shock is a pure demand side disturbance that does not shift the aggregate production function as, e.g., a technology shock would. Finally, condition (iii) serves to single out government spending shocks from other non-technological disturbances. It imposes that government spending shocks are at least partly deficit financed over the short run. This assumption is plausible in view of the political decision process, with spending changes rarely linked to specific tax changes required to finance them.

Note, importantly, that conditions (i) to (iii) neither constrain the signs of the reactions of output nor of hours worked to a government spending shock. It is only the *relation* between these two reactions that is restricted. The idea is that the basic notion of a demand side disturbance brought about by government spending changes imposes the required pattern of comovement between the impulse responses, as long as the data generating process is characterized by a constant returns to scale production function. It is left unrestricted, and hence decided by the data, whether this implies that output and hours increase while productivity decreases, or that output and hours decline while productivity rises.

In the next section, we proceed in three steps. First, in section 3.1 we review some popular identification schemes that have been used in the fiscal VAR literature to identify government spending shocks. We discuss whether the impulse response functions generated by these models are compatible with the theoretical requirements that characterize responses to government spending shocks as set out in conditions (i) to (iii) in section 3.2. Since the answer turns out to be negative, we proceed in section 3.3 by directly imposing conditions (i) to (iii) as the restrictions to identify government spending shocks via sign restrictions on

VAR model impulse responses. Finally, in section 3.4 we investigate the robustness of the results with respect to allowing for variable capital utilization.

### 3 Empirical results

#### 3.1 Review of existing fiscal VAR model results

We start off by reviewing standard findings of the empirical literature on the effects of government spending shocks. Given the above discussion, negative comovement between the impulse responses of output and labor productivity to government spending shocks should prevail. Consequently, the first question we ask is whether the available fiscal VAR model results are compatible with this restriction. The answer is no. In section 3.3 we therefore present results where we impose this negative comovement between the output and productivity responses to government spending shocks via sign restrictions.

All VAR models considered in this paper are estimated with quarterly US data from 1948q1 to 2013q4, which is the longest period over which all variables are available. The variables used in the baseline specification in this section are the logarithm of real government consumption and investment spending,  $\log G_t$ ; the logarithm of real output in the non-farm business sector,  $\log Y_t$ ; the logarithm of hourly labor productivity,  $\log Y_t - \log H_t$ , where  $H_t$  is hours worked in the non-farm business sector; the logarithm of real net taxes,  $\log \tau_t$ ;<sup>2</sup> the nominal three months treasury bill rate,  $R_t$ ; the inflation rate as measured by the annualized log change in the deflator of non-farm business output,  $\pi_t$ ; the government deficit,  $D_t$ , defined as minus total government saving as a fraction of GDP; and the logarithm of real private nonresidential investment,  $\log I_t$ .

We have checked the robustness of our results by using, instead of  $\tau_t$  as defined above, the Barro–Redlick (2011) measure of the average marginal tax rate, which is available only up to 2008q4 and thus requires using a shorter sample. The results do not change by much, and therefore we use in our analysis the tax measure  $\tau_t$  and the longer sample until 2013q4. The data on hours worked and the Barro–Redlick tax rate have been downloaded from Valerie Ramey’s website, the other variables are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database, except for private nonresidential investment, which is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Expressing the flow variables as per capita values by dividing through population does not change the results appreciably. To match the approach commonly used in the literature, all models also contain a constant as well as linear and quadratic time trends

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<sup>2</sup>Here  $\tau_t$  is defined as government current tax receipts plus contributions for government social insurance less government current transfer payments, deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator.

and are estimated with four lags of each endogenous variable.

Note that in all estimates below both output and hours, and thus productivity, are measured for the private (non-farm business) sector only. This seems important in the present context, because using economy-wide measures – such as real GDP and total hours worked – could be misleading. The reason for this is that GDP also contains the public sector output, which is difficult to measure and for which the existence of a standard production function is not necessarily guaranteed. Therefore, we only investigate the response of private output and private hourly productivity to government spending shocks. That being said, the results reported below only change very little if economy-wide GDP based measures for output and productivity are used instead of the non-farm business data, as we have ascertained by running this specification as another robustness check.

For comparison with our own results shown in the next subsection, as a first step we show the implications of three commonly used VAR identification methods for the response of labor productivity in the private non-farm business sector to a government spending shock. The first approach imposes Blanchard and Perotti's (2002) assumption that government spending does not react endogenously to the state of the economy within the quarter, but only with at least a one quarter lag. Thus, the government spending shock is in this setting identified by using the recursively orthogonalized residuals from a VAR model with the variables mentioned above with government spending ordered first. For brevity, this is called BP or recursive identification, henceforth. The BP approach has been criticized by Ramey (2011), who argues that the possible presence of anticipated changes in government expenditure invalidates the BP identifying assumption. If news of future rising expenditure arise, the private sector will respond before the econometrician actually observes an increase in measured spending. The resulting mismatch of timing could then lead to erroneous estimates of the shock responses. To overcome this problem, Ramey (2011) proposes the use of a narrative measure of the present discounted value of anticipated military spending to identify government spending shocks (orthogonal in addition to this variable). Therefore, the second approach shown below adds Ramey's (2011) variable for the present discounted value of expected future military expenditure as the first variable in the VAR model, and calculates an anticipated government shock as an orthogonalized innovation to this variable. This is called the Ramey identification for short. The third approach uses the same VAR model specification as the previous one, i.e., with the Ramey news variable ordered first and government spending ordered second, but considers a shock not to the anticipation variable, but to the spending variable itself. In this way, this identification can be seen as an attempt to capture an unanticipated spending shock

while at the same time controlling for anticipation effects through the inclusion of Ramey's news variable, which continues to be ordered first. This third specification is abbreviated as BP-R below.

Figure 1 shows the results in terms of impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to government spending or Ramey's (2011) news variable using these three identification schemes, along with  $\pm 1.96$  bootstrapped standard errors to capture symmetric 95% confidence bands. For brevity, only the responses of the most interesting variables for the question at hand are shown. The full set of impulse responses for all variables included in the VAR models is available upon request.




Figure 1: Impulse responses to government spending shock: BP, Ramey and BP-R identification schemes.

In all identification schemes, a positive government spending shock raises private sector output (though only insignificantly so in the Ramey version), and the government deficit (though less clearly and with a lag in the Ramey specification). Most importantly for the present purpose, however, is the fact that under all identification schemes labor productivity (shown in the last but one row of figure 1) rises slightly. The increase in productivity is certainly not large, and in the Ramey case again not significantly different from zero. However, as argued above, if one believes that these models truly identify a government spending shock, then one expects a pronounced decrease in labor productivity.

In principle, it is possible that the increase in measured labor productivity is explained by the effect of a decline in hours worked on marginal productivity of labor. However, this does not seem to be the case. Replacing the productivity variable  $\log Y_t - \log H_t$ , used in the VAR models above, by the logarithm of hours worked,  $\log H_t$ , and re-estimating (leaving the rest of the VAR model unchanged) yields the estimated impulse responses of hours to a positive government spending shock in the three specifications shown in figure 2.




Figure 2: Impulse response of non-farm business hours to government spending shock: BP, Ramey and BP-R identification schemes.

In all cases, the response of hours appears to be close to zero or slightly positive, at least for the first couple of quarters after the shock, but not markedly negative. Thus, the behavior of hours does not seem to explain the estimated increase in productivity. Moreover, even if the hours response were indeed negative, this would raise the question how, in that

case, a positive short run output response could be explained if the maintained assumption that these models correctly identify a purely non-technological government spending shock is correct. If technology does not change and the capital stock is predetermined in the short run, then rising output is associated with increases in hours worked (the possible caveat in the case that the output expansion is explained by a large concomitant increase in capital utilization is explored in section 3.4 below).

To sum up, the conclusion obtained so far from standard structural VAR model approaches is that output increases following a government spending expansion are difficult to explain without rising productivity. The very fact that the VAR model results point to productivity increases following rising government spending, casts doubt on their ability to identify a pure demand side innovation like a government spending shock. If the popular identification methods shown above truly identify government spending shocks, and if government spending shocks are truly non-technological in nature, one expects that impulse responses of output and hours have the same sign and are both of the opposite sign of the response of labor productivity. Yet, in the estimates it appears that output comoves positively with productivity, conditional on the identified shock, and weakly positively with hours. Thus, to the extent that these conventional identification schemes indeed succeed in isolating government spending shocks, one needs to explain how an increase in government spending is able to raise labor productivity.

## 3.2 Discussion

While in the recent literature the debate has revolved around estimating the magnitude of the effect of government spending shocks on output so far (the fiscal multiplier debate), the empirical evidence provided above highlights a different aspect: However large the output effects may be, they tend to derive not only from comparably large increases in hours or employment, but also from increases in labor productivity.

This poses an interesting challenge to our understanding of the fiscal transmission mechanism. The evidence given above seems incompatible with the usual view of the way government spending affects the economy, as it is embedded in most DSGE models. The standard transmission mechanism implies that an increase in government spending raises output because higher spending, through its associated tax burden, exerts a negative wealth effect on households. This gives households an incentive to reduce their consumption of leisure, which boosts labor supply such that output rises. Along a neoclassical production function with capital predetermined in the short run, this implies that decreasing returns to labor set in.

Hence, a decrease in measured labor productivity results.

Three principally different reactions to the apparent conflict between theory and empirical evidence are conceivable. First, the standard view of the fiscal transmission mechanism needs to be augmented. If the positive labor productivity response is structural, one has to adjust theoretical models to accommodate it. Second, the identification methods discussed above tend to confound government spending shocks with other shocks, in particular with technological shocks that are known to raise productivity. A positive technology shock raises productivity and could be mistaken for a government spending shock in a recursive identification scheme, if the government immediately increases spending in response to the positive technological shock. Third, an increase in activity following a government spending shock triggers a rise in unmeasured factor utilization, in particular capital utilization. This might counteract decreasing returns to labor since the unobserved variable utilization rate of capital increases too. We discuss each of these possibilities in turn.

If one adopts the first view and maintains that the orthogonalizations applied in the VAR models shown above succeed in identifying structural government spending shocks, it could indeed be that the measured increase in labor productivity is structural. One possibility for this is that government spending is productive, in the sense of entering private sector production functions with a positive output elasticity. Higher government spending then shifts up the production functions of private firms and leads to a labor productivity increase. However, direct productivity effects of government spending most likely result from investment in public infrastructure. This, as a part of the economy's total capital stock, only changes slowly and therefore can be considered as predetermined in the short run following a spending boost.

Another possibility is that there are increasing returns to scale, and more stringently increasing returns to labor. In this case any increases in the scale of production, including those brought about by an increase in government spending, lower average costs and thus endogenously raise overall productivity. However, while this could, if the relevant effects are strong enough, also lead to a rise in measured labor productivity, one expects that (as also in the case of infrastructure effects from higher spending) private investment increases too, since private investors would attempt to take advantage of higher productivity. The impulse responses of investment are, however, not significantly different from zero in the three discussed structural VAR models. It is positive but not significantly different from zero in the specifications using the Ramey news variable, and negative (albeit not significantly different from zero) in the BP identification. Several other studies have also found negative invest-

ment responses to government spending shocks (e.g., Galí et al., 2007). Thus, the positive investment response that one expects if higher government spending truly increases productivity (either by shifting the production function by adding public capital, or by shifting the economy along an increasing returns to scale production function) does not seem to receive much empirical support.

Hence, we conclude that while we cannot strictly rule out the possibility that procyclical productivity is indeed a structural feature of government spending shocks, we consider the evidence in favor of this hypothesis to be weak. Note that this also rules out the possibility that labor productivity simply increases, because higher private investment raises the capital stock quickly enough. Even if there were a positive private investment response, this effect is expected to work intertemporally, with some delay because of the short run predetermined nature of the capital stock. The productivity response instead appears to be immediate.

In sum, this leaves us with either the second or the third view, namely that the non-negative productivity response either follows from failure to identify and disentangle government spending shocks from technological shocks with the methods employed above, or that it is the result of unaccounted increases of capacity utilization. The following two sections are dedicated to our attempt to distinguish between these possibilities.

### 3.3 Results with sign restrictions imposed

In this subsection, we present the results when we impose the discussed sign restrictions on the impulse responses from VAR models. We impose restrictions (i) to (iii) introduced above (positive comovement of output and hours, negative comovement of output and productivity, positive comovement of government spending and the budget deficit) on the impulse responses of the VAR model to identify government spending shocks. The crucial restriction is (ii), which has to be fulfilled by responses to demand side shocks like government spending shocks, but not by responses to technology shocks. In this way, the sign restrictions are used to separate government spending shocks, whose effects we want to analyze, from technology shocks.

The estimated VAR model contains essentially the same variables as discussed in the preceding subsection. The difference is that we include output and hours separately in order to be able to constrain their impulse response relation. Thus, the following variables are included  $\log G_t$ ,  $\log Y_t$ ,  $\log H_t$ ,  $\log \tau_t$ ,  $R_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $D_t$ ,  $\log I_t$ . Furthermore, we again include four lags, a constant and linear and quadratic time trends. We implement the sign restrictions following the methodology outlined in Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010). In brief (for more details see



appendix A), we randomly draw orthogonal matrices to rotate the so-called structural impact matrix until we have 5000 models in which the impulse response patterns to a government spending shock match restrictions (i) - (iii) over a horizon of four quarters. Robustness checks show that imposing the restrictions only for one or two quarters following a shock does not change the conclusions. From the responses fulfilling the sign restrictions, we calculate the median target (MT, henceforth) impulse response as advocated by Fry and Pagan (2011). The MT impulse response is the impulse response that is closest in a (variance weighted) squared distance sense to the (pointwise) median curve of the 5000 impulse responses satisfying the sign restrictions. To allow for inference, we quantify the uncertainty around the estimated MT responses by a bootstrap method described in appendix A, and use this to construct 90 percent confidence bands that are depicted in the figures below as dashed lines.




Figure 3: Median target impulse responses to government spending shock identified through restrictions (i) – (iii).

Figure 3 shows the estimated effects of a positive impulse in government spending. In terms of the median target responses, a positive government spending shock is associated with an increase in the deficit and labor productivity, but with an initial decrease in output and hours worked. Note that while spending and the deficit have been restricted to be positive, output and hours are unrestricted. Only their relation is restricted by (i) and (ii) given

above. The median target effect of government spending shocks on output is significantly negative for several periods.

The result that government spending expansions are associated with negative output and hours responses is, of course, surprising. As mentioned above, a large number of previous studies – using different identification assumptions – finds that positive government spending shocks are associated with short run increases in output. Hence, it is crucial to understand why our results differ markedly in this respect. The reason is, of course, that we restrict the relation between the responses of labor productivity by our restriction (*ii*) to be in accord with our view of the consequences of demand shocks, i.e., negative comovement between the impulse responses of output and productivity. In other words, if labor productivity rises when a government spending shock has occurred, this must have been due to the increase in the marginal product of labor. This increasing marginal product of labor is implied by the decline in hours, and thus in output. Hence, by using restriction (*ii*) we in a sense force the data to decide whether, conditional on a government spending increase, either an increase in output and hours with lower productivity, or a decrease in output and hours associated with a rise in productivity is more likely. The results shown in figure 3 indicate that the data appear to favor the latter possibility.

The results in figure 3 allow for different possible interpretations. One possible conclusion is that previous estimates that find a positive response of output to government spending increases (like those summarized in the preceding subsections) fail to disentangle government spending shocks from other confounding disturbances, like technology shocks. Our estimates, in contrast, explicitly rule out the influence of shocks that shift the short run production function and thus could be seen as identifying the pure demand side effects of government spending shocks.

It is important to stress that the results shown in figure 3, as well as in figures 4 and 5 to be discussed later, display the median target response. The corresponding figures 3A to 5A in appendix B show the range of the sign-restricted impulse responses as generated by our simulation approach. The results from the appendix show that the largest part of the impulse responses has qualitatively the same shape as the median target impulse that we focus on, since the pointwise median curve over all impulse responses throughout is close to the median target impulse response. The figures in appendix B, however, also show that there are feasible sign-restricted impulse responses with the opposite implications regarding the effects of government spending shocks on output and hours worked. There is no statistical way of discriminating between these different feasible orthogonalizations, as they are all

observationally equivalent to the estimated reduced form VAR model. In the literature it is customary to focus on either the pointwise median curve (not itself an impulse response function) or the median target impulse response to capture the main tendency in the data. Both lead to very similar conclusions in our case. Second, and more problematically, we have thus far assumed that labor is the only variable factor of production that can adjust in the short run. This is debatable when the amount of services derived from the capital stock varies over the business cycle, as is implied by many theoretical models with variable capital utilization. We thus turn to an enlarged model where we allow for utilization changes in the following section.

### 3.4 Robustness checks: variable capital utilization and total factor productivity

So far, we have assumed that capital services  $s_t$  are identical (or proportional) to the capital stock  $k_t$ . This is a useful simplification, because the capital stock is predetermined in the short run, and moves only slowly even over the medium run. Hence, under this assumption it is possible to abstract from changes in capital services, at least for the small number of time periods for which sign restrictions are imposed on impulse responses. However, it is indeed likely that capital services are more variable than the capital stock itself, if the utilization rate of the latter is time varying. The question thus arises in how far our results are robust to allowing for variable capital utilization.

Time varying capital utilization is found to be an important feature of business cycles in several recent papers, e.g., Justiniano et al. (2010). Empirically, Fernald (2014) provides a measure of the change in utilization that he computes based on the methodology described in Basu et al. (2006).<sup>3</sup> In the following, since the other variables in our VAR models are in log-levels as well, we use his measure of utilization change and integrate it (from a starting value of one) to obtain the level of utilization  $U_t$  (which is then taken to logarithms in the empirical model), and allow the services of capital to depend on it through  $S_t = U_t K_t$ , where  $K_t$  is the stock of installed capital.

Allowing for variable capital utilization, the log-linearly approximated production function thus reads as:

$$y_t = z_t + ah_t + (1 - a)(u_t + k_t). \quad (5)$$

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<sup>3</sup>The data are available at John Fernald's web site <http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/economists/john-fernal/>.

Under non-technological shocks, i.e., with  $z_t = 0$ , and upon neglecting movements in the capital stock which continues to be predetermined, it follows that measured labor productivity is approximately given by:

$$y_t - h_t \approx (1 - a)(u_t - h_t). \quad (6)$$

Hence, given  $a \in (0, 1)$ , labor productivity rises in response to a non-technological shock only if utilization  $u_t$  increases more strongly than hours worked  $h_t$ . Thus, with variable capital utilization our previous restriction (ii), which requires output and productivity to have opposite signs, may be too restrictive.

We thus extend the VAR model of the previous section with the logarithm of the level of utilization as an additional variable. The variables used are thus  $\log G_t$ ,  $\log Y_t$ ,  $\log H_t$ ,  $\log \tau_t$ ,  $R_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $D_t$ ,  $\log I_t$ ,  $\log U_t$ . Using the same notation as in section 2, let  $\tilde{u}_j$  denote the impulse response at horizon  $j$  of  $\log U_t$  to a government spending shock. In terms of identification restrictions on the impulse responses, we replace the sign restriction (ii) by a new sign restriction (iv):

- (iv) The difference of the impulse responses  $\tilde{y}_j$  and  $\tilde{h}_j$  has the same sign as the difference of the impulse responses  $\tilde{u}_j$  and  $\tilde{h}_j$ .

Figure 4 shows the MT impulse responses of the utilization-augmented VAR, with the government spending shock identified using sign restrictions (i), (iii), and (iv). A positive shock to government spending appears to trigger a strong negative adjustment of utilization in the short run. Note that the utilization response itself is not sign-restricted by (iv), but only its relation to the output and hours responses. As can be seen by a comparison with the results shown in figure 3 above, the other responses do not change qualitatively compared to the case without time varying utilization, although the magnitudes and the persistence of the responses differs. In particular, the median target output and hours reactions are still negative in the short run, even though less strongly so, since the decrease in utilization picks up part of the variation. Capital utilization itself is, as theoretically expected, procyclical, which in the current context means that it declines alongside output. Since utilization declines by less than hours, labor productivity rises by implication.




Figure 4: Median target impulse responses to government spending shock identified through restrictions (i), (iii) and (iv).

Thus, allowing for time varying utilization does not change the basic conclusion reached above that imposing constant returns to scale (in hours and in utilized capital, given the predetermined capital stock) leads, in the short run, to a negative median target response of output and hours to a government spending shock, accompanied by a positive productivity response.

Recall that the main purpose of the restrictions we use is to help disentangle government spending shocks from other shocks that directly shift the production function. Therefore, it might be useful, as a further robustness check, to control directly for a measure of technology in the VAR model. It is well known that standard measures of total factor productivity (TFP) that are based on the classic Solow residual contain a component that is endogenous to the business cycle. The reason is that with procyclical utilization and possibly imperfect competition, the productive contribution of the input factors is larger than their income shares, with the latter commonly used as production elasticities in the computation of Solow residuals. Fernald (2014) also provides a corrected TFP measure that takes account of these effects, based on a methodology to purge spurious cyclicalities due to utilization changes and markups expounded in Basu et al. (2006). Thus, his utilization corrected TFP series is likely to be a better proxy for exogenous shocks to the aggregate production function, and hence an appropriate control variable for us. Since his measure is in growth rates, we integrate it

from a starting value of one to get the variable  $TFP_t$ , and use its log-level as an additional variable in the VAR model.

After a government spending shock that has no impact on technology, the impulse response at horizon  $j$  of the total factor productivity measure to this government spending shock,  $\widetilde{tfp}_j$ , should be zero, at least in the vicinity of the shock impact at short horizons  $j$ . We thus impose, as an additional identifying restriction, the exact zero-at-impact restriction:

(v) The impulse response  $\widetilde{tfp}_j$  does not change on impact under government spending shocks.

This model version thus mixes the sign restrictions (i), (iii), and (iv) with the exact zero restriction (v). The implementation is based on the methodology set out in Arias et al. (2014) described in appendix A. Figure 5 shows the median target impulse responses of the VAR model with the variables  $\log G_t$ ,  $\log Y_t$ ,  $\log H_t$ ,  $\log \tau_t$ ,  $R_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $D_t$ ,  $\log I_t$ ,  $\log U_t$ ,  $\log TFP_t$ .




Figure 5: Median target impulse responses to government spending shock identified through restrictions (i), (iii), (iv) and (v).

The MT impulse responses shown in figure 5 show some differences compared to those previously discussed. In particular, while output and hours still decline in the short run, the size of the negative response is somewhat mitigated. To the extent that the inclusion of the  $\log TFP$  variable succeeds in controlling for residual technological disturbances unaccounted

for in the previous models, the estimates shown in figure 5 give a cleaner indication of the consequences of a government spending shock. Most clearly visible, the response of utilization now appears rather unclear, and statistically not significantly different from zero. This is also true for the TFP response itself, which is only constrained to be exactly zero in the impact period, and shows some endogenous but altogether insignificant variation thereafter. Labor productivity reacts less strongly than in the previous models, but the response is still positive. However, the main pattern found in the simpler models above still holds: Output and hours tend to decline for some periods following a government spending increase, whereas labor productivity rises slightly. We thus conclude that the central result presented in the previous subsection is robust to the consideration of both variable capital utilization and total factor productivity as additional control variables.

## 4 Conclusions

Taking stock, the estimates presented above all highlight the central point: As soon as we impose the crucial requirement that the impulse responses of structural VAR models aimed at identifying government spending shocks exhibit behavior required to be consistent with a standard constant returns to scale aggregate production function, we find that the median target responses to a government spending increase imply short run declines in private sector output and hours, along with rising labor productivity. This result is robust to the inclusion of variable capacity utilization and to additionally including a measure of utilization-adjusted total factor productivity. Since the majority of previous studies has found positive output responses following government spending increases, the question arises, of course, how to interpret the results presented here.

Our results certainly cannot be taken to necessarily imply that other identification schemes that tend to find positive output responses to government spending increases are wrong. While there is the possibility that identification schemes that do not take into account the restrictions we impose on productivity behavior confound demand shocks deriving from government spending variations with technology shocks, we need to be cautious here for at least three reasons. First, sign restriction methods do not allow to exactly identify government spending shocks, but only the set of admissible model impulse responses given the restrictions. The range of admissible models includes impulse responses for output and hours of both signs. However, as demonstrated by the median target impulse responses shown above (and by the figures in appendix B), the majority of admissible impulse responses points towards a negative reaction of these variables, when forced to have a negative correlation of

the responses of output and labor productivity in the short run.

Second, we use an estimated regressor as our variable capital utilization rate, which itself is not directly observable. Hence, although the measure is carefully constructed by Fernald (2014), there might still be unaccounted residual variation in true capital utilization that is not captured in the measured variable. As a consequence, observed labor productivity behavior could still be misleading and not fully capture movements in the marginal product of labor.

Finally, it might be that the main identifying restriction we use, namely constant returns to scale in the aggregate production function, does not hold empirically. In this case, the negative impulse response correlation between output and utilization-adjusted productivity need not hold. This would invalidate our central identification assumption. While this is possible in principle, we note that a large majority of business cycle models assumes the standard assumption of constant returns to scale. Allowing for increasing returns to scale requires an altogether rethinking of the fiscal transmission process in such models. The distinction between these possibilities is arguably an important topic of future research. At this point, we conclude that the data seem to imply that shocks to government spending either have negative output consequences, or if they have not, then this can, in our view, only be explained through the existence of aggregate increasing returns to scale.

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# Appendix A

## The VAR model

We describe the employed econometric model in this section for the sake of completeness and, mainly, to fix notation. A  $k$ -variable structural VAR model for  $x_t$  is given by:

$$A_0 x_t = \mu + C_1 t + C_2 t^2 + A_1 x_{t-1} + A_2 x_{t-2} + \dots + A_p x_{t-p} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (7)$$

where  $x_t \in \mathbb{R}^k$ ,  $\varepsilon_t \sim WN(0, I_k)$ ,  $A_0, \dots, A_p \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ ,  $\mu, C_1, C_2 \in \mathbb{R}^k$ .  $A_0$ , the so-called *structural matrix*, is assumed to be non-singular. In order to define a unique lag length  $p$  we assume  $A_p \neq 0$ , in our application  $p = 4$ . The corresponding reduced form, obtained from (7) by pre-multiplication with  $A_0^{-1}$ , is given by:

$$x_t = \nu + D_1 t + D_2 t^2 + B_1 x_{t-1} + \dots + B_p x_{t-p} + u_t, \quad (8)$$

with  $B_i = A_0^{-1} A_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, p$ ,  $D_j = A_0^{-1} C_j$ ,  $j = 1, 2$ ,  $\nu = A_0^{-1} \mu$ , and  $A_0^{-1} \varepsilon_t = u_t \sim WN(0, \Sigma_u)$ , with consequently  $\Sigma_u = A_0^{-1} A_0^{-1'}$ .

Denoting with  $B(z) = I_k - B_1 z - \dots - B_p z^p$ , we impose the *causality assumption*,  $\det(B(z)) \neq 0 \forall |z| \leq 1$ . Under this assumption, the errors  $u_t$  correspond to the one-step prediction errors from the Wold decomposition, i.e., we obtain an infinite order moving average representation of the form:

$$x_t = \tilde{\nu} + \tilde{D}_1 t + \tilde{D}_2 t^2 + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \Phi_j u_{t-j} \quad (9)$$

$$= \tilde{\nu} + \tilde{D}_1 t + \tilde{D}_2 t^2 + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \Phi_j A_0^{-1} \varepsilon_{t-j} \quad (10)$$

The  $(r, s)$ -element of  $\Theta_j = \Phi_j A_0^{-1}$  describes the change of variable  $r$  to a unit increase of  $\varepsilon_{t,s}$  after  $j$ -periods, i.e., at horizon  $j$ . In the main text we use the short-hand notation  $\tilde{m}_j$  for this, with  $m$  denoting an element of the vector of variables  $x_t$ , since we are throughout only interested in the effects of government spending shocks, i.e., for one particular  $s$  only.

## Identification schemes

As is well-known, the structural form (7) is not identified, for a detailed discussion see Hannan and Deistler (1988). The literature provides a large array of approaches to point or set identification of structural VAR models. In our paper we employ the following ones:

- (1) Recursive identification: The structural matrix,  $A_0$  is lower (upper) triangular, or, equivalently,  $A_0^{-1}$ , the *structural impact matrix*, is lower (upper) triangular.
- (2) Sign restrictions:  $\Theta_j^{(r,s)}$  is restricted to be either nonnegative or nonpositive for some combinations of  $(r, s, j)$ ,  $r, s \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{N}_0$ .
- (3) Zero and sign restrictions:  $\Theta_j^{(\bar{r}, \bar{s})} = 0$  for some  $(\bar{r}, \bar{s}, \bar{j})$ , and some  $\Theta_j^{(r,s)}$  are sign restricted as defined in the previous item (2). Note already here that in our paper we only consider zero-at-impact restrictions, i.e.,  $\bar{j} = 0$ .

The recursive identification scheme yields an exactly identified structural VAR. It is important to note, however, that sign restrictions and the mixture of zero and sign restrictions, in general do *not* yield exactly identified structural forms. The identified set for the impulse responses is, thus, in general non-singleton for the second and third cases.<sup>4</sup>

### Impulse response functions

The reduced form parameters are estimated by ordinary least squares, resulting in  $\hat{B}_1, \dots, \hat{B}_p$  and  $\hat{\Sigma}_u$ . Thus, an estimate of the reduced form impulse response sequence  $(\hat{\Phi}_j)_{j \geq 0}$  follows immediately. The approach to obtain structural impulse responses differs across cases (1) to (3). In every case, however, the starting point is the identity  $\Sigma_u = A_0^{-1} A_0^{-1'}$  and the available estimate  $\hat{\Sigma}_u$ .

For recursive identification consider the (unique) Cholesky decomposition of  $\hat{\Sigma}_u = \hat{L}\hat{L}'$ , with  $\hat{L}$  lower triangular (and positive elements along the diagonal), and set  $\hat{A}_0^{-1} = \hat{L}$ .

Now, observe that for any unitary matrix  $Q \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ , with  $QQ' = Q'Q = I_k$ , it holds that

$$\hat{\Sigma}_u = \hat{L}QQ'\hat{L}' = \hat{L}_Q\hat{L}'_Q \quad (11)$$

is another valid decomposition of  $\hat{\Sigma}_u$ . Thus, the whole range of structural impulse responses consistent with the reduced form error variance matrix  $\Sigma_u$  is given by varying  $Q \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$  over all unitary matrices (for given Cholesky factor  $L$ ). This is clearly not feasible and thus approximate solutions are required. Here we follow the approach of Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010) to generate uniformly distributed  $Q$ -matrices:

1. Draw a matrix  $M$  with i.i.d. standard normal entries and perform the QR-decomposition of the matrix  $M = QR$ . Doing so,  $Q$  is unitary and has the uniform (or Haar) distribution.

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<sup>4</sup>Note that imposing *too many* sign restrictions can reduce the set of feasible impulse responses to the empty set. The same is, a fortiori, true for the combination of zero and sign restrictions.

2. Calculate the corresponding structural impulse response function  $\{\widehat{\Theta}_j^Q\}_{j=0,\dots,J} = \{\widehat{\Phi}_j \widehat{L}_Q\}_{j=0,\dots,J}$  and verify whether the formulated sign restrictions are fulfilled. If so, keep  $\{\widehat{\Theta}_j^Q\}_{j=0,\dots,J}$ , otherwise discard it.
3. Repeat these calculations until the set of retained structural impulse responses contains  $n = 5000$  elements.

From the 5000 elements the median target impulse response function is then calculated as described below.

It remains to discuss the implementation of the combination of zero and sign restrictions, where we follow Arias et al. (2014). As can be guessed by now, the solution consists of drawing random unitary matrices that imply that the resultant  $\widehat{\Theta}_0^Q$  satisfies the required zero-at-impact restrictions in addition to the formulated sign restrictions. We describe the approach here only for our specific application, in which TFP is ordered last in the VAR model where we combine zero and sign restrictions:

1. Find a matrix  $N_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times (k-1)}$  with  $N_1' N_1 = I_{k-1}$  such that  $\widehat{L}_{[k,\bullet]} N_1 = 0$ , with  $\widehat{L}_{[k,\bullet]}$  denoting the  $k$ -th row of  $\widehat{L}$ .
2. Generate a vector  $z \in \mathbb{R}^k$  with i.i.d. standard normally distributed entries and form the vector:

$$q = \frac{1}{\| [N_1 \ 0_{k \times 1}] z \|} [N_1 \ 0_{k \times 1}] z, \quad (12)$$

i.e., project the vector  $z$  on the space spanned by  $N_1$  and normalize it to unit length.

3. Find a matrix  $N_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times (k-1)}$  with  $N_2' N_2 = I_{k-1}$  such that  $q' N_2 = 0$ .
4. Draw a matrix  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{(k-1) \times (k-1)}$  with i.i.d. standard normal entries and calculate the QR decomposition of  $N_2 M$ , i.e.,

$$N_2 M = [\tilde{Q}_1 \ \tilde{Q}_2] \begin{bmatrix} R_1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (13)$$

with  $\tilde{Q}_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times (k-1)}$ .

5. Form the matrix  $Q^+ = [q \ \tilde{Q}_1]$  and calculate the corresponding structural impulse response function  $\{\widehat{\Theta}_j^{Q^+}\}_{j=0,\dots,J} = \{\widehat{\Phi}_j \widehat{L}_{Q^+}\}_{j=0,\dots,J}$ , with  $\widehat{L}_{Q^+} = \widehat{L} Q^+$ , and verify whether the formulated sign restrictions are fulfilled. If so, keep  $\{\widehat{\Theta}_j^{Q^+}\}_{j=0,\dots,J}$ , otherwise dis-

card it. Note that by construction, the zero-at-impact restriction on the structural impulse response of  $\log TFP$  holds for all draws.

6. Repeat these calculations until the set of retained structural impulse responses contains  $n = 5000$  elements.

In the discussion of results with sign restrictions we focus on the median target (MT) impulse response functions, compare Fry and Pagan (2011). The MT impulse response function is the element-wise closest impulse response function – out of the retained 5000 impulse responses – to the median curve, which itself is not an impulse response function corresponding to any of the structural models. Thus, we consider the set of structural impulse responses  $\widehat{\Theta}^n = \{\widehat{\Theta}_j^n\}_{j=0,\dots,J}$  for  $n = 1, \dots, 5000$  and denote the (*element-wise*) median curve as  $\widehat{\Theta}_{med} = \{\widehat{\Theta}_{j,med}\}_{j=0,\dots,J}$ . The median target impulse response is defined as:

$$\widehat{\Theta}^{MT} = \operatorname{argmin}_{n=1,\dots,5000} \sum_{r \in \mathcal{R}} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \frac{1}{\widehat{V}_{r,s}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left( \widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)} - \widehat{\Theta}_{j,med}^{(r,s)} \right)^2, \quad (14)$$

with  $\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{S} \subseteq \{1, \dots, k\}$  and  $\mathcal{J} \subseteq \{0, \dots, J\}$ .  $\widehat{V}_{r,s}$  is a measure of variability of the set of sign-restricted impulse responses for variable  $r$  and shock  $s$ . Starting with  $\widehat{\operatorname{Var}}(\widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)}) = \frac{1}{5000} \sum_{n=1}^{5000} (\widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)} - \overline{\widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)}})^2$ , with  $\overline{\widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)}} = \frac{1}{5000} \sum_{n=1}^{5000} \widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)}$ , we use two variability measures  $\widehat{V}_{r,s}$ :

$$\widehat{V}_{r,s}^{max} = \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \widehat{\operatorname{Var}}(\widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)}) \quad (15)$$

$$\widehat{V}_{r,s}^{avg} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{J}|} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \widehat{\operatorname{Var}}(\widehat{\Theta}_{j,n}^{(r,s)}), \quad (16)$$

with  $|\mathcal{J}|$  denoting the cardinality of  $\mathcal{J}$ . In our application the results do not differ markedly when using either the maximum or the average variation measure. The results in the paper are based on the average measure  $\widehat{V}_{r,s}^{avg}$ .

Note that the general formulation above, with the index sets  $\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{J}$  allows to calculate the distances for any combination of variables, shocks and horizons deemed important for the econometric analysis at hand.<sup>5</sup> In relation to our application we consider only on the impulse responses to the government spending shock, i.e.,  $\mathcal{S} = \{1\}$  and the restricted impulse responses. Thus, for the three specifications considered, we have  $\mathcal{R} = \{1, 2, 5, 7\}$  (baseline specification),  $\{1, 2, 5, 7, 9\}$  (utilization rate augmented specification) or  $\{1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10\}$  (utilization rate and TFP augmented specification). The horizons considered are  $\mathcal{J} = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ ,

<sup>5</sup>Clearly, the difference can also be calculated with any other quantile or the mean as target.

with the results robust to choosing only one or two quarters.

## Inference on impulse response functions

The confidence bands for the recursive identification scheme are obtained using the bootstrap algorithm proposed in Kilian (1998), which is based on a preliminary (simulation based) bias correction step. The 5000 bootstrap samples are then drawn using bias corrected parameter estimates.

Some more care has to be taken into account when bootstrapping the median target solution. The median target structural impulse response function by construction depends upon  $\widehat{B}_1, \dots, \widehat{B}_p$  as well as  $\widehat{L}_{QMT} = \widehat{L}Q^{MT}$ , with  $Q^{MT}$  denoting the rotation matrix corresponding to the minimizer of (14). Thus, resampling data from the reduced form model has to be combined with the structural decomposition given by  $\widehat{L}_{QMT}$ , which is done by a modification of the previous algorithm:

1. As in the standard case, generate a bootstrap sample,  $x_1^*, \dots, x_T^*$  using the Kilian (1998) bootstrap, i.e., bias corrected parameter estimates.
2. Estimate the parameters of the VAR model using  $x_t^*$ , resulting in parameter estimates  $\widehat{B}_1^*, \dots, \widehat{B}_p^*$ . Calculate the structural impulse response function using these parameter estimates and the *original*  $\widehat{L}_{QMT}$ .
3. Verify whether the impulse response function from the previous item,  $\{\widehat{\Theta}_j^{QMT*}\}_{j=0, \dots, J}$ , satisfies the formulated sign restrictions. If it does, keep it, otherwise discard it.
4. Repeat the above steps until 1000 impulse responses are retained and calculate pointwise bootstrap confidence bands as usual from these 1000 impulse responses.

## Appendix B

In Sections 3.3–3.4 in the main text we present the median target impulse responses as summaries or typical representatives of the set of sign-restricted impulse responses. In the following we augment this information by additionally plotting the element-wise median curve as well as the element-wise 10-th and 90-th quantile curves. As already mentioned, the median curve, and similarly the quantile curves, do not themselves correspond to structural models. This is, since for any variable, shock and horizon the median or quantile may – and in general will – correspond to a different structural model.

The structure of the following plots is the same as that of figures 3–5 in the main text. Figure 3A corresponds to the specification shown in figure 3, figure 4A to the specification of figure 4 and figure 5A to the specification of figure 5. The figures show that the feasible set of sign-restricted impulse responses includes elements with both positive and negative responses of output, hours and labor productivity to a government spending shock. The figures also show, however, that the main tendency points towards the direction discussed in the main text and represented by the median target impulse responses. There is only one small noticeable difference: the median target response of the utilization rate shown in figure 5 shows a positive albeit not significant value in the first period, whereas the median curve (shown in figure 5A) starts off negatively.




Figure 3A: Set of sign-restricted impulse responses to government spending shock identified through restrictions (i) – (iii).






Figure 4A: Set of sign-restricted impulse responses to government spending shock identified through restrictions (i), (iii) and (iv).




Figure 5A: Set of point- and sign-restricted impulse responses to government spending shock identified through restrictions (i), (iii), (iv) and (v).





