Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wimmer, Simon	-
dc.date.accessioned	2024-08-08T08:34:19Z	-
dc.date.available	2024-08-08T08:34:19Z	-
dc.date.issued	2023-06-13	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2003/42638	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-24475	-
dc.description.abstract	I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that ϕ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that ϕ, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’	en
dc.language.iso	en	de
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Canadian journal of philosophy;52(8)	-
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	de
dc.subject	knowledge	en
dc.subject	primitivism about knowledge	en
dc.subject	epistemology	en
dc.subject.ddc	100	-
dc.title	Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle	en
dc.type	Text	de
dc.type.publicationtype	Article	de
dcterms.accessRights	open access	-
eldorado.secondarypublication	true	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifier	https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.16	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitation	Wimmer S. Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2022;52(8):777-788. doi:10.1017/can.2023.16	de
Appears in Collections:	Institut für Philosophie

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