Participatory Local Governance for Sustainable Community-Driven Development

The case of the rural periphery in the Kurdish region of Iraq

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Revised: 31 March 2008

Originally submitted 3 July 2007 to the faculty of spatial planning at Dortmund University as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Dr. rer. Pol.
Acknowledgements

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to all individuals and institutions who in different ways contributed to the completion of this research work. I am particularly indebted to my academic advisor Prof. Dr. Günter Kroës. I thank him for all his support, care and patience with me to successfully overcome all kinds of limitations and obstacles to complete this work. I also thank my second advisor, Prof. Dr. Einhard Schmidt-Kallert for his practical and useful comments and Dr. Sebastian Müller for accepting to be my external examiner.

I have no words to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for granting me a scholarship to conduct my doctoral studies and having confidence in me to work for a democratic planning system in the Kurdish region. I am also very grateful to the Martin Schmeißer Foundation which in difficult financial situation supported me to carry out the empirical work. I will always appreciate the support of Professor Jameel Al. Jaloudi from Al-Balqa Applied University and his family in Mahis in facilitating the life in Jordan while waiting for a German visa. I am also grateful to all members of the Faculty of Spatial Planning especially Dr. Katrin Weiß, Dr. Karin Gaesing, Susanne Syska-Fleckes, Alexandra Hill and Herr Reiner Löb for their valuable advice and administrative services. Sincere thanks to all colleagues from other developing countries, especially Wondimu Kenea from Ethiopia, who provided me more insights into the development problems in their countries.

Many people also assisted me during the field study in the Kurdish region in Iraq and I am grateful to all of them in particular Dana Qashani (a local urban planner), Andrea Fischer-Taher (the employee at the ministry of higher education in Sulaimanyah), Barbara Dridi (Concordia manager in Kurdistan) and Kamal Tamas (a management student at the Sulaimanyah University). I thank Anwar Ibrahim (the director of planning department at the ministry of agriculture in Erbil) and Abobakar Ahmed (the employee at the ministry of agriculture in Sulaimanyah) for being supportive and helpful in approaching local people and institutions to carry out the field study.

Without the enormous support, hospitality and friendly attitudes of local people in the targeted sub-districts and communities, the conduction of the field study would have been very difficult. It was in fact an encouraging factor to implement all activities as were planned despite limited time and resources. In the Seweil sub-district, I am grateful to Farhad Saleh (the head of the sub-district government), Khalid Abdullah (the Mayor of the sub-district centre), Salam Hasan (the head of school in the sub-district centre). The cooperation spirit and great hospitality of the people in the targeted communities are highly appraised. I am particularly thankful to Abdullah Mohammad, Rasool Mohammad, Mamosta Ahmad (the school director) and Dr.Khalid (health official) in Marwe and Mohammad Mesri and Osman Rahim in Bewre. As well, in the Harir sub-district people helped to facilitate the implementation process of the fieldwork activities, just to mention a few, Haje Sabir (the employee at the agricultural agency in Harir), Kak Majed and his son Jabrail in Jamasor and Namegh Abdulkhalegh and his family in Old Batas. I am indebted to all these people and institutions for their enormous hospitality and cooperative behaviour to facilitate the implementation of the data collection activities.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife Rezheen and my children Mardin and Kanila for their understanding and patience and standing by me throughout my academic adventure. Without their immense support and sacrifice this work would not have been completed.

Abstract

Under the rule of Saddam’s dictatorship during 1970s and 1980s huge part of the rural area in the Kurdish region of Iraq was destroyed and caused enormous internally displaced people and consequently most social structures as part of social capital were collapsed. In 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces took control over a major part of the Kurdish region and tried to build their own institutions for reconstruction and development of the controlled area by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Lack of experiences in good governance and effective management has made the social reengineering very difficult and has also created an enabling environment for power abuse, corruption and misuse of public resources. The current rural-urban mass migration in the region is a clear indicator on the lack of effective institutional arrangements for rural community development. Increased corruption as a result of poor governance has put a question mark on the legitimacy and capability of the KRG to effectively deal with the development problems. This is the background on which this thesis has been written.

To effectively deal with current development problems in the Kurdish region, Community Driven Development (CDD) strategies are proposed that operate on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability and enhanced local capacity to use social capital effectively. The principles of good governance such as rule of law, participation, transparency, and accountability necessary to achieve sustainable local development are examined in a traditional and post-conflict society that face many challenges toward a real democracy.

In this process the need for fundamental but incremental change in existing institutional structure to strengthen the rule of conduct and coordination of efforts are highlighted. The study emphasises the need to introduce the “participatory local governance” where political and institutional reforms are carried out to increase the capacity and authority of the local institutions. The study also introduces “communicative planning” to build network and partnership among local institutions, which as a legitimating process requires trust, consensus-building and democratic control to direct the development course of the society. The findings justify the need for political and institutional pluralism to promote local governance for sustainable CDD.

Key words: Social capital, traditional society, civil society, community empowerment, sustainability, grassroots participation, institutional capacity building, accountability, corruption, local governance and decentralization.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-based Organizations</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community Driven Development</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnant of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
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<td>KFU</td>
<td>Kurdistan Farmers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNA</td>
<td>Kurdistan National Assembly</td>
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<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<td>KWU</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
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<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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1 Introduction

The study of institutions as formal rules and informal constraints in a particular region or country needs an in-depth look into the historical, cultural, social, political and economic circumstances and tracing the incremental evolution of the institutions. In the Kurdish region of Iraq during the last decades many factors in a complex environment have interacted to create the current political and institutional structure.

The aim of this chapter is to explain the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq relevant for later references in the thesis. Then based on the context of the Kurdish region from which the most current development problems are rooted, the research problems and objectives will be discussed. Finally, the structure of the work will be presented.

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Figure 1.1: Areas of majority Kurdish settlement in the Middle East and Iraq

- Kurdish region in the Middle East
- Kurdish region in Iraq

Source: Adapted from [www.krg.se](http://www.krg.se), access: 15 May 2005

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1 The main focus of this study is on the functional understanding of institutions and not so much on the organisational structures. For more explanation see page 14.
1.1 The context of the Kurdish region in Iraq

The Kurdistan Regional Government

The Kurdistan region is an autonomous, federally recognized, political entity located in north part of Iraq. It borders Iran to the east, Turkey to the north and Syria to the west (see Figure 1.2 on page 3). Its capital is the city of Erbil, known in Kurdish as Hewlêr. The name Kurdistan is a combination of the word "Kurd" derived from the ancient Kingdom of Corduene plus the suffix "istan", together meaning Land of the Kurds. The full name of this region is Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) which in the new Iraqi constitution is referred to the Kurdish region under the control of the Kurdish authorities.

A Kurdish autonomous region was established in 1970 following the agreement of an autonomy accord between the government of Iraq and leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish community. A legislative assembly was established in the city of Erbil with theoretical authority over the Kurdish-populated provinces of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah. In practice, however, the assembly was under the control of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein until the 1991 Kurdish uprising against his rule.

The Kurdistan region gained de facto independence after creating the Iraqi no-fly-zones which were proclaimed by the coalition forces and UN after the Gulf war of 1991 to protect Kurds from the further attack of former Iraqi army. As a result, since 1991, the region has been ruled by the two principal political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) without any control from Baghdad. The KDP and the PUK are originally initiated by people during the 1960s and the 1970s to organize the Kurdish movement to build a territorial autonomy in Iraq. While the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk and part of Ninawa province are the stronghold of the KDP, the PUK is dominating the Sulaymaniyah province and part of Kirkuk and Dyala provinces (see Figure 1.2 on page 3). The region has its own flag and National Anthem.

Geography, demography and culture

The area of the Kurdish region in Iraq is about 80,000 sq km, and thus it forms 18% of the total area of Iraq (about 435,000 sq km). The Kurdish population in Iraq is about six million, of whom 2/3 inhabiting the three provinces of Erbil, Sulaimanyah, Dohuk and parts of Dyala, Kirkuk and Mosul provinces currently under the control of the KRG. The remaining population inhabit the area under the control of coalition forces and Iraqi government. There will be a referendum in December 2007 to determine whether the other provinces will be included in the KRG.

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2 The information source of this section is from different public documents e.g. UNICEF (2002), Wikipedia (2006), Kurdistan Parliament (2007), etc. whose reliability has been cross-checked. It is worth to note that the term Northern Iraq is a bit of a geographical ambiguity in usage. "North" typically refers to the Kurdish region. "Center" and "South" are referring to the other areas of Iraq. Media types continually refer to "North" and "Northern Iraq" as anywhere north of Baghdad.
3

Figure 1.2: Map of the Kurdish region in Iraq

The Kurdish region in Iraq is largely mountainous with the highest point being a 3,611 m point known locally as Cheekah Dar (black tent). There are many rivers flowing and running through mountains of the region making it distinguished by its fertile lands, plentiful water, and picturesque nature. The largest lake in the region is Lake Dukan. The mountainous nature of the region, the difference of temperatures in its various parts, and its wealth of waters, make the Kurdish region a land of agriculture and tourism. In addition, there are various minerals in particular oil in the province of Kirkuk that is not controlled by the KRG.

The majority of the people in the Kurdish region in Iraq are Sunni Muslims. There are also significant numbers of Christians and Yazidis, who believe in Zarathushtra as the ancient Kurdish religion. Kurds comprise the ethnic majority in the region while the Assyrian who particularly resides in the western part of the area makes up the second largest group.

Kurdish cultural heritage is rooted in one of the world's oldest cultures, the Mesopotamian. Through the ages, this heritage has been subject to injustices, neglect and repression or has been eclipsed by other cultures. Important components of the original cultural heritage have disappeared or have been destroyed. Kurds have always been among the more liberal Muslims and as a result Kurdish women have faced fewer restrictions in wearing headscarf or holding jobs outside home than other Muslim women. The Kurdish culture is close to Iranian culture among their neighbours, for example they celebrate Newroz as the New Year which is celebrated on March 21 as the first day of spring in Iranian and Kurdish calendar.

Economy

The economy of the Kurdish region in Iraq is dominated by the agriculture and tourism sectors. In addition, there are huge oil reserves in those areas that are not yet controlled by the KRG especially in the province of Kirkuk. Prior to the removal of Saddam

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3 There are numerous examples of how valuable or irreplaceable Kurdish physical heritage are endangered or destroyed, like the threat posed by the Illusi Dam in Kurdish region in Turkey, where the oldest Kurdish city, Hasankeyf, soon is to be covered by water.
Hussein, the KRG received approximately 13% of the revenues from Iraq’s oil-for-food program\(^4\).

Following the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the subsequent sectarian violence in Iraq, the three provinces fully under the KRG’s control were the only three in Iraq to be ranked “secure” by the international community. The relative security and stability of the region has allowed the KRG to sign a number of investment contracts with foreign companies. In 2006 the first new oil well since the invasion of Iraq was drilled in the Kurdish region by the Norwegian energy company DNO. Initial indications are that the oil field contains at least 100 million barrels of oil and will be pumping 5,000 bpd by early 2007. The KRG has signed exploration agreements with two other oil companies, Canada’s Western Oil Sands and the UK’s Sterling Energy.

The relative stability of the Kurdish region has allowed it to achieve a higher level of development than other regions in Iraq. Since 2003, the reconstruction boom in the Kurdish region has attracted around 20,000 Arab workers from the rest of Iraq. The two chief cities of the region, Erbil and Sulaimanyah, both have international airports serving destinations through the Middle East and parts of Europe. The KRG continues to receive a portion of the revenue from Iraq’s oil exports and will soon implement a unified foreign investment law.

**Politics**

Since 1992, the KRG has been based in Erbil which consists of a parliament, elected by popular vote, called the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and a cabinet composed of the KDP, the PUK and their allies (Iraqi Communist Party, the Socialist Party of Kurdistan etc.). Nechervan Idris Barzani has been prime minister of the KRG since 1999. The main Kurdish parties and Kurdish Peshmerga forces cooperated with the US-led coalition during the 2003 invasion of Iraq that led to Hussein’s overthrow and afterwards Kurdish politicians were represented in the Iraqi governing council. On January 30, 2005 three elections were held in the Kurdish region: the first for Transitional National Assembly of Iraq; the second for the KNA and the third for provincial councils. The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period recognized the autonomy of the KRG during the interim between "full sovereignty" and the adoption of a permanent constitution.

The KRG has constitutionally recognized authority over the provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk, as well as de facto authority over parts of Diyala and Ninawa and Kirkuk provinces. One particularly difficult issue yet to be resolved is the future boundaries of the region. Many Kurds wish it to be expanded to include the largely Kurdish cities of Mosul and Kirkuk but this is complicated by the Assyrian, Turkmen and Arab populations of both cities and the opposition of Turkey which is concerned about the region’s potential to break away from Iraq with possible consequences for its own Kurdish minority.

The final boundaries of the autonomous region are set to be decided through a number of referendums. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to be held on 15 November 2007 to decide its status with respect to the region but was delayed first to 31 December and then by a further six months. In the wake of the ratification of the Iraqi constitution in October 2005, Iraqi Kurdistan reconstitutes itself as a region under the

\(^4\) For more information about the oil-for-food program see page 9.
new constitutional framework. The relatively high political achievement in the region is a result of historical efforts of its people who have gone through many crisis and difficulties during last century as explained in the following section.

**History**

The Kurdish region in Iraq has gained very different political and socioeconomic settings during the last decades. It is highly imperative to give a historical background to the region to better understand the complex context of its current development problems. Before 1970s, in the Kurdish region, agriculture and animal husbandry provided most employment and household food security. But, the region has during last decades especially in 1980s been subjected for tremendous political, social, demographic and economic challenges causing drastic decrease in agricultural production and destruction of rural infrastructure which are explained chronologically below.

**British mandate**

On December 1918 during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah with Colonel Arnold Wilson (the Acting Civil Commissioner for Mesopotamia) Kurdish leaders called for British support for a united and independent Kurdistan under British protection. Between 1919 and 1922, Sheikh Mahmoud Hafid, an influential Kurdish leader based in Sulaymaniyah, formed a Kurdish government and led two revolts against the British rule. It took the British authorities two years to put down the uprisings and exiled Sheikh Mahmoud to India. In July 1920, 62 tribal leaders of the region called for independence of the Kurdish region under a British mandate.

The objection of the British to the Kurdish self-rule was driven by the fear that the success of the Kurdish region will tempt the two Arab areas of Baghdad and Basra to follow suit, hence endangering the direct British control over all Mesopotamia. In 1922, Britain restored Sheikh Mahmoud to power hoping that he would organize the Kurds to act as a buffer against the Turks who had territorial claims over Mosul. Sheikh Mahmoud declared a Kurdish Kingdom with himself as the King, though later on he agreed to limited autonomy within the new state of Iraq. In 1930, following the announcement of admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, Sheikh Mahmoud started a third uprising which was suppressed with British air and ground forces.

By 1927, Barzani clan had become vocal supporters of Kurdish rights in Iraq. In 1929, the Barzanis demanded the formation of a Kurdish province in northern Iraq and emboldened by these demands in 1931 Kurdish notables appealed the League of Nations to set up an independent Kurdish government. Under the pressure from the Iraqi government and the British, the most influential leader of the clan, Mustafa Barzani was forced into exile in Iran in 1945 and after the collapse of the Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan in 1946 moved to the Soviet Union.

**Barzani revolts 1960-1975 and their aftermath**

Abdul Karim Qasim, who was an army officer, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 and became head of the newly formed Republic of Iraq. This enabled Barzani to return from exile and to set up his own political party, the KDP which was granted legal status in 1960. But soon afterwards, Qasim tried to incite Baradost and Zebari tribes against Barzani. In June 1961, Barzani led his first revolt against the Iraqi government with the aim of securing Kurdish autonomy. Due to the disarray in the Iraqi Army after the 1958
coup, Qasim's government was not able to subdue the insurrection. This stalemate irritated powerful factions within the military and is said to be one of the main reasons behind the Baathist coup against Qasim in February 1963. Abdul Salam Arif declared a ceasefire in February 1964 which provoked a split among Kurdish urban radicals on one hand and traditional forces led by Barzani on the other. Barzani agreed to the ceasefire and fired the radicals from the party which later resulted in building the PUK. Despite this, Baghdad government tried once more to defeat Barzani's movement by the use of force but this campaign failed in 1966 when Barzani forces defeated the Iraqi Army near Rawanduz. After this, Arif regime announced a twelve-point peace program in June 1966 which was not implemented due to the overthrow of Arif in 1967 in a coup by the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein.

The Baath regime started a campaign to end the Kurdish insurrection that was stalled in 1969. This can be partly attributed to the internal power struggle in Baghdad and also tensions with Iran. Moreover, Soviet pressured the Iraqis to come to terms with Barzani. Hence a peace plan was announced in March 1970 which provided for a broader Kurdish autonomy than before. The plan also gave Kurds representation in government bodies and it was to be implemented in four years. Despite this, the Iraqi government embarked on an Arabization program in the oil-rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanaqin in the same period. In the following years, Baghdad government overcame its internal divisions and concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in April 1972 and ended its isolation within the Arab world. As a result, Kurds remained dependent on the Iranian military support and could do little to strengthen their forces.

The Algiers agreement

In 1974, the Iraqi government began a new war against the Kurds and pushed them close to the border with Iran. Meanwhile, Iraq informed Tehran that it was willing to satisfy other Iranian demands in return for an end to its aid to the Kurds. With the mediation of the Algerian President Houari Boumédiène, Iran and Iraq reached a comprehensive settlement in March 1975 known as Algiers Pact. The agreement left the Kurds helpless as Tehran cut supplies to the Kurdish movement. Barzani fled to Iran with many of his supporters and others surrendered en masse and the rebellion was finished in a few days. Consequently, Iraqi government extended its control over northern region after 15 years and started an Arabization program by moving Arabs to the oil fields in the Kurdish region particularly the ones around Kirkuk.

The repressive measures carried out by the Iraqi regime against Kurds after the Algiers agreement, led to renewed clashes between the Iraqi army and Kurdish guerrillas in 1977. Consequently in 1978 and 1979, nearly 600 Kurdish villages were burned down in order to cut support for Kurdish guerrilla in monotonous area bordered to Iran and as a consequence around 200,000 rural people were deported to the small collective towns far from their farmlands and livestock. The Kurdish resistance was calmed down for a while but never gave up the struggle for ethnic rights and regional autonomy within Iraq.

Iran-Iraq war and Anfal campaign

By removing Shah of Iran from power in 1979, the historical conflicts between Iran and Iraq again appeared which led to a long-lasting war between the two countries (1980-1988). The Iraqi army concentrated its resources in the south to battle the Iranian army and the Kurdish resistance groups took the golden opportunities to reorganize themselves in the north of the country. But later a new front of war was opened in the
north as well and consequently, huge rural areas of the Kurdish region bordered to Iran became large minefields and were heavily contaminated with weapons especially with mines and Explosive Remnant of War (ERW) which have caused thousands of innocent death and everlasting handicap of the rural people. The existence of landmines and unexploded ordnance in the rural area, which is still not totally cleared, has had a direct impact on the environmental, social and economic aspects of the rural area.

*Anfal* campaign constituted a systematic genocide of the Kurdish people by Iraqi army between 1986 and 1989 (during and just after the Iran-Iraq war). Rural people were collected, systematically killed and mass grave far away from their home region. The campaign takes its name from Surat Al-Anfal in the Koran, which was used as a code name by the former Iraqi regime for a campaign against the Kurdish community of northern Iraq characterized by the following human rights violations by the most conservative estimates: The widespread use of chemical weapons, the wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, and slaughter of around 50,000 rural Kurds. The large Kurdish town of Qala Dizeh (population 70,000) was completely destroyed by the Iraqi army. The *Anfal* campaign is said to have cost the lives of 182,000 civilian Kurds, according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Mass graves of the dead have been discovered in centre and south of the country after the collapse of former Iraqi dictatorship.

"Arabization" was another major element of Al-Anfal which heavy population redistribution was carried out, most notably in the oil-rich area of Kirkuk. This was a further policy of ethnic cleansing and a tactic used by Saddam's regime to drive Kurdish families out of their homes in Kirkuk and built several public housing facilities in the city as part of his “Arabization”, shifting poor Arabs from Iraq's southern regions to Kirkuk with the lure of inexpensive housing.

The *Anfal* campaign has been considered as one of the most terrible genocide policy for ethnic cleansing in modern history but the Kurdish resistance did not give up and the former Iraqi dictatorship did not stop carrying out further collective punishment against a people who struggled for their right of autonomy. During the Iran-Iraq war, the regime implemented anti-Kurdish policies which was widely-condemned by the international community but was never seriously punished for oppressive measures, including the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds that resulted in thousands of deaths in the town of Halabja.

*Halabja poison gas attack*

Among all of the atrocities committed against the Kurds, as part of *Anfal* campaign, Halabja poison gas attack has come to symbolize the worst of the repression of the Iraqi Kurds. Saddam Hussein's regime carried out conventional and chemical bomb attacks over three days in March of 1988 on the Kurdish town of Halabja of 70,000 people located about 8-10 miles from the Iranian border. Whole families died while trying to flee clouds of nerve and mustard agents descending from the sky. At least 5,000 people died immediately as a result of the chemical attack and as a further effect of this single chemical massacre of the Kurds, many who managed to survive still suffer from cancer, blindness, respiratory diseases, miscarriages, and severe birth defects among their children.

*The Gulf war and creating no-fly-zones*

The Gulf war was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of approximately 20 nations led by the United States and mandated by the UN in order to liberate Kuwait
from the Iraqi occupation. The war began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, following Iraqi arguments that Kuwait was illegally slant-drilling petroleum across Iraq’s border. The invasion was met with immediate economic sanctions by the UN against Iraq. Hostilities commenced in January 1991, resulting in a decisive victory for the coalition forces which drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with minimal coalition deaths.

A peace conference was held in Iraqi territory occupied by the coalition. At the conference, Iraq won the approval of the use of armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian transportation. Soon after, these helicopters and much of the Iraqi armed forces were refocused toward fighting against a Shiite uprising in the south. In the North, Kurdish leaders took heart in American statements that they would support an uprising and began fighting in the hopes of triggering a takeover. However, when no American support was forthcoming, Iraqi generals remained loyal and brutally crushed the Kurdish troops and as a result Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran.

Concerns for safety of Kurdish refugees was reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution 688 which gave birth to a safe haven in which allied air power protected a Kurdish zone inside Iraq. Then following several bloody clashes between Iraqi forces and Kurdish troops, an uneasy and shaky balance of power was reached and the Iraqi regime withdrew its military and other personnel from the region in October 1991.

As a consequence of creating the no-fly-zones, the Kurdish people took the historical chance and participated in a multi party election in June 1992 and the main Kurdish political parties (the KDP and the PUK) established the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and other institutions to run their own issues. But, due to the lack of democratic traditions and experiences in institutional building, the elections produced an uncertain outcome that the assembly was divided almost equally between the two main parties and their allies. Anyway, the primary objective of the KRG, UN-agencies and other aid organizations was the reconstruction of the destroyed villages and rural infrastructure to encourage internally displaced people to return to their farms. At the same time, Iraq imposed an economic blockade over the region, reducing its oil and food supplies.

*Imposition of triple embargo*

During this period, the Kurds were subjected to a double embargo: one imposed by the UN on Iraq and one imposed by Saddam Hussein on the Kurdish region. The severe economic hardships caused by the embargoes and power struggle between the KDP and the PUK over control of trade routes and resources led to intra-Kurdish conflict between 1994 and 1996. The third embargo was imposed by the two separated administrations of the KDP and the PUK on their respective areas in the region. In this manner, the triple embargo caused enormous poverty and under-nourishment among people and decreased the quality of education, and thereby mass out-migration of the people to the western European courtiers which caused brain-drain and erosion of human capital. As a result trust as social capital between people and institutions was eroded which has still not recovered and it says to be one of the obstacles to really reunify the separated administrations of the KDP and the PUK. In addition, the main infrastructure of the region e.g. buildings, roads, power facilities, water facilities, and waste processing capability was damaged that allowed eroding the physical capital that are still not fully reconstructed especially in the rural areas.
Emerging enormous poverty among the urban population in the region who lacked of food, fuel and other basic needs convinced the rural people to stay in their villages focusing on the agricultural related activities that provide them a relatively self-sufficient and secure livelihood sources.

_Oil-for-food programme and Washington agreement_

According to the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN and the former Iraqi government, the UN was entitled to implement Security Council Resolution 986, which stipulated the terms of reference of the oil-for-food programme, on behalf of the former Iraqi government in the three northern governorates. The UN used the 13 percent of funds allocated to the Kurdish region from the total budget for the programme. The programme was funded by commissioned oil sales and was allocated for provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population which began operating in the three governorates (Sulaymaniyyah, Erbil and Dohuk) in the Kurdish region in 1997. The two Kurdish administrations of the KDP and the PUK were at no point mentioned as a party of the legal framework of the programme which recognised only the relation between the former Iraqi government and the UN.

Meanwhile, direct United States mediation, led the two parties to a formal ceasefire in Washington agreement in September 1998 convincing them to return to negotiation table and put armed conflict aside. It is also argued that the oil-for-food program from 1997 onward had an important effect on end of the hostilities which all led that the situation in the Kurdish region gradually improved, although in a very uneven manner. Education, health, and water and sanitation facilities were reconstructed and service delivery was improving due to more imports of equipment, spares and essential supplies and food rations met the basic food needs of the population.

The reconstruction programmes provided many local people with causal labour employment and the resumption of state services enabled people to return to their jobs in education and health sectors. The financial resources brought in by the programme have also helped boost the economy and above all, internal peace has allowed the local population to begin rebuilding their lives. But, the programme had also a negative impact on the livelihood sources of the rural people as most food grains were imported and distributed free among the people of Iraq contra-productive to the local farming. As a consequence, in the Kurdish region, the rural people started migrating to the urban area to look for other income sources.

Political development after Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Kurdish military forces known as _peshmerga_ have played a key role in the overthrow of former Iraqi regime in spring 2003 by joining coalition forces in the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite lack of peace and stability and increased sectarian violence in south and centre parts of Iraq, the political development has been positive especially in the Kurdish region. All Iraqis, for the first time, went for a multi-party and democratic election in January 2005 which has increased the chance for establishment of a democratic and decentralized planning system in the country and opening the door for the institutions in the Kurdish region to find other development partners in the rest of Iraq. The KDP and the PUK have united to form an alliance with several smaller parties to increase the voice of the Kurdish people in Baghdad. The Kurdish alliance has 53 deputies and the Kurdish Islamic Union has five in the new Baghdad parliament. The PUK-leader Jalal Talibani has been elected president of the new Iraqi administration, while KDP leader Massoud Barzani is president of the KRG.
The security situation has got worse in Iraq during last years following by the outbreak of sectarian violence and increased insurgencies in the centre and south of the country which make the national reconciliation very difficult. The Kurdish community in the north fears that the outbreak of a civil war in other parts of Iraq will endanger the relative peace and stability in the Kurdish region and the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad would not act according to the new Iraqi constitutions to accept the legal status of the KRG. However, this is not a justification to ignore substantial institutional reforms in the Kurdish region for a more participatory planning. Planning is largely about how to deal with limitations and uncertainties in the future.

1.2 Problem statement

Intra-Kurdish conflict between the main political parties (the KDP and the PUK) during 1990s, which was explained earlier in this chapter, was one of the factors to mass out-migration of the people to the western European courtiers which caused brain-drain and erosion of human capital. As a result trust as social capital between people and institutions was eroded which has still not recovered and it says to be one of the obstacles to really reunify the separated administrations of the KDP and the PUK.

The negative trend of rural-urban mass migration in the region caused by the implementation of the oil-for-food programme was reinforced after collapsing of the Iraqi dictatorship in 2003. It was positive that the legal status of the KRG was accepted and financial capacity of the KRG was increased but it lacked effective policy for regional rural development. Instead, it has focused only on urban development which convinced rural people to out-migrate in searching for employment within the public sector in the urban area as police and security guards. As a result, the farmland remained uncultivated and the livestock were sold to the Iranian villagers which have had negative effects on agricultural related activities as the basis of local economy. The rural people who were in better economic conditions moved to the big cities in the region where they had already a house and income generating capabilities. The poor households remained in the rural area are largely engaging themselves in subsistence farming that has already endangered food security of the region. The major income source of rural inhabitants in the border area to neighbouring countries is cross-border trade activities. Regarding the relationship between the civilians and the government institutions, there is a high social capital deficit. The rural people have simply lost their confidence in the government as it lacks regional rural development policies to connect the rural and urban economies (Jalal.F., 2006: 4).

Furthermore, ineffective land use management and agricultural policy has eroded the natural capital in the region. Large agricultural land, as the main production factor for agricultural output, is still contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance and has eroded the natural capital. The mine clearance process has not been successfully implemented and mine action organizations have argued the slowdown of the process due to the Kurdistan nature, terrain and topography, and the existing of a high number of metal fragments in the land which make mine clearance very difficult. Since 2003 the agricultural land in the region has rapidly being transformed into building land or it is left unplanted since farming is no longer profitable. As a result, the rural-urban mass migration is continuing to such an extent as never seen before.\(^5\) Now, the big cities are characterized by the highest population, job density, expansion of informal settlement

\(^5\) Information about the exact number of the out-migrated rural people is missing by the local authorities as well as by the international aid agencies.
areas and increased traffic volume. Increasing land claims and impairments through housing, industry, commerce and traffic endanger the quality of natural resources. The spatial development trends are alarming because of many negative effects on the environment and hence on the quality of life (Jalalj, 2005:14).

Latest tense public discussions on the Kurdish mass media have pointed out that the KRG system is not able to deal with development problems in the region. Current rural-urban mass migration is a clear indicator on lack of effective mechanism and institutional arrangement for community-driven and sustainable rural development. Sustainable agricultural and rural development strategies are missing despite that the agricultural sector is the main potential for the economic development in the region and fulfils the national and regional polices on food security. The policies to achieve sustainable development in the rural communities based on available capital assets (natural, social, human and physical) are missing. In addition, the system is not able to effectively absorb the human and intellectual capital provided by the Kurdish returnees in western European countries.

The core institutional obstacle to the development in the region is that the planning system is highly characterized by sectoral and top-down approaches inherited from the former Iraqi system. Recent development efforts have been solely concentrated on physical development in urban area in ad hoc approach and the strengths of rural area with its rich natural resources to achieve sustainable development have not been considered. The capacity development of local institutions, as social capital additionally to other capital assets (natural, human and physical), has largely been ignored. For example, in the rural area it has been easier to build irrigation channels than to put a workable water management system in place which require common action from the community people. For many development agencies in the region, the main dilemma has been how to reconcile the twin objectives of physical development and local institutional development as a soft and cross-disciplinary activity. In addition, the local governments suffer from a “power deficit” as they will continue to lack the tools very needed to become powerful local development actors. Latest public discussion in the region has also emphasized the urgent need to alleviate the corruption as a major obstacle to fairly distribute the resources among civilians and to provide basic social services for grassroots people (Qadir, 2006:12; Bayani weekly newspaper, 2006:1)

To summarise, the reasons of development problems in the Kurdish region to a large extent could be found in the complex historical events explained earlier. During the last decades, all type of community assets such as the natural, human, social, and physical capital from which a community receives benefits and on which the community relies for continued existence, were heavily eroded. The region is currently facing an enormous challenge to rethink about its development approaches that calls for a paradigm shift from reconstruction, sectoral and physical development to build local institutional capacity for sustainable development.

1.3 Research objectives and questions

The main objective of this research is to analyze the role of existing local institutions as part of social capital in the community development process in the rural area of the region, and their interrelationships and potentialities in strengthening self-directed development. It will be analyzed if there is a consensus-building dialogue between local stakeholders to increase the joint capacity and thereby responding more effectively to the interests and aspirations of the poorest of poor in the region. Based on social capital theories, the strengths and weaknesses of existing institutional norms and structure will
be assessed not only to know how they are applied in reality but if they can conform to sustainable community-driven development (CDD). The indicators of institutional effectiveness for local development to identify and analyse the gaps will be developed. Then, the right direction for appropriate solutions will be proposed and it will be discussed how to bridge the institutional capacity gaps and facilitate the establishment of participatory governance consisting of local network institutions for sustainable CDD. The final objective is to contribute to the knowledge of social capital theories for sustainable local development. In addition, the research tries to answer the following questions:

a) Which are the main obstacles to establish participatory governance consisting of local institutions for sustainable CDD?

b) How is the stock of social capital and how is the interplay among different types of social capital to promote CDD?

c) Are there effective institutional interaction and coordination mechanisms to gain synergy effect?

d) How do civic social capital and institutional social capital get together?

e) Are there appropriate supporting polices to participatory local governance and sustainable CDD? How to bridge the gaps?

f) How far can the generated ideas from the observed data be generalized and how this contributes to the development of social capital theories?

To summarize, the main focus of this research is to show how well the local system is dealing with the sustainable development issues; analysing institutional obstacles to CDD; and thereby proposing what direction to take in order to find appropriate solutions.

1.4 The structure of the work

The work consists of four parts: theoretical context; research design; empirical evidence including interpretation and generalization; and recommendations/general conclusions.

Chapter two is aimed to give conceptual guidance and lessons from accumulated experiences and practices with the purpose of creating a deeper and integrated view of conceptually related development topics of sustainable development, community driven development and participatory governance. Particularly, the role of social capital, as a broad concept and as a comprehensive approach to build institutional capacity in the society, is discussed. A framework has been developed to easier comprehend the link between different types and dimensions of social capital on three levels of micro, meso and macro, which is manifested through building different formal and informal institutions and their interrelationships for common good. Based on the inductive methodology, more adaptable concepts and theories to the research area were identified and developed during the entire learning process of the dissertation especially after conducting the empirical work and continual revision of the guiding concepts.

Chapter three highlights the link between conceptual and methodological framework. The reason to make the best of methodological pluralism by combining a number of approaches, e.g. deductive and inductive approaches appropriate to the context of the research area is explained. In addition, the reasons to avoid conventional field study methods and, instead, applying triangulation as a tool to cross-check the reliability of the obtained data, are discussed. A sampling framework was designed to select
representative sites and selection criteria of rain-fed area of the Kurdish region as research area including decision-making levels (household, group, community and sub-district). To provide a broader insight into the development problems in the research area and to increase the chance for analytical generalization, a comprehensive comparative case study of two contrasting rural sub-districts including two different communities from each one was conducted.

Chapters four and five provide base for empirical evidence, interpretation of data and analytical generalization.

Chapter four discusses a service provision profile of the targeted communities that includes quality assessment of the existing public services; and past experiences with CDD including the impact of reconstruction and development projects implemented after 1991 to know if the development actors have succeeded to encourage local participation and to initiate a CDD. Then, the existing stock of social capital; the institutional arrangements on local level; and the policy framework as an enabling environment to solve the community development problems and to initiate CDD, will be presented. Finally, the gaps to implement the existing institutional norms and structures will be identified to explore how they are applied in reality and how they conform to sustainable CDD. Particularly, the current system of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is targeted for an in-depth investigation.

In chapter five, a more in-depth analysis of the institutional gaps to CDD from a more “participatory governance” perspective is carried out by pointing out the interrelated obstacles to CDD on both local and policy levels. Then, it will be highlighted if there is a strong link between civic social capital and institutional social capital as a solid base to good governance and communicative planning system. In the conclusion part, the degree of analytical generalization and major obstacles to participatory local governance and CDD in the Kurdish region in Iraq is presented. Finally, the limitations in the research area to apply the data collection methods will be critically evaluated and discussed.

Chapters six and seven consist of proposals for fundamental change and general conclusions to improve the situation on the ground.

The chapter six is aimed to bring together both conceptual and evidence-based analysis. The attempt is to contribute to creation of a new institutional and policy framework within which problems involving community development might be examined and solved and thereby creating a sense of right direction for appropriate solutions. The main recommendation is to stimulate the creation of different types of social capital to CDD according to strengths and limitations both on local and policy levels. Some appropriate strategies and necessary actions are proposed to provide a space for discussion and key challenges for the future with the aim of trying to remove the obstacles to sustainable CDD. Especially, the importance of taking incremental but secure steps towards a real democracy and local governance in the Kurdish region is emphasized.

In chapter seven, first, the challenges for institutional capacity development as comprehensive social capital-building in the Kurdish region are discussed. Then, the contributions of this thesis to the current academic debates about the role of social capital and institutions in local development are highlighted. Finally, related to the development topics examined and developed in this dissertation, the aspects for future research will be recommended.
2 Social capital for sustainable Community-Driven Development

For achieving sustainable Community-Driven Development (CDD), the locally-based institutions must be in place to make effective use of the available capital assets (natural, social, human and physical). The term “local institution” is interchangeably used with “local association” or “local organization”. This follows the practice of most social science literature, but there is a slight distinction between the two concepts. Uphoff (1993) stated that:

“Institutions, whether organizations or not, are complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes, while organizations, whether institutions or not, are structures of recognized and accepted roles” (Uphoff, 1993:614).

Examples of institutions are money, the law and marriage. Organizations are e.g. workers’ unions and rotating credit associations. In some cases, the two terms overlap: the army is an institution as well as a group of soldiers; the parliament is a lawmaking institution as well as an association of law makers. The difference is a matter of degree, and organizations can become relatively “institutional” over time (ibid).

A pressing problem has been how to adapt the institutional strategies to local development, which has been relatively successful in the developed countries than in the rural areas in developing countries.

In fact, most organizational models reviewed throughout the literature are not very helpful in designing appropriate institutional structures for rural community development in the Kurdish region in Iraq as also in other developing countries and regions. For example, the decentralized organizational structure and learning organization models require high educational rate and self-motivation behaviour of the civilians which is mostly appropriate to advanced systems and effective organizational culture of some organizations in developed countries. These organizational models simply ignore the value of existing institutions and roles, socioeconomic, cultural and political realities of the rural areas in developing countries. These models are all built out of the western experience, which to begin with, was confined to well-defined organizational activities in a relatively democratic and decentralized planning system as an enabling environment. Under those conditions, it was relatively easy to develop an organizational theory capable of analyzing through both inductive and deductive systems and the various organizational issues (Singh 1986:299).

The structure of local institutions in rural areas of many developing countries is very different that makes it difficult to propose general strategies for making certain structural improvements in the institutions. The organizational models serve considerable purpose in their applications only to some rural activities such as those relating to fertilizer production, power generation, irrigation etc. In these activities, the performance of functions and tasks can be accurately measured and identified that make it easier to prescribe what is to be done to effectively and efficiently achieve the organizational objectives. Therefore, the research for appropriate institutional designs and structures for rural community development in developing countries still continues (Uphoff, 1986: 145-150).

The Kurdish region in Iraq is tremendously different regarding cultural, socioeconomic, political and physical (topography, soil, temperature, and water)
circumstances as mentioned partly in chapter one and can be seen on the topography and land use maps on page 69. Based on the research methodology, more adaptable concepts and theories were identified and developed during the entire learning process of the dissertation especially after conducting the empirical work and continual revision of the concepts.

This chapter is aimed to review and synthesize the existing knowledge and accumulated experiences of the conceptually related development topics, which are discussed within the framework of social capital as a long-term asset of a society. It will be discussed what kind of approaches and strategies are needed to build social capital on different levels of micro, meso and macro. In the context of the research area, it is necessary to take a locally-based and integrated view in the process of social capital building to create an enabling environment for sustainable Community-Driven Development (CDD).

### 2.1 Sustainable Community-Driven Development

Earlier references to sustainable development focused on the preservation of natural resources for present and future use. Thus, it was defined as development which meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The contemporary definition of sustainable development is more as a continuing process of social, economic, and environmental needs where the economic development should not undermine the ecological and social systems upon which communities and societies are dependent. UN (2004) states that:

"the lack of integration between the objectives of economic and social policies has become increasingly more evident and a more urgent issue" (UN, 2004:3).

The process of sustainable development involves a balance between human-made assets (physical capital), natural capital, social capital, and human capital and priority is neither given to the spatial demands of the economy and society nor to the demands of ecological protection. Depending on local circumstances there are different definitions and interpretations of sustainable development. Kamara and Kargbo (1999) state that:

"Sustainable development can mean different things to different people. In industrial countries, focus is on environmental management with as little negative impact on economic development as possible. In developing countries, focus is on economic development with as little negative impact on the environment as possible" (Kamara and Kargbo, 1999:108)

For example, in Germany, sustainable spatial development, is meant to bring ecological considerations in line with the social and economic demands on space which equal opportunities e.g. for education, medical care, housing, jobs, good environmental conditions and recreational activities are relatively guaranteed in a community or region. In most other developed countries in Europe bringing, the ecological capacity of space in line with the demands on space made by the economy and society is an important prerequisite for securing the quality of life (Lutter, 2001:5).

In some developing countries like the oil-rich Gulf States, the main focus has been to develop only one sector of the economy without considering fair share of benefits among different groups in the society and sustainable use of natural resources. Moreover, it is now widely recognized that sustainable community development in the developing countries cannot be achieved by the development of only one sector such as agriculture. Even if the agricultural sector is generally of prime importance in livelihood
development for many rural communities, the aspects of other sectors of social, ecological and non-agricultural economic development must be included in a truly integrated approach (Austin, 1981:1).

In ecological terms, the *carrying capacity* of an ecosystem is the size of the population that can be supported indefinitely upon the available resources and services of that ecosystem, for example, food and water as the natural capital of the community. Living within the carrying capacity means using those supplies no faster than they are replenished by the community's environment. A community that is degrading or destroying the ecosystem on which it depends is using up its community capital and is living unsustainably (Hart, 1999: website).

The sustainable community is not only about the carrying capacity of natural capital. Equally important to community sustainability is living within the carrying capacity of the community's human, social and physical capital. Carrying capacity is much harder to measure for human and social capitals but the basic concept is the same - are the different types of capital being used up faster than they are being replenished. Some examples will be given here: a community that allows its children to be poorly educated, undernourished, and poorly housed is eroding its human capital; a community that allows the quality of its social interactions to decline through lack of trust, respect, and tolerance is eroding its social capital; and a community that allows its buildings, roads, parks, power facilities, water facilities, and waste processing capability to decay is eroding its physical capital (ibid).

Thus, in the context of sustainability, carrying capacity is the size of the population that can be supported indefinitely upon the available resources and services of physical, natural, human and social capital. Sustainability can also be viewed from different levels: international/global, national, regional, provincial, municipal, community and individual level. These levels are interrelated and interdependent. For example, global events and trends can affect what happens in a small town within a province of a country. However, at whatever level sustainability involves an inherent or local capacity to initiate, manage, and pay for change.

To sum up, the best indicators for the sustainable community development are those which:

- address the issue of the community's carrying capacity relative to different types of community capital (physical, natural, human and social);
- fit the community in question and link the community's social well-being, economic development and environmental protection together; and
- Focus on a long range view and measure local development that is not at the expense of sustainability on the local, regional, national and global levels.

Traditional tangible indicators e.g. rate of literacy and infant mortality rate focus only on a single part of the development without considering the intangible indicators of social interaction, interpersonal relationships and institutional coordination to link all parts and sectors together, which is essential to achieve sustainable Community-Driven Development (CDD). They do not consider the important role of social capital to establish effective interactions among local people and institutions with shared vision of what the community should be.

The achievement of sustainable CDD requires balancing many different needs within the community which can be met by promoting effective interactions among people and institutions in the community on the one hand and with neighbouring communities and
institutions on higher levels on the other hand as part of social capital investment, which includes:

- Social relationships: sharing, cooperating, and solving common problems together.
- Economic transactions: buying and selling goods and services to each other.
- Environmental interdependence: relying on common resources or the services of common ecosystems like farmlands, forests and water supplies.

**Community-driven development**

A fresh look on sustainable development concept is provided in this thesis by introducing the concepts and strategies of Community-Driven Development (CDD), which emphasizes the integration of all activities including all the target population, men, women and children in the present and future generations. The community members need to be the driving force behind becoming a community with a sustainable quality of life for all members, now and for future generations (Dongier et.al, 2002:303-304).

Simply defined, CDD gives control of decisions and resources to community groups. In other words, the CDD is an approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups and local governments. CDD strategies operate on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability, and enhanced local capacity. It is evident that the CDD can only be reached by taking a participatory and integrated approach of development where many social groups and disciplines with different interests and activities contribute to positive changes in a community (Ibid; Mansuri and Rao, 2004:2; Malombe, 2000:3-15).

Indeed, CDD treats poor people as assets and partners in the development process. The CDD builds on the institutions and resources of the poor in partnership with Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), demand-responsive support organizations and service providers including elected local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central government agencies. Broach participation of local stakeholders in the process of the CDD often requires decentralization reform and promotion of a favourable legal and regulatory framework. Furthermore, the CDD is a strategy to effectively and efficiently provide social and infrastructure services; organize economic activity and resource management; empower poor people; improve governance; and enhance security of the poorest. Support to CDD usually includes strengthening inclusive community groups; facilitating community access to information; and promoting an enabling environment for participatory local governance through the policy and institutional reform which will be discussed later in this chapter. Therefore, the fundamental elements of CDD are actually political in nature (UN, 2004:4; Dongier et.al, 2002:304-325).

The CDD has also been shown to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of poverty reduction efforts. Experience demonstrates that by directly relying on poor people to drive development activities, CDD has the potential to make poverty reduction efforts more responsive to demands, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more cost-effective than traditional centrally led programs. Well-designed CDD strategies are inclusive of

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6 In the rest of the paper, the “CDD” will be used as shorthand for its sustainable form.
poor and vulnerable groups, build positive social capital, and give people greater voice both in their community and with government entities (Dongier et.al, 2002:304-315).

To conclude, the CDD is defined as community control of investment and management decisions to achieve sustainable socioeconomic and environmental protection in a certain community.

**The main benefits of the CDD approach**

*The CDD empowers poor people, builds social capital, and strengthens governance*

The objective of development is not merely to increase incomes or to improve poverty indicators but also to expand people’s real freedoms. These are the choices people make between different valuable beings and doings such as being nourished; being educated; and participating in public debate. Community-driven approaches will devolve control and decision-making to poor people and empower them immediately and directly. Sen (1999) notes that:

“Freedom is not only the basis of the evaluation of success and failure, but it is also a principal determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness. Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and these are central to the process of development” (Sen, 1999:18).

Furthermore, control over decisions and resources give communities the opportunity to build social capital; to increase the ability of individuals; and to secure benefits as a result of membership in social networks by expanding the depth and range of local networks. This kind of network expansion as part of social capital can have a positive effect on household welfare and can be critical for long-term growth and development in developing countries (Grootaert and Narayan, 2000:54-61).

The creation of networks and social capital also helps to reduce household exposure to risk. For example, in rural communities of many developing countries members of rotating saving and credit associations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual trust can save and lend among themselves for the case of emergencies. Hence, development strategies that strengthen CBOs and build social capital can also strengthen the safety net for poor people and reduce their exposure to risk (Grootaert, 2001:40).

Finally, strengthening local associations that are inclusive increase poor people’s voice in local political processes and governance. When poor communities are trusted to drive development and are given appropriate information, support, and clear rules, a system can be put in place to facilitate their active and ongoing role in local development. Because CDD devolves responsibilities and resources to the local level, activities can occur simultaneously in a large number of communities without being constrained by too much central bureaucracy (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997:33). Furthermore, about the positive impacts of broad participation of local people as part of CDD, UN (2004) states that:

“CDD and its institutionalization can represent a driving force towards more open and responsive political systems while improving the quality and level of social development outcomes. The principle informing this approach is simple yet powerful: allowing for broader participation in policy identification and decision-making improves the effectiveness of projects and, therefore, the development outcomes of social policies” (UN, 2004:5).
The CDD approach fills the gaps

The potential for CDD is greatest for goods and services that are small in scale and not complex and that require local cooperation such as common pool goods (for example, management of common pasture and surface water irrigation systems), public goods (for example, local road maintenance), and civil goods (for example, public advocacy and social monitoring). Similarly, private goods or toll goods are often better provided using a market-based approach, relying more on individual enterprises than on collective action.

CDD can, however, fill the gaps in the settings similar to the Kurdish region in Iraq where markets are missing or imperfect, or where public institutions or local governments fail to fulfil their mandates. Accumulated experience has shown that the market alone cannot provide all essential services and goods for community people. The market often provides insufficient public goods e.g. roads, education, and health care for poor people while over-harvesting common pool goods e.g. forests, watersheds, and fishery resources. About the need to enhance the complementary role of public, private and voluntary sectors in order to support CDD, Dongier et.al (2002) state that:

"Market- and state-run activities can be effectively complemented by community-driven solutions that engage CBOs, local governments, NGOs, and the private sector" (Dongier et.al, 2002:305).

The CDD improves efficiency and effectiveness of development investments

Many studies suggest that CDD can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of services in many sectors and contexts. For instance, a recent study by Hoddinott et.al (2001) in South Africa shows that when CBOs are responsible for all aspects of a development project (design, management, and monitoring), costs per beneficiary is less than half. The study concludes that:

"These analytics suggest that because communities possess informational advantages not available to outsiders, community participation offers the prospect of lowering the cost of antipoverty interventions. In cases where the outcomes of interventions are difficult to measure, community participation is attractive because it is more likely to produce a set of outcomes actually desired by the community" (Hoddinott et.al, 2001:57)

The CDD improves efficiency and effectiveness in the provision and maintenance of many community services. Examples of these benefits for irrigation, education, microfinance, and natural resource management are given below.

- Irrigation: Community management of development investments usually results in lower costs and more productively employed assets. Studies of community-organized irrigation systems in Asia and Africa have repeatedly found that systems constructed and operated by the farmers themselves, often without much external assistance, generate a higher level of agricultural productivity than more modern systems constructed by government agencies with substantial external assistance (Reidinger and Meinzen-Dick, 1995: 5-10).

- Education: There is empirical evidence that community management and accountability can improve education outcomes. Results from El Salvador shows that greater parental involvement in children’s education can inspire children to attend school and put pressure on providers to deliver better services. Communities that oversee school management are also more willing to assist in financing school
activities and hold the costs lower while holding enrolment and quality constant (Jimenez and Sawada, 1998:19).

- Microfinance: Evidence suggests that certain models of both individual and group-based microfinance can extend the reach of financial services and achieve high repayment rates. Group-based microfinance tend to do particularly well where the screening and monitoring costs of credit are too high for the lender and when the group approach reduces the cost of information gathering and creates incentives at the local level. Usually in the big cities, access to information for both lender and clients matters and information on branches, financial products, clients and loans must be provided on a timely basis. This requires using a computer-based information system to which the poor people in rural communities of many developing counties have no access. Seibel (2005) explains that:

"but in small institutions and remote areas, manual processing of information can be far more effective. Cost and benefits of information processing have to be balanced. In rural microfinance, personal relations with clients can be very important and cannot easily be replaced by a computer" (Seibel, 2005:40).

- Natural recourse management: During the last decades, several countries have moved from state to community management of natural resources. For example, the joint forest management program in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh shows how community management and effective collaboration among local stakeholders can increase the effectiveness of services and lead to sustainable forest management. It has brought many positive results e.g. degraded forests have sprung back to life; timber smuggling has almost been stopped; cattle grazing are under control; soil conservation has saved local water resources; and village labour is more gainfully employed and as a result out-migration has declined (Venkatamaran and Falconer, 1998: website).

The CDD approach enhances sustainability

The community members are the most legitimate, informed, and reliable source of information about their own priorities. The CDD can make services responsive to demand expressed by poor local people and as a result can enhance sustainability. Community-developed facilities such as health centres, schools, and water supply systems tend to have higher utilization rates and better maintenance when investment decisions are made by actors inside the community. Experience also demonstrates that demand is better articulated, when communities contribute to investment costs and control investment choices ensuring that they get what they want. Households are willing to pay for and to maintain services only when the services are tailor-made to their needs (Azfar et al., 1999:3).

Critical reflections on the CDD approach

For all its potential benefits, CDD also presents risks especially in the absence of effective and accountable Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). If CBOs are not appropriately strengthened or exclude the poor; if they cannot finance recurrent costs; and if they crowd out local government or are manipulated by elite interests, then CDD may not be the optimal development approach. Moreover, there is a risk of undermining CDD where the development efforts are not built on the basis of interaction and
coordination between local people and institutions as part of social capital (UN, 2004:5).

In any context, the CDD needs a long-term support to grow up where the central government is responsible to create an enabling environment for CDD. But, at the same time there is a dilemma with the CDD concept. For instance, in the context of rural area in the Kurdish region in Iraq the grassroots people and institutions lack necessary human and organizational capacities to design their own concepts and drive the sustainable development of their own community. Therefore, on the initial stage, they are highly dependent on the central capacities regarding the provision of training and education. There is simply a risk for the domination of top-down approach when the support is from central bodies. But even during the process of capacity-building of local people, the risk of being manipulated by governmental institutions and NGOs, which sometimes have a hidden agenda, is not excluded.

2.2 Social capital

There is growing evidence in the literature that differences in economic outcomes, whether at the level of the individual or household or at the higher levels of decision-making, cannot be explained fully by differences in traditional inputs such as labour, land, and physical capital. During the last decades, increasing attention is given to the role of social capital in affecting the well-being of households and the level of development of communities and nations (Steger et al. 2002:85).

It is now recognized that social capital is an input in a household’s or a community’s production functions and the acquisition of human capital and the establishment of a physical infrastructure need to be complemented by locally-based institutional structure as part of social capital to reap the full benefits of these investments. For instance, a well functioning parent-teacher association may be a necessary complement to building schools and training teachers in order to provide a higher quality of the education services in a community. Another example is that the promotion of social interaction among poor farmers may need to complement the provision of seeds, fertilizer and other inputs to efficiently and effectively increase the agricultural production.

Social capital is less tangible than traditional forms of capital such as physical or human capital for it exists in the relations among people but shares a number of features with them (Coleman, 1988:S100). For example, social capital, like physical capital, accumulates as a stock that produces a stream of benefits in the form of information sharing and collective decision-making. Like physical capital, social capital stock requires an initial investment and regular maintenance in the form of repeated social interaction or trust-building behaviour. Social capital also exhibits several features that set it apart from physical and human capital. First, and by definition, social capital, unlike human capital, cannot be built individually and it can take years to build and is more easily destroyed than built or rebuilt. Second, unlike physical capital, but like human capital, the stock of social capital does not decrease, and can actually increase as a result of its use (Ostrom, 2000:172-176).

Observation levels and types of social capital

Each country or region consists of specific socio-cultural, political and economic settings and thus there are different meanings on social capital. On the one hand, social capital must be revised and redefined in any given situation. On the other hand, there is
an increasing need for some generalizations about the concept as a highly complex issue. While there are many definitions and interpretations of the social capital concept, there is growing consensus for a common definition. Portes (1998) states that:

“social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (Portes, 1998:6).

If one takes a broad view of what is comprised by these “other social structures,” then it is relevant to observe social capital at the micro, meso, and macro levels. In the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq, the social capital is broadly classified into three main groups, namely, cognitive, structural and bridging which are highly overlapping each other in each spatial unit and level of decision-making. It is, therefore, very tricky to classify them according to territorial units or decision making levels but it is likely to analyse the way of their interplay in each level of analysis (micro, meso and macro) including the spatial unit.

Micro-level (community)

Social capital at micro level refers to strong cognitive and intangible elements such as common values, norms, attitudes, mutual trust and networks that govern interactions among individuals, in a certain group, organization or community. On community level, cognitive social capital is defined as connections and the ways in which people interact and relate to each other in a cognitive way and on an equal basis. This consists of horizontal and informal relationships among community people and simplest connections are those to family, friends and neighbours. Cooperation between neighbours in a community can be based on a personal cognitive bond that may not be reflected in a formal structural arrangement. Social capital is here understood as features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks, which is a precondition to facilitate coordinated actions and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of development activities within the community.

Such networks are often, but not necessarily, given structure through the creation of community institutions and volunteer organizations in order to deal with common problems. When the community people are capable to form organizations to create goods and services, cognitive social capital is converted to structural social capital. But, it is important to note that cognitive social capital is still embedded in the organization’s structure such as informal links and bonds among members of a community organization. Community organizations can be a manifestation of structural social capital, but social capital can exist outside the context of community organizations, whether formal or informal. For example, a group of friends or relatives who help each other in times of trouble have cognitive social capital but may never embody their bond in an association as structural social capital. However, social interaction can become capital through the persistence of its effects which can be ensured through both cognitive and structural channels. For example, a sport association embodies the values and goals of the social interaction that initiated it but the cognitive social capital created by the repeated social interaction can survive the end of the sport season and have lasting effects among and even beyond the original members (Grootaert, 2002:3-9).

Putnam’s seminal analysis of civic traditions in northern Italy focused primarily on “horizontal” institutions in which members relate to each other on an equal basis. But on the other hand, community organizations can be of little use for development if they lack external links and influences even if their structures are complemented with strong cognitive elements, such as common values, norms and mutual trust. In the literature, many authors highlight the importance of social networks for self-reliant actions both as
horizontal networks among family, friends and neighbours in a certain community and as vertical networks up through the social hierarchy that give household access to other forms of power and resources (Putnam, 1993 quoted in Grootaert, 1998:2; Friedmann, 1992:68-69).

Coleman (1990: 65-90; 1988:S101) suggests a new approach to describe both stability and change in social systems by linking the behaviour of individuals to organizational behaviour and then to society as a whole. In this manner the social capital include “vertical” institutions as well, characterized by hierarchical relationships and unequal power distribution among members which is defined as bridging social capital. “Horizontal” bridging social capital will appear when there is an effective interaction and cooperative behaviour among community-level organizations to solve the common problems. “Vertical” bridging social capital is produced when the organizations individually or commonly interact with an institution on higher level of decision-making to obtain assistance on issues, which are far beyond the capacities in the community (Grootaert, 2002:3-5).

Thus, when the community institutions, as part of structural social capital, are enabled to effectively interact with the higher level institutions on meso and macro levels, the bridging social capital is produced to satisfy the community needs. This is close to Coleman’s definition of social capital, which includes also the vertical links with the institutions on higher levels.

This form of interplay between different types of social capital can be found on meso and macro levels as well but with more complexity as the actors and groups to produce a certain type of social capital are increasing both in number and scale.

**Meso level (sub-district)**

On *meso* level, the social capital begins to be more tangible and structural which facilitates information sharing, collective action and decision-making through established roles and social networks supplemented by rules and procedures. The interaction between people and institutions at community level and the local government and line agencies at the sub-district level is more defined as “vertical” bridging social capital. This level functions as a link between community and policy levels. Therefore, as main element of bridging social capital it is vital that the sub-district institutions are provided adequate human and organizational capacities and decision-making power to establish participatory local governance for CDD.

**Macro level (policy)**

On the *macro* level, in addition to the largely informal and structural relationships at micro and meso levels, social capital includes most formalized institutional relationships and structures such as political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties. These elements of social capital are very important for providing an enabling environment for participatory local governance and CDD. Governmental organizations represent structural social capital in which the cognitive element is not necessarily present (Grootaert, 2002:3).

**Complementarity and substitution of social capital among different levels**

There is overwhelming evidence in the literature that building different types of social capital on all levels of micro, meso and macro has a significant impact on national
economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1283). Furthermore, Olson (1982) notes that:

“There is a parallel between the individual in a group that would gain from provision of a collective good and the organization for collective action within the society. The organization that acts to provide some benefit for the society as a whole is, in effect, providing a public good for the whole society, and it is accordingly in the same position as an individual who contributes to the provision of a collective good for a group of which he or she is a part” (Olson, 1982:43).

The strength of such a broad concept is that the inclusion of micro, meso, and macro levels of social capital allows for important effects of complementarity and substitution between different types of social capital. For example, national institutions can provide an enabling environment in which local associations can develop and flourish and local associations can, in return, sustain regional and national institutions and add a measure of stability to them. Furthermore, a certain level of substitution is present among the levels of social capital. For example, communities in developing countries often rely on social pressure and reputation to enforce agreements between individuals or groups. When institutional development strengthens the rule of law and the court system, local informal arrangements for dispute resolution usually become less relevant and may lead to the weakening of the social bonds. Hence a concept of social capital that encompasses the micro, meso and macro dimensions will be better able to capture the counterbalancing effects of structures and attitudes at all levels of society (Grootaert, 2002:6).

**The need to convert cognitive social capital into local institutions**

There are growing evidences that the problem of underdevelopment is to a significant extent a problem of underdeveloped institutions. North (1990) argues that:

“The evolution of institutions that create a hospitable environment for cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth” (North, 1990: vii).

The literature contains an impressive and still growing number of case studies which document that local institutions as part of social capital play a key role in the success and sustainability of development activities. This has been demonstrated in almost all parts of the world and many case studies are cited by Uphoff (1993:the entire book) and Narayan (1995:5-33) in sector settings, ranging from irrigation and water supply, to management of forests and wildlife resources, to the provision of credit to the poor, and the implementation of health service programs. The way local institutions perform their useful role is centred on three mechanisms: the sharing of information among association members, the reduction of opportunistic behaviour, and the facilitation of collective decision making (Collier, 1998:4).

A study has been conducted by Narayan and Pritchett (1997:35) which demonstrated that the ownership of social capital by households in Tanzania has strong effects on households’ welfare. The study found that the magnitude of the estimated effect exceeds by far that of education and physical assets owned by the household, but it does not address whether social capital is an asset which primarily helps the poor.

However, in the Kurdish region in Iraq converting cognitive social capital into the local institutions and networks as part of structural social capital needs an enabling environment to produce bridging social capital necessary for participatory local governance and CDD. In fact, developing a framework for analysing and building social capital on all three levels of micro, meso, and macro is the main contribution of this
research to the existing social capital theories. The elements of social capital on the three levels are overlapping each other, expressing a relation of power between different actors and between different levels of decision-making in a society (see Figure 2.1 on page 25).

![Building social capital for sustainable CDD](image)

*Source: Mahzouni, 2007*

*Figure 2.1: Building social capital for sustainable CDD*
Conceptual and practical limitations of social capital

Social capital is commonly defined as the ability of individuals to build bonds within their own group and create bridges that link them with other groups on the assumption that such networks are a source of strength and improve existing social conditions and economic opportunities. It is true that social capital can be used constructively to facilitate collective action for the common good. But, as social capital is embedded within the structures of power and social construction, it can be used destructively as well to continue domination and violence against others. For example, within a community, the rich and elite groups usually possess better networks and can use these networks to establish an unequal system of domination and control. Therefore, the conceptual and practical limitations of social capital especially the existing power relations within the community or between the central and local authorities must be carefully examined before using social capital for local development (UN, 2004:4).

Friedmann (1992) highlights the power sharing problem between the three levels, which sometimes leads to many unavoidable conflicts in a society:

“....the interests, concerns, and values arising from within the micro sphere of households, with their legitimate political claims for economic and political inclusion, penetrate the meso-and macro spheres of social practice and thus also the spheres of established relations of power. This penetration is bound to be conflictive” (Friedmann, 1992:53).

Furthermore, the mere presence of an association in a community does not prove the existence of social capital. It must be emphasized that social capital, sometimes even when its main purpose is good, can generate harmful outcomes for non-included groups and even for society as a whole. For example, local branches of political parties with mandatory membership are institutions which may display little or no social capital. For that reason, it is important to look at membership conditions (voluntary or not, payment of fees, etc.) and the degree of effective participation in institutions before making any conclusion about the social capital effects. The members of a special-interest organization, for example, by building cartel or monopolistic behaviour can increase the income of its members while reducing society’s output (Olson, 1982:44-45).

To summarize, excessive strong ties in form of high bonding and cognitive social capital often prevents people from making connections outside their small world of friends and family. If this form of social capital is not linked to structural and bridging social capital in an appropriate way, the society can not be stable. Furthermore, power struggle and conflict in a society can be managed by empowering the grassroots people and civil society. They must be involved in strengthening the rule of law and a regulatory framework where the rights and obligations of all individuals, groups and institutions are clearly defined. In addition, there must be sanctions capacities and enforcement mechanisms against any misconduct and opportunistic behaviour.

2.3 Building social capital on micro level

A further contribution of the research will be exploring the value of existing and traditional institutions, roles and leaderships as part of social capital on micro level to mobilize the local people for self-reliance and Community-Driven Development (CDD).
CBOs as the driving force behind the CDD

Throughout history, communities have organized themselves to address collective and individual needs. Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are made up of a group of individuals in a self-defined community who have joined together to achieve common goals. They can also be groups of people who are united by a common interest but do not live in the same geographic community. The common interest might be related to production, consumption, the use of common pool resources, or the delivery of services. Examples include women's groups, credit circles, youth clubs, cooperatives and farmer associations, irrigation associations, forest and watershed management groups, artisan groups, fishery associations, and school-parent associations. CBOs can be informal or formal. Informal organizations such as women’s and men’s clubs and community groups pursue joint interests and often appear more accessible to the poor than formal organizations which have legal status, formally stated rights and responsibilities, and a legally binding government structure for recruiting members, selecting leaders, and conducting affairs (Konteh, 2000:57-63).

It is worth to make a distinction between a CBO, an NGO and a local government. A CBO is considered to be a membership organization aimed at furthering the interests of its members. But one of the characters of an NGO is having a broader scope of activities that might assist CBOs and pursue commitments that do not directly benefit NGO members. CBOs differ from elected local governments in that they are voluntary and choose their own objectives. In contrast, local governments are mandated to be responsible for revenue collection and for the delivery of a variety of infrastructure and services. CBOs may interact closely with local government, central government agencies, private sector, and NGOs in a local network (Malombe, 2000:23-28).

CBOs as part of a local network can act as the mediators to effectively and efficiently coordinate external support in the community and in this way the bridging social capital necessary to support CDD is produced. Through a learning process within the local network, CBOs and other local institutions can increasingly build up their capacities and those of their communities. Where the traditional institutions exist and are not biased obviously in favour of privileged interests, they should be engaged in the development activities (Motee and Namazi, 2000:7-14).

Traditional arrangements and endogenous institutions that are not organizations (e.g. traditional birth attendant, setting broken bones, traditional rotating credit arrangements etc.) but are directly accountable to community people, should be integrated into an effective local network that facilitates the vertical assistance from higher decision-making bodies and thereby enhancing the bridging social capital to CDD. Pre-existing institutions for all their faults have the advantage of being familiar with the local problems and of having accumulated some local legitimacy, support and commitment over time. Traditional institutions in any case are able to make important social and psychological contributions and therefore deserve acceptance as a necessary and helpful part of village society’s network of institutions even if they appear irrelevant to some development activities. Hence, the emphasis should be on trying to increase their capacities and work through them. To introduce modern institutions, which compete with traditional ones, even if necessary in some cases, is usually unlikely to be successful (Motee and Namazi, 2000:14).

Lutz and Linder (2004:3) note that: “traditional structures are often more legitimate than the modern state” because unlike modern structures, the legitimacy of traditional leaders is deeply rooted in historical and cultural values and is not based on constitutions and electoral processes.
The value of traditional institutions and roles as accumulated social capital of the community has played an important role in the process of local development and is highly appraised by many cases in the literature. The informal local institutions, if accountable to grassroots people, should be respected and preserved as they are very important for CDD. For example, introducing formal financial institutions in the rain-fed area of the Kurdish region in Iraq, where risks and variability are so great, would probably not succeed because consequences become practically uninsurable. Therefore the strategy for the capacity development of local institutions and networks should build on any capacities that exist (Uphoff, 1986:147).

A study conducted by Dürr (1998:25-56) emphasizes the potential of the traditional savings group, which has enhanced social and economic security within a rural community in Thailand. The services of the savings group cover much more than just savings and credit operations. Besides the direct improvements in the financial status of the members, a social welfare system, including various funds, provides a social safety net. It includes redistribution mechanisms that particularly benefit the poorer members. This has enhanced the social integrity and cohesion in the community and now the group is recognized as a widely accepted “social institution”. The development process has been strongly shaped by the personality of the leader who is highly accountable to the community.

Representative CBOs can provide voice and empowerment to groups that are typically excluded from the development process. The interests of women, indigenous groups, ethnic minorities and the disabled people might not be effectively expressed through centralized political and economic structures. If these minority groups are actively involved in CBOs, they will help make development processes more inclusive. In the absence of reliable information to allow means testing such as for household income, involving CBOs directly in the targeting process can improve the efforts to target the poorest and most marginal individuals and groups. For example, the parent-teacher association in a given community might be in the best position to determine which children should receive tuition or school lunch subsidies (Swamy et.al, 1999:28).

Existing institutions and roles should be involved in planning and implementation of community development efforts. Through enhancing a learning process among different individuals, households, institutions and networks, it will be possible to modify the traditional and endogenous institutions and integrate them in a workable, accountable and sustainable system of local development. Lutz and Linder (2004) note that:

“Following the CDD approach, control over development is often given to local community groups, where traditional leaders would be one among many other actors, such as elected or non-elected officials, local governments, agency representatives, CBOs and NGOs. One of the core elements of CDD is to strengthen local groups and facilitate information both from the national and local level, and among different groups within a community” (Lutz and Linder 2004:35).

This will further call for establishing a transparent and accountable local network of institutions that constantly reviews the management style and organization structure of the institutions to increase flexibility to external change and demand of local people. The rural communities should increasingly direct and manage their own development, adapted to their specific local conditions and needs. Anyway, the most effective institutions will be those in which the technology, the organizational structure and the social process in an enabling environment are designed to fit together (Grootaert, 2001:44-48).
Social and gender inclusion

Any CDD approach must consider the potential to increase the power of poor communities to negotiate with government, the private sector and civil society responsive to the priorities of all poor groups. Especially, when the community is not homogeneous, the CDD approach needs to be socially inclusive, giving voice and decision-making power to women, the elderly, disabled, youth, religious and cultural minorities, indigenous and other ethnic groups. When the CDD does not pay attention to issues of social inclusion, groups of people may be excluded and as a result investment choices may not reflect the true needs of all people. A typical example of negative effect of social exclusion is when cultural practices restrain women from attending or speaking at community meetings, often resulting in underinvestment in health services, literacy programs, water supply systems, and other interventions typically more valued by women. Another example is when input and participation from indigenous groups are imperfect because information materials and planning discussions are in languages unfamiliar to them (Fong et al., 1996:2).

Various participatory methods can facilitate the inclusion of marginal groups. As gender cuts across other forms of exclusion, specific gender-sensitive approaches are needed to ensure the participation of women from all groups. It is important to understand existing community decision-making process and the often complex local political and social context. According to World Bank (2007: website), some general guidelines for building in social inclusion include:

- identifying subgroups among the poor especially those at risk of exclusion;
- where existing systems of social organization are highly inequitable, new groups may need to be created to enable excluded groups to participate;
- ensuring that intermediaries (NGOs, local government, and so forth) have expertise in working with these groups and using participatory techniques;
- investigating how local institutions can be made more responsive and inclusive of these groups; and
- Provide necessary capacity building of these groups.

Also, when the social organization of a community is highly inequitable, new groups may need to be created to promote the participation of disadvantaged people and thereby achieving sustainable development objectives. Both new and special-purpose organizations are more effective when they build on positive organizational traditions of a community. This is the case for the Moldova Social Investment Fund (2006: website) where traditional decision-making mechanisms are used to establish community priorities. Inclusion also requires that scarce public resources be targeted to groups that most need them.

Community access to information

An essential component of any CDD strategy is to provide community members with knowledge and information useful to conduct transactions with both the government and market organizations thereby facilitating linkages of community groups to both government and markets as part of bridging social capital. Support to CDD is as much about facilitating flows of information among all groups in a community as it is about facilitating flows of funds. The lack of information is often the most significant limitation on CBOs’ capacity to play a part in the development process. Community organizations need information on market opportunities, on what support resources are
available and on how to use these resources productively and efficiently. A variety of free media may be used to facilitate access to and stimulate flows of information in the community. Information technology and the Internet, adapted to community needs, are playing a growing role in this process and can dramatically accelerate local learning and connections with a wide range of opportunities (Mozammel and Schechter, 2005:3-6; Dongier et al, 2002:325).

Access to information on the actions and performance of government is critical for the promotion of government accountability. Communication channels, which provide wide public distribution of the information materials can place control in the hands of communities only if the information is understandable for poor local people. The information must also be free of propaganda and not subjected for manipulation by politicians, government officials, contracting agencies, and local elites who have usually their own language. Only enabling communities to be involved in decision-making is not sufficient to achieve sustainable outcomes. The decisions of each option need to be based on accurate information about how fairly the costs are shared and the benefits are distributed among different social groups. Communities and stakeholders should have access to sufficient information to make realistic investment choices from a range of options that meet their needs and fit local conditions, culture, values, and available operation and maintenance capacity. Furthermore, a free and independent media can play a vital role to facilitate community access to information (Azfar et al., 1999:12).

**Simple rules and participatory evaluation**

Sustainability and effectiveness of CDD strategies are enhanced when processes are simple and transparent and when actors have strong and consistent incentives for performance. Regular monitoring and participatory evaluation then provide the necessary information to ensure that the integrity of the system is maintained (Narayan, 1993:1-9).

Community access to resources needs to be governed by simple rules that are easy for participating communities to interpret and apply. Clearly defined procedures, outlined and widely circulated, help to avoid confusion and minimize administrative complexity. To maintain the credibility of the system, these rules should be monitored and transparently enforced. Key actors at all levels should be rewarded for performance through objective evaluation based on clear criteria. For example, payments to intermediaries and support organizations could be tied to their performance against indicators of access to service and of the institutional sustainability of the CBOs (Narayan, 1995:16-17).

Most successful development programs routinely conduct beneficiary assessments, focus group interviews, client surveys, and other forms of evaluation that provide policymakers and program managers with information on whether investments reflect community priorities, the level and type of participation they have used, their sustainability, and their impacts. Flexibility in design, often through piloting, is essential to allow systems to evolve and adapt better to local demand and capabilities. Systematic monitoring and evaluation of the CDD activities and outcomes are critical to ensure that activities continue to grow and adapt to changing conditions. This is particularly important where the CDD activities are being scaled up, which monitoring systems supply the necessary information and feedback to ensure that processes are appropriately modified to the needs of different localities and that potential bottlenecks or problems are identified and overcome early, before they become constraints to
expansion. Not only the physical and financial progress, but also the quality of participatory processes and effectiveness of local institutions and economic impact of the activities must be monitored. Participatory monitoring and evaluation is also a useful tool for evaluating how the activities are seen and valued locally (Chambers, 1994:1445-1446).

**Subsidiarity principle**

Subsidiarity means to delegate control to the lowest appropriate level in the community. Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (2006: leaflet) notes that:

“Freedom and responsibility are inseparable and only those who are free to decide and act can be held responsible for their actions. Individual responsibility is a fundamental requirement in a liberal society and as far as possible decisions should be taken by the citizens themselves as they have to bear the consequences“.

Based on the idea of subsidiarity, the CBOs themselves must drive the development process especially for those goods and services that are best handled at the community level. This means that for some types of goods or services, local governments should focus on resource allocation across communities, and the CBOs should then be entrusted with resources and making the key service provision decisions, seeking support from local government and other service providers as they require (Malombe, 2000:29).

Tasks and roles about the provision of social services can also be delegated horizontally among local actors. For example, in Germany the subsidiarity means not only to delegate tasks and decision-making power vertically from federal government to the local government Gemeinde, but also from local government to the community groups and private sector, where appropriate, to increase the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of social services.

Flexible development planning and decentralized decision-making mechanisms situated as close to the community as possible, would facilitate quick response to change and increase more direct capacity building and integration of local governments in the project cycle, as the accumulated experiences from many developing countries show. As part of this learning process, direct feedback from the community on the performance of development activities is essential.

**2.4 Building social capital on meso level**

Building social capital on meso level is a further attempt to create an enabling environment for the CDD. Interaction and cooperation across local people and institutions in a participatory “learning process” will build more trust and in this manner producing bridging social capital for CDD. CDD will be achieved through a series of trials and errors which involve interaction of local people and institutions and gathering as much information as possible. The learning process approach aims to orient the local institutions to a problem-solving approach, recognizing that often more can be learned from failings than from apparent successes. “Learning by doing” is an appropriate strategy to the capacity development of local institutions (Uphoff 1986:200).

The CDD itself is the most demanding learning process which is achieved by consensus-building and collective action among different individuals, groups, institutions and networks at local level. The effective transformation of the cognitive social capital into the structural social capital is a vital precondition to produce bridging
social capital necessary to set up effective system of behaviour and appropriate institutional arrangements to CDD.

Towards participatory local governance

Usually “government” refers to state structures and institutions while “governance” is a broader concept and goes beyond political institutions, which is broadly defined by the UNDP (1997) as:

“comprising the complex array of mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise rights and obligations and mediate differences” (UNDP, 1997: ix)

Furthermore, UNDP cited in Lutz and Linder (2004) defines local governance as follows:

“Local governance comprises of a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes, through which citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations at the local level. It requires partnership between local governmental institutions, civil society organizations and private sector for participatory, transparent, accountable and equitable service delivery and local development” (UNDP in Lutz and Linder, 2004:16).

In search for a non-western approach for local governance, Lutz and Linder (2004) propose that:

“Development can build on existing structures and different countries can find their own model of development and social and political engineering at the local level” (Lutz and Linder, 2004:29).

The shift in policy-making for a sustainable local development is characterised by a new process of governing, from government to governance. Here the term governance is used with reference to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within the public, private and voluntary sectors have become unclear. The participatory governance structure is more likely to be self-selecting than designed through authoritative relationships. However, from this perspective, it becomes logical to better empower local communities to oppose the dominant vertical and instrumental power structure. This involves the strengthening of horizontal power structure on local level by activating civil society, elected representatives, and through the local embedding of private businesses. In this way, horizontal political power can be organised to supplement and oppose the sector dominated and vertical power structure. The aim is to reach sustainable local development by promoting local institutions that take more responsibility for development of their own community (Bonfiglioli, 2003:41-54).

In this perspective local government is not a fixed structure. It must be more flexible to enter in a process of partnership, network and coalition with other local institutions. Thus, the new local political institutions need a political process to make them legitimate political actors. Historically the term “region” (sub-district in the Kurdish region in Iraq) as a political actor has been used in two connections. In the “top-down” tradition, regions are a part of the nation-building process and a tool to decentralise power and responsibility to territories within the nation. In the “bottom-up” tradition, regions are arenas of social mobilisation which is taking an institution-building process. Elements or phases in the later are: the localisation of organised social practices; the formation of identity; the emergence of institutions and the achievement of
administrative status as an established spatial structure (Perotti and Bortolotti, 2005:14-18).

A legitimate local political institution in the participatory local governance must be a fruitful combination of nation-building and local mobilisation, of “top-down” and “bottom up” politics, of government and governance, and of instrumental and communicative rationality. Only within a framework of local governance based on both top-down and bottom-up, the carrying capacities of the local community can be effectively enhanced. This means to create an effective institutional framework and enabling environment for sustainable local development, which during last decades has taken form of participatory planning and decision-making in many developing countries. Friedmann (1992) justifies the need for participatory local governance:

“By differentiating territorial needs, as well as the special needs of different social groups, particularly the disempowered, it argues for a decentralized, participatory mode of decision-making in development” (Friedmann, 1992:35).

Participatory local governance as a missing link for CDD

There is an ambiguous definition about the “region” or “local” in the literature. According to the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1993:18), region as frame of reference of regional rural development is “a cohesive spatial unit above the local and below the national level”. The shaded area in the following figure is defined as “local rural area” and administratively as “sub-district” in the Kurdish region in Iraq and can be compared to “locality level” in international context (Esman and Uphoff, 1985 quoted in Kroës and Kokor, 2001:4) or “county” in Norway (Amdam, 2004:3).

Figure 2.2: Local rural area in the Kurdish region-Iraq

Anyway, the idea behind the regional or local approach is that the situation of the population in an area is influenced by common natural and socioeconomic characteristics that need tailor-made development policies.
Role of local government in a local governance structure

Local government in a local governance framework will have actually a double role both as a “public service producer” and as a “territorial network builder”. On the one hand, the local government is to carry out planning and development work within the field of welfare state services for which the organisation has responsibility and is integrated into the national state welfare production. On the other hand, as a formal political institution it has to be a network builder to coordinate both vertical and horizontal interaction among local institutions. This means that the local government must be accepted and enjoy legitimacy from both above (policy level) and below (community level) with a well-defined role and function in relation to other formal levels of government (Amdam, 2004:6).

Regardless of the mode of the CDD approach, which much depends on the local circumstances, local government can be critical to the success and sustainability of any CDD. Empowered local governments are often well positioned to facilitate coordination across communities and allocate resources. Local governments can interact with community groups in a participatory way to achieve economies of scale in producing and providing goods and services that could not be achieved by CBOs operating independently.

Mechanisms must be established to foster organized community voice and participation in local government decision-making. More open and more accountable local government is likely to be more responsive to local needs and more involved in finding solutions to community problems which in turn generates greater trust on the part of civil society and thereby producing bridging social capital. More accountable governments also tend to encourage community-wide participatory initiatives such as the formation of groups and associations and thereby providing an enabling environment for structural social capital (Bærenholdt, 2002:48-49).

Moreover, local governments are more likely to be responsive, accountable, and transparent in relationships with their constituents if there are mechanisms through which CBOs can express their priorities and concerns and monitor local government processes. These mechanisms include: centrally mandated or supported local elections including open list elections; municipal oversight councils with CBO representation; and participatory planning and transparent budgeting. But, the local capacities must be in place to establish a successful and sustainable partnership between CBOs and local government. In a local governance structure, the local governments have to cooperate and compete with other established actors and agencies in order to become political legitimate institutions. Thus, it becomes important for different public units to produce satisfactory services at a low price in order to legitimate themselves in a local governance structure (Amdam, 2003:9-11).

Indeed, local governments are generally more responsive and accountable to CDD where complementary forms of decentralization (spatial administrative, political, market, and fiscal) on macro level as an enabling environment are created, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Local network institutions

There is growing recognition in the literature that participatory and interdisciplinary institutional arrangement leads to increasing bridging social capital and thereby strengthening common action to alleviate poverty while ensuring sustainable use of natural resources. The main idea of local governance should be to work out a network of different channels and disciplines, which will enhance each other’s effectiveness in their
respective tasks. A great potential for CDD is attributed to locally-based institutions and their networks, which take advantage of what each channel can do best. There are three domains of governance that contribute to achieving sustainable development. This includes the public sector (political and governmental institutions), the voluntary sector (civil society organizations) and the private sector (Penalba, 2006:4). Furthermore, Friedmann (1992) emphasizes that:

“A dense network of civic organizations strengthens community. It channels new information and resources to the community. It increases the community’s stock of knowledge and makes it more adept in using it. It augments its political voice and increases its capacity to quickly organize around issues when they become critical. Building civic organizations is an empowering social process” (Friedmann, 1992:161).

In a local network of institutions, each actor with its particular knowledge and experience can provide input into the network. Therefore, it is very crucial to develop a network of multi-disciplinary and complementary local institutions and roles that results in synergy effects for all parts and target the poor in rural communities (Goldman et.al. 2006:2; Konteh, 2000:126-131).

In an effective local governance, the capacity of local government must be in place and appropriate political and institutional reforms should be carried out to build network and partnership among local institutions in, so called, “communicative planning” as a legitimating process that need both trust and resources, and democratic control to guarantee openness and transparency. Communicative planning is defined as a social interactive process between different actors and interests to build consensus about the development course of their society (Amdam, 2004:11-15).

The main objective to build local network institutions is to coordinate the development activities within a particular territorial unit, which can include many kinds of horizontal and vertical interrelationships among local actors from public, private and voluntary sectors that can make the network very complex. This requires an appropriate management and monitoring system to coordinate the activities and prevent any corrupted behaviour of the involved actors (Schmidt-Kallert, 2005:10; Amdam, 2002:107).

A network of local institutions is able to pool the internal and external knowledge and facilitate a learning process through exchange of ideas and draws on external resources. Since the members of grassroots institutions and networks know best about the local community needs, they can serve as the missing link between community people and the administrative and political system on higher levels and in this manner establishing a sustainable and trustful vertical interaction and producing bridging social capital to CDD. The local institutions have the potential to address the problems not sufficiently covered by the government officials, political system and international NGOs and to set new topics on the political agenda (Bærenholdt, 2002:36-42).

Surely, depending on the purpose, local institutions are not equally necessary or useful for all tasks. Therefore, different kinds and combinations of local institutions consisted of public, private and voluntary sectors are needed that are likely to be most appropriate to provide local people with different kinds of services and inputs. Comparative advantages of local institutions should be assessed in order to determine clear roles and responsibilities of each institution to effectively and efficiently provide community people with a certain service and input. Uphoff (1986) sates that:
"The principle of comparative advantage proposes that all parties concentrate on doing what they can do best or avoid what they do worst in order to contribute to the greatest total benefit" (Uphoff, 1986:69).

The strength of any institutional network is gaining comparative advantages. The objectives of CDD are best served by having a full range of institutional capacities from the group level up to the sub-district level which the Kurdish region in Iraq like many other developing countries and regions is highly lacking of. Local institutions based on horizontal interdependence, communication and cooperation among members or clientele in a single community should be better able to contribute to mutually strong and beneficial interdependence over time. At the same time, in a local governance structure, vertical assistance from higher level to local institutions enabling the later to function more effectively, and encourage producers to enter into more horizontal cooperation and thereby strengthening the capability of local institutions to effectively support CDD (Malombe, 2000:23).

The principals for alternative institutional arrangements to CDD, however, will depend on the existing local capacity, and the amount and type of social capital on micro, meso and macro levels. There are growing evidences that the macro-level social capital is needed to create an enabling environment for participatory local governance and institutional capacity-building for CDD (UNDP, 1997: 21-40).

**Institutional capacity building**

The elements of organizational effectiveness include governance, management capacity, human resources, financial resources, service delivery, external relations, and sustainability. “Institutional capacity building” is defined as the provision of any assistance to strengthen one or more elements of organizational effectiveness. Like trees, the institutions need a long time horizon to grow and bear fruit. In the literature, earlier references to “institutional development” are more about enhancing a process where the institutions are capable to make effective use of the human and financial capitals available, which can be internally generated by the staff of an institution or induced and promoted by the government or NGOs (Israel, 1989:1, 11). But, Narayan and Ebbe (1997) link the institutional capacity development to common action and trust between people as part of social capital:

“Local organizational capacity is the ability of people to work together, trust one another, and organize to solve problems, mobilize resources, resolve conflicts, and network with others to achieve agreed-upon goals” (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997:33).

Based on synthesized results from a comprehensive and cross-sectoral study in many developing countries, Spector (2005) concludes that the weak human and organizational capacity of the institutions creates an enabling environment for corruption:

“Lack of competence and capacity including insufficient educated and skilled staff; lack of adequate equipment, research materials and data; and poor working conditions all combine to create the enabling environment for corruption” (Spector, 2005:160)

An organization’s effectiveness depends largely on the ability and willingness of its staff to carry out the tasks of the organizations, which the skills and values of staff play a key role in this process. In contrast to skills, values cannot be learned quickly because they change slowly over a long time span. Therefore, the appropriateness of any organizational or management strategy largely depends on how well it accord with the dominant cultural values. Culture and values affect the ways in which the individuals
perceive the need for change and how to respond to change and therefore the organizational structures and management process must be compatible with cultural and social factors. Otherwise, adequate resources must be in place to reorient people toward organizational behaviours and working methods demanded by the new management strategies. However, changing the management strategy of an organization requires changing the values and beliefs of its staff, and changing the management process and organizational structure which can be difficult and time-consuming (Rondinelli et al., 1990:58-61).

The main question is how to make an administrative system more accountable. The bureaucratic organizational model has an inflexible structure and strict rules that constrains the behavior of staff and prevents them from being productive. In an accountable, effective and efficient system of administration, the civil servants behave less like administrators and more like managers. Cohen and Peterson (1999) state that:

“it is assumed that the principal task in improving the bureaucratic model is to improve accountability which is achieved by monitoring from above by progressive political elites and monitoring from below by clients that demand efficient and equitable services” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:5).

In a post conflict society as the Kurdish community in Iraq any form of institutional development for community development must consider the existing social and political structures. The rural communities have to be integrated in the process of institution-building in order to foster a sense of identification with the greater whole and a feeling of ownership.

**Regional rural planning**

A “small region” as a coherent spatial unit is much stronger than the villages that try to develop on their own because they all have some unique potentials and comparative advantages which can complement each other and in this manner gaining synergy effect. In many cases, local governments are needed to support operation and maintenance of services and for continuing funding of community groups (Schmidt-Kallert, 2005:9; World Bank, 2001: website).

The regional approach is based on the premise that the situation of a population in a given area is influenced by common ecological, socio-cultural and economic features. The spatial framework in regional rural development is the “region” as a coherent spatial unit located between the local and the national level and consisting of a network system of the local inhabitants. “Regional development planning” is defined as a communicative process involving all actors from different sectors who collectively identify the potentials and constraints of development in the region, and they together design appropriate goals and the strategies how to implement the development plans (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:4-6).

One of the principles of regional rural development is to promote the complementary functions of cities and the rural areas. While cities play an important role for providing services to the rural areas, the rural hinterlands can provide the industries in the cities with different kinds of inputs and capitals such as natural capital and human resource. Nevertheless, the framework conditions for rural development have changed over the past ten years. Everywhere in the world, global networking is shaping the development opportunities of rural populations. While certain regions actively take advantages of these chances, the wealth in more backward regions is at risk of falling even further behind. Therefore, the concept of regional rural development is now more relevant to
strengthen the region and its governance functions. In fact, not all goods and services are best managed through collective action on the community level. Public goods that cover many communities or that require large, complex systems are often better provided by local government in an integrated regional rural development (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:8-10).

Regional planning is used to cover both “sectoral” and “spatial” planning. In sectoral regional planning, different organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors can provide the region with specific services while they do not have overall responsibility for developing the region as a “society”. The planning and development work of the organisations is restricted to the service production areas that in the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq are the responsibility of the different levels of government and line agencies as welfare state service producers. This form of planning could be characterised as a sector-dominated and fragmented form of regional planning. But, in spatial regional planning, the planning and development work is carried out for the whole society in a spatial unit and is concerned with long-term development issues such as socioeconomic development, land use planning, transport, communications, and cooperation among the sectors in the production of services. It is typical for this type of planning that in addition to governmental institutions the private and voluntary sectors are involved in the planning and implementation of the development activities in a local governance structure (Amdam, 2002:106-109).

Spatial regional planning would thus appear to take place in network organisations and on a co-operative basis between organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors, and from the various levels of government. But, sectoral regional planning, which in general is carried out within the domains of the public sector organisations to provide civilians with public services, has implications for spatial regional planning. Therefore the challenge of spatial regional planning is to get service providing organisations in a system of participatory governance (Amdam, 2004:9-18).

The main purpose of regional rural planning is to obtain co-ordination between sectors and levels through a broad process of social learning and in a dynamic local governance arrangement, which in turn is supposed to stimulate the participation of people by creating both local horizontal and global vertical relationships. Many researchers, for example, consider the local community with a strong civil society and a strong democratic process as the key to dynamic local development (Friedmann, 1992:133-135).

To effectively implement regional rural development strategies, a new administrative culture and institutional framework is needed where the key elements are democratic participation of all relevant stakeholders and transparent decision-making processes. Regional development planning is a communicative process involving representatives of all local stakeholders, where new partnerships have to be formed between state, market and civil society.

*Integrated rural development versus CDD*

The rationale for integrated rural development during 1970s and 1980s was that poor communities in developing countries face a multitude of problems, and that poverty reduction efforts should attempt to address them at once by providing a package of services to the poor at a relatively low cost. It was confirmed that the problems of farmers in many developing countries were not due solely to undeveloped agricultural technology but influenced by many interrelated factors. The aim was to view rural people holistically in all their contexts and with all their needs where social equality and
economic and ecological sustainability were considered. Lessons learned from accumulated experiences show that the integrated rural development strategies implemented by different aid agencies failed mainly because of the reasons described below (Wienecke, 2005:21-22; Friedmann, 1992: 93-96; Cohen, 1987:9).

First, they were often supply-driven planning exercises designed and implemented as blueprints with limited flexibility, which planning was often delegated to the regional or provincial level and the beneficiaries on community level were generally excluded from decision-making. A fixed blueprint approach implemented by a centralized authority may be suitable for large infrastructure projects like building large dams or ports but it is less suitable for projects spread over large areas with widely differing conditions on community level.

Second, integrated rural development strategies are believed to have failed partly as a result of the inability of central government agencies and donors to respond to local priorities and to take advantage of local skills. Fund allocations were driven by donors and central government which failed to generate local participation and ownership in maintaining assets, but instead created dependency on these funding sources.

Last but not least, the coordination of the required range of different sector practices necessary to achieve sustainable services in each sector was a logistical nightmare that led to failure.

Experience has shown that coordination is hard to achieve at central levels and therefore it should be fixed on the community or local government level, where local actors are empowered and capable to take over the activities. The most appropriate institutional arrangement to CDD in any particular region will depend on the specific circumstances of that region or location. Favourable contexts of any institutional arrangement to support CDD must be carefully studied. For example, some types of public goods can only be provided effectively by government, either on the central level or by some agent of the central government on the local level. These are often services and goods that require large investments in capital equipment and that must be linked together in a system to operate effectively. For example, those with strong implications for public health, safety or welfare that has high political sensitivity and if they were provided privately, the poor or a minority would be excluded. Anyway, mechanisms should be established to prevent “free riders”, which discourage citizens from contributing to the cost of goods that are communally shared and serving the community as a whole (Montgomery, 1988:44-46).

**Multi-sector versus single-sector planning**

Both multi-sector and single-sector approaches to CDD have advantages, serving different objectives in different circumstances. By offering greater choice, a multi-sector approach has the potential to respond better to the priority demands of each community and thus make services more appropriate, targeted, and sustainable. It can also offer the opportunity to share the cost of the outreach, social mobilization, and capacity-building support to communities. By sharing investment costs across several sectors, it becomes affordable to provide more intensive capacity-building support to CBOs over a significantly longer period. Multi-sector strategies encompass a broader range of issues and, therefore, the appropriate mechanisms for participatory planning and coordination across sectors must be in place.

On the other hand, single-sector strategies offer greater opportunities to effectively respond to a specific service demanded by the community and ensuring more sustainable operation of services. For example, electricity distribution or water supply
tends to have greater revenue-earning potential than natural resource management or the provision of primary health and education on community level. This calls for different financial policies with respect to minimum amounts of community contributions and to credit financing. Similarly, the relevance and competitiveness of CBOs relative to other institutions will vary across sectors (World Bank, 2001: website).

During recent years, many education projects as single-sector CDD by World Bank have been supported in various developing countries, where reform was achieved by transferring responsibility for school management to the community level and where new school financing was done as part of a single-sector investment program. The CDD may also be supported through multi-sector approaches, systematically applied to broader national policies and investments across sectors as in the case of the comprehensive decentralization in Bolivia in the mid-1990s which responsibilities and funds for a wide range of activities encompassing numerous sectors were transferred to local governments and, where appropriate, to the CBOs (Dongier et al., 2002:317).

It is clear that sectoral approaches are not sufficient to resolve the multi-faceted problems of the rural population in a holistic manner. Therefore, efforts should be made to ensure cohesion and consistency between investment policies and the ways the instruments work with local institutions. As a holistic approach to go far beyond conventional service delivery by sector agencies, “micro-regional planning” can be helpful to coordinate the common efforts and create horizontal and vertical links among all stakeholders within a spatial unit (Schmidt-Kallert, 2005:7-12).

However, the most appropriate strategy could be the integrated planning but sectoral implementation in an effective regional planning framework or what Amdam (2002:108) describes, “We need both sectoral government planning and territorial governance planning”. CDD requires different institutional arrangements for different sectors but the integrated and coordination policies among sectors for sustainable spatial development must be ensured.

Good practice for sustainable rural development and CDD

In 2001, the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in Germany started a pilot project entitled “Regionen Aktiv”. The project within the framework of national sustainable strategies should present new methods for rural development. The idea was to promote a more consumer-oriented agricultural production by increasing competition. One of the main reasons for announcing the competition was the need to rebuild consumer trust in the safety and quality of the food products through greater transparency and stronger consumer focus on how agricultural products are produced and processed. The project, which is still ongoing, is divided in three phases (Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture, 2002:5-9).

In the first phase of the competition, besides the consumer organizations, key regional interest groups from all sectors (e.g. agriculture and forestry, environment, craft, retail trade, health, education, local government, science, etc.) were asked to develop a joint vision for the future development of their own regions. The main criteria for selecting best regions were to present visions that describe:

- How to strengthen the identity of the region and creating additional sources of income in the region;
- How to promote nature-friendly and environmentally compatible agriculture production; and
• How to strengthen farmer-consumer relations and promote a more sustainable and consumer-oriented farming.

Based on these criteria, in the second phase of the competition, 18 model regions were selected by an independent jury from a total of 206 submissions. The winning regions represented a vast diversity from both remote and relatively developed rural areas across Germany.

In the third phase of the competition, the selected pilot regions were required to put their integrated development plans into practice and implement strategies through building network of local institutions and regional partnership. They had to ensure that all social groups are included in planning, implementation and assessment of the development process and in the use of available funding. The actors formed regional partnership as an integrated part of the competition and presented innovative ideas how to promote regional rural development and link rural-urban economies. One of the keys to success in implementation and participation process has been professional management on local level, where communication skills, organizational talent and the ability to mediate have been essential in each model region within the funding period (ibid).

New control and funding approach

New control mechanisms of the project planning and implementation were established. The agreement between the Federal Ministry and the model regions provides the framework for the overall project, where the regional development plans are binding for the allocation and use of funding. The Federal Government’s role is thus limited to setting the goals, decision-making structures and self-assessment mechanisms. But, the regions have been required to set up a support and self-assessment system in order to draw conclusions from their own successes and failures and make corrective actions in line with the objectives. In addition, a public body in the region assumes responsibility for financial management and budget administration. The funding policy was to gradually reduce the dependency of the regions on central funds and to encourage the regions to relay more on their own financial means. In initial stage in 2005, the project was up to 100 percent supported by the central funds, in the second stage in 2006 was reduced to 75 percent and in 2007 to 50 percent. The new funding policy was to use public resources more effectively and make the development project more community-driven and sustainable over time. In addition, the main focus has been to conduct structural change of the existing administration and management culture in order to effectively respond to the local needs (Elbe, 2007:41; Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture, 2002: 9).

Lessons learned from the Regionen Aktiv

The “Regionen Aktiv” is a new approach to self-determined regional development where competing goals of sustainable development are to be balanced and harmonized. The focus is on consumer protection, quality in agricultural production, enhanced regional added value, employment opportunities, and ecological protection. An integrated approach to regional rural development focuses on developing new sources of income both in agriculture and other sectors of rural economy like tourism, craft and commerce. The local people and actors are engines in the development process of a certain region and enhancing their participation would bring many benefits such as:

• To develop new ideas, perspectives and know-how;
• To create synergies by bringing together the interests of consumers, producers, retailers in accordance with environmental protection; and
• To better exploit the local resources.

Existing network of rural actors from all public, private and voluntary sectors must be reinforced to provide the basis for successful development in the region. The process has been supported by effective project management, intensive public relations work and participation of local people. Regional marketing structures and closer producer-consumer relations as part of social capital also play a key role. The 18 model regions present a new approach where cooperation among regional economy, environmental protection, and education creates new sources of income and new opportunities for development. They provide also best practice models for recreating regional identities, sustainable rural development and thus strengthen the region in a rural-urban connection.

Indeed, many developing counties and regions can draw lessons from the “Regionen Aktiv” concept. But this concept should be carefully examined and modified as the communication infrastructure, the individual and organizational capacities, and the leadership quality in many developing countries, especially in the rural areas, are highly missing. For example, in the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq this concept as a CDD pilot project can be successfully implemented only if there is an enabling environment in form of effective policies and regulatory framework for sustainable local development. In addition, the capacities of local people and institutions to independently design and implement the appropriate development strategies of their own communities and regions must be in place.

Critical reflections on participatory local governance

To sum up, one of the central issues in establishing participatory local governance is to empower local governments with authority and resources and building their capacity to be more responsive and accountable to the concerns and needs of all local people. Local governance is also about strengthening grassroots democracy and empowering citizens and their organizations such as CBOs and NGOs to participate as equal partners in local governance and local development process.

The concept of participatory governance has recently gained widespread currency across many of the social sciences but warns that the growing obsession with participatory governance mechanisms, as a solution to market failure or state failure, should not lead to a neglect of participatory governance failure. One should avoid seeing participatory governance as being a necessarily more efficient solution to the problems of economic or political co-ordination than markets or states. There is no linear drift from centralized system of governance to participatory local governance. Governance still operates in the shadow of centralized system and governance processes and institutions tend to lack democracy and transparency even in most developed countries (Amdam, 2004:7-10).

In addition, participatory local governance requires democracy and individuals rights that are hard to achieve in many developing countries and can takes years or even decades to establish. Linder (2004) gives two arguments for this:

“The first is: there is strong empirical evidence that democracy and individual rights require some advanced level of socio-economic development, such as basic education, or some economic, social and administrative capacity to become effective. Traditional segments of societies in developing countries may often still
lack these criteria. The second is: our definition of democracy corresponds to western philosophies of enlightenment which see the individual and his fundamental rights as the highest value. This may not correspond to other cultures, valuing duties for the community equally or even higher than the individual’s personal rights. These community-based values must be respected, the more as they are functional for these societies' socio-cultural and economic structures” (Linder, 2004:30).

But, a sustainable CDD can not happen in isolation. It requires that the community-based values and action of plans are integrated in regional, national and global development policies.

2.5 Building social capital on macro level

Creating an enabling environment for participatory local governance and Community-Driven Development (CDD) requires long-term investment in different types of social capital. On macro-level social capital includes most formalized institutional relationships and governance structure such as political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties. Social capital building on macro level often demands fundamental change in cultural, organizational, political and economic elements in a society.

Large programs of support to CDD will not be sustainable without the policies, laws, systems and governance processes that encourage effective collaboration among local governments, central government, civil society, service providers, and CBOs. The CDD involves more than strengthening CBOs and funding their projects. It also requires active measures to establish an enabling environment for participatory local governance. As mentioned on meso level such an environment should include a responsive elected local government which is responsive to the constituents and is empowered to serve them. Other necessary actions undertaken on macro level are discussed here to create an enabling environment for local governance and CDD.

In this section the local planning and CDD is discussed in the context of “political will” seeing it as a legitimate process, focusing on the interaction between the higher levels of decision-making and the local people and institutions. An effective framework of regional rural planning implies that the local planning and development work is done in a collaborative process between the international, national, regional and local levels, and between the public, private and voluntary sectors based on participatory governance where the local government is not the only actor. In addition, success of CDD depends highly on an enabling political and institutional environment where the government is committed to transparent, accountable and democratic governance and the line ministries are responsive to the needs of community people (Mansuri and Rao, 2004:31).

However, supporting local governance and CDD a long array of cultural, political, institutional and organizational changes, which are highly interrelated in any society must be carried out. They are discussed thoroughly in the following sub-sections.

The incremental change in culture, society and institutions

Local culture influences the institutional structure and management capacities in any society. Cohen and Peterson (1999) highlight that:
“in those late developing countries where the administrative culture is not supportive of the legal-rational structure of bureaucracy, it is also not supportive of an alternative method of organization that would promote accountable, efficient, and effective use of resources” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:57).

Here some cultural and socio-economic issues that influence management and organizational culture in many developing countries are discussed.

**Bridging the structural gap between tradition and modernity**

In the industrial societies, the family and clan system have already begun to lose their significant role and function. The institution of family has been reduced into single households and the state has become a substitute for the family system because the market-based economy in these societies requires commonly agreed law on national level. The welfare state has been established to take over those responsibilities previously within the domain of the family system such as taking care of the elderly, disabled and unemployed citizens. Therefore, the state must ensure that it receives adequate fiscal revenues from industrial market production. The individuals in the industrial societies have to adopt different roles such as producers, consumers, citizens and family members in the context of a modern economy and social system. Their roles in the modern economy system are built on professionalism and in such a situation the manager of an enterprise is obligated to fire the unqualified employees no matter if they are close relative of her or him (Lutz and Linder, 2004:8-9).

On the other hand, most developing countries are usually divided into traditional and modern segments, above all, due to means of production. In these societies, the market economy is relatively weak and the proportion of industrial manpower small, then the state lack sufficient fiscal revenues to carry out its “modern” functions. As a result, it may be able to deliver services only for elite groups in urban areas and the mass population especially in the rural areas must rely on their family and tribal bonds as they are excluded from employment within the modern economy and have no or inadequate access to basic social services. Moreover, the less people are integrated into a modern market economy, the deeper the division is between rich and poor people, between urban and rural areas, and between educated and less educated civilians (ibid: 9-10).

Institutionalizing co-operation among local actors may diminish these gaps between tradition and modernity. It can ensure that political, social, environmental and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in the society and the voice of the most vulnerable groups is heard in decision-making over the allocation of available resources. This is a precondition for good local governance necessary to achieve CDD.

**Informal constraints versus formal rules**

Understanding informal constraints as part of cultural heritage is important for study of human and institutional interaction. Informal constrains in a society such as the socially sanctioned norms of behaviour through specific sanctioning capacities or information networks may make the internally “enforced standards of conduct” effective (North, 1990:40-48).

On the other hand, formal rules include a hierarchy of rules such as political, judicial and economic rules ranging from constitutions and common laws to specific bylaws and individual contracts in order to facilitate the political and economic exchange. While the political rules define the hierarchical structure of the state, the economic rules define the property rights and the ability to alienate an asset or a resource. The remarkable decline in interest rate in some European capital market during last centuries was a result of the
increasing security of property rights, which in turn was a consequence of the effective interaction among a variety of both formal and informal institutional constraints. In this case, the formal law was included into the self-imposed codes of behaviour from the merchants. Increasing specialization and division of labour in Western world have been the main reason for moving from unwritten traditions and customs to written laws, which have made the societies more complex. But at the same time, the technology advancement led to lower information, monitoring, enforcement and transaction costs and in this manner formal rules could easily complement and increase the effectiveness of informal constraints (ibid).

It is evident that cultural features have persistent survival ability because they change incrementally over time. Therefore, it is naïve to believe that informal constraints that are culturally derived will change immediately in reaction to changes in the formal rules. Institutional change is tremendously incremental where the institutional context makes possible new bargains and compromises between the players. In fact, the political institutions can provide a favourable framework for evolutionary change where actors to an exchange can easily settle disputes (North, 1990:89-90).

An example of the need for incremental change in institutions is in the post-Saddam Iraq, where a foreigner power has tried to rapidly change the formal rules not in line with the informal constraints. As a result, there has been an ongoing tension between informal constrains and the new formal rules, which has caused sectarian violence and disobedience of civilians against the new order as we are witnessing on the daily basis. Simply, the religious and cultural norms of Iraqi people are not compatible with democratic traditions and values imposed by a Western power. By a regime change in Iraq, the deep-seated cultural inheritance that underlies many informal constraints was ignored. Now, the informal constrains and norms have to gradually come in a new equilibrium with the formal rules. But this depends also on how much the new formal rules largely imposed by a foreigner democracy can resist the traditional norms and informal constraints in the Iraqi society. For example, despite fundamental change in the formal rules after the creation of a new Iraqi constitution, many informal constraints have resisted to alter because they still resolve basic social, economic, and political exchange problems among the civilians. In an optimistic scenario, an incremental change and restructuring of both formal and informal constraints can produce a new equilibrium and thereby bringing security, stability and democracy to Iraqi people.

**Good governance**

Broadly defined “governance” is about how power is exercised and how important decisions in a society are made where not only the state institutions but also other actors from private sector and civil society are participating in the local development process. Good governance implies effective political institutions and the responsible use of political power and public resources by the state. It is about the interaction between democracy, social power and management of welfare and the rule of law. Democracy requires a rule of law framework in order to govern the interaction and co-existence of all citizens (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2007a: website).

Good governance thus extends beyond the public sector to include all other actors from the private sector and voluntary sector (civil society) as Friedmann (1992) states that:

“Most important, an alternative development involves a process of social and political empowerment whose long-term objective is to rebalance the structure of
power in society by making state action more accountable, strengthening the powers of civil society in the management of its own affairs, and making corporate business more socially responsible” (Friedmann, 1992:31).

A good system of governance is characterized by the presence of local institutions that promote inclusion, efficiency and participation as well as decision-making systems and processes that uphold accountability and transparency. Government institutions should be efficient and effective in carrying out their functions responsive to the needs of people; facilitate and enabling rather than controlling and commanding; and operate according to the rule of law (Penalba, 2006:5).

In the United Nations’ Millennium Declaration, the international community reached a consensus that good governance is not only an aim in itself but also a key factor in attaining human development and in successful poverty reduction and peace-building. As part of good governance, enhancing democracy and rule of law are essential to use the public resources effectively and efficiently. Achieving good governance needs government and administrative reforms; decentralisation and regionalisation of state power; and promoting civil-society actors (UNDP, 1997:3).

Furthermore, good governance is the most important vehicle to promote a sustainable socioeconomic development within the scarce resources that are available to government in any country or region. As part of good governance, effective economic and financial management in the public sector stimulates the promotion of efficient institutions that are responsive to the public interest ensuring social and economic equity. Conversely, corruption as a result of lacking transparency and accountability of government performance, especially in public financial management, can cause a fast decline of governance (Spector, 2005:79).

The principles of good governance

According to Lutz and Linder (2004:17), any local governance must fulfil at least four criteria before calling it “good”:

- People who are governed must accept the decisions of the authorities as legitimate.
- There must be social inclusion and empowerment, equal voice, and participation regardless of gender, youth, social class, ethnicity or religion. About the importance of social inclusion and participation for successful local governance, Linder (2004) states that:

  "Effectiveness for participation in modern governance can be expected if the principle of inclusion is respected. No group and no segment of society should be discriminated, or excluded from the right to organise in groups and to participate in collective bargaining and decision making“ (Linder, 2004:31).

- Basic human rights need to be respected, as well as the rule of law and the division of power.
- Local governance must be responsive and transparent. The leaders are to be accountable, which means that it should be possible to penalize corrupted behaviour and action.

The social inclusion and participation as dimensions of social capital necessary to achieve local governance and CDD were discussed earlier in this chapter. Here, the accountability and transparency of the institutions to civilians are discussed.
Accountability

The specificity of the tasks within an organization affects the degree of accountability. The more specific task, the more specific the role, and the easier it is to evaluate the performance. As the specificity of a given task decreases, the need for accountability will increase. When the task is highly specified and the accountability high, it is inefficient to have a variety of actors competing for the provision of public services. Indeed, most important tasks performed by public sector institutions in rural areas of many developing countries such as the provision of basic health care and education facilities are not specific, which require high level of accountability to ensure adequate delivery of these services (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:93, 97).

Transparency of rules, regulations and processes

Enhancing transparency in administrative procedures and decision-making processes within an entity is essential to reduce opportunities for abuse of power and manipulation of rules and regulations for private interests. Citizen watchdog groups consisting of professionals have proved to be very effective in dealing with this kind of corruption by monitoring decisions made by government and keeping officials accountable for their actions (Spector, 2005: 112-114).

The dramatic improvement in the administrative capacity is now possible by new management techniques and the application of information technology, where civil servants can do their tasks more efficiently. Since the 1980s, there has been a growing recognition that information technology-based reforms can dramatically increase the capacity of public sector bureaucracies to perform the tasks efficiently and effectively. In addition, information technology can allow to reduce those middle-level managers whose tasks is to broker information from lower levels to higher level and in this manner to reduce hierarchy and to better manage information flows (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: 59-60).

For instance, computerization of court files can significantly reduce the labour-intensive workload of court personnel, especially those who are still handwriting their work of compiling case files and in this manner enhancing the quality of judicial administration. Furthermore, computerization of the administrative works prevent documents or case files from being “lost” or “found” for a fee. In the case of Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria, the computerization of court files and providing a website for detailed information about each case have increased the transparency of court proceedings and the opportunity to observe the consistency and application of temporal standards of each case (Mahzouni, 2007:10; Spector, 2005: 24).

The tasks can be efficiently carried out using a mix of personnel, information technology and appropriate management strategy and organization structure where by institutionalizing the roles the corruption is far more difficult to sustain.

It is obvious that information technology can increase the transparency of administrative tasks within the public sector and thereby reduce corruption. But, investment in information technology needs to be grounded in broader institutional reforms. For example, the introduction of an education management information system in Gambia helped to reduce the role of favouritism in teacher assignments. The new system has made the information transparent and available necessary to constrain the assignment of teachers on the basis of such factors as tribal and family connections, personal friendships, or other forms of illegal personal influence (Department of State for Education of Gambia, 2001 quoted in Spector, 2005:74).
To summarize, as one of the principles of good governance, government should regularly publish accurate and complete information on the distribution of public revenues and expenditures. The application of computer technologies to coordinate operations of government e.g., taxation operations, budgeting and making the public budgets accessible and transparent to the public, have shown to be useful. Furthermore, the use of information technology in governmental functions e.g. court records and drugs procurement has been demonstrated to be an effective tool in limiting and preventing corruption (Spector, 2005:174).

The link between poor governance, corruption and poverty

Today “good governance” has got into the top of the development agenda in many developing countries and increasing attention is paid to the relationship between governance, corruption and poverty. It is now recognized that corruption is a critical indicator of poor governance and state failure to be accountable and responsive to the needs of grassroots people. Corruption is contributing factor to poverty and consequently to conflict and global insecurity. In other words, corruption in a society undermines governance, economic growth, and consequently the stability of that society. USAID (1999) gives a broad definition of corruption:

“corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. It encompasses unilateral abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, as well as abuses linking public and private actors such as bribery, extortion, influence peddling, and fraud. Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic offices and can be petty or grand, organized or unorganized” (USAID, 1999:5).

Focus of this study is more on corruption within the political sphere and public sector institutions as the private sector is still very weak in the Kurdish region in Iraq. It is now evident that the poverty in developing countries, to a large extent, is caused by widespread corruption in the society. Based on the synthesized results from a comprehensive and cross-sectoral study in many developing countries, Spector (2005) highlights the causes of corruption and its negative effects on the poor:

“Corruption flourishes when the public is poorly informed, apathetic, cynical, tolerant, or so politically weak as to be unable to protest. The most vulnerable individuals in society are the poor, and they often encounter petty corruption on a daily or regular basis: for example poor patients who must pay fees for “free” government health services. The poor also bear the heaviest burden from the larger economic and societal impacts of corruption: the slowing of development, the dissipation and wastage of public resources, the erosion of formal sector employment, the decline in investment, and the loss of government legitimacy through poor governance” (Spector, 2005:158).

The corruption is not only a result of poor governance but also a direct consequence of an uninformed and uneducated civilian population and weak civil society.

Institutional and organizational change for good governance

Institutional and organizational development has always been important for the long term functioning of a society. It is sometimes difficult to make a distinction between institutions and organizations as they are highly interrelated. Similar to institutions, organizations provide a structure to human interaction. Indeed the actions and results that arise as a consequence of the institutional framework, in many cases, are the result
not only of that framework, but also of the organizations that have been developed in consequence of that framework. Conceptually, the rules (institutions) from the players (organizations) must be clearly distinguished. For example, in the ministry of education in a country the purpose of the rules is to define the way how to provide the education services but the objective of the different departments within that set of rules is to supply services effectively and efficiently by a combination of skills, strategy and coordination. Institutions may be created, as was the case of new Iraqi constitution in 2005 or they may simply evolve over time, as did the Iraqi common law combined of English common law and Islamic and traditional rules. Changing the later is much more difficult.

Simply defined, an “organization” is a group of individuals who work together to achieve common goals. The existence and evolution of organizations over time is largely determined by the institutional framework and governance structure within a given society. In turn, the organizations have an impact on the gradual evolution of the institutional framework and in the course of attempts to achieve their objectives can play a vital role as agent of institutional change. Therefore, it is important to study the interaction between institutions (underlying rules) and organizations (the strategy of different players) within the institutional framework in a certain country or region (North, 1990:4-5).

The establishment of appropriate institutional framework is critical for the legitimacy of government and the support of participatory local governance for CDD. Spector (2005) states that:

“Institutional weakness however surfaces again and again as a fundamental contributor to embedded corruption and a resulting low level of legitimacy for the government. Without strong government legitimacy, all development aspirations are hindered, and the resources allocated to development assistance are of questionable efficacy” (Spector, 2005:160)

Institutional change involves a long process of (1) creating awareness or perception among civilians that changes are needed; (2) promoting widespread acceptance and legitimization of change; and (3) adapting and institutionalizing changes. Promoting change is especially difficult in the developing countries with unstable political, economic and social circumstances. Most developing countries are lacking strong institutions and organizations to institutionalize and carry out changes. Especially, the experienced and skilled professionals to efficiently perform the tasks are often missing (Rondinelli et al., 1990:10).

To summarize, the key role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure for human and organizational coordination and cooperation. Organizations in the course of pursuing their objectives incrementally alter the institutional structure. They are entities designed to maximize wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the society. In this process, the kind of knowledge and skills that are acquired by the organizations to further their objectives will in turn play a major role on the change of institutional framework and the society as a whole.

**The impact of knowledge and skills on institutional change**

A successful achievement in institutional and organizational changes demands continuous development of knowledge and skills of civilians. Through history knowledge and skills, as main competitive advantages among organizations and societies, have played a vital role. The institutional context is very essential not only for organizational development of entities but also for the development of appropriate
knowledge and skills demanded from that context. North (1990) highlights the importance of institutional context for acquiring appropriate knowledge and skills in a society or organization:

“The kinds of information and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in good part a consequence of a particular institutional context. That context will not only shape the internal organization and determine the extent of vertical integration and governance structure, but also determine the pliable margins that offer the greatest promise in maximizing the organization’s objectives” (North, 1990:77).

Indeed, there is a need to examine the institutional context to know what kinds of knowledge and skills are demanded. The incentives embodied in the institutional framework play the decisive role in shaping the kinds of skills and knowledge needed for long-run development of a society. Within the institutional framework the economic organizations invest in the kinds of skills and knowledge that will pay off. Such investment in skills and knowledge, to a great extent, will shape the long-term development of institutions and organizations and the whole society in which they are operating (ibid: 81).

In this process, a society that permits the maximum generation of trials and errors will be most likely to solve problems over time. Evidently, political competition and institutional pluralism that promote decentralized decision-making are crucial to effective institutions and organizations in a society.

**Political competition**

Increased political competition is essential to good governance. The creation of legislation is needed to define the scope of activities and authority of political parties and facilitate the development of a competitive and democratic regime where there is no space for monopoly party authority. Political party laws covering party registration, finance, and general operation are crucial in framing the context in which political parties can operate. This, in turn, could provide legitimacy to party activities that go beyond the election campaigning to create a solid institutional base for party competition that can reduce opportunities for corruption. Creation of financial legislation is another step toward a more competitive environment for political parties, which can lead to a fair distribution of political funds and increase equality in political competition. A high degree of transparency in political finance reduces the opportunity for parties to build secret campaigns (Spector, 2005: 37-38).

A classic explanation for relative success of Western world in institutional development and sustainable development contrary to Asian and Middle East is providing competition not only among private organizations but also among political units. In other words, a significant factor to the economic growth in Western world was the reinforcing role among political and economic organizations. An institutional framework was evolved to achieve synergy affects in the society where the economic organizations induced incremental change and the political organizations provided an enabling environment for economic organizations to flourish (North, 1990:130, 137).

Political parties play a key role in linkages between the state and the society as the activities of political parties relate both to the political world and to society. Therefore, lacking fair competition among political parties in a society, one-party political system can create an enabling environment for corruption and thereby spreading corruption to both spheres of society and state. In some developing counties with insecure political and economic institutions, the patronage and clientele structures can be used as means for political parties to maintain themselves in power. For local poor, the patronage
networks are sometimes the only way to access basic services. In fast growing economies in East Asia like China, political party control over society is weakening due to economic liberalization. In these counties, the private sector is gradually taking over most of state’s business activities but there is no effective monitoring system to ensure the transparency in the relationship between economic and political organizations (Spector, 2005: 35-36).

Multiparty systems with active party competition can generally be considered less exposed to corruption. Party competition provides voters with an alternative when they do not approve of the ruling party’s politics. It is evident that most industrialized liberal democracies are characterized of a relatively high party competition; a clear separation of power (legislative, executive and judiciary); efficient monitoring system; and a vibrant civil society. As a result, corrupt actors in these countries face a higher risk of exposure and being driven out of power, which increase transparency and accountability. Linder (2004:31) highlights the “political pluralism” as a main criterion of modern local governance where “No single group should have the power to dominate the others”.

To summarize, the structure of political parties is critical for improving democracy in developing countries. It is obvious that the risk of corruption is higher in political systems where the institutional structure to enforce government accountability is weak and where there is lack of mechanisms to limit the corrupt behaviour of government officials. In order to eliminate corruption in political parties, the reforms have to address both the governing regime with which parties interact and internal party governance. Parties can lead the transition to greater democracy but when there is no competition and monitoring system to put any corrupt behaviour and action on high risk, democratic reforms and the efforts to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development are likely to fail.

Institutional pluralism

Cohen and Peterson (1999) relate institutional pluralism more to accountability, where besides the government other actors from voluntary and private sectors are involved to increase the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of social services:

“Institutional Pluralism strategies that allow non-central and private sector institutions and firms to carry out task-related roles more accountably, effectively, and efficiently than governmental institutions holding monopolies over public sector tasks ” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:53).

The institutional pluralism implies a network of different organizations from public sector (central, non-central), private sector and voluntary sector that share roles and tasks relative to the production and provision of public goods and services, where the public sector institutions play as “brokers”. By increasing the number and diversity of institutions involved in providing services, accountability is increased, risk is reduced, and service delivery is more efficiently managed and tailored to local needs. In this manner, it breaks the monopoly of the delivery of public goods and services; creates a market for the management and provision of public goods and services; and promotes accountability where the government is only one actor among many (ibid: 86).

It is now evident that monopoly, either within the public or private sector, delivers services at high costs, less efficiently, and less accountable. In administrative strategy of institutional pluralism, the tasks and roles are not monopolized but are shared between central and non-central public and private levels. This can promote administrative
accountability through competition, which in turn can promote democratic process and civic participation. In institutional pluralism, the role of state is redefined from a “producer” to a “provider” of public goods and services. It will increasingly be concerned more with the marketing, negotiation, management, and funding of contracts with private firms and NGOs than with the direct production of goods and services. Anyhow, in an institutional pluralism, the state is still needed to ensure coordination between the broad array of institutions and for stabilization and distribution policies (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:61).

Appropriate management strategies to good governance

Rondinelli et al. (1990) define a management strategy as:

“a particular pattern of management processes and organizational structures that enables an organization to accomplish specific tasks in a given environment”

(Rondinelli et al., 1990:33).

The standard operating procedures and blueprint designs are only efficient for providing routine and repetitive services. They are ineffective and inflexible for people-centred services and activities e.g. education and health care that are constantly changing and need to be tailored to the needs of different groups in different areas. The quality perception of these services depends heavily on the values, attitudes, and behaviour of intended beneficiaries which is largely different from region to region, from group to group, and even among individuals. Therefore, a contingency analysis is needed where the level of innovation in performing the tasks and the degree of uncertainty in the environment in which they are carried out are main determinates to apply an appropriate management strategy. It is clear that each country’s socioeconomic environment is different and that adjustments in tasks, organizational structure, and management processes evolve incrementally from learning and experimentation. Innovative tasks that are carried out in fast changing environments have to be managed differently than routine tasks in stable environments (ibid: 1-8).

Depending on the tasks and the degree of uncertainty in the environment in which the organization is operating Rondinelli et.al (1990:73-84) defines some management strategies among which the two most contrasting are discussed here: the mechanistic management strategy and the adaptive management strategy.

The mechanistic management strategy is relevant for tasks and activities that have relatively low levels of innovation and that are implemented in relatively stable environments. This classic bureaucratic management strategy is typically characterized by:

- Blueprint planning procedures and centralized decision-making;
- Hierarchic leadership and administrative structure;
- Top-down and one-way communication structure;
- Commando-based coordination;
- Standard and rigid operating procedures; and
- Rule-based jobs where staff are motivated through a combination of monetary rewards and threats of punishment.

Organizations using mechanistic management strategy attempt to control staff performance by rigid procedures. This strategy has been justified in most developing

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7 More about the institutional pluralism will be discussed in the sub-section of “Market decentralization” on page 57.
countries especially for budgeting and expenditure functions as the only way to prevent corruption and inefficient use of public resources.

Conversely, the *adaptive* management strategy is usually more suitable for tasks and activities with high levels of innovation that are implemented in relatively uncertain environments. The adaptive management strategy is usually characterized by:

- Participative decision-making and planning, where there is a constant adjustment of strategies and tactics to the new circumstances in the environment;
- Regular monitoring and evaluation to learn from experience;
- Decentralized structure and participatory leadership;
- Collegial leadership style based on trust between supervisors and subordinates;
- Open and interactive communication where coordination is achieved through negotiation and facilitation; and
- Objective-based jobs where supervisors give the subordinates more responsibility and control over their own activities and where staff is motivated by achievement awards, participation, continuous competence development, and monetary compensation.

In this strategy, the objectives and performance criteria is more emphasized rather than function, where employees are expected to take initiative, solve problems, find appropriate ways to meet objectives, and are more allowed to self-control. In this case the employees must be able to work independently and flexibly without strong central controls.

It is obvious that one management strategy is not necessarily better than another. Today, most organizations, wherever, have to perform both routine and innovative tasks. Therefore, depending on the tasks each organization must apply some combination of mechanistic and adaptive management strategies. For example, in a certain university, routine tasks such as procuring instructional materials, paying lecturers, and collecting enrolment statistics will usually require a mechanistic strategy of management. But, the curriculum that should be flexible, innovative, and responsive to the new demands of the environment, may require an adaptive management strategy.

The fundamental question in local governance is how to make the public sector more accountable, effective, and efficient. There are growing evidences in the literature that a pluralistic rather than a monopolistic organizational design promotes good governance principles. Designing an administrative framework for public sector institutions three principles must be considered: accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness to optimize the mobilization of public resources. The weak management and organizational system of many developing countries is a direct consequence of weak or absent of these three principles of which accountability is the most important and when achieved it promotes the efficient and effective mobilization and management of resources and thereby sustainable development. One reason of using roles rather than structure in designing a new framework for public sector as Cohen and Peterson (1999:71) emphasis is that “it gives important insight into the level of accountability”.

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1999) emphases the need for an effective management and organizational culture to successfully implement the regional rural plans:

“To plan and implement regional rural development activities, you need an organizational and institutional framework that is geared to development. At the administration level, new communication and management structures need to be introduced. Planning procedures that involve the target group, transparent decision-making processes democratic participation- all these are elements of an
administrative culture that regional rural development can help support. It is equally important though to know how to efficiently manage limited financial and human resources” (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:7)

To sum up, there is growing recognition that the creation of an appropriate management and organizational strategy can help to reduce corruption in public sector administration in many developing countries. Corruption can be reduced by creation or modification of organizational structure and administrative procedures intended for breaking the system of corrupt behaviours within the society. An appropriate management strategy and organizational structure must be established to increase the accountability of the system where: the rules and procedures are clear; the mechanisms for monitoring compliance are in place; the consequences for non-compliance are specified; and the consistency of enforcement mechanisms is ensured. Accountability in the systems can only occur when the procedures and laws are transparent to all civilians.

Decentralization as a strategy for participatory local governance

In many developing countries local services and infrastructure are either provided by central governments inefficiently or by community organizations and intermediary support organizations (NGOs and private firms) irregularly as there is no coordination mechanism and local capacity to make the service provision more sustainable over time. Local institutions often lack decision-making power, technical expertise, management capacity and adequate funds to provide services. The problems of providing and maintaining public services and infrastructure have brought increasing calls for decentralizing responsibilities for service and infrastructure provision, financing and management. Service provision and maintenance can often be improved by devolving responsibilities to local governments or administrative units (Rondinelli et.al, 1984:3).

There are a variety of definitions of decentralization that makes a vague perception of the concept. But there is a growing consensus that “decentralization” is any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political, administrative and territorial hierarchy. The main objective is to promote accountability by tailoring services to the variations of local needs. Decentralization promotes efficient decision-making and local participatory governance through institutional pluralism and competition (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:77; Mawhood, 1985:1-5). Furthermore, the benefits of decentralization to sustainable local development are highlighted by USAID (2000) as follows:

“By bringing government closer to citizens, decentralisation allows people to participate more effectively in local affairs, including identification of community priorities. Local leaders and institutions can be held increasingly accountable for decisions and actions that affect citizens’ lives. Citizens and their elected leaders gain experience in the practice of democracy” (USAID, 2000:5).

Participatory, well-functioning and responsive local governance needs necessary human resources and organizational skills on local level to effectively perform the delegated tasks. Local governance needs to be tailored to the local power structure both vertically and horizontally and adequate time and patience to flourish. It also requires shifting power from the central to local level because the centralist approach has showed poor results in poverty reduction especially in rural areas where poverty is greatest.

Some studies identify the empirical links between decentralisation and various dimensions of governance. Shah (2000: 22) finds that in decentralised countries, citizen participation (political freedom and stability), judicial and bureaucratic efficiency,
human development, and income equalities become higher, and corruption becomes lower. In a management system based on institutional pluralism consisting of different actors with complementary task-related roles where the outcome is constantly monitored, the accountability is higher and the rate of corruption lower.

Decentralised governance structures working closer to the grassroots people are more cost-efficient and flexible. However, a transparent regulatory framework must be in place to know which government level should perform which task and what competencies do the local authorities need in order to promote local development. This also means involving representatives from the regions and municipalities, civil society and the private sector in decision-making process (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2007b: website).

To summarize, the main benefits of decentralization are:

a) Decentralization increases responsiveness to local demands as the central government might not be adequately informed about the local needs and preferences;

b) Decentralisation increases accountability and transparency and enables citizens to oversee the performance of local government as the system of checks and balances works better at the local level; and as result

c) Better and more effective management of local resources and revenue collection can be achieved as decentralization is supposed to make local government more responsive to local needs and in this manner to increase the willingness of the beneficiaries to make contributions in the provision and maintenance of local services. Local governments may also be more willing to increase revenue collection if they can determine how the revenues are to be used.

Institutional arrangements for decentralization

Despite vague definition of the decentralization concept, there is growing consensus in the literature about some complementary forms of transferring power and resources from central government. Among those that are most clearly identified and elaborated to create an enabling environment for participatory local governance and CDD are: spatial administrative, political, market and fiscal, which are described in the following subsections.

Spatial administrative decentralization

“De-concentration” of power within the public sector can be considered as the weakest form of decentralization in which the central government has still monopoly over competencies and resources on local level without any participation of local people and organizations in decision-making process. In this case, the central government agencies on local level have the authority or at least have a say in co-decision with their ministries to appoint or dismiss the staff of local administration (Linder, 2004:7, 30; Rondinelli et al., 1984:10).

“Administrative” decentralization has a spatial dimension when public sector tasks are moved geographically away from the centre to local level. “Spatial” decentralization is a term used by regional planners that aim at reducing extreme urban concentration in a few large cities in order to promote local economy and regional growth. Effective spatial decentralization usually requires administrative decentralization, which means a
hierarchical and functional distribution of power and functions between central and non-central governmental units (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:22).

To some degree, de-concentration as a limited form of decentralization can allow efficient and effective management of many routine functions. For example, de-concentration of responsibilities to regional, provincial, and district agencies of education ministry in Thailand have allowed responding more effectively to the local needs of education and making the curriculum and content more relevant to the desires of local people (Rondinelli et al, 1990:129).

To summarize, when powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are accountable to their superiors in a hierarchy up to central government, the reform can be termed as administrative decentralization or de-concentration. In other words, the authority for making decisions is transferred from persons who are located at the central line ministries to other persons within the bureaucratic structure on local level. The aim is to enable the governmental institutions on local level to undertake development activities in line with local needs and priorities. In spatial administrative form, which requires major changes in management processes, decentralization as an innovation must be introduced into organizations slowly and incrementally allowing staff time to adjust and providing them with the necessary capacities and authority to manage the delegated tasks efficiently and effectively. Therefore, decentralization strategies must be planned and implemented on a small scale and it should be kept simple and appropriate to the capacities of the organizations or units to which responsibility are transferred in order to expand incrementally and obtain sustainable results.

However, in spatial administrative decentralization the focus is on the spatial relationships of institutions and firms rather than on how specific task-related roles are shared between them. This form of decentralization does not make systems more accountable because task-related roles are not delegated to actors from private sector and civil society and the responsibility for the roles is only spatially distributed and still monopolized by public sector. Nevertheless, spatial administrative decentralization is a step towards political decentralization.

**Political decentralization**

Political decentralization means “devolution” of legislative decision-making power from central governments to autonomous, lower-level assemblies and local councils that have been democratically elected by their constituencies (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:22).

Political decentralization is also called “democratic decentralization” or “democratic local governance” by some authors. The attributes of democracy and rule of law such as local election or the right to levy taxes are supposed to be the main principles of this from of decentralization. The main objectives of elections are to legitimise public authority and to mandate elected officials. But, additionally to elections, more directly mode of participatory mechanisms should be used to enhance the involvement of civil society in policy-making and implementation of local activities and thereby improving local governance. Most justifications of political decentralization are built around the assumption that by bringing government decision-making closer to the citizens, efficiency, equity and accountability in the public resource management is increased and thereby an enabling environment for CDD is created (Linder, 2004:7, 39).

There is a close relationship between centralized system of governance and corruption. In a centralized system such as the Kurdistan Regional Government, decision-making is controlled on the top and there is no transparency how the public
resources are used and distributed. Especially when a system lacks appropriate oversight mechanisms, the corruption is embedded and pervasive. In such situations it will be difficult for economy to flourish and for democracy to grow strongly. As a result, the quality of life will erode; underdevelopment becomes persistent; and the government legitimacy remains weak. Through transferring more decision-making powers and resources to local level, transparency can be enhanced and accountability might be achieved as one of the main principles of good governance.

To sum up, at its most basic, decentralization aims to achieve one of the central goals of just political governance (democratization), or the desire that civilians should have a say in their own affairs. In this sense, decentralization is a strategy of governance to facilitate the transfer of power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of power. Political decentralization is different from administrative decentralization since powers in this case are devolved to actors or institutions that are accountable to the population in their jurisdiction. Devolution requires that local governments be given clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority, and within which they perform public function in coordination with central government. Typically, elections are seen as the mechanism that ensures accountability in political decentralization but more the “accountability structure” in which actors are located will determine if the form of decentralization is political or administrative. This is true whether lower-level actors are appointed or elected because elections can still be structured in ways that make elected officials upwardly accountable. When powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are downwardly accountable, even if they are appointed, the reform may be categorized as political decentralization (USAID, 2000:6-7; Azfar et.al, 1999:12-14).

**Market decentralization**

Often the organizations to which functions and decision-making power are transferred are not located within the regular government structure which are representing specific interest groups in the society and are established and operated by members of those groups. These include farmers, cooperative organizations, women and youth association (Mawhood, 1985:4).

Concerns in the early 1990s about inefficient administrative capacity on central level, fiscal constrains, and limited accountability on all levels of government provided the basis for a third phase of decentralization strategy based on “delegation” to the private sector firms and civil society organizations. Grassroots participation was pushed as much for its potential to make the public sector more accountable and as for its relationship to participatory local governance. Understanding that the role sharing of public sector tasks promotes competition and accountability, this form of decentralization has become more prevalent due to recent trends toward economic liberalization and privatization (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:5).

The main objective of market decentralization is to create conditions that allow goods and services to be produced and provided by market mechanisms tailored to the needs and preferences of individuals where small and large firms, community groups, cooperatives, private voluntary associations and NGOs are collaborating. In this case the government is not obliged to provide services but to ensure that they are provided and distributed fairly among the civilians. The evidence of recent economic growth in developing countries, such as Asia’s Tigers shows that the task of state should be limited to provide infrastructure and promote human capital and financial markets. To limit the role of government in economic activities can increase competition and
accountability and thereby reducing corruption (USAID, 1999:7; Cohen and Peterson, 1999:23, 52).

Decentralization and privatization of some public services can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of provision as well as maintenance of those services. For example education managed by voluntary organizations has a long history of tradition in some developing countries, which has shown many potential benefits. It promotes closer relationships between the schools and the community people and gives parents a greater opportunity to participate more directly in the educational process as well as in fund-raising activities. It can also increase the ability of teachers, administrators, and parents to tailor school programs to community needs and to set standards of quality for education of their children (Rondinelli et al., 1990:128)

The role shift of state from “controlling” to “brokering” is to do less but facilitate more. The brokerage role is the crucial feature of the administrative strategy of “institutional pluralism”, which means that both central and devolved local-level governmental institutions delegate roles (related to the provision of collective goods and services) to private sector firms, community organizations and NGOs. This means to induce private investment and empower civil society organizations in order to find complementary roles and create the enabling environment for CDD. But, it needs a capable and committed leadership and central government to create the enabling environment needed for local public agencies to perform a brokerage role (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: 171).

To sum up, the market decentralization calls for institutional pluralism strategy where roles related to a specific task within public sector can be shared by two or more governmental institutions and/or private sector firms or civil society organizations. The logic of the institutional pluralism is to increase accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in use of public resources through promoting multiple actors, where public tasks are gradually transferred to private sector and civil society organizations. For example, within the education system citizen involvement can consist of parent-teacher associations not only to deal with the problems of pupils but also to monitor the quality of the education system and ensure that there is no space for favouritism and discrimination. Institutional pluralism is an evolving strategy of redefining the boundaries of the public, private and voluntary sectors. But the public sector monopoly will continue for the provision of those services and goods that require economies of scale and are not suitable for a private firm to supply. While the spatial administrative decentralization is focusing on de-concentration of only structure, the market decentralization on delegation of tasks and roles to increase efficiency, equity and accountability in the provision of public services.

Fiscal decentralization

Making the decentralized local governance successful, requires that local governments have the authority to enforce and collect local taxes and user fees to finance their own activities and delegated tasks and, if necessary, to obtain funds from central government and aid agencies. In principal, fiscal decentralization is an integrated part of any form of decentralization. Financial authorities must include in any decision-making power passed to local government and community institutions.

There are growing evidences that decentralization policies in most developing countries have not been implemented successfully because the fiscal aspects were not

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8 See even the sub-section of “Institutional pluralism” on page 51.
seriously incorporated in the design of decentralization. For example, in Kenya despite
decentralization reform the public services are still provided centrally partly because of
the insufficient allocation of funds to the local government bodies (Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:17). About fiscal problems faced by the
decentralized local governments in developing countries, Lutz and Linder (2004) note
that:

“It is often the case that power and responsibilities have actually shifted, but
without reliable resources and transfer mechanisms. The new local governments
are established without obtaining the necessary resources to function as expected.
Even where there are clear rules of inter-governmental fiscal transfers, central
governments do not transfer financial resources regularly or reliably. This
insecurity hinders proper and sustainable planning at the local level” Lutz and

Indeed, many central governments in developing countries lack financial resource and
therefore there are not enough funds to distribute among different local governments.
Socioeconomic, political and institutional factors are generally important for the
analysis of fiscal decentralization. The institutional context of fiscal decentralization
entails: the overall economic development; the nature of the legal system; ongoing
process of economic and political reform; and the organization of monetary and
financial institutions which determines the design of intergovernmental financial system
and ultimately affects the outcome of fiscal decentralization reform. However, local
government must have authority and control over own fiscal resources to carry out their
delegated responsibility efficiently, otherwise most advantages of decentralization may
not be sustainable (Wildasin, 1997:19; Esmail, 1997:12; Linder, 2004:11).

To summarize, the main idea behind fiscal decentralization is to provide an
institutional framework for jurisdiction in a certain geographic area to effectively and
efficiently internalize benefits and costs of public services. The key element underlying
the interest in fiscal decentralization is to achieve economic stability, sustainable
growth, and provision of basic public services efficiently and equitably across people
and jurisdictions. In a fiscally decentralized system, the policies of sub-national
branches of governments are permitted to differ in order to reflect the preferences of
their residents. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization brings government closer to the
people and a representative government works best when it is closer to the people.

However, much of the established theoretical literature of fiscal federalism has been
based on issues within the developed countries. The definition and implementation of
fiscal decentralization differ greatly across developing countries due to differences in
economic and political structures and the capacity of local institutions to take over the
delegated tasks (Azfar et al., 1999:10-12).

Critical reflections on good governance and decentralization

There is a dilemma of good governance and fighting corruption. The power-sharing
among different local actors to build local governance can be an apparent problem in
any given context especially in the Kurdish society in Iraq, which still consists of
traditional structure. Therefore, a careful examination of the structural divide between
traditional and modern institutions is essential, where appropriate mechanisms are
created to bridge the gaps and promote mutual respect, recognition and confidence
between them. In this process of consensus-building for fundamental change in a
society, Linder (2004) emphasises the role of modern institutions:
“the modernist side has to think of much broader concepts of some key notions as: statehood, democracy, participation, gender politics and governance” (Linder, 2004:28).

Politicians are most unlikely to engage in corruption when there is a high risk to be put on trial, punished, or to loose the position and seat, therefore, to prevent corruption, it is necessary to increase the risks. However, the creation of monitoring and auditing institutions in government and parliament to fight corruption can only be effective if they are independent, represent all parties in parliament and have authority to prosecute and sanction misbehaviour. The most serious consequences of corruption is not only the waste of the public resources that get misdirected but also a misallocation of talent due to promotion being awarded on the basis of bribery, family and party political connection rather than merit. As a result, generations of students come to believe that personal effort and merit do not count and that success comes through manipulation, favouritism and bribery. This could encourage a negative value among young generation; lead to ineffective use of human capital and “brain drain”; and as a further consequence losing both social capital and human capital necessary for sustainable socioeconomic development.

Furthermore, this study attempts to avoid normative bias toward decentralization that extreme devolution and delegation combined with political empowerment at the grassroots is the only way to produce and provide collective goods and services on an efficient, effective, equitable basis. Decentralization is a political, cultural and socioeconomic issue by itself and requires a long time horizon to achieve and therefore it has its protagonists and opponents. Linder (2004) proposes that:

“in countries with a history and culture of a central state, decentralization of the administration is a process that takes time: professional resources and skills must be developed at the local level; relations between central and decentralized authorities must change, as well as mentalities of the old bureaucratic elite. In this learning process, occasional distrust between the central and the local authorities must be overcome” (Linder, 2004:9).

It is obvious that successful decentralization is more than just strengthen the public sector institutions. By enhancing the participation of local people and institutions and their inclusion into decision-making process, the transparency, accountability and responsiveness will be more fostered to achieve a sustainable local development (Lutz and Linder, 2004:2)

The questions of which services should be decentralized; how they should be financed; which institutional arrangements are most feasible and effective; and how decentralization policies can be better implemented, however, remain open and in some countries hotly debated. Nevertheless, an integrated approach exploring the political, economic and social dimensions of the decentralization policies in the local context must be taken in order to provide an appropriate approach to decentralization reform. If decentralization policies are to be implemented successfully, they must be designed carefully, in particular the services to be decentralized; the characteristics of users; and financial and institutional alternatives. Moreover, the capacities of local people and institutions to take over the delegated responsibilities must be systematically analyzed and grounded in an integrated framework. Decentralization is viewed as an incremental process of building the capacity of local institutions to assume greater responsibility for development planning and management (Linder, 2004:50; Rondinelli et.al, 1984:45).

It is imperative that the legal form of decentralisation is an element of constitutional law and less subject to change by political changes of central government. The aim is to
ensure that no influential actors (political parties, central government or the elite of central administration) can be opposed to decentralisation reform.

Different institutional arrangements for decentralization, which were described earlier, are highly interrelated. Indeed, the failure to distinguish these arrangements is one of the major reasons for the confusion on decentralization concept in the literature. For example, effective “spatial administrative decentralization” usually requires both administrative reforms within the public sector and a political commitment from the central government to transfer decision-making power and promoting democratic elections of low-level officials and councils in form of “political decentralization”. In developing countries usually there are great urban-rural disparities regarding economic growth and the public sector is usually incapable to provide rural poor with basic public services, which in turn calls for “market decentralization”. In this case the task-related roles to produce and provide collective goods are delegated to the private firms and NGOs, where appropriate. However, certain political conditions need to exist before devolution or delegation can be promoted as a strategy. Fragile states with weak bureaucracies have shown incapable to introduce, implement, and monitor the decentralization strategies. Moreover, a strong commitment from the centre is needed to create an enabling environment for enhancing the organizational capacity of those actors which are granted responsibility and task-related roles (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: 23, 62).

The objectives of decentralization are not achieved when the central government fails to monitor the integrity of lower and decentralized governments, or fails to establish transparent linkages between the different levels of government. In such a scenario, the decentralization can favour the interests of powerful local elites who find new opportunities to search for illegal benefits though pressuring local government officials when the oversight from the central government is absent (Spector, 2005: 155).

For a successful implementation of decentralization reform, Rondinelli et al. (1990) emphasises the need for a greater role of central bodies to support the capacity building of local government:

“Decentralization is more likely to be successful if programs are carefully supervised and administrators make an effort to teach lower-level officials and organizations how to handle new responsibilities. Projects that transfer large numbers of tasks or greater responsibility all at once without sufficient technical assistance are likely to fail. Plans for decentralization should include training for both central administrators and lower-level implementers. In a decentralized organizational structure the role of high-level administrators is to provide guidance and assistance rather than to exercise stringent controls. Technical and managerial training must be provided not only for those to whom responsibility is being transferred, but also to central officials who will have to learn how to support local implementers more effectively” (Rondinelli et al., 1990:155-156).

To summarize, decentralization reform is not a condition but a process which needs a long time span and incremental change in management and organizational culture in a certain society. Therefore, a precondition to achieve the goals of decentralization is to take a more realistic view of decentralization’s potential and limitation in any given society with particular political and cultural features. Especially, it is important understanding the organizational and management requirements for carrying out decentralization reforms.
2.6 Conclusions

There is actually a dilemma with social research. On the one hand, an in-depth analysis of only one theory can isolate it from other important interrelated theories. On the other hand, presenting and analysing different interrelated theories will exclude the possibility to conduct an in-depth analysis of each theory usually because of the limited time. In this chapter, the conceptual framework was actually designed and developed as guidelines to answer the research questions. A full study of the closely related theories to social capital such as CDD, community empowerment, participation, institutional capacity building, local network institutions and good governance has been done. These theories are so interlinked that it makes no sense to study them separately.

The Figure 2.1 on page 25 illustrates the link between different elements of social capital necessary to achieve sustainable CDD, where the integration of all social, economic and environmental activities including the target population is needed. This in turn demands building social capital on macro, meso and micro levels in form of effective and efficient horizontal and vertical interaction between institutions preferably in an established system of participatory local governance. On micro level the driving forces behind any CDD are empowered CBOs and village council and on meso level is the local government which plays as a network-builder to link the institutions from all levels. Therefore, on macro level appropriate political and institutional reforms should be conducted to produce different types of social capital necessary for creating an enabling environment for local governance and sustainable CDD.

But, a concept like social capital that encompasses too much is at risk of explaining nothing. Therefore, the challenge for the author was to give meaningful and pragmatic content to the rich notion of social capital in the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq and to define different types and dimensions of social capital necessary to build participatory local governance for CDD. It is supposed that a complementary local network based on public, private and voluntary organizations can best meet the needs on community level, which requires capacity development of people and institutions producing different types of social capital.

The CDD approach is more sustainable where community decision-making and management of resources are supported by a favourable legal and regulatory framework. This means that appropriate policies and law enforcements must be in place to support local initiatives and to protect community rights. For example, CBOs should be easily able to obtain legal status and own assets. Procurement and contract laws may need to be changed to enable direct resource transfer from local governments to CBOs. An overall freedom of information act including legal protections for the press, free speech, and the right to organize as part of structural social capital is also essential for effective community action. Finally, readily accessible dispute resolution mechanisms are required as key legal and regulatory policies that support CDD. Systems may need to be developed to hold both local governments and CBOs accountable for their actions.

The support to CDD will not be sustainable without the policies, laws, systems, and governance processes that encourage effective collaboration among local governments, central governments, line agencies, civil society, service providers, and CBOs. Specifically, such an environment should include; (a) elected local governments that are responsive to their constituents and are empowered to serve them; (b) a conducive legal and regulatory framework that supports community action and enforce laws to co-ordinate activities; (c) intergovernmental arrangements for fiscal flows to local governments and CBOs; and (d) well-defined financing rules and task-related responsibilities of key players in each sector.
Ideally, an enabling environment in form of political, spatial administrative, market, and fiscal decentralization should be in place before initiating the CDD efforts which makes the local governance more responsive and effective to CDD. This is not always possible and where such conditions are not present, the deficiencies in the surrounding environment must be addressed. By empowering communities and generating upward pressure on governments and agencies, these strategies can serve as catalysts to initiate the necessary policy and institutional reforms.

The question is how to downsize the public sector to make it more efficient and accountable. The approach of spatial administrative decentralization is limited because this kind of downsizing simply transfers central problems to the periphery and does not resolve the core problem. Therefore, the increased attention has been given to the delegation of public sector tasks to private sector and civil society organizations in form of market decentralization. The aim is to transfer the responsibility for the production and provision of many public goods and services, which are handled by central government inefficiently or inadequately, to a broad institutional array in order to increase competition, accountability and effectiveness in the provision and maintenance of the public services. Successful decentralization should be based on any array of institutions and organizations performing task-related roles, which is flexible to changing political, economic, and social objectives over time. But this also requires high inter-institutional and organizational coordination that must be managed in a proper way.

Fundamental institutional change is required to reach participatory local governance and CDD. The institutions change in an incremental and complicated process. How fast they are changed are determined by informal constrains embodied in customs, traditions and codes of conduct, which in any society connect the past with the present and future and therefore provides a key to explain the institutional change over time. Unlike informal constrains, the formal rules can change overnight as the result of political and judicial decisions, but the results may not be sustainable if not supported by informal constraints. As the institutional structure and behavior are deeply rooted in the cultural values and norms in a given country or region, the institutional arrangement to promote local governance for sustainable CDD must be carefully examined.

Nevertheless, “good local governance” means bringing the government closer to local people, which needs new norms and relationships based on mutual respect, recognition and trust as part of social capital. Increasing the confidence of civilians in the government system, the efficient production and fair distribution of public services and goods must be guaranteed. This confidence can be further reinforced if the civilians are involved in identification of their own needs and priorities and are empowered to make contributions in providing and maintaining the services.

In the next chapter, closely linked to the conceptual framework the methodological framework including different methods of data collection methods will be discussed to find appropriate answers to the research questions.
3 Research approach and methodology

The first section of this chapter is about the requirements and justifications to design appropriate methodologies and ensuring a strong link between conceptual and methodological framework. The strengths of using participatory and interdisciplinary methods of data collection in form of triangulation are also discussed to increase the validity and reliability of obtained data in the research area\(^9\).

In the second section, the area of analysis is explained which according to the local circumstances is classified in micro, meso and macro levels of social capital and the need to conduct an in-depth study on local level intuitions is emphasised. Locally-based validated indicators that can measure types of social capital in relation to other development indicators in the areas of poverty alleviation, inequality reduction, environmental protection and economic growth on local level are also described, which are somehow linked to the indicators on regional, national and global levels.

The third section will describe the case study selection and a sampling framework to select representative sites on both meso and micro levels. The selection criteria of rain-fed area of the Kurdish region in Iraq as research area including decision-making levels (sub-district, community and household) are explained.

In the fourth section, the empirical work including a mix of methods highly adapted to the local needs and requirements is explained which were applied in many steps during two periods of the empirical work\(^{10}\). It will be explained for which reasons and how the methods are applicable in the research area. The shortcomings of each method and the ways to make them more relevant to the local context are also discussed. The aim has been to find and apply the best mix of methods belonging to different mythologies to answer the research questions. The events have been explained and interpreted from the perspectives of the rural people who are the subject of the research. In addition, by intensive and active observation during the continuous learning process of the field study, the cause-effect relationship of the events was observed systematically.

In the last section, the test of scientific analysis is discussed to evaluate the applied research methodology based on the validity and reliability of the obtained data. The importance of triangulation as a tool for cross-checking the obtained information is also highlighted.

3.1 Local approach to research methodology

The research applies a combination of deductive and inductive research approaches. Deductive research moves from general ideas and theories to specific particular situation. This approach offers the researcher a relatively easy and systematic way of testing general ideas on a range of situation. One hypothesis is that bottom-up local development planning and interdisciplinary interactions among well established local

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\(^9\) A measure is said to be valid to the degree that it measures what it is supposed to measure. The reliability of obtained data is high when the probability that other researchers would draw the same conclusions from the same information is high. For more about the validity and reliability see page 87.

\(^{10}\) Reviewing different information gathering tools used by international development agencies e.g. the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SCAT) and the Local Level Institutions Study (LLIS) developed by World Bank (1998) has been useful to develop information gathering tools adapted to the local context of the research area.
institutions and their networks lead to production of social capital (trust, common sense and collective action) and thereby provide great potentials for sustainable development (Chopra, 2001:8). But this hypothesis is too general and difficult to test in any given situation as well in the research area to provide appropriate recommendations for political and institutional reforms that can be implemented afterwards.

Therefore inductive research was also applied which moves from the particular situation of the research area to create broad general ideas. This approach was very time-consuming and took a lot of efforts, but the reward was in terms of arriving at a fresh way of looking at the subject of social capital theories and how far they contribute to the building of effective local network institutions for participatory local governance necessary for CDD (Bradford University, 2005:3-7).

Fieldwork requirements

The research, in general, avoids simple positivist and conventional field study methods such as formal sample surveys and inquiry using a tool box of techniques for data collection, hypothesis testing because they are isolating the determinants of social behaviour and are not in compliance with the effective participatory approach of planning. The study of institutions, as part of social capital, is about the human and social behaviour and should not be conducted in the same way as studies conducted in the natural sciences. Therefore, the research will apply a more phenomenological approach from the perspective that human and social behaviours are not as easily measured as phenomena in the natural sciences. Human and social motivation is shaped by factors that are not always observable e.g. inner thought process and social norms. Furthermore, people place their own meanings on events which do not always coincide with the way others have interpreted them and can become hard to generalize on (ibid).

In addition, the local circumstances of the research area e.g. lack of effective information and communication infrastructure call for a different mode of investigation and analysis. Usually, the information in the research area is more shared and owned by local authorities and are not easily accessible and transparent to the public. People on low-levels of decision-making do not dare to give out the information even within the legal framework. They fear to be fired if they criticize the reliability of the obtained information from higher levels, which is an organizational behaviour inherited from the former centralized system of Iraq. Therefore, as a principle of research ethics, in the case of personal interview, the interviewer ensured that the obtained information would be managed confidentially and not used for other than the research purpose.

Last but not least, the political instability in the new Iraq does not allow effective information exchange without face-to-face contact and established personal trust. In fact, there are many arguments to apply “triangulation” to cross check the data obtained from different sources that required dialogue, flexibility and social interactions between different interests and actors at different local levels of decision-making in the research area.

Triangulation

Triangulation is an approach to acquire reliable data by cross-checking obtained information through the application of different interview techniques, using different sources of information and different perspectives (Mikkelsen, 2005:96). Furthermore, Golafshani (2003:603) explains that “Triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for
improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings”. In social science you can never verify the obtained data, but you can reconfirm that the data would not be false. When emphasizing qualitative data some selected methods could be criticized for the limited objectivity, reliability and validity. In order to minimize such shortcomings, the triangulation is applied to ensure that the obtained data would not be false and thereby increasing the validity and reliability rate of the obtained data. Four basic types of triangulation were used in this research:

- **Methodological** triangulation involved “between-method” triangulation when six different methods were used to analyse the selected households, organizations communities in one sub-district as a single case study and “within-method” triangulation when a certain method, for example, the integrated interview guide, was used to analyse all selected households in both sub-districts as two different case studies. In another word, the between-method triangulation was applied when for instance the information obtained from the group interview of the key informants in a targeted community was cross-checked later by obtained information from the focus group discussions in the same community. The within-method triangulation was applied when for example, the group interview of the key informants, was applied on all investigated communities in both sub-districts. While the between-method triangulation was mainly designed for data collection purpose, the within-method triangulation was more for comparative analysis of collected data; the sensitizing findings and results; and thereby increasing the chance of analytical generalization.

- **Data** triangulation means that primary and secondary data were cross-checked through the entire process of the research. The research applied more qualitative methods of primary data collection e.g. workshop, seminar, focus group discussions, semi-structured interview, active observation, etc. The only quantitative method to collect the primary data was integrated interview guide (see Table 3.3 on page 80) which was also semi-qualitative while the local context and the requirements of the target group called for more face-to-face modes of communication and questioning.

- **Hierarchical** triangulation means that the data was obtained from different decision-making levels of the public administration and civil society organizations which have access to different types of information. In this way, the obtained information would be understood and analyzed from different points of view that will provide a comprehensive view and reliable context about the nature of the institutional problems to development in the research area.

- **Discipline** triangulation means that the data was obtained from different disciplines to consider social, ecological and economic aspects of the development problems on local level and thereby providing more reliable information about the core problems to CDD.

### 3.2 Area of analysis

The research strategy is in accordance with the millennium development goals accepted by international community e.g. decreasing the growing gaps between rich and poor countries and regions by enhancing local institutional capacity. The new challenge to the Middle East region to promote democratic values and increase the participation of grassroots people in decision-making process is also considered, which is supposed to
be achieved by finding locally adapted approach to a more decentralized and democratic planning system in each country. For the purpose of conducting an in-depth study on local level institutions, the variables at national level are, in principle, excluded from the analysis. In fact, the Kurdish region during 1991-2003 has been independent from the former central government and after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship in 2003 has developed very differently in comparison with the rest of Iraq. But somehow the effects of national policies on the Kurdish region were analysed e.g. through semi-structured interviews with key informants in sector institutions, review of document sources and local media. In fact, in the new context of Iraq one of the important policies is supposed to be decreasing regional disparities and promoting local level development. However, three major levels of analysis (micro, meso and macro) including different levels of decision-making are defined in the research area, about which an in-depth analysis was conducted (see Table 3.3 on page 80).

The macro level is consisted of both regional and provincial levels and to some extent the district level, which were not systematically investigated because they were not a major focus of analyzing the local institutional arrangements for CDD. But they are, somehow, influencing the variables on both meso and micro levels and it made sense to investigate the whole system as an enabling environment for development of local institutions. Therefore, the major focus of the first period of the empirical work was to investigate the macro variables. It has to be noted that the district level has no role in the analysis as most decision-making power is concentrated on provincial and regional levels. Only during the first period of the empirical work, the secondary data were collected and the interviews with the line agencies were conducted on district level as information basis for selection criteria of a sub-district that faces most development problems.

The study of micro and meso levels, which was done during the second period of the empirical work, concentrated more on analyzing the indicators related to social capital and institutional effectiveness that may be created by households and institutions on community level as micro level and among the institutions on the sub-district level as meso level. In another word, the analysis of micro level was more concentrated on horizontal interaction of people and organizations on community level, where both cognitive and structural social capital play an important role while the meso-level analysis focused more on vertical interaction of community people and institutions with the higher levels of decision making up to sub-district level where bridging social capital plays a significant role and can be further linked to the existing development policies as part of social capital on macro level.

3.3 Case study selection and sampling framework

As a principal no sample was conducted randomly because this could not guarantee that such a sample would represent the main institutional problems to CDD in the research area and measure what is supposed to be measured. Locally based criteria were developed to select representative sites and making a valid and reliable measurement of social capital and local institutional capacities on the levels of meso and micro.

Site selection criteria

Due to limited time and resources it was not possible to design a sampling framework such that the study would be representative for all rural area in the Kurdish region.
Instead, the rain-fed area, which covers the mountainous area in the north-east of the Kurdish region bordered to Iran and Turkey, was targeted. Land use categories in the Kurdish region are mainly consisted of arable land (rain-fed and irrigated area), pasture land, built-up-land and woodland/forest (see the topography and land use maps on page 69). There are many reasons and criteria to select the rain-fed area of the region as research area as follows.

**Low agricultural productivity**

There is usually no assured level of production in rain-fed areas where increased agricultural variability creates less predictability and as a result the agricultural tasks can become less standardized with less uniform and heterogeneous activities. The producers (animal keepers, bee keepers, farmers) in the rain-fed cultivation area of the Kurdish region, are generally less interdependent and more dispersed and this effect the patterns of local institutional development which demands for more horizontal cooperation between locally-based institutions and more tailor-made vertical assistance and inputs from higher level institutions (Uphoff, 1986:148).

**Poor accessibility**

Existing of great natural barriers and the mountainous character of the rain-fed area in the Kurdish region is one of the main reasons behind low access to the basic public services, transportation, communication and marketing facilities. In addition, missing cross-border spatial development cooperation, make the research area (especially the selected sub-district of Seweil bordered to Iran) as hinterland with very poor accessibility. The people in this area have less possibility to find a livelihood and cannot easily and legally cross the border to search for a job and better quality of life. Their main source of income is to import or export goods without paying lawful customs charges or duties.

**Less vertical assistance**

Such as financial, technological and managerial capabilities tend to be weakest where they are needed most and modern institutions and central government bodies are less effective in more remote area. Therefore, in the socio-economic periphery and disadvantaged rain-fed area of the Kurdish region, local people are supposed to be more motivated to cooperate and take collective actions for solving their own problems. This will consequently justify the need of developing local networks based on very strong horizontal cooperation among local institutions e.g. member organizations, farmer cooperatives, service organizations and local government that should be better able than central government ministries to respond to the local variations and needs.
Sub-district selection criteria

In the local context a sub-district is defined as the administrative level above the community (see Figure 2.2 on page 33). The centre of the sub-district is usually a rural small town with no sufficient access to the basic social services (only the primary health care centre and secondary school) that make people migrate to the district or province centre as the low quality of the road infrastructure especially in the wet seasons does not allow any daily-based commuting. A mix of methods has been used to set up selection criteria for two sub-districts in different parts of the rain-fed area as a comparative case study, which to a great extent cover the ecological, agro-economic, socio-demographic,
cultural and political diversities in the rain-fed area of the Kurdish region\textsuperscript{11}. However, the main criteria for selection of each sub-district were set up.

**Table 3.1: Sub-district selection criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>Socio-demography</th>
<th>Dominated political Party</th>
<th>Main land use category</th>
<th>Agro-economic activities</th>
<th>Road access.</th>
<th>Vertical assistance rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seweil</td>
<td>- Internally displaced people</td>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Woodland</td>
<td>- Fair agriculture</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Less traditional society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Informal business activities\textsuperscript{12}</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Livestock raising</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Horticulture\textsuperscript{13}</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Bee keeping</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harir</td>
<td>- No internally displaced people</td>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Farmland</td>
<td>- Agriculture</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Traditional society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Livestock raising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Horticulture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Bee keeping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Seweil sub-district**

The Seweil sub-district, which is located in the Sulaymaniyah province and bordered to Iran, is relatively more disadvantaged by its socio-demographic history (internally displaced people), land use (woodland), topography (mountainous), location (remote area with low accessibility), less vertical assistance and which calls for a comprehensive approach to address the local problems and measure the level of latent social capital as an input to local institutional effectiveness\textsuperscript{14}. According to the findings of the first period of the empirical work, the out-migration in Seweil sub-district is higher in respect of other three sub-districts in the district of Chwarta in the Sulaymaniyah province, which was used as one of the criteria to select the sub-district for investigation (Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the district centre of Chwarta, 25 June 2005).

The history of the Seweil sub-district goes back to Islam time. Umar who was the second caliph after the death of the Islam’s prophet Mohammad, led the Moslem troops to conquer the mountainous Kurdish region in Iraq during 634-644 A.D which faced tremendous resistance from the Christians and other local religious groups. Some ruins and mass graves of those who died in the battle are still around many villages among other in the selected communities. As mentioned in chapter one, tremendous demographic changes in the rural area of the Kurdish region have been conducted during the last decades, especially in those areas bordered to Iran including the Seweil sub-district. In 1978 after an agreement between Iran and Iraq all Kurdish villages from the border 15 kilometres inside Iraq were burned to the mark in order to cut support for Kurdish peshmerga forces. Consequently, all the people in the sub-district were

\textsuperscript{11} The obtained documents e.g. rapid district and sub-district summary from UN Joint Humanitarian Information Centre in Erbil (2003, 2004) and the information from the ministry of agriculture in both Erbil and Sulaimanyah have been very useful to select the representative sub-districts (see the “Map of the research area including the selected communities” on page 74). According to a brochure from the Ministry of Agriculture in Erbil (2003:5), the selected sub-districts are considered as secured raining areas with an annual raining rate above 400 mm.

\textsuperscript{12} Import or export of goods without paying customs duties.

\textsuperscript{13} In the local context, horticulture is a simple form of agriculture cultivating plants, especially fruit and vegetables based on working small plots of land without using draft animals or irrigation.

\textsuperscript{14} See the land use and topography maps on page 69 and the “Map of the research area including the selected communities” on page 74.
displaced to the small collective towns far from their farmlands and livestock and the local culture, society and economy was subjected for tremendous changes. Before 1978 the sub-district consisted of a strong feudal system which collapsed after the displacing of people to the collective towns.

In 1991, after the Iraqi army withdrawal from the Kurdish region, most of internally displaced households went back and started to reconstruct their own village but the traditional culture and society could not be restored as the community people were already accustomed to the urbanized life style. Poverty in the region increased as a result of economic embargo, first by international community on Iraq and then by Iraqi central government on the Kurdish region. A third economic embargo was imposed on the region a result of the outbreak of factional violence between the main political parties (the PUK and the KDP) in 1994 that made an economic embargo on their respective areas. This caused extreme poverty in the region especially in the urban area which forced the people of Seweil to stay in their villages working with agricultural related activities that provided them a relatively secure livelihood sources.

The synthesized results from the empirical work and observable facts shows that the implementation of the oil-for-food programme in 1998 has had long-term negative effects on the livelihood sources of people in both investigated sub-districts. As part of the programme, the food grains were imported and distributed free to improve the situation of Iraqi people. As the imported food grains competed with the domestic ones, the rural people could not sell their food grains anymore and therefore they shifted their role from producer to consumer. The people in the Seweil sub-district like all other rural people in the region started to leave their farmland and livestock and migrate back to the urban area in searching for income sources.

This negative trend was reinforced in 2003 after the fall of Iraqi central government following by enormous demand of manpower for reconstruction boom and physical development in the urban area of the Kurdish region. The rural people whose livelihood has already been negatively influenced by the implementation of the oil-for-food programme were now more convinced to migrate to the cities. In the Seweil sub-district the farmland remained uncultivated and the livestock were sold to the Iranian villagers, which had negative impacts on local economy. The agricultural related activities, which are usually the principal ways in which people make a living have significantly decreased during recent years and is now only for the household’s own consumption. The synthesized results from the empirical work and observable facts shows that only those who had already a house or relatives in the cities could out-migrate. The remaining households in the targeted communities in the Seweil sub-district (in April 2006) are considered as poorest of poor, who are periodically working with livestock, horticulture and small scale agricultural activities mostly for household’s own consumption (Focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate meetings in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

However, the society in both targeted communities in the Seweil sub-district is very homogenous without any social hierarchy and everybody in the community lives on equal basis and lives together peacefully. The community members belong to the same ethnic, linguistic and religious group, which could be an indicator for high sense of collective action among people in the community.

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15 For more information see the sub-section of “Imposition of triple embargo” on page 8 in chapter one.
Harir sub-district

The Harir sub-district is located in the province of Erbil, which is one of the three main fertile flat terrains for agriculture in the Kurdish region\(^{16}\). The history of the sub-district goes back to pre-Islam time and there are many historical ruins as a potential for tourism development.

There are many reasons that people in the Harir sub-district, in opposite to the people in the Seweil sub-district, were not displaced internally by former Iraqi government during the last decades. The people in the Harir sub-district are largely belonging to the Sorchi tribe which refused to support the Kurdish liberation movement during 1970s and 1980s and as a reward their villages were not subjected for Anfal campaign during late 1980s. Anfal campaign was fulfilled by the former dictator of Iraq to displace rural people of the Kurdish region of political reason (see chapter one). Moreover, thanks to sub-district location that is far from the Iranian border, the villages were neither destroyed by former Iraqi government in 1978 nor subjected for the Iraq-Iran war during 1980s. As a result, the people in Harir have not been subjected to big changes in demographic, cultural and social structure during the last decades and have remained a society of a strong tribal system until now. The people belong to the same ethnic, linguistic and religious group and this could increase the sense of collective action on community level as part of cognitive social capital.

The people except those in the sub-district centre are less accustomed to the urbanized life style. After the Iraqi army withdrawal from the region in 1991, the KDP as the dominated political party in the region has tried to integrate the tribal groups into its political system, which make them still powerful in the area with a continuous strong role of tribal system in local culture and behaviour. Particularly, the leaders of Sorchi tribe, who possess high position and influential power within the KDP and the government, are still very strong in the area.

The major livelihood sources of the people in the sub-district are crop production; livestock raising; and working as civil servant and construction worker in the urban area as the relatively high road accessibility does allow daily commuting. The implementation of the oil-for-food programme in 1998 and the reconstruction boom in the urban area after 2003 had a negative effect on the livelihood sources of the Harir people as well. But people of Harir in contrast to the people in Seweil, who had already a house or social network in the urban area, could not easily abandon their community to look for income sources in the cities. The synthesized results from the empirical work and observable facts shows that only people who were in better economic conditions could move to the city of Erbil and the rest are, in general, considered as poor who are usually working with small scale agricultural-related activities. In addition, during last years many of people in this area have got the chance to work as civil servants in different governmental institutions (Focus group discussions in Jamasor, 20 April 2006; Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

Comparative case study

The described differences between the two sub-districts made a great sense to conduct a comparative case study in order to provide a broader insight into the development problems of rain-fed area of the Kurdish region as the research area. In addition, there are two main political parties in the region, which have had different courses and

\(^{16}\)See the land use and topography maps on page 69 and the “Map of the research area including the selected communities” on page 74.
strategies to develop their respective ruling area during the last 15 years. Therefore, it was also justified to explore the political diversity influencing the development policies of the research area; find out the rate of analytical generalization; and thereby making political recommendations to promote participatory local governance and CDD, especially now when a regional unity government has recently been formed by the KDP and PUK.

Community selection criteria

The terminology of “community” in this thesis is considered as a territorial (social) unit including a decision-making level (see Figure 2.2 on page 33). In the local context, a rural community is defined as a group of people often clan members or relatives to each other living within a specific geographic area whose main livelihood is based on agriculture and livestock raising without any sufficient access to the most basic social services.

Appraisal of all communities of a sub-district was, clearly, an impossible task. Instead, the selected sub-districts were structured according to demographic, socio-cultural grouping, road accessibility, natural resource heritage and economic features to select two contrasting communities which highlight the key issues in the sub-district and represent different amount and type of social capital that can be linked to other development indicators. The development problems and causes of poverty in each selected community were somewhat different that require different solutions. In the following pages, a profile of each selected community including the relevant information about location, history, socio-demographic changes and economy is presented. The information was obtained and cross-checked during the group interview of the key informants and the focus group discussions in each selected community.
Figure 3.4: Map of the research area including the selected communities

Source: UN Joint Humanitarian Information Center, 2002 (Adapted by Mahzouni, 2007)
Marwe (Seweil sub-district)

The village is located on the cliff edge of the Choman River that is the natural border of Iraq and Iraq. The village has a strong historical and cultural identity and is famous for great hospitality towards strangers. Once the village was so big that was called the city of Marwan and some ruins and mass graves of people who died in the battle between Christians and Moslems in seventh century are still around the village. In 1975 the community consisted of 150 households but the village was destroyed by Iraqi army in 1978 and all people were displaced to collective towns around the province centre. In 1991, after the Iraqi army withdrawal from the Kurdish region, approximately 170 households went back to reconstruct their own village. The main livelihood sources of remaining 70 households (in April 2006) are transportation and other business-related activities with Iranian dealers on the border (Group interview of the key informants in Marwe, 31 March 2006).

Bewre (Seweil sub-district)

Like Marwe, the village of Bewre is surrounded by high mountains but enjoys relatively high road accessibility as located only one Kilometre from the main road to the sub-district and the district centres. The community has a strong historical and cultural identity and its history goes back 3000 of years. The graves and ruins of the ancient Kurds, who believed in Zarathushtra, are still around the village. Like in Marwe, the people resisted against the Moslem troops to conquer the village during the seventh century and mass graves of people who died in the battle still remained in 15 different places around the village. The ruins of the castle from which the Christians defended themselves against the Moslems are part of historical heritage of the community.

Like in Marwe, the internally displacement conducted by former Iraqi army caused enormous damages in Bewre. In addition, the village was also a real battle field during the Iraq-Iran war in 1980s, which much of its land is still contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordinances that has caused social, ecological and economic damages. In 1991, about 80 households went back to reconstruct their own village. In April 2006, only 43 households remained in the community that are considered as very poor (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006).

Jamasor (Harir sub-district)

The village of Jamasor is located in the fertile soil of Harir flat terrain located about 15 Kilometres from the sub-district centre. The history of the community goes back to pre-Islam time but there are no historical ruins remained from that time. Due to less external influences the community people are less accustomed to the urbanized life style and the society is very homogenous with some social hierarchy but everybody in the community lives on equal basis and peacefully together. Not many community people were employed within the public sector after collapsing of the Iraqi dictatorship in 2003 due to the lack of social networks of the community people within the KDP and the KRG (Group interview of the key informants in Jamasor, 20 April 2006).

Old Batas (Harir sub-district)

The community of Old Batas is located in the upper part of the fertile soil of Harir flat terrain only one kilometre from the sub-district centre. The history of the community goes back to 4000 years ago. It is one of the oldest settlements in the Kurdish region with historical monuments remained from the Assyrian empire e.g. the Tele Hill and the
Kafaran Port, which gives a strong identity to the community and thereby a great potential for the development of tourism industry if combined with other local potentials for attracting the tourists from south of Iraq and other counties in the Middle East\textsuperscript{17}. In 1921 after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire and the building of Iraqi nation, Batas became the centre of the sub-district but during 1950s, of some political reasons, the centre of the sub-district was moved to Harir (Khabat Daily Newspaper, 2005: no. 1847, p.12).

Before 1960s there were some Christian and Jewish minorities. The Jews after the establishment of the state of Israel moved to Israel and the Christians after the armed conflict between the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga forces moved either to the urban area or Western Europe. The reliable data on the reasons for their out-migration is missing. It is not clear if their out-migration was due to the pressure from the Iraqi army or other local groups. However, the society is now very homogenous consisting of only the Moslem Kurds with some social hierarchy\textsuperscript{18} (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

For the same reasons as mentioned in the case of Jamasor, the people of Old Batas were not displaced and not subjected for any war during last decades. As the community is located much closer to the urban area and on the main regional road, it was easier for the former Iraqi army to control the village. The whole Batas is considered as biggest village in the Kurdish region which the number of households has increased by 50 percent during the period 1991-2005 (about 1000 households in July 2005) which about one quarter live in Old Batas(Khabat Daily Newspaper, 2005: no. 1847, p.12).

About 90 percent of the community people belong to the Sorchi clan and only a few households are from other local clans that have migrated to Batas long time ago and now hold their own land in the community. Anyway, compared with the Jamasor community, the social hierarchy in Old Batas has been more weakened by urbanized lifestyle. Old Batas has much potential for a diversified economic development. The community is located at the foot of Harir Mountain and very close to the natural springs. About 80 percent of its agricultural land is irrigated fertile land which makes the area very potential for crop production e.g. wheat, barley, pea and rice and horticulture like vegetables and fruits (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

A comparative analysis of selected communities is illustrated in the Table 3.2 on page 77 to highlight and summarize the differences among them. The reliability of the obtained data was ensured by applying different methods and triangulation during the second period of the empirical work in April 2006. Exact figure about the population in the selected communities is missing partly because the local authorities are not efficient enough to produce the updated statistics and partly due to the fact that usually the rural people in the Kurdish region do not have a single or permanent residence. For example, in both selected communities in the Seweil sub-district, the pupils during the school semesters have to move to their relatives in the urban area as there is no secondary school in these communities. In addition, most of the households only during hot seasons are occupied with farming and have no permanent livelihood sources all year.

\textsuperscript{17} Currently every summer, many people from the centre and south of Iraq visit the Harir sub-district and other neighbouring areas to enjoy the relatively cool climate.

\textsuperscript{18} Based on the information obtained during a preparatory visit of the research area in June 2005, one of the selection criteria of the Harir sub-district was to comprise a Christian minority in order to analyse their relations with other local groups as part of social capital. But during the field study in April 2006, it was found that they had already moved out.
around. Some people during off-farm seasons move or commute to other places to work as construction worker. Therefore, it is very difficult to estimate the population of a rural community in the research area (Group interview of the key informants in Marwe, 31 March 2006; in Bewre, 7 April 2006).

Table 3.2: A comparative analysis of selected communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected communities in the Seweil sub-district</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Harir sub-district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marwe</td>
<td>Bewre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a hill and isolated from roads</td>
<td>On a low land closed to the main road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to the sub-district centre (km)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel time to sub-district centre (minute)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road accessibility</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to communication infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to basic social services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical assistance rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmines problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Household selection criteria**

In the rural context of the research area a *household* is defined as a related group of people who normally live in the same dwelling, share a common economy and eat together. The household is the basic economic unit of community which provide primary commodities for food sector. It is still usual that the sons remain in the household and share the same economy even when they get married and have many children. For that reason an average household size is between 5-10 members where even the children take an active part in the household economy.\(^{19}\)

Within each community depending on the size of population and covering different groups of society, 2-3 households were selected to take a more in-depth look on the community development problems and explore the potentials for CDD. Locally significant indicators of poverty and exclusion were used to purposely select marginalized households who have no sufficient access to the basic social services and livelihood sources (e.g. those who do not have electricity/piped water in their home, or

\(^{19}\) For detailed information about the livelihood and welfare of surveyed households in each targeted community see the tables on pages 199-201 in the appendix.
those who do not own land). The representation of female-headed households was also ensured.

3.4 Empirical work

The centre of attention of the social capital analysis on macro level was to explore the institutional and political arrangements to participatory local governance necessary to support CDD. The aim of social capital analysis on micro and meso levels was to analyze the local potentials and obstacles to CDD. On micro-level observation, the major focus of data collection and analysis were on household, group and community levels of decision-making; on meso level on sub-district level; and on macro level on district, provincial and regional levels. The applied methods of data collection in each level of analysis are presented in the following sections (see Table 3.3 on page 80).

Methods to analyze social capital on macro-level

The investigation of macro level, which was principally the objective of the first period of the empirical work conducted during June-July 2005, focused more on reviewing and analyzing primary and secondary data at regional, provincial and district levels. The participatory and interdisciplinary methods of data collection e.g. workshop, seminar, ad hoc conversation and active observation were applied to collect the primary data, which provided the opportunity to test the relevancy of the research concepts and methodologies to the local context of the research area. The secondary information were available in published form e.g. documents, statistics, books and newspapers articles, which were reflecting the statements and views of local people and institutions, top political leaders, different line ministries, international development agencies and civil society organizations operating in the research area.

Indeed, analysing the macro level of social capital as an ongoing task was not limited to the data obtained during the first period of the empirical work. The information was continuously updated by reviewing the local and international media about the political and institutional changes, which somehow would influence the local development in the research area. However, the methods that were applied during the first period of the empirical work to obtain primary data are described as follows.

Workshop

As part of research methodology, a participatory and interdisciplinary workshop including focus group discussions in Qaradagh (rural sub-district centre in the Sulaimanyah province) on 30th June 2005 was conducted to discuss the reasons for mass out-migration of rural people in the region. The main reasons of out-migration were discussed and linked to the level of life quality in the most remote communities. Representatives from different ministries, NGOs, research institutions and grassroots people and organizations e.g. farmer union and women association were invited and organized in four interdisciplinary groups to discuss a case study of a village bordered to Iran suffering from low access to basic social services and road infrastructure which have caused mass out-migration of local manpower.

20 During the second period of the empirical work, these problems were more analyzed in relation to the social capital and local institutions on micro and meso levels.
The participants were highly inspired by such methods of discussions and team-working to achieve common objectives. Most groups were very dynamic in the discussions and were convinced that they can only reach a consensus about the sustainable rural development strategies when rural people themselves are actively involved in the problem definition, planning and implementation of the development activities. The groups came out with different plans of action and then all groups put together their ideas and recommended some political strategies to solve the current rural development problems. The emphasis was to increase public awareness and policy making not to take any steps for the urban development at the expense of rural development. It was suggested to establish appropriate institutional mechanisms for integrated and sustainable regional planning which ensure the balance between rural and urban development. However, a strong link between research concepts and methodologies and the development problems in the research area was observed. In fact, this was an encouraging factor to continue arranging such kind of participatory and interdisciplinary methods of data collection during the second period of the empirical work for obtaining more reliable local data.

**Seminar**

A seminar at the ministry of agriculture in Erbil on 6\textsuperscript{th} July 2005 was conducted, which many local people and institutions were invited in order to explore the connection between research topic and the current rural problems. Many positive reactions and constructive comments were received from the participants to capture a representative picture of the current rural development problems in the research area. Indeed, the inputs from the participants helped to select two different rural sub-districts as representative sites for further investigation in the second period of the empirical work.

**Ad hoc conversation**

Spontaneous conversation with out-migrated rural people was also useful to know about the current economic and socio-demographic situation in the rural area and the reason for low incitement to increase the agricultural production. The spontaneous reactions of the respondents about the root of the problems would have never come up through a planned information gathering method, for example, a structured interview. But the reliability of any spontaneous reaction has to be questioned and cross-checked.

**Semi-structured interviews with the district institutions**

Semi-structured interview with the respective head of governmental agencies (agriculture, health, education, communication and transportation) in the district centre of Chwarta on 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2005 were conducted. The main aim was to obtain relevant information for selection criteria of a sub-district that faces most development problems in the district. One of the used indicators was the number of out-migrated people from the sub-district during the last years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of social capital analysis</th>
<th>Levels of decision-making</th>
<th>Applied data collection methods</th>
<th>Study issues related to the research questions</th>
<th>Number of interviews and focus group discussions</th>
<th>Number of questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Integrated interview guide</td>
<td>- Local capacities for CDD</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Stock of social capital and the interplay among different forms of social capital to promote CDD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Link between civic social capital and institutional social capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured interview with the leaders, members and non members of community organizations</td>
<td>- Strengths and weaknesses of community-level organizations to promote CDD</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Horizontal and vertical relationships among institutions as part of social capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group interview of the key informants</td>
<td>General information about the selected communities and service provision problems, and the role of the community groups in service provision</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
<td>- The rate of community participation in planning and implementation process of the development projects and past experience with CDD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate sessions</td>
<td>Cross-checking the obtained information from the key informants providing a more in-depth and reliable view on the community development problems</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                          | Sub-district             | Semi-structured interview of the sub-district institutions | - Existing institutional structure and coordination mechanisms
- Organizational and institutional obstacles to establish local governance necessary to support CDD | 12                              | 35              |
| Meso                         |                          | Focus group discussions | With targeted people and institutions cross-checking the reliability of obtained information about the selected communities and initiating the analysis of obstacles to local governance and CDD | 2                               | 3                |
| Macro                        | District, provincial and regional (Policy) | Primary data: Semi-structured interviews of district institutions, rural workshop including focus group discussion, seminar and ad hoc conservation. Secondary data: newspaper articles, books and official documents, internet sources. | Enabling environment in form of existing polices and institutional arrangements for participatory local governance necessary to support CDD. | 7                               | -               |
Active observation

Active observation was conducted during the entire process of the first period of the empirical work. One of the lessons learnt was that in the local context there is a need to be a very good listener and observer in interaction with local people to find out the main trend of institutional problems to CDD.

Methods to analyze social capital on micro and meso levels

Different methods of data collection (in six steps) were applied on four levels of decision-making during April 2006 (see Table 3.3 on page 80). Ensuring a logical consistency of the applied methods, in the following sections each method is discussed thoroughly including the way how the method was applied and how the accuracy of the obtained data is ensured21.

Group interview of the key informants

In a group interview of the community key informants, the general information on the community was obtained to know if and how the community people have access to basic social services, which institutions provide the services, how the quality of available services is, and if there are groups in the community that work closely with the service providers to improve the quality of the services. Subsequently, all existing groups and institutions in the community and their role in improving the living conditions of the people were investigated. In an assessment their origin and link with government; their membership and leadership; and their organizational and decision-making structure were analyzed. The aim was to explore how far the groups are community-based; who has the influential power in the community; and what is the role of each group to provide services demanded by community people. Finally, the most important development and reconstruction projects implemented in the community since 1991 were evaluated to find out if they have really contributed to solving the community’s development problems in a sustainable manner and if and how the community people and groups have been involved in the planning and implementation process.

Focus group discussions with community people

In focus group discussions with community people, all data obtained from the key informants was cross-checked and completed to find more accurate information about the community’s perspective on the quality of services available, their experience with collective action, their views of community organizations and development projects. At the end, the work of most important CBOs was evaluated, if they have really been meeting the community’s needs and if they have the capacity to create sustained relationships and effective vertical interactions with the institutions outside of the community. The most important institutions to the community were ranked by groups for a further in-depth analysis in the next method of data collection.

21 For identification of the surveyed households and groups including the date of interview or discussion in the targeted communities and sub-districts see the tables on pages 197-198 in the appendix.
Focus group discussions were carried out both with men and women in two separate sessions as a gender triangulation. Efforts were made to purposely select marginalized household members from different settlements and social groups in the community. The representation of female-headed households and other vulnerable households was also ensured. During the process of discussion, the role of the researcher was not only to facilitate the discussion but also to make sure that no one would dominate the discussion and every participant had the equal chance to speak out in order to gain a more reliable result of the discussion. Less active participants were encouraged to more discussion e.g. by asking specific questions to them.

Semi-structured interview with the community organizations

In semi-structured interviews, the ranked institutions from the focus group discussions were further profiled to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the nature of community organizations; their development over time, activities, leadership and membership; and to gain a more balanced view on the role of the organizations in the community development. Furthermore, it was assessed if the organization has effective and complementary horizontal relationships with other community institutions and vertical interaction with government institutions and the NGOs and in this manner producing bridging social capital.

Integrated interview guide

An integrated interview guide of those household members who were politically and socially marginalized or of some reasons could not participate in the household group discussions was conducted to find more reliable data about the community’s development problems, services available, associational life and the situation of poorest of poor in the community. It happened that some household members who participated in the focus group discussions did not express their views, maybe of the fear to be punished if their criticism would direct to a certain person or authority or of other personal reasons. Therefore, it was relevant to target them for a more personal interview which helped to increase rapport with the most vulnerable households. The strength of any face-to-face mode of communication is to avoid misunderstanding between the sender and receiver of a message and thereby increasing the chance to obtain more reliable information. The questions were asked in local language and were reformulated when the respondent did not understand them.

Other purposes of the integrated interview guide was to explore the nature and extent of social relations between the households and associations inside the community on one hand as both cognitive and structural social capital, and the links to markets, states and NGOs on the other hand as bridging social capital. Measuring the community’s stock of social capital, six dimensions of social capital (adapted from Grootaert et al., 2004) were analyzed. In each dimension a couple of questions related to the research objectives and questions were asked to conduct an in-depth analysis of the role of social capital in the community development as follows.

a) Social cohesion and inclusion: Social cohesion manifests in individuals who are willing and able: to work together to address common needs; to overcome constraints; and to resolve differences in a civil and non-confrontational way. Inclusion promotes equal access to opportunities, and removes both formal and informal barriers to participation. The main questions that were asked in this dimension are listed as follows.
- What is the heterogeneity rate of the community?
- Do differences among community people cause problems, lead to conflict and violence and in this manner influence the sense of common action negatively?
- Is the homogeneity of groups an important assumption to create and maintain the effective interaction and sustained relationship among community people?
- What is the nature of everyday social interactions in the community?

b) **Trust and solidarity**: These informal and subjective elements of interpersonal behaviour, as the most important component of social capital, shape people’s thoughts and attitudes about interacting with others. When individuals and groups in a certain community trust each other, then they can easier reach agreements and conduct transactions. The main questions were:

- What is the solidarity rate among community people especially in emergency cases?
- What is the rate of trust among homogenous group members as cognitive social capital and to the other groups and institutions beyond the household and relatives as bridging social capital?

c) **Collective action and cooperation**: The provision of many services requires collective action by a group of individuals. The purposes of collective action may differ widely across communities. In some places, collective action consists primarily of community-organized activities for building and maintaining infrastructure and for providing related public services. In other places, collective action is important for achieving improved governance and accountability, and used for example to lobby elected officials to provide more services to the community. The main questions were:

- What is the rate of common sense, collective action and cooperation among community people to solve their own problems?
- Which are the local norms to encourage participation or punish those who do not participate in the community activities?

d) **Informal networks and associational life**: Engagements of people to organize themselves and mobilize resources to solve problems of common interest are some of the outputs from groups and networks that enhance or build upon social capital. The effectiveness of groups and networks and the extent to which they can help disseminate information, reduce opportunistic behaviour and facilitate collective decision-making depends upon many aspects of these groups, reflecting their structure, their membership and the way they function. The main questions that were asked in this dimension are listed as follows.

- Has the household access to informal network beyond the household and relatives to turn to for assistance in emergency cases?
- In general, what is the rate of associational life in the community?
- Do the household members take an active part in community’s associational life?
- Do they participate in the decision-making process of those groups that are most important to the household?
- What is the organizational capacity of important groups to the household?
- Which is the main benefit from joining the groups?
• How far the groups are democratic and effective regarding decision-making process and selection of leader?
• Finally, what is the capacity of the groups to effectively interact and cooperate with the groups inside the community as horizontal bridging social capital and with the institutions outside of the community as vertical bridging social capital?

e) Information and communication: They are central to social interactions. Downward flows of information from the policy level and upward flows from the local level are critical components of the development process. Horizontal information flows strengthen capacity by providing civil society a medium for knowledge and idea exchange. Open dialogue fosters a sense of community, while secrecy breeds suspicion and distrust. Enhancing the dissemination of information can break down negative social capital as well as build trust and cohesion. The main questions were:

• How is the accessibility of the household members to information and communication facilities such as post, telephone and media (television, radio, magazines, and newspapers)?
• Which are the three most important sources of market communication and information e.g. about the food prices and what government and other institutions are doing?
• How is the road accessibility in order to communicate and obtain information?

f) Empowerment and political action: Empowerment refers to the expansion of assets and capabilities of people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives. Empowerment is thus a broader concept than social capital and political action is only one of many activities that can be undertaken to increase empowerment. The main questions were:

• Have the household members enough power to make important decisions over issues that affect them in everyday life?
• Have they impact to change the course of their life and making their own community a better place to live?
• What is the rate of common sense of the community people to jointly request government officials or political leaders for something benefiting the community?
• To what extent the local governments and local leaders take into account concerns voiced by household members?
• Did the household members go to vote in last elections?
• Which are the opinions of the household members about the honesty rate and corrupted behaviour of the officials and staff of local institutions?

Semi-structured interviews of sub-district institutions
As part of a larger participatory and integrated empirical work and after that information was gathered in two different communities, the head of sub-district institutions were interviewed to capture more views about the development problems on the community level. The objective was also to find out some key information about the whole of the sub-district in order to know how the obtained information from the investigated communities fits into the larger picture of the sub-district.

In an interview with the head of the sub-district government, the structure of the sub-district government and what powers and responsibilities does it has; the rate of
political participation of the people in the sub-district issues; how the community people are represented in the government, the main sources of revenue for the sub-district administration, were evaluated.

In an interview with the district head of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) as largest civic organization in the Seweil sub-district affiliated to the PUK and the head of the sub-district organization of the KDP in the Harir sub-district, the general information and the history of organization; the role of these organizations in local development comparing with the roles of CBOs; the relationship of the organization with the government and conditions of the relationship and cooperation; if the organization is able to influence government decisions and activities; and the relationships of the organization with other civic organizations in the sub-district, were assessed.

Finally, in interviews with managers of the different line agencies on the sub-district level, information about the relative role of the agencies in planning, staff management and financing of the basic social and livelihood services was obtained. It was also analyzed which kind of service by what institution has been provided in the sub-district over the last three years and the rate of cooperation among sub-district government, line agencies, civic organizations and international NGOs to gain synergy effect and to increase the quality of services.

Sub-district focus group discussions

In the final stage of the empirical work, focus group discussions were conducted to already present the obtained data and initiate the analysis of the institutional problems to community development in consultation with the local people involved in data gathering activities. The further objective was to support the generation of visions of the participants how to act for participatory local governance and CDD, where efforts were made to make the knowledge and experiences of the participants more productive. The discussions were structured to assess the key community problems; to collect the proposed solutions which were sometimes contradictory; and finally proposing the most rationally and agreed solution to the key problems. This was an effective way to make the final cross-checking of the obtained information from different sources.

3.5 Conclusions and critical reflections

Fundamental to action-oriented research is that it is not just enough to analyse and understand the social world. Necessary efforts must be made to change the social world where the commitment of any action-oriented researcher is to bring about change as part of the research act. Action learning throughout the research process has determined most appropriate approaches of the research strategy.

In the local context, it is very important to establish trustful personal relationships with the institutions before conducting any information gathering activity. Therefore, during the first period of the empirical work an informal network of institutions and individuals was built, not only for the purpose of reliable and valid data collection in the second period of the empirical work but also for creating the political and social commitment to implement the research recommendations afterwards. Furthermore, a wide understanding of current political and institutional arrangements on macro level as enabling environment to local governance and CDD was provided; effective local
indicators of institutional effectiveness on micro and meso levels were developed\(^\text{22}\); a sampling framework including the case study selection was determined; and a suitable and systematic plan was designed for the second period of the empirical work.

The researcher was already familiar with some local shortcomings in finding reliable information, for example, the respondents especially from the government institutions would be reluctant to officially leave reliable information because of the organizational behaviour inherited from the former Iraqi system. Therefore, during the first period of the empirical work, efforts were made to establish personal contact and trust with the targeted institutions and local people to facilitate the implementation process of the data collection activities in the second period in a relaxed atmosphere.

Incentives to participation of local people in data collection methods were: a) to promise them to communicate their needs and problems in the local media; and b) to try to implement the result of the investigation afterwards that might improve their living conditions. As one of the principles of the research ethics, keeping the first promise is already in the process by highlighting the roots of rural development problems in local media and proposing creative ideas and solutions based on existing knowledge. About the second promise, after finalizing the doctoral studies it is intended to try to implement the ideas of CDD first on the targeted communities as pilot projects.

**Test of scientific analysis**

In contrast to quantitative researchers who try to disassociate themselves as much as possible from the research process, qualitative researchers have to play a significant role in the research process as the credibility of a qualitative research largely depends on the ability and effort of the researchers. Nevertheless, both qualitative and quantitative researchers have to test and show that their studies are credible (Golafshani, 2003:600).

The credibility of this qualitative research would be increased by testing its capacity to conduct a scientific analysis. The researcher has been living in different countries and has gained considerable amount of experiences from many different systems of management and organization. He has also considerable amount of local knowledge and personal contacts with local people and authorities, which helped to critically and neutrally review the sources of information and bridging the gap of limited access to relevant and reliable data as a usual problem in the research area.

During the second period of the empirical work the researcher lived a few days among people in each selected community in order to build confidence among different groups of people; to do research with local people and not for them; to take an active observation about the situation in the community; and thereby reducing the information bias. This actually helped to involve local people and institutions in the investigation process.

It has to be noted that some applied methods were already pre-tested during the first period of the empirical work and evaluated as relevant information gathering tool in the local context\(^\text{23}\). As communication between the participating group members had a corrective function, it is supposed to increase both validity and reliability of the obtained data\(^\text{24}\). However, ensuring a scientific analysis of the obtained data the rate of validity and reliability must be carefully examined.

\(^{22}\) Mainly as six dimensions of social capital described in the sub-section of “Integrated interview guide” on page 82.

\(^{23}\) See the section of “Methods to analyze social capital on macro-level” on page 78.

\(^{24}\) See the section of “Triangulation” on page 65 to know how by methodological triangulation the data was analyzed.
Can triangulation increase the rate of validity and reliability

The concepts of validity and reliability are used to clarify the nature of possible measurement errors. Hubert and Blalock (1968:13) state that “From a logical or theoretical standpoint, a measure is said to be valid to the degree that it measures what it is supposed to measure”. Two kinds of validity are concerned in this research.

First: internal validity in which the degree of validity is determined by the fact that the result of the analysis is really true or approximated true. Using a combination of different methods that cross-check the truth of the obtained information will increase the rate of internal validity (ibid: 390-391). Indicators for measuring six dimensions of social capital was developed and used in the integrated interview guide highly related to other methods of data collection.25

Second: external validity is defined by Golafshani (2003:603) as “the ability to generalize findings to wider groups and circumstances” which is considered to be quite high because the two investigated rural sub-districts are politically, geographically and sociologically different from each other and to a large extent cover the main institutional problems to CDD in the rain-fed area of the region. Therefore, it is supposed that conclusions drawn from the analysis will extend beyond the immediate final results in the research area as two different survey systems, to the rest of rain-fed area of the region that consists of the same mechanisms and conditions, and consequently increasing the degree of analytical generalization. In any case, the degree of analytical generalization of obtained data from micro level must be carefully examined because of very different local circumstances.

About the reliability concept, Hubert and Blalock (1968:12) state that:

“The concept of reliability is built into the notion of an operational definition. If the instructions are not clear enough for two different researchers, working independently, to get the same or nearly the same results, then they are of little use”

The reliability is also defined as the degree of objectivity that is supposed to be high because of combining many methods of information gathering as part of triangulation that are balancing and completing each other. Therefore, the probability that other researchers would draw the same conclusions from the same obtained information is supposed to be high.

Triangulation, which includes multiple methods of data collection and data analysis, is particularly useful in this research work as more qualitative, where the human judgment to figure out the development problems in a complex context is very valuable. The use of triangulation as a tool to cross-check the reliability of obtained information in a post-conflict situation such as in the research area, which lack established institutional norms and structures, is highly relevant. In a qualitative research, for example, in focus group discussions it is always difficult to find out who says the truth. Therefore, avoiding the information bias, it is the task of the researcher to make a fair human judgment through cross-checking the obtained information from different stakeholders and interests and relying on his own sense after many days staying in the research area. Triangulation demands many efforts from the researcher to read between the lines when the obtained information is complex and unclear.

Moreover, applying participatory methods of data collection and triangulation will ensure that the target groups would gain a relatively clear understanding about their own situation by entering a process of self-evaluation and thereby obtaining feedbacks on the

25 See “Methods to analyze social capital on micro and meso levels” on page 81.
validity and reliability of obtained data and the result. Triangulation can also facilitate a learning experience by exchanging the results between different disciplines and levels of decision-making. In optimal cases, applying participatory methods of data collection can help people to plan and act on their own premises which is in accordance with the participatory planning approach.

In the next chapter, based on methodological pluralism and triangulation using different methods of data collection, the institutional gaps to CDD will be analyzed.
4 Analysis of existing institutional framework for CDD

The chapter is structured as following. In the first section, a service provision profile of the targeted communities is provided to explain the quality of existing public services on community level. In the second section, past experiences with CDD will be analyzed, which the impact of reconstruction and development projects implemented by different institutions after 1991 will be evaluated to know if the development actors have succeeded to encourage local participation in development planning and thereby initiating a CDD. In the third section, based on the assessment of service problems and past experiences with CDD, the existing stock of social capital to initiate any CDD in the targeted communities will be discussed. The focus of analysis is on the six dimensions of social capital as the indicators for local institutional capacity. In the fourth section, the existing institutional arrangements on local level for CDD will be presented. In addition, it will be discussed if there is a favourable policy framework as an enabling environment to local governance and CDD. In the fifth section, the existing institutional norms will be analysed to explore how they are applied in reality and how they conform to CDD.

In the conclusion, the common issues and phenomena of development problems in the research area will be summarized and the existing policies and institutional structures to promote regional rural development and CDD will be discussed.

4.1 Key service problems on community level

In this section the accessibility to the basic services in the targeted communities is discussed. Available community services were assessed in a participatory approach and according to the main criteria of sustainable community development comprising social, environmental and economic aspects which are classified in three main groups according to the local context and will be discussed thoroughly in the following sub-sections:

a) Basic social services (health, education, drinking water and electricity) which are the basic elements to live in a rural community in the research area.

b) Environmental protection services (waste water management, solid waste management and landmines clearance) which are preconditions to provide a sustainable, healthy, attractive and productive environment in the community.

c) Livelihood generating services (irrigation water, road infrastructure, land tenure, credit facilities and other agricultural and marketing support services) as primary production inputs to which access must be in place in order to ensure a sustainable livelihood for the community people.

26 According to the research ethics, the name of the respondents or interviewees and other people who have been involved in data collection activities will not be mentioned, if not necessary. But upon the request they are available only for the research purpose.
Basic social services

The synthesised results from the targeted communities in both sub-districts show that everyone has equal access to the school without paying any school fees and as an old traditional value the rate of community action for solving the school problems and to improve the quality of education is very high and the community people respond very quickly to the request of the school.

The health care centre provides only basic health services and for every visit the community people have to pay a small amount of money which includes the supply of medicines and even the poorest of poor can afford it. For more advanced health services, the community people have to travel to the health clinic in the sub-district or district centre. This would not be a great trouble in the Harir sub-district with relatively high road accessibility where people can make a fast move to the nearest clinic in the sub-district centre.

In general, the people in the Seweil sub-district suffer more from the shortages of basic social services as it is located in hinterland with low road accessibility. In both targeted communities in Seweil, the health care centre has limited capacity and provides only the basic services. In addition, the low road accessibility in a community like Marwe does not allow easy access to the nearest hospital in the district centre. In the group interview of the key informants in Bewre (7April 2006) and focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate sessions in Bewre (8April 2006), the participants stated that they were not satisfied with the quality of health services delivered by the non-inborn officials who lack accountability both downward to the community people and upward to the health ministry. This is an example that the existing institutional norms and structures, which must ensure the accountability of the officials upward to the ministry, are neither applied in the reality nor conform to CDD.

Furthermore, in both surveys the people in Bewre complained that the ministry of education has ignored their need to establish a secondary school in the community. In an interview with the head of women association in Bewre (9April 2006), the need to establish a secondary school in the community was confirmed. But, the interviewee added that the ministry of education did not agree on that because it had already planned to build the student houses in the district centre for secondary school pupils from Bewre. It is true that any public investment must be viable both economically and socially but the core problem has been that community people are usually not involved in decision-making process how to improve the access to the social services.

The bad condition of the road in Marwe is usually the main bottleneck to the supply of most public services which especially during the wet seasons is a hinder for the pupils to attend the secondary school in the neighbouring village. In most communities in the Seweil sub-district, there is no secondary school, which has convinced many households to migrate back to the urban area. In a semi-structured interview, the director of primary school in Marwe stated that:

“Immediately after reconstruction of the Marwe village in 1991, the community people made efforts to establish a school, which was built in 1992 by UN in cooperation with the ministry of education. At the beginning, the teaching Staff was only three to serve about 195 pupils but now (in April 2006) has increased to ten to serve only 75 pupils. So, while the number of teachers has increased, the number of students has decreased due to the latest rural-urban mass migration” (Director of primary school in Marwe, 7April 2006)

Generally, the people in the Seweil sub-district have a relatively low access to vertical assistance and therefore they must rely on their own limited capacity. They have built
membership users group e.g. for drinking water and electricity supply where a certain amount of fees is obtained and a local person is hired to maintain the service supply system (Semi-structured interview of leaders, members and non members of water users groups in Marwe, 2 April 2006; in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

Among the investigated communities only Old Batas in the Harir sub-district thanks to its location close to the sub-district centre and urban area, has a comparatively high access to the public services. The community has no water problems; receives regular vertical assistance from the municipality in managing the waste water and has very easy access to the intermediary school and the secondary school (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006; Focus group discussions with male group in Old Batas, 26 April 2006).

Environmental protection services

In the Seweil sub-district before 1978 the male members in the community used the WCs in mosque and the female members the WCs near the “women spring”. But after the comeback in 1991 each household in the community has dug a hole in the backyard as an outside latrine and make individual efforts to maintain the system which can cause the pollution of ground water. The community people are relatively less empowered to demand the governmental institutions for assistance in improving the sanitation and sewage system (Focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate sessions in Marwe, 1-2 April 2006; in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

The synthesised results from focus group discussions in all targeted communities and the personal observation show that in none of the investigated sub-districts, the condition of sewage system inside the community is satisfactory. The liquid waste is carried away uncovered, through small streams inside the village, into the river that is a great danger for public health and hygiene and can in long-term make imbalance on the local ecosystem. In addition, it disgusts the tourists to visit the community and thereby having a negative impact on the livelihood of the community people. Moreover, the investigated communities have no effective solid waste disposal system especially for mass animal manure that threatens the healthy environment of the community and again distracts the visitors. Only in Old Batas the municipality of Harir takes the responsibility to regularly carry away water waste or sewage from the place. The households do not need to make individual efforts to maintain the system and there is no risk to pollute the ground water (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

During the armed conflict between the PUK and the KDP and triple embargo on the Kurdish region during 1990s, which caused lack of fuel for the whole region, the villagers carried out massive deforestation both for their own firewood consumption and as a source of income. Since 1991, the KRG has legislated law against any kind of deforestation. In general, no attempt has been made to make improvements of the quality of local ecosystem and it has not been any efforts by the community groups to obtain certain environmental protection services e.g. for soil and forest management and biodiversity conservation. The rate of environmental awareness of local people is very low and they have to prioritise the social and economic concerns. In the Seweil sub-district, which has faced the problem of landmines, some limited activities of landmine clearance have been conducted. Ineffective delivery of the landmines clearance service, as a cross-sectoral service, has caused social, economic and environmental problems in Bewre (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006).
Livelihood generating services

In both investigated sub-districts, there are very limited agricultural support services e.g. training, technical assistance and credit, except that the agricultural agency in the sub-district every year sells agricultural inputs like chemical pesticides and fertilizer to the farmers on a price not much lower than the market prices. The governmental institutions and NGOs have assisted only to reconstruct the streams for irrigated farming. In contrast to all other investigated communities, Jamasor lacks natural streams for drinking water and irrigated farming according to the focus group discussions in Jamasor (20 April 2006) and personal observation. In the research area, there is also lack of land titles. The synthesised results from the focus group discussions in all targeted communities show that the landlords have no document as evidence to own the land and most participants from the focus group discussions believed that this would not cause problem and conflict and thereby affecting their sense of solidarity and common action. There is a traditional agreement that every land has a name and after the death of the owner his/her relatives inherit the land.

The synthesised results from the integrated interview guide indicate that both investigated sub-districts share the same trend about the credit facilities. Most of community members are close relatives to each other and if someone needs to borrow money for business or other purposes, the friends and relative are helpful. The trust, solidarity, and social obligation among the community people to help each other in case of emergency are so strong that the borrower does not need to pay interest or leave collateral. Usually, the community members collect money for poor members and young couples who want to get married without any demand to pay back. There are only traditional and informal credit institutions like the Community Fund in Bewre whose head in an interview (8 April 2006) stated that the institution “lacks of capacity and external link in order to efficiently deliver the services”.

Ineffective service delivery

To summarize, people on community level in the research area are facing different development problems. While the Seweil sub-district is in more urgent need for increasing the road accessibility and improving the quality of basic social services, the Harir sub-district need more livelihood generating services except in Jamasor where the major concern is access to water. The people of Old Batas demand even for recreational services (the group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

But on the other hand, people in the Seweil sub-district are more experienced in building their own membership organizations for public services independently from the government and political parties while people in the Harir sub-district lack such local initiative (see the tables on the next pages). After the implementation of the water project in Jamasor the people took the initiative to create a water users group. But, in contrast to the water users groups in the targeted communities in the Seweil sub-district, the leader is appointed and paid by the government to coordinate the water sharing among the households and no water fees on the regularly basis are obtained. Only those households that have access to the piped water are irregularly paying for the reserve parts and other operation and maintenance costs (Interview with leaders, members and non-members of the water users group in Jamasor, 21 April 2006).

The synthesized findings from the group interview of the community key informants show that none of the investigated communities fulfil the requirements for achieving a CDD. There is high lack of effective provision of basic social services, environmental
protection services and livelihood generating services. The basic social services e.g. health, education, drinking water and electricity, which are the basic elements to live in a community, are highly lacking. The environmental protection services e.g. waste water management, solid waste management and landmines clearance, which are preconditions to provide a healthy, attractive and productive environment in the community, are missing. In addition, access to an effective irrigation system, passable road, marketing facilities and agricultural support services (as primary production inputs) are not in place to provide a sustainable livelihood for the community people.

Indeed, limited livelihood sources are caused by many factors e.g. ineffective irrigation system, low access to road and marketing facilities. As a result, the farmers cannot compete with the imported food products. Indeed, the decreased demand for domestic food grains has been one of the main reasons to recent rural-urban mass migration. In addition, the policy efforts have been to create jobs only within the public sector in urban area. As a result, most people in both targeted sub-districts feel extremely ignored and discriminated by governmental institutions (the workshop in Qaradagh, rural sub-district centre in the Sulaimanyah province, 30 June 2005; seminar at the ministry of agriculture in Erbil, 6 July 2005).

Based on the group interview of the Key informants, for each targeted community an institutional landscape is illustrated in the following pages. The questions for tabulation are:

1) Could you mention all the groups and institutions which presently exist in the community? Examples: religious groups, credit groups, water users groups, women’s groups, etc.

2) What have been the major role and positive impact of these groups in helping to improve the people’s well-being in the past 3 years?

3) Some groups may share the same members, others may have different members. Please identify the groups which have the same membership.

4) Some groups have connections with the government, some don’t. Which groups are formally linked with the government?

5) Which groups are set up because of a government program, and maybe even receive money from them?

6) Government employees are often very active in the community. Which groups have leaders who are civil servants?

7) Do you know which of the groups have elections to choose their leaders?

8) If you look at the 3 largest groups in the community, has their leadership been stable or the leaders whom have been changed because of their behaviour?

9) Which is the main financial source of the group?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/group</th>
<th>Which role and positive impact in the last 3 years?</th>
<th>Same membership?</th>
<th>Formal government link?</th>
<th>Set up by the government?</th>
<th>Government worker lead?</th>
<th>Leaders elected?</th>
<th>Leaders changed?</th>
<th>Which financial source?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water users group</td>
<td>Easier access to clean water</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity users group</td>
<td>All people have access to electricity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation water users group</td>
<td>Main input for livelihood generating</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rotating-based work of members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community mosque</td>
<td>Burial ceremonies, social and spiritual meeting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, ministry of Islamic issues</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Government, but usually the community people pay extra to the Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village council</td>
<td>Informs the government about the community problems</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, but it is elected by community</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, every four years</td>
<td>Community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care centre</td>
<td>Provides the basic health services</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but the community proposed the foundation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, by the Staff members but in agreement with the ministry</td>
<td>Yes, but in agreement with the ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>Provides the basic education services</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but the community initiated it</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, by the Staff members in agreement with the ministry</td>
<td>Yes, but in agreement with the ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution/group</td>
<td>Which role and positive impact in the last 3 years?</td>
<td>Same membership?</td>
<td>Formal government link?</td>
<td>Set up by government?</td>
<td>Government worker lead?</td>
<td>Leaders elected?</td>
<td>Leaders changed?</td>
<td>Which financial source?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community fund</td>
<td>As a social institution play an important role in emergency cases</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Community properties like land and forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation water users group</td>
<td>Main input for livelihood generating</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rotating-based work of members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herdsman group</td>
<td>Collective action for livestock raising</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rotating-based work of members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water users group</td>
<td>Easier access to clean water</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity users group</td>
<td>All people have access to electricity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community mosque</td>
<td>Burial ceremonies, social and spiritual meeting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, ministry of Islamic issues</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paid by the government but usually the community pays extra to the Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village council</td>
<td>Inform the government about the community problems</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, but it is elected by community</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, every four years</td>
<td>Community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK local organization</td>
<td>Influential power to inform the politicians and governmental institutions about the community problems</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, every four years</td>
<td>The PUK plus very small amount of membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK local women group</td>
<td>Gender equality, awareness raising of women and recreational activities</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, every four years</td>
<td>The PUK plus very small amount of membership fees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3: Institutional profile of Jamasor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution /group</th>
<th>Which role and positive impact in the last 3 years?</th>
<th>Same membership?</th>
<th>Formal government link?</th>
<th>Set up by government?</th>
<th>Government worker lead?</th>
<th>Leaders elected?</th>
<th>Leaders changed?</th>
<th>Which financial source?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water users group</td>
<td>Easier access to clean water</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Irregular contribution from the beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community mosque</td>
<td>Burial ceremonies, social and spiritual meeting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, ministry of Islamic issues</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Government, but usually the community pays extra to the Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village representative, Moktar</td>
<td>Inform the government about the community problems and help to officially contact the government</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Salary from government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP local organization</td>
<td>Influential power to inform the politicians and governmental institutions about the community problems; maintain the security in the community; and solve the social conflicts in the community</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The KDP plus very small amount of membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care centre</td>
<td>Provide basic health services</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and secondary school</td>
<td>Provide education services</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-teacher group</td>
<td>Joint effort to improve the supply of education services</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Community people and the Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 In 1997 the Moktar system replaced the village council.
28 Usually, the KDP nominate a candidate and the members make a formal decision.
Table 4.4: Institutional profile of Old Batas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/group</th>
<th>Which role and positive impact in the last 3 years?</th>
<th>Same membership?</th>
<th>Formal government link?</th>
<th>Set up by government?</th>
<th>Government worker lead?</th>
<th>Leaders elected?</th>
<th>Leaders changed?</th>
<th>Which financial source?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community burial fund</td>
<td>Taking the financial responsibility for burial ceremonies.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Upon request the community people are paying a certain amount of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-teacher group</td>
<td>Joint effort to improve the supply of education services in the community</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Community people and the Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP local organization</td>
<td>Influential power to inform the politicians and governmental institutions about the community problems; maintain the security in the community; and solve the social conflicts in the community</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, every four years</td>
<td>The KDP plus very small amount of the membership fees on the monthly basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union</td>
<td>Offering the farmers supporting services for crop production and other agricultural related activities</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The KDP plus very small amount of the membership fees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 Usually, the KDP nominate a candidate and the members make a formal decision.
30 The organization is affiliated to the KDP from which a candidate is nominated and the members make a formal decision.
The household participation in groups or organizations in the research area has relatively increased during last years but still the most powerful organization is the local association of the political parties to which even the civic organizations like women and farmers association are affiliated. The membership fee in these organizations is only a small amount of money to maintain the contact with members. Usually the household members share the same political believes as a strong family or tribal feeling. Furthermore, in most community groups one becomes a member of voluntary choice but according to the personal observation the social obligations and group pressure in the community do exist to join some groups e.g. the community burial group or the local political party.

4.2 Past experiences with CDD

Community involvement in local development

Generally, there are no constrains to collective action among community people to make improvements of the services but local people have been denied involvement in the planning of the public services and reconstruction projects. From the findings, there are many cases of low rate of participation of local people and institutions in development planning particularly regarding the reconstruction of the villages during 1990s. Synthesized results from both group interview of the community key informants and focus group discussions across the investigated communities show that since 1991, many reconstruction projects implemented in the Seweil sub-district have not in a sustainable manner contributed to solve the community’s problems. The community people and groups have been involved only in the implementation phase of the projects without any participation in planning and decision-making process. This has caused many maintenance problems and even conflict among local people when an unfinished project has been handed over to the community people. There are many cases from the findings to prove this, which are discussed thoroughly in the following sub-sections.

Beekeeping project in Bewre

In 2002, the World Food Programme (WFP) together with the district organization of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) affiliated with the PUK and the agricultural department in the district centre of Chwarta in the Sulaimanyah province were involved in the implementation of a beekeeping project in Bewre to improve the livelihood of the poor widows and female-headed households. In an interview, the head of the KWU district organization provided detailed information about the project:

"The aim of the project as part of oil-for-food programme was to increase the technical knowledge of the targeted group in beekeeping so that they can run their own business. The WFP and the agricultural agency in the district centre selected Bewre for the project and our local committee in Bewre helped to identify and select the target group which one of the selection criteria of the participants was having experiences in beekeeping. The target group was given money and incentive enough to cover their daily expenses to attend a 15 days course in the district centre. The WFP staff continuously monitored the progress of the project” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KWU district organization in Chwarta, 16 April 2006).

But the project ended unsuccessfully after one year without reaching the project objective. The information about the reasons behind the failure of the project has been
obtained from different surveyed groups and has been cross-checked as part of triangulation and research methodology. The participants from the focus group discussion with female group in Bewre (8 April 2006) mentioned that the target group in Bewre were not involved in the planning phase of the beekeeping project and they were not properly trained to take over the activity. But, in a semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district other reasons behind the failure of the project were mentioned:

“The agency was not involved in the design and implementation of the project despite the fact that in the Seweil sub-district is the most relevant agricultural institution to the community level. For example, it has more access to local knowledge; it has more technically experienced staff in beekeeping; and it is more familiar with the potentials and limitations of the agricultural-related activities in the area. Instead, the agricultural agency in the district centre was involved in the project which usually has less local knowledge about the Seweil sub-district”(Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).

The interviewee highlighted another important fact behind the failure of the beekeeping project in Bewre:

“In addition, the bees were brought from the Sharazor area in the south part of the Sulaimanyah province with a completely different climate that made it hard for bees to survive in the new environment”(Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).

Water project in Jamasor

The results from both group interview of the key informants and focus group discussions in Jamasor (20 April 2006) show that people in Jamasor have not access to clean drinking water. In an interview, the head of agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district about the drinking water problem in Jamasor stated that:

"It is true that the community of Jamasor lacks ground water but neither the community people nor the agricultural agency were involved in the planning and implementation of the water project. It was a central decision without any involvement of farmers, agricultural agency, the ministry of water resources, the geology experts at the university, and other relevant local actors”(Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district centre, 26 April 2006).

It is evident that the authorities failed to involve local stakeholders in the planning phase of the water project who could contribute with their local knowledge and expertises.

Drinking water project in Marwe

Lack of participatory planning has also caused social exclusion. About 30 percent of people in the settlements around the Marwe village have no access to the piped drinking water. They were excluded from the benefit of a drinking water project implemented by a local NGO, the Kurdo Organization. This has caused a division among the community people which in long-term may influence the common action negatively and thereby degrading community’s social capital (Integrated interview guide in Marwe, farmer in the Zeber settlement, 3 April 2006).

The Kurdo Organization did not evaluate the exclusionary effects of such development policy on the community and the sustainability of the project. It has not paid attention to issues of social inclusion in the design and implementation of the
project. There is no doubt that exclusion of community people in local development planning will have a long-lasting negative effect on the whole society.

In addition, in Jamasor, people were not involved in the decision-making process of rebuilding the health care centre except that some community members worked in the implementation phase and were offered some money in return (Focus group discussions in Jamasor, 20 April 2006). In Old Batas, people usually are not involved in the planning process to improve the health activities (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

However, a few conclusions from the described cases can be drawn. There is lack of mechanisms from the government and NGOs to involve local people and institutions in improving the basic social services on the community level and consequently deceasing sense of ownership and unsustainable maintenance of the projects. The NGOs in the Seweil sub-district have failed to incorporate community initiatives, knowledge and preferences in the project design and implementation. The strength of community organizations to improve the service provision and to make more effective and sustainable use of the resources has not been considered. The development actors including the government institutions have not succeeded encouraging local participation in the planning and implementation process to ensure the sustainability of the implemented projects and thereby initiating a CDD. The existing capacity has been undermined rather than strengthened (Group interview of the key informants in Marwe, 31 March 2006; in Bewre, 7 April 2006).

But, there are some differences between the two investigated sub-districts. In the Seweil sub-district, the community people were at least involved in the implementation phase of a project because most project organizers in this area were NGOs that had limited financial resources and involved the community people without offering any money in return in order to cut the investment costs. On the other hand, the investigated communities in the Harir sub-district, which were not targeted for reconstruction efforts after 1991, have a relatively low rate of incitement and collective action to work for common good. In spite of facing housing problems in both investigated communities in Harir, no common effort has been made to obtain housing services from government. Furthermore, in the research area usually women are not directly involved in planning and implementation of the projects but informed by their men31.

However, all surveyed people and institutions across the investigated communities believed that it would be better to seriously incorporate the views and knowledge of local people into the decision-making process and the planning procedures in order to increase the sense of community ownership; to effectively maintain the project; and thereby making the projects more sustainable and beneficial to the community people. The community people know better their needs and have the local knowledge and sufficient expertise to effectively maintain the projects. In fact, there are local potentials for CDD especially in the Seweil sub-district where people on the community level have built users groups for managing water and electricity supply. But, there are no effective policies to strengthen the participation of community people in local development planning and management.

31 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigated communities based on the information from the group interview of the key informants. See also the tables on pages 108-110 on group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities based on the data obtained from the integrated interview guide.
Community empowerment

Generally, in the Kurdish region in Iraq, there is a traditional attitude remained from the previous Iraqi system that it is absolutely the task of government to provide the public services without any input from the civilians, for example, to build and maintain a road. The head of the water users group in Bewre stated that:

“We want to be part of the ministry of water resources or any other government institution where the head is paid by the government and the people don’t need to pay any fees for drinking water” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the water users group in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

It seems that people in Bewre would rely more on the vertical assistance and do not fear to hand over a CBO like water users group to the government which could take the decision-making power from the group that usually know best how to meet the water needs of the community.

Nevertheless, there is lack of mechanism to help the community people helping themselves, which is more evident in the Harir sub-district located in a flat terrain without any natural barriers and closed to the urban area. In this area, the community organizations are more politicized and there is a comparatively lower rate of common action. The KDP local organization has more power than any other institution on the community level. For example, in Jamasor even the leader of water users group and village representative are appointed by the KDP and the government. In opposite, the CBOs in the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district are relatively capable to drive the development process very independently at least for those goods and services that are best handled on the community level like drinking water and electricity.

Low empowerment of the community people for local development planning makes the CDD approach as a dilemma in the context of the governance system in the Kurdish region. Therefore, in the initial stage the CDD strategy can be a combination of both top-down and bottom-up. But, in the process of capacity development of the community people and institutions there is always a risk that top-down approach would dominate. This is particularly true in the Kurdish region where the governance system and the organizational culture are inherited from the former Iraqi centralized system.

More about the past experience with the CDD will be discussed throughout the presentation of other findings in the coming sections.

4.3 Analysis of existing social capital stock for CDD

A comprehensive study of the complex issues of local development was facilitated by analysing existing social capital stock. It was really a difficult task to categorize the social capital as a highly multifaceted issue in the local context. An in-depth look on six dimensions of social capital listed below, as indicators for local institutional capacity, has been taken to explain the nature and extent of social relations between the households and community institutions as part of cognitive social capital and horizontal bridging social capital, and links to governmental and non-governmental organizations as part of vertical bridging social capital.

1. Social cohesion and inclusion
2. Trust and solidarity

See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities.
3. Collective action and cooperation
4. Informal networks and associational life
5. Information and communication
6. Empowerment and political action

In the following sub-sections, first the nature of the social capital dimensions and then their interrelationship in the context of the research area is described thoroughly to explore if and how they are interrelated and complement each other to effectively promote CDD.

Social cohesion and inclusion

The people in the research area are Kurds and Moslems and there is no ethnic and religious conflict among the community people. As a result, the feeling of togetherness or closeness is strong. The ethnic and religious homogeneity in the research area is an important issue to create and maintain effective connections among community people and institutions. But, according to synthesized results from the focus group discussions across the investigated communities there are some other differences in income, landholding, education level and political beliefs. Especially, people who are members of the local political party have close contact with governmental officials and thus more chance to get jobs as civil servants and access to a range of services. The settlements around the community of Marwe do not have access to piped drinking water because of their disadvantaged location, which have not yet led to conflict and violence but as stated by a farmer whose settlement is excluded from the piped drinking water:

“This can in long-term have negative impacts on the unity of the community”
(Integrated interview guide in Marwe, farmer in the Zeber settlement, 3 April 2006).

In fact, this kind of exclusion could be an obstacle to form organized community groups as structural social capital which can sequentially hinder the effective interaction with institutions outside of the community and thereby weaken bridging social capital. Synthesized results from both key informants group interview and focus group discussions across the investigated communities show that on the daily basis and in a relaxed atmosphere people and groups are highly interacting with each other and are living peacefully together. Most households are actively participating in recreational activities especially in cultural and religious events. There is high stock of cognitive social capital and thereby a great potential for promoting common action and building structural social capital.

Trust and solidarity

As mentioned, both investigated sub-districts consist of only one ethnic and religious group and the trust of community people in their own family or tribe is very high. The people on community level enjoy a high level of trust as the most important component of the cognitive social capital and as an essential input to increase common action and building structural social capital. But, according to synthesized results from the integrated interview guide across the investigated communities illustrated in the Table 4.5 on page103, there are different reasons for having trust in an institution. Trust (as a cognitive element) in an institution often depends on the personal experiences with the officials of that institution which is different from person to person and therefore it is
difficult to generalize the obtained results, which sometimes are contradicting. The efforts were made to select households from different social groups and settlements in each community which are coded as follows:

- **Marwe**: H1 (farmer from the Kawlan settlement), H2 (civil servant from the village centre), H3 (farmer excluded from piped drinking water from the Zeber settlement)
- **Bewre**: H1 (village council representative), H2 (victim of landmines)
- **Jamasor**: H1 (female-headed household), H2 (farmer excluded from piped drinking water), H3 (landless worker)
- **Old Batas**: H1 (retired civil servant), H2 (active member of the KDP)

Table 4.5: Trust rate of the surveyed households in people and institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People and institution</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Seweil sub-district</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Harir sub-district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marwe</td>
<td>Bewre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own family/tribe</td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other families/tribes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-district government officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District government officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs officials</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Shopkeeper</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police in the sub-district center</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in neighboring community</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table, to a great extent, there is trust in CBOs, teachers, health officials and community shopkeeper who are more accountable to the community people except that people in Bewre have a relatively low trust in health officials due to the ineffective supply of health services. The trust in the institutions outside the community much depends on the result of what the institution has done to solve the

33 A five point scale was used to analyze the trust rate of the community people in different institutions, where 5=to a very great extent, 4=to a great extent, 3=neither small nor great extent, 2=to a small extent, 1=to a very small extent. When the interviewee had no direct contact or experience with the institution in question and did not made any statement the result is marked with “-”.

34 The son of the interviewee is police officer in the sub-district centre.
community problems and in some cases on the family and personal relationship to provide the household access to social services.

Most surveyed households expressed a relatively low rate of trust in the sub-district government officials because of not being very responsive to the community needs. The high trust of some households in the sub-district government is usually based on the personal reasons and professional status. For example, the interviewee of the H2 in Marwe highly trust the sub-district government because he is a civil servant, active member of the PUK and the head of the electricity users group in the community that make him to frequently contact the sub-district government. The interviewee of the H1 in Jamasor (female-headed) added that she highly trust the sub-district government because the head of institution is a relative of her.

Most of the interviewees added that their low trust in the sub-district government depends largely on the lack of decision-making power of the sub-district government rather than the personal incapability of the officials. But it can be also a combination of both. As the sampled group is very small and cannot represent the attitudes of the entire sub-district, careful generalization must be made. However, in general the community people in the research area have less trust in an institution that lacks of power and organizational capacity to act strongly and quickly to solve the community problems.

The Seweil sub-district is no more consisted of a tribal system and therefore the trust of people in each other is much based on the personal relationships rather than tribal bonds. In contrast, in the Harir sub-district, which still consists of a relatively strong tribal system, people have less confidence in other tribal groups that could be a sign of a strong cognitive social capital but a weaker bridging social capital in this area. Those who are active members of the local political party (the KDP) like the H2 in Old Batas have more positive attitudes towards other tribes because within the KDP different tribes on the daily basis are interacting with each other and in this manner are building necessary trust and bridging social capital. Therefore, it can be concluded that creating more interaction between people and institutions leads to increased trust and thereby producing more bridging social capital.

As mentioned earlier, the people in the Harir sub-district was not displaced by former Iraqi army and as a result remained more conservative with a stronger cognitive social capital. The people have had less contact with international NGOs as the area was not destroyed and targeted for reconstruction projects and therefore posses a relatively weak bridging social capital. In opposite, the people in the Seweil sub-district have more experiences with the international NGOs. However, the level of trust in local NGOs is different depending not only on the personal contacts of a single household to an NGO in question but also on how far the NGO has succeeded to involve community people in the planning of the reconstruction and development activities. As can be seen from the table, most households have a relatively low trust in local NGOs. Again, those households like the H2 in Marwe and the H2 in Old Batas that are active members of the local political party, as part of structural social capital, are more able to establish contacts with institutions and producing bridging social capital for the household members.

Nevertheless, according to the synthesized results from the integrated interview guide across the investigated communities, over the last three years and after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship, the level of trust on community level have gotten better as the violence and armed conflict between the political parties has finally come to an end. One important conclusion is that less trust in the government officials are often because they lack decision-making power and less trust in the NGOs is due to the fact that they
haven’t brought any direct benefit to the households. The accountability of the governmental officials is an important factor to build trust between civilians and the government. The high trust in teachers and the health officials is a result of their accountability to the community people.

In the research area, there is lack of rule of law and clear administrative procedures and instead the family and personal relationships play a significant role in interaction between the government and the civilians. Therefore, trust (as a cognitive element) in an institution is often based on individual relationships and experiences with the staff of that institution which make it impossible to conduct a collective evaluation of the institution in question and make generalisations.

Moreover, the solidarity rate among community people especially in emergency case e.g. when the household is short of food and money or when any members of the household suffering illness, is very high. All interviewees of the integrated interview guide across the investigated communities believed that if a community project does not directly benefit their households but it does many others in the community, they would contribute time or money to the project, which is an evidence of high solidarity among the community people as part of cognitive social capital and thereby a potential to collective action and structural social capital.

**Collective action and cooperation**

As both investigated sub-districts are homogenous regarding the ethnic and religious composition, it can be easier to solve the conflict among the community people in a peaceful way and theoretically it would not be any constraints to collective action. But the synthesised results show that the homogeneity of the community people is not the only factor to strong community action.\(^{35}\)

The people of Seweil sub-district are less homogenous as the society was subjected for massive displacement and change in the social structure during 1970s and 1980s. But on the other hand people in this area have relatively more experiences of collective action as it was targeted for reconstruction efforts after 1991 where people have been in more interactions with the government institutions and NGOs. Local people were enforced into a learning process to rebuild their villages and as a result effective norms to community action and participation have been established. People in the Seweil sub-district, despite their disadvantaged location in hinterland and far from the province centre where all institutions are, have succeeded to build community organizations and thereby using the bonding and cognitive social capital more effectively as an input to structural and bridging social capital.

On the other hand, the people in the Harir sub-district, who have not been subjected for great demographic changes and still live in a relatively more homogenous and traditional society, have not gained many experiences of how to get together and act collectively for the common good.\(^{36}\) In Jamasor all three responders from the integrated interview guide (21April 2006) agreed that in the past 12 months no collective work has been done despite many shortcomings in social and livelihood services in the community. Only those who are members of local political party have more access to a network of different people and organizations to bring more economic benefit for their

\(^{35}\) See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities based on the information from the group interview of the key informants.

\(^{36}\) See the table on page 110 on group accessibility of the surveyed households in Jamasor and Old Batas.
household and easier access to social services. But this kind of privilege access to social networks and institutions can have an exclusionary effect and marginalizing more vulnerable households and thereby damaging collective sense and action as an important input to CDD.

**Informal networks and associational life**

The analysis of this dimension of social capital is consisted of two parts. In the first part, the access of the household members to an informal network of people beyond the household and relatives for assistance in emergency cases (such as the death of a breadwinner, harvest failure and business bankruptcy) is discussed. In the second part, the rate of associational life that could be formally organized groups or just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things, is presented. The aim is to know how household members take an active part in the community’s associational life.

**Informal networks**

All interviewees from integrated interview guide across the investigated communities believed that their households have a very high access to an informal social network of people beyond the family and relatives for assistance in emergency cases, which again proves the high cognitive social capital on community level especially among the investigated communities in the Harir sub-district. As mentioned before, traditional norms and structures in this area were not destroyed by former Iraqi government during last decades. Anyway, there are even internal differences among the communities in a single sub-district. For example, in the Seweil sub-district the surveyed households in Bewre have a lower access to an informal network compared with the surveyed households in Marwe, which is located in hinterland with lower rate of road accessibility. However, about the importance of informal networks in community life, one of the interviewees from the integrated interview guide in Old Batas stated that:

“It doesn’t matter if we live closed to urban area. My household still need access to relatives and friends around us for emergency cases, for example when my wife is sick they can take care of our children. For building this house in 1999, the relatives borrowed me money and some friends offered free work” (Integrated interview guide in Old Batas, retired civil servant, 25 April 2006).

The main reason for relying on informal network of people even in the areas close to urban area, where all government institutions and decision-making power are concentrated, is to fill the gaps of an ineffective vertical assistance in providing basic social services. The findings from integrated interview guide in Marwe (2-3 April 2006) show that in general people in rural hinterland receive less vertical assistance and therefore need relying more on their own social network. But even people in the Harir sub-district despite being close to urban area have still to rely on their informal network because: the society is still very traditional; people have no experiences how to get together for common good; people possess a low rate of associational life and lacks of bridging social capital; and as a result they have no effective access to vertical assistance.

It is evident that the households even in a single community have different rate of access to informal networks. The interviewee of the female-headed household in Jamasor stated that:
“My husband died in 1999 and left me alone with seven children but the high solidarity and support from community people has eased my sadness and the pressure to take care of them. The community people took social responsibility for what happen to me and my children” (Integrated interview guide in Jamasor, interviewee of female-headed household, 21 April 2006).

Indeed, among the surveyed households in Jamasor the female-headed household has the highest access to an informal network, which can be explained by many factors. Generally, women make more efforts to build a social network around them and in the local context there is a high solidarity with the widows. It was also observed that underlying personal behaviour and social competence of the household head is vital to create and maintain mutual social relationships.
Table 4.6: Group accessibility of the surveyed households in Marwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group or organization</th>
<th>Selected households for the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>H1 (settlement of Kawlan)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Political group or movement:</strong> The PUK originally initiated by people is the dominant political party in the sub-district. One becomes a member by voluntary choice paying a certain amount of membership fees.</td>
<td>The head of household is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making and monthly meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Religious or spiritual groups:</strong> The mosque initiated by community people but the Imam is usually paid by the government. The community members are born to the group and make contribution e.g. by paying extra to the Imam.</td>
<td>The head of household is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making and day-to-day praying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Burial group:</strong> It is spontaneously built by informal male and female groups in cooperation with the mosque to deal with the burial activities of a dead person.</td>
<td>Both the household head and the spouse are active members of the group who takes part in burial activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Education group:</strong> Parent-teacher committee was initiated by community people to create an encouraging environment for the pupils in school and at home. One becomes member of this group of voluntary choice.</td>
<td>Both the household head and the spouse are member of the group who actively take part in the group’s meeting and decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Water users group:</strong> The water project was left over to the community people who established a membership organization to maintain the project. One becomes a member by paying membership fees on the monthly basis.</td>
<td>The household is a member of the group and the head of household takes part of the group’s meeting and decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Electricity users group:</strong> The power generator is left over to the community people who established a membership organization to maintain the project. One becomes a member by paying membership fees on the monthly basis.</td>
<td>The household is a member of the group and the household head takes part of the group’s meeting and decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G. Animal keeper group:</strong> Community herdsman as an informal and traditional rotating group.</td>
<td>All male adults are active member of the group who takes part in the group’s rotating activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H. Irrigation water group:</strong> King Stream, the largest stream to provide most of the community’s lands with irrigation water and Sonbar Stream, which serves the lands in the east part of the community. Both works on the rotating basis.</td>
<td>All male adults actively take part in the maintaining of the Sonbar Stream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Cultural association:</strong> The Kurdistan Arts Union is a civic organization that carries out the recreational activities e.g. arts, music, theater and film. The members have to pay a certain amount of membership fees on the annual basis.</td>
<td>The household head is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s meeting, decision making and activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.7: Group accessibility of the surveyed households in Bewre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group or organization</th>
<th>Selected households for the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Village council representative:</strong> As a link between community people and government institutions is appointed by a common agreement between the community people and the PUK led government.</td>
<td>The household head is the representative of village council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Political group or movement:</strong> The KDP and the PUK are the two major political parties in the region originally initiated by people. One becomes a member by voluntary choice and pays certain amount of membership fees.</td>
<td>The head of household is an old member of the KDP who takes part in the group’s decision making and monthly meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Women association:</strong> The institution is affiliated to the PUK and conducts different activities to improve the situation of women in the community.</td>
<td>The spouse is active member and takes part in the group’s decision making and monthly meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Religious or spiritual groups:</strong> Mosque initiated by community people but the Imam is usually paid by the government. The members are born to the group.</td>
<td>The head of household is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Burial group:</strong> Spontaneously built in cooperation with the mosque to deal with the burial ceremonies of a dead person</td>
<td>Both the head of household and spouse are active members of the group who take part in burial activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Water users group:</strong> The water project was left over to the community people who established the group as a membership organization to maintain the project. One becomes a member of this group by paying membership fees on the monthly basis.</td>
<td>The household is a member of the group and the head of household takes part of the group’s meeting and decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G. Electricity users group:</strong> The power generator was left over to the community people who established the group as a membership organization to maintain the project. One becomes a member of this group by paying membership fees on the monthly basis.</td>
<td>The son is the leader of the group. He organizes meetings about the maintenance issues and collects the fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H. Animal keeper group:</strong> Community herdsman as an informal and traditional community rotating group.</td>
<td>The head of the household is an active member of the group and takes part in the group’s rotating activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Irrigation water group:</strong> The group usually works on the rotating basis</td>
<td>The head of household actively takes part in the maintaining of the community streams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J. Community fund:</strong> Initiated by community to help vulnerable people with credit and social benefits in emergency cases. There is no membership fee.</td>
<td>The household head is actively participating in the group meeting and decision making.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 The term of “village council” in the local context is confusing as it consists of only one member. See the sub-section of “Village council” on page 118.
Table 4.8: Group accessibility of the surveyed households in Jamasor and Old Batas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group or organization</th>
<th>Selected households for the interview in Jamasor</th>
<th>Selected households for the interview in Old Batas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Political group or movement:</strong> KDP, as dominated political party in the province that is originally initiated by people. One becomes a member of this group by voluntary choice sharing opinions of the party and paying a certain amount of membership fees.</td>
<td>The head of household is very active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making and monthly meeting.</td>
<td>The head of household is a passive member of the group who does not take part in the group’s decision making and monthly meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Religious or spiritual groups:</strong> Community mosque initiated by the community people but the Imam is usually paid by the government. The community members are born to the group who make a contribution, for example, by paying extra to the Imam.</td>
<td>The head of household is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making and day-to-day praying.</td>
<td>The head of household is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making and day-to-day praying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Community burial group:</strong> The informal group that is spontaneously built by community people in close cooperation with the mosque to take the responsibility for burial activities of a dead person. There are no membership fees but based on the financial ability there is a social obligation to contribute.</td>
<td>The household head is active member of the group who takes part in the burial activities.</td>
<td>Both the head of household and spouse are active members of the group who takes part in burial activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Education group:</strong> Parent-teacher committee, which is initiated jointly by community people and the school, organizes meetings to discuss and solve the problems of pupils. One becomes member of this group of voluntary choice.</td>
<td>The household head is very active member who takes part in the group’s decision making.</td>
<td>The head of household is active member of the group who takes part in the group’s decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Water users group:</strong> It is initially built by the ministry of water resources, which has employed a community member as water manager. There are no membership fees but those who have access to the piped water have to pay for some operation and maintenance costs.</td>
<td>The household is a member of the group and the head of household takes part of the group’s decision making.</td>
<td>The head of household is a member of the group and the head of household takes part of the group’s decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Animal keeper group:</strong> Community herdsman as a traditional rotating group.</td>
<td>The household head is an active member.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 In addition to listed groups in this table, the head of the household actively takes part in the meeting and decision making of a local women association affiliated to the KDP. According to the interviewee the association conducts different activities in the community to improve the situation of women and especially support the female-headed household.

39 In addition to listed groups in this table, the head of household is a member of a local football team who plays on an irregular basis.
**Associational life**

As can be seen from the tables in the previous pages, the people in the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district enjoy a relatively high rate of organized form of common action in form of CBOs as part of structural social capital. The CBOs are defined as the groups which are relying more on resources inside the community regarding the leadership, source of funding and expertises. They are either on membership basis like users group for respective water and electricity supply where the users pay a certain fees to have access to the services, or on rotating basis like irrigation water and community herdsman groups. As mentioned earlier, the Harir sub-district is relatively poor of CBOs and even the head of water users group is appointed by government and no user’s fee on the regular basis is obtained.

In the semi-structured interview with the members of the community organizations, most interviewees believed that the leadership of their group was effective because the leaders consider the opinions and concerns of the group members, are honest and do not discriminate a member or a group of people. It was observed that much of the ability of the community groups to interact with the institutions outside the community depends on the individual capability of the group leaders to create and maintain trustful vertical relationships, which based on the personal observation not many of the group leaders have access to. Only those like the H2 in Marwe who has many functions (such as member of the local political party, civil servant and the head of the electricity users group) seemed to have the ability to easily create effective vertical links for the group as part of bridging social capital.

However, the households have to contribute either by offering free work or cash to remain a member of the group and having access to the services. None of the groups to which surveyed households have access, contribute to the sustainable livelihood development in the community. The local political parties are offering only the members employment within the organization or the public sector, which has an exclusionary effect on the community and therefore can not conform to the approach of sustainable CDD.

**Information and communication**

To find out the rate of access to information and communication infrastructure, the surveyed households in the integrated interview guide was asked to mention the four most important sources of information (among a long list) about what government and other institutions are doing such as agricultural extension, workfare, family planning, etc. The result is illustrated in the following table.

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40 For more analysis of the CBOs in the research area see the sub-section of “CBOs” on page116.
41 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities and the tables on pages108-110 on the group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities.
42 Ibid.
43 In the table on the next page (as in the previous tables) the surveyed households in each community are coded as follows: Marwe: H1 (farmer from the Kawlan settlement), H2 (civil servant from the village centre), H3 (farmer excluded from piped drinking water from the Zeber settlement). Bewre: H1 (village council representative), H2 (victim of landmines). Jamasor: H1 (female-headed household), H2 (farmer excluded from piped drinking water), H3 (landless worker). Old Batas: H1 (retired civil servant), H2 (active member of the KDP).
Table 4.9: Most important sources of information for the surveyed households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of information</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Seweil sub-district</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Harir sub-district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marwe</td>
<td>Bewre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community people</td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community institutions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village council representative**</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearest market</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper and magazine</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone network</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table, the four most important sources of information in all targeted communities about what government and other institutions are doing are community people (relatives, friends and neighbours), community institutions, radio and television. But, these sources are not able to provide community people with accurate information in order to make realistic choices from a range of options that would meet the community needs and fit local circumstances. Most information about the local market such as prices of goods or crops is spread by the community people who commute on the daily basis to the sub-district or province centre, which the people in Marwe is largely excluded from because of low road accessibility and long distance to the urban area.

In the targeted communities in Seweil, access to television is only at the evening when the community generator is on and there is no access to newspaper and magazine and nearest market except for some households like the H2 in Marwe whose head is the civil servant in the district centre, active member of the PUK and the head of the electricity users group in the community, which increases the access of the household to different sources of information. Furthermore, none of the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district have access to national or mobile telephone network. But in Bewre it is possible to get access to the local mobile network in the top of mountains around the village, which takes more than half an hour to go there. On the other hand, both targeted communities in the Harir sub-district have access to mobile telephone network of Korek. But, the majority of the people in Jamasor including the surveyed households are not subscribers and use the mobile phone of their relatives to get access to the network. Among the targeted communities only Old Batas have daily access to the newspaper or magazine as it is close to the urban area.

In general, due to the existing of natural barrier, the households in the Seweil sub-district have a relatively low access to information, mass communication and marketing facilities to provide community people with knowledge and information useful to conduct transactions with both government and market organizations as part of vertical bridging social capital. This shortcoming has caused a weak link to the government and

** Old Batas has no village council representative.
market. The lack of communication to the governmental ministries has been a
significant limitation on CBOs’ capacity development as the head of the water users
group in Marwe stated:

“...I don’t get any information from the ministry of water resources on what supports
and resources are available and how to efficiently use these resources in order to
deal with the provision and maintenance problems of the drinking water in this
community” (Semi-structured interview with the head of water users group in
Marwe, 2 April 2006).

However, access to modern information technology and Internet, which can noticeably
contribute to the local learning and connections with a wide range of institutions as part
of bridging social capital, is highly missing in the research area. The lack of effective
and transparent channels of communication usually creates an enabling environment for
corruption and manipulation of public information by politicians, government officials,
contracting agencies, and local elites.

**Empowerment and political action**

To analyze the sixth dimension of social capital, in the integrated interview guide the
interviewees of the targeted households were asked if they feel having the power to
make important decisions that change the course of their life. The result is illustrated in
the following table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected communities in the Seweil sub-district</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Harir sub-district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marwe</td>
<td>Jamasor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bewre</td>
<td>Old Batas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>H3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the results from the table show, in both investigated sub-district the community
people have very limited ability to make important decisions over issues that affect
them in everyday life. Those who are able to make important decisions to change the
life course of their household members are usually the active members of the local
political parties including their affiliated organizations who enjoy easier access to a
wide range of political and governmental institutions, for example, the H2 in Marwe as
member of the PUK and the H2 in Old Batas as member of the KDP. The normal
civilians lack of power to improve their life situation and to make their own community
a better place to live.

Furthermore, the interviewees were asked how often in the past 12 months have
people in their community got together to jointly request government officials or
political leaders for something benefiting the community, and if any of their requests
were successful about which the result is highlighted in the bracket in the following
table.

A five point scale was used, where 5 = Totally able to change life, 4 = Mostly able to change life, 3 = Neither able
nor unable, 2 = Mostly unable to change life, and 1 = Totally unable to change life. For a description of the coded
households see the section of “Information and communication” on page 111.
Table 4.11: The rate of collective action and the responsiveness of the government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected communities in the Seweil sub-district</th>
<th>Selected communities in the Harir sub-district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marwe</td>
<td>Bewre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of jointly requests to the government</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the successful results of the requests</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results from the table show that the rate of common efforts and political action in the Harir sub-district to jointly request government officials or political leaders for something benefiting the community is relatively low. As a result of a weak local empowerment, the political leaders and governmental institutions in this area have not been responsive to the needs of people. The exceptions are the H2 in Old Batas who as an active member of the KDP has effective personal contact with the political and governmental institutions. But, the interviewee mentioned some reasons for why the government officials are usually not responsive to the need of civilians:

"Most of governmental officials are unqualified for their jobs. There is no monitoring system to evaluate their performance and accountability to the civilians. There are many deficiencies in our administrative system that makes it far responsive to the needs of civilians" (Integrated interview guide in Old Batas, active member of the KDP, 26 April 2006).

Even in the Seweil sub-district, the government has not been responsive to the concerns voiced by people despite higher political action in this area. Furthermore, all interviewees from the integrated interview guide mentioned that they have voted in the last national national/presidential election after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship. Even with high ambition rate of household members to vote, the local governments and local leaders have not effectively responded to the community need. The finding is that active participation of community people to demand for vertical assistance is not enough if it is not supported by an effective governmental system and responsible policymakers.46

Interplay among different types of social capital

After exploring various dimensions of social capital including the community’s social organization, horizontal and vertical connections, it is now relevant to provide an answer to one of the research questions. How is the stock of social capital in the research area and how is the interplay among different types of social capital to promote sustainable CDD?

The community people in both investigated sub-districts are homogenous regarding ethnicity and religion and to some extent concerning income and social status. Trust and solidarity as cognitive social capital among community people is high which theoretically can facilitate the collective action to solve the community problems. But, only in the Seweil sub-district the cognitive social capital is effectively converted into the structural social capital in form of CBOs which consequently have led to

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46 An analysis of the governance and administrative system in the Kurdish region will be presented on page 131.
coordination of community activities and gaining synergy effect as horizontal bridging social capital. But, even in this area there is lack of vertical bridging social capital to effectively deal with governmental and non-governmental institutions based on the synthesized results from the semi-structured interview with the leader of community organizations across the investigated communities. So, the collective action and cooperation in the research area appears both as output of community’s cognitive social capital and as input to more organized and structural social capital and in this manner has potential to produce bridging social capital for CDD if the favourable political and institutional environment is created.

Synthesised result from different methods of data collection across the investigated communities shows that in the research area people on community level possess a very strong cognitive social capital but much weaker bridging social capital. In the Seweil sub-district, additionally to natural barriers, another reason to weak bridging social capital is lack of effective communication and information infrastructure to establish effective links to the governmental institutions and the NGOs. But, the situation in the Harir sub-district with a relatively good location to the urban area and better access to information and communication infrastructure is not better. In general the communities in the Harir sub-district possess a relatively less amount of bridging social capital as they have had less contact to NGOs for the reconstruction efforts. But, the governance system, which lacks of effective management capacity, organizational effectiveness and participatory planning mechanisms, is to be blamed for the limited bridging social capital more than any other factors. There is lack of rule of law, transparency and clear administrative procedures to effectively meet the needs of civilians and instead the family and personal relationships play a significant role in the relationship between the governmental officials and the civil population.

The result of investigation of social capital dimensions as explained in the previous sections shows that the horizontal connections are strong in all investigated communities, which are manifested through the informal social network. There are groups of friends or relatives who help each other in times of trouble that is considered as strong cognitive social capital. But only in the Seweil sub-district the cognitive social capital is converted into more structural social capital by building CBOs for providing basic social services. The weakness is that this strong bond has generally not been embodied in an association as part of structural social capital to produce more bridging social capital, especially in the Harir sub-district. Furthermore, the presence of local branches of political parties display little or no bridging social capital for the community people except for their own members. For that reason, it was important to look at membership conditions (voluntary or not, payment of fees, etc.) and the degree of effective participation in institutions before making any conclusion about the social capital effects. Other people who have high access to bridging social capital are those who have a governmental work position or are active member of the political parties (like the H2 in Marwe and the H2 in Old Batas) that make them to constantly interact with central government institutions.

The poor people in the research area have very high access to cognitive social capital but it is not enough to increase the income and wealth level in a sustained way. Therefore, it is very essential to build structural social capital in form of CBOs, which

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47 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities and the tables on pages 108-110 on the group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities.
48 The deficiencies of the governance system will be more discussed in section 4.5 on page 129.
49 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities.
are able to create good contact with political and governmental institutions as part of bridging social capital. Bridging social capital would facilitate access to a wide range of information and services as inputs to CDD. Therefore, the appropriate mechanisms should be established for using the latent cognitive social capital more effectively and create more structural and bridging social capital necessary to participatory local governance and CDD.

Another important conclusion is that the location factor and the rate of access to the institutions outside of the community can not alone determine the amount and type of social capital. But, many different factors such as historical, socio-cultural, political, organizational and personal in a complex interrelationship play a significant role in building the social capital stock for CDD.

4.4 Analysis of institutional capacity for local governance and CDD

In the previous section, by analysing the social capital stock in the targeted communities, it became clear that the collective action and cooperation in the research area appears both as output of community’s cognitive social capital and only in the Seweil sub-district as input to more organized and structural social capital. It is now more evident, that the cognitive social capital on the community level has a potential role to produce both structural and bridging social capital for CDD if the favourable political and institutional environment is created.

In this section, the capacity of existing institutions to promote structural and bridging social capital necessary for participatory local governance and CDD will be discussed. In an integrated manner, first, the role of institutions on community and sub-district levels and later the political establishment as an enabling environment will be analyzed.

Community level institutions

Depending on the historical factors discussed previously in the first and third chapters, each targeted sub-district has a different intuitive landscape that will be comparatively analysed. There is no written constitution in the targeted communities. Roughly, the community institutions in the research area can be categorized in four main groups: CBOs, village council, governmental line agencies and politicised organizations.

CBOs

In the local context, a community-based organization is defined as a self-organized effort created by community people to provide a certain social or livelihood service in the community. They are relying more on resources inside the community regarding the leadership, source of funding and expertises, which are classified in three main groups: membership, voluntary and rotating groups about which more detailed information with some examples are provided.

Membership groups: The users groups of drinking water and electricity in both investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district are recognized as membership CBOs. They are membership group because only members who pay certain amount of fees can take benefit from the groups and they are community-based because the community people have made genuine efforts in creating them. They are now taking the main role to manage and maintain the supply system of the services.
Moreover, they share the same members and no one in the community can be excluded from their important services as the fee is reasonably low and there is strong solidarity with poor people who are not able to pay. But there are always some exceptions, for example in Marwe some settlements could not have access to the piped drinking water partly due to the location factor and partly because the implementing agency did not take the social inclusion factors into account as an important criteria of CDD. In the initial stage of the reconstruction of the village in 1991, the community people themselves built the membership groups to solve the water and electricity problems. These groups have close cooperation with other community organizations e.g. health care centre, school and mosque, which is recognised as strong horizontal bridging social capital. According to the result of the interviews with members and non-members of the surveyed CBOs, the head of these groups is appointed by community people who usually ask for community’s opinions before making a decision, for example, when there is a need to increase the membership fees\(^51\).

In the Harir sub-district the numbers of membership CBOs are very limited. The community institutions do not rely on the resources inside the community and have a strong link to the KDP and the government. The community people are less involved in appointing the leader of a community group. An example of weak structural social capital in the Harir sub-district is that the water users group in Jamasor, in opposite to similar group in the investigated communities of Seweil, is not completely CBO because the head of the group is appointed by the ministry of water resources and community people has not the main role to manage and maintain the water supply system. The group receives some sort of assistance from outside for its organizational development and it is not a membership organization because no water fees on the regularly basis are obtained from the users. The community people become involved in the group only by offering free work and voluntarily contribution to the maintenance costs of the water system which can easily allow “free riding”\(^52\).

**Voluntary groups:** An example of CBO is the Community Fund in Bewre that plays a vital role in social issues of the community. The organization was created by the community people immediately after their comeback in 1991 and the reconstruction of the village. About the role of the organization in the community issues, the head of the organization stated that:

> The Community Fund, among others, provides the community people financial support in emergency cases and pay for the common expenses e.g. food expenses of the visitors from NGOs and government. The organization is completely supported by the community members for running the activities and organizational development. All community people voluntarily and upon their financial capability obliged to contribute to the organization”(Semi-structured interview with the head of the Community Fund in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

In another interview with a community member, the above information stated by the head of the organization was confirmed:

> The Community Fund plays a social security role in the community without excluding any community member from the benefits. Its role is similar to the mosque, which all people born in the community are members and can take the benefits regardless their financial ability to contribute. The activities of the Community Fund have been expanded during the recent years and nowadays it

\(^51\) See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities.

\(^52\) Ibid.
Furthermore, according to the interviewee, the head of the Community Fund is directly elected by community people and is very accountable who usually ask for community’s opinions before making a decision, for example, when there is a need to contribute to a social activity in the community. The interviewee concluded that some out-migrated households living in the urban area are still helping the Fund with financial means and there is no need to ask for financial support from the government and the NGOs.

The main strength of the Community Fund is relying on local capacities and self-organized efforts. Other strength is the accountability of the leader and the transparency in the activities of the group as the community members are allowed to periodically control the financial issues of the institution. The organization enjoys a high rate of trust among community members and it has even provided the neighbouring communities with advises and experience to establish a similar Fund. Because of high accountability and responsiveness of the organization to community people, the enforcement laws do not appear in this group. Regarding the institutional linkages, the Community Fund has close cooperation with other community institutions to solve the common issues, for example, it helped the water users group to provide new pipeline, which is recognized as strong horizontal bridging social capital (Semi-structured interview with the head of the Community Fund in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

The Burial Fund in Old Batas is also recognized as voluntary organization, which is not formally linked to the government and rely on financial resource inside the community. It is built occasionally to run the burial activities after the death of a community member. Rotating groups: The irrigation users group and the herdsman group as two main productive groups in the community are relaying on the rotating-based work of the members to provide irrigation water or livestock raising services. Among the investigated communities, Old Batas as most urbanized community lack this kind of traditional groups.

In fact, it was difficult to classify the mosque into the above described groups. Generally, the mosque has been always important in times of emergency and is a place for increasing spirituality, social status and self-esteem of individuals in the community. Synthesized results from the group interview of the community key informants show that the mosque, as a traditional institution, plays a significant role in the community life in all targeted communities and provides space for practicing the religious believes and obligations. As a spiritual power, it has also the ability to gather all people and institutions for discussion about different community issues. The important messages to the community members and institutions are usually announced in the mosque after the Friday praying. In addition, inside the mosque there is a guest room for strangers and visitors who are not willing to stay by people in the community. Therefore, the mosque has a high social status and coordination role in the community. The Imam who manages the mosque is not well-paid by the government and the community people are usually paying him extra.

Village council

Before Saddam Hussein came to the power in 1967, the rural area of the Kurdish region was still consisted of a feudal system and the village chief Kwekha was usually

53 See the table of the institutional profile of Old Batas on page 97.
54 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities.
appointed by the local landlords Agha. During the Saddam occupation of the region the village chief Kwekha, which was centrally appointed by the Iraqi security service, changed name to Moktar. After 1991 the village council replaced the Moktar system but this time affiliated with the local political party. In 1997, in the dominated area of the KDP, the system of Moktar was suddenly restored (Group interview of the key informants in Jamasor, 20 April 2006; in Old Batas, 25 April 2006). Anyway, there are controversial discussions whether the PUK’s “village council”, does not function as the KDP’s “Moktar”. Even the PUK’s village council is consisted of only one person who is formally elected by the community people but the participants from the focus group discussions in Bewre agreed that:

“The village council lacks of decision-making power to act for the community needs and its only task is to inform the government about the community problems” (Focus group discussions with men in Bewre, 8 April 2006)

The power deficit of the village council was confirmed in the focus group discussions with women in Bewre (8 April 2006) and with men in Marwe (1 April 2006). In general, they expressed low confidence in the village council as it lacks power to act for the community people. Those who have the real power on community level are the elder people plus the local political party that usually have good rapport with the sub-district government and other governmental institutions.

**Governmental line agencies**

The health care centre and the primary school as governmental line agencies are providing community people with most important social services and are more accountable to the community people when the staff members are inborn. They are traditionally very beloved institutions among rural people. The school as a multi-functional social institution has a high social status because it has always played a vital role not only in increasing awareness of the community people about their civil rights but also of taking more coordination efforts with other community institutions e.g. with the health care centre in taking prevention actions against diseases. The health care centre provides both prevention and curative services and increase the health status of the people.

In 1991, when the reconstruction of the Kurdish villages was on the top agenda of the newly established Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the people in Marwe made genuine efforts and initiatives to ask the KRG to provide them primary education and health care services. The respective ministry of education and health accepted their demand and the community people provided land and helped with all means to build the house and other physical infrastructure for both agencies. These agencies in Marwe are formally linked to their respective ministries to pay the staff and provide the school materials. But, they are largely managed by the community people and their respective inborn head is more accountable to the community people (Group interview of the key informants in Marwe, 1 March 2006). The heads of both line agencies in Marwe are usually elected by staff members in agreement with their respective ministries; the decisions in both organizations are made democratically; and as a result they are more accountable to the community people than upwardly to their respective ministries. On the contrary, the people in Bewre complained that the non-inborn health officials most of time are not available in the community and were very dissatisfied with their services. They were extremely frustrated and confused to whom they have to revert to

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55 See the table of the institutional profile of Marwe on page 94.
solve the problem because it seemed that the officials are not accountable neither to the ministry of health nor to the community people (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006; Focus group discussions with men and women in separate meetings in Bewre, 8 April 2006).

In addition, the head of education and health agencies in the targeted communities of the Harir sub-district are not inborn and are appointed centrally by their respective ministry and therefore their accountability towards community people can be questioned\textsuperscript{56}. Furthermore, the secondary school in Jamasor lacks of effective horizontal interaction and relationship with other community organizations except with the health care centre, which can be recognised as a relatively weak horizontal bridging social capital (Semi-structured interview with the assistant director of the secondary school in Jamasor, 21 April 2006).

\textit{Politicised organizations}

The local political parties with their respective affiliated organizations e.g. the PUK and its women association in the Seweil sub-district or the KDP and its farmers union in the Harir sub-district are powerful in their respective areas. The women association in Bewre as a politicised organization affiliated to the PUK has high rate of vertical relationship with the institutions outside of the community as strong \textit{vertical} bridging social capital but less interaction with other community organizations as weak \textit{horizontal} bridging social capital (Semi-structured interview with the head of women association in Bewre, 9 April 2006).

The KDP provides public employment for its members and the farmer union affiliated to the KDP enjoys good contact and access to wide range of governmental institutions to provide agricultural services for farmers to which the members of the organization have often the privilege (Semi-structured interview with the assistant head of the KDP local organization in Jamasor, 21 April 2006; with the head of the local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union in Old Batas, 26 April).

\textit{Comparative analysis of community institutional landscape}

Based on the synthesized results\textsuperscript{57}, a comparative analysis of the institutional landscape of the targeted communities to provide the services are highlighted in the Table 4.12 on page 122. The “accountability structure” is very important to find out to what extent the listed groups are community-based. As can be seen from the table, the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district enjoy a relatively dense associational life based on CBOs (membership, voluntary and rotating groups). On the contrary, the investigated communities in the Harir sub-district possess a low rate of associational life. The differences can be explained in many ways. It may depend on the fact that people in the Harir sub-district live close to the urban area and gain a comparatively high rate of vertical assistance. This, in turn, makes people in this area less active to build their own institutions and more dependent on the government for providing the basic social services. The community organizations in this area are more linked with the government that has been the main development actor in the area since 1991. This has created a culture and attitude of dependency on the government. The participants on the

\textsuperscript{56} See the tables of the institutional profile of Jamasor and Old Batas on pages 96-97.

\textsuperscript{57} See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities. See also the tables on pages 108-110 on group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities.
focus group discussion in Jamasor (20 April 2006) agreed that: “it is only the task of government to provide public services”.

As mentioned earlier in the third chapter, the society in the Seweil sub-district has developed differently and is no longer very homogenous in attitudes and values. It was subjected for destruction and massive displacement and targeted for reconstruction efforts during the last decades. In contrast, as the Harir sub-district was not subjected for destruction and internally displacement, the cultural and social norms of people was not destroyed and the NGOs have not conducted any reconstruction activity to influence the social and institutional structure (Group interview of the key informants in Jamasor: 20 April 2006; in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).

Other ways to explain the differences in institutional landscape is that the Seweil sub-district posses a relatively high political freedom and is bordered to Iran, which people gain other impulses and experiences in contact with different political believes and cultural attitudes. Changing to a less traditional society in Seweil sub-district has not led to decreased collective sense and togetherness among people on community level and as can be seen from the Table 4.12 on page 122 the rate of self-organization efforts in form of structural social capital is comparatively high. The opposite can be true, in the Harir sub-district, as very homogenous and traditional society, there is a relatively low rate of self-organization and collective action where community institutions are more affiliated to government and the KDP but surprisingly this does not mean that they posses more bridging social capital. In fact, the KRG lacks the main principle of good governance when it has no social inclusion policy and when it is not responsive to the need of civilians. The finding is that the people living in the hinterland of the Seweil sub-district have a relatively high access to structural social capital in form of CBOs and horizontal bridging social capital in form of good cooperation among community groups. They have actually been able to convert the cognitive social capital to more organised form of collective action as structural social capital necessary to build links to the governmental institutions. But the vertical bridging social capital is not produced because the governance system does not provide an enabling environment.
## Table 4.12: Comparative analysis of the community institutional landscape

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution</th>
<th>Investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district</th>
<th>Investigated communities in the Harir sub-district</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership groups</td>
<td>Marwe</td>
<td>Bewre</td>
<td>- Water users group - Electricity users group</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary groups</td>
<td>Parent-teacher committee</td>
<td>Community Fund</td>
<td>- Water users group - Electricity users group</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotating groups</td>
<td>Irrigation groups (King Stream, Sonbar Stream) - Community herdsman</td>
<td>Irrigation groups - Community herdsman group</td>
<td>Community herdsman group</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line agencies and politicized</td>
<td>Health care centre - Primary school - Village council</td>
<td>Health care centre - Parent-teacher committee - Health care centre - Primary school - KDP local organization - Women association - Village representative</td>
<td>Relatively high human and organizational capacity - Access to central capacities</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Established by community people
- Relying on local capacities and self-organizational efforts
- As small organizations have effective decision-making process; effective communication among members; greater transparency; high trust among members and no need for enforcement laws; and therefore high accountability and responsiveness to the community needs.
- Lack of human and organizational capacity
- No links with the central capacities
- Power deficit
Sub-district level institutions

In this sub-section the role of sub-district institutions in planning, staff management and financing of the basic social services will be discussed. It has to be noted that in the time of conducting the empirical work in April 2006, the two administrations of the PUK and the KDP had not yet formed a regional unity government and had still the separated role in providing the social services in their respective stronghold area.

Power deficit and limited role of local institutions in development

All sub-district institutions are highly lacking decision-making power and essential resources to quickly respond to the community needs.

In a semi-structured interview with the head of the Seweil sub-district government (12 April 2006), it was found out that there is no elected sub-district council to represent local people in the government. The head of the sub-district government is appointed by the ministry of interior backed by the local political party (the PUK). Furthermore, the interviewee stated that:

“Usually, in my office I decide alone but there are two other officials who upon my request appear in the office to assist me in daily administrative work. My major task is to communicate the needs and problems of the local people up to the higher decision-making institutions. For example, on the behalf of people in Bewre I contacted the health ministry to solve their problems about the provision of the health services. In addition, in wet seasons as the road accessibility is a substantial problem in this area, I ask the governmental institutions in the province centre for necessary equipments and machines to maintain the road between the communities. I also follow-up the implementation and the progress of the development projects and evaluate the work of officials of governmental line agencies” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the Seweil sub-district government, 12 April 2006).

The sub-district government in Seweil has comparatively much tasks to do as the area is monotonous and located in hinterland, which make the maintenance of the roads very difficult especially during the wet seasons. As the sub-district government is not delegated task-related roles and decision-making power, its organization structure is very simple without any technical and organizational capacitates. The interviewee concluded that he must follow-up the result of the demands from community people in a long decision-making process within the government institutions.

The municipality in both investigated sub-districts has limited authority and organizational capacity and offer only services of waste collection and cleaning of the streets on the daily basis. The mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) stated that:

“The municipality has no role in the planning of activities e.g. drinking water, housing, and waste and sanitation management in the sub-district centre. The authority of municipality to offer demanded services is very restricted because it has limited capacity of both staff and resources. For example, it can only borrow a tractor with a driver to the communities for transportation of the animal manure from the residential houses. The main role of the municipality is to forward the needs of people to the ministry of municipality” (Semi-structured interview with the mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre in Basne, 12 April 2006).

It has to be noted that the solid household waste is usually put in an uncovered 20L can unclassified in front of each house. The waste must be collected by the municipality on the daily basis otherwise it causes diseases especially during the hot seasons. According to the result of the focus group discussion in Old Batas (26 April 2006), the solid
household waste in Old Batas is only collected ones a week despite the fact that the community is located only one kilometre from the sub-district centre.

The agricultural agency in both sub-districts provides only agricultural inputs e.g. seeds, chemical fertilizer and pesticides. It lacks decision-making power and organizational capacity to properly respond to the need of farmers. The head of the agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district emphasized that:

“The Power of the agricultural agency to act for the needs of the farmers is very limited. It can only raise their demands to the governmental institutions in the province centre e.g. about the irrigation water problem of Old Batas which the farmers needed to cover the two streams with concrete” (Semi-structured interview with the head of agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district centre, 26 April 2006).

Furthermore, the agricultural line agency on the sub-district level has no authority to hire personnel. They are appointed centrally by the agricultural ministry. It also lacks own budget to make the services tailor-made to the specific needs of farmers. The power of the agriculture line agency on the sub-district level is very limited to successfully assist farmers in increasing crop production and livestock rising as two main livelihood sources in the area (Semi-structured interview with the head of agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district, 12 April 2006; with the head of the agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district, 26 April 2006).

Centralized budget planning system

Synthesized findings from the semi-structured interview with institutions in both sub-districts show that all sub-district institutions are highly lacking financial capacity to quickly respond to the community needs and problems. They lack of sources of revenue, which make them dependent to periodically receive a certain amount of money from their respective ministry. The head of the Seweil sub-district government stated that:

“The sub-district government receive fixed budget from the ministry of interior for staff wage, repairing the car and other daily expenses. It has neither the authority nor the organizational capacity to collect taxes from the farmers and no annual budget for the sub-district is determined by the ministry” (Semi-structured interview with the head of Seweil sub-district government, 12 April 2006)

Furthermore, about the power deficit to decide over financial issues the mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre stated that:

“The municipality lacks own budget to respond rapidly to the needs of civilians and even for basic inputs and simple issues I need to travel long distance to the ministry of municipality in the province centre. The fixed budget is only for the staff cost and other expenses of fuel and vehicle maintenance that has also decreased in 2006. Upon the request, the ministry provides the municipality with daily expenses” (Semi-structured interview with the mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006)

The line agencies e.g. health and primary school have no role in planning of activities and work only as a bigger agencies to provide basic health and education services for the sub-district centre and the surrounding villages. The centrally determined budget is only to keep the administration running in the sub-district and not to finance development activities. Upon request, the ministry provides the agencies with necessary equipments. For example, the education ministry provides the school e.g. fuel oil, stationary materials (paper, pen and pencil) and other daily expenses (Semi-structured
interview with the assistant director of the health care centre and with the primary school director in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).

The agricultural agency, like other governmental agencies, lacks own budget to finance the different agricultural activities in the sub-district. Upon request, the agricultural ministry provides its agency in the sub-district with daily expenses. The head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district stated that:

“It is the council of ministry in province centre which determines the needs of farmers” (Semi-structured interview with the head of agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006)

The civic organizations affiliated to the local political party follow the same course. They are also suffering from power deficit and have no role in planning and drawing the budget, which it is done centrally by the council of ministry (Semi-structured interview with the head of the district organization of the Kurdistan Women Union in Chwarta, 16 April 2006; Semi-structured interview with the head of sub-district organization of the KDP in Harir, 26 April 2006).

Lack of authority for staff management

Again, synthesized findings from the semi-structured interview with institutions in both sub-districts show that the sub-district institutions have very limited authority to employ local people who are more familiar with local circumstances and therefore more responsive to the local needs. The mayor of the municipality in the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) stated that:

“The officials of the municipality are appointed centrally by the ministry of municipality but as a formal procedure usually my opinion is asked.” (Semi-structured interview with the mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).

The line agencies (health, education and agriculture) have no authority to hire local people. The staff members are appointed centrally by their respective ministry and this has caused some problems to improve the provision of public services as the assistant director of the health care centre in the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) pointed out:

“The health agency in the Seweil sub-district centre has only two officials that are overloaded with huge amount of work. Despite that there are available equipments to give birth of a child, the health ministry has still not appointed a midwife” (Semi-structured interview with the assistant director of the health care centre in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).

Besides, there is lack of manpower for agricultural production as the young villagers have recently left the farming and out-migrated to the urban area in searching for income sources. When it is about the international NGOs the situation is different. The Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People Aid (NPA) has a relatively higher administrative and financial authority in hiring the technical staff and planning and implementation of their own activities. The organization has conducted mine clearance activities in the Seweil sub-district among others in Marwe and Bewre (Semi-structured interview with the head of Mine Action department of the NPA, 16 April 2006).

Is there an enabling environment to CDD

There are many cases from the synthesized results which show that the development actors including the government institutions have been unable to use participatory
approach of development planning and to create visions to effectively promote CDD. No efficient institutional coordination of the reconstruction activities have been carried out to gain synergy effect and to improve the situation on the ground\textsuperscript{58}. Based on the institutional analysis on community and sub-district levels, it is now relevant to begin answering one of the research questions by analysing the obstacles on policy level.

In a conversation with a community member from the Marrane village in the Seweil sub-district, it was found that the number of households in Marrane after the reconstruction of the village in 1991 was about 50, but had gradually decreased after the fall of Iraqi government in 2003, which in June 2005 only 20 households remained in the village\textsuperscript{59}. He highlighted the reasons of out-migration:

"Most young people in the community have been discouraged to work as poor farmers and herds and have migrated to the province centre because they earn more money by working within the public sector as police and security guards" (spontaneous conversation with the community member from the Marrane village, 15 June 2005).

The respondent called this new phenomenon as the second \textit{Anfal} campaign because no young manpower is remained in the community to work in agricultural production and the community is gradually becoming empty and unsustainable\textsuperscript{60}. The respondent was also against the concept of “modern village”, which has currently been discussed in local media to mix different people together in a new collective town to provide the villagers more cost-efficient public services. This reminded him of collective towns constructed by the former Iraqi government to displace rural people in the Kurdish region of political reasons.

Indeed, there are missing strategies to ensure sustainable rural development in the Kurdish region in Iraq (Mahzouni, 2005a:10). Other obstacles to create an enabling environment to CDD are discussed in the following sub-sections.

\textit{Increased power of politicized organizations}

In the research area, the local organization of the political parties is powerful and the civic organizations are too much politicized. Detailed information about the province wide Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) affiliated to the PUK and the sub-district organization of the KDP in Harir are provided to highlight the historical reasons for their extreme power to influence government decisions and activities more than any other local organization. It is important to find out how they (as region-wide organizations) are contributing to produce bridging social capital necessary for local development. One issue is clear that the objectives of these two organizations are too much politicized as they were created under particular social and political circumstances in the Kurdish region in Iraq during last decades.

The KWU was created in 1989 in the mountains as an affiliated organization to the PUK to protect the rights of women and organize them in the armed and political campaign against the former Iraqi regime after the conduction of the \textit{Anfal} campaign in late 1980s. During the \textit{Anfal} campaign many men were systematically killed by the former Iraqi army and the widows escaped to the mountains to join the Kurdish \textit{Peshmerga} forces. Today the KWU has filial from the province centre to the

\textsuperscript{58} See “Past experiences with CDD” on page 98.
\textsuperscript{59} The reliability of this information was cross-checked with the Seweil sub-district government.
\textsuperscript{60} For information about “the Anfal campaign” see chapter one on page 6.
community level. Only the KWU district organization in Chwarta, where the Seweil sub-district is located, has about 1500 members who pay a small amount of membership fees every year and attend meetings. The KWU attract members by active campaigns but it is easier to find members in those households where male members are already the sympathizers of the PUK (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KWU district organization in Chwarta, 16 April 2006).

The role of KWU on the community level is different from the role of the CBOs (such as the water users group in Marwe or the Community Fund in Bewre). The CBOs are more focused on providing basic social services with limited capacities without effective vertical assistance while the role of KWU is more awareness-rising about the rights of women and encouraging them into more participation in social and political life. The local organization of the KWU in Bewre receives high vertical assistance from the PUK and the KRG to accomplish its objective. The KWU has considerable amount of influence on government decisions and activities. For example, in the interview with the head of organization in district centre of Chwarta was explained that a few years ago through the women campaigns and lobbies the KWU succeeded to pass a law within the Kurdistan National Assembly that stopped acting the former Iraqi law in the Kurdish region permitting a man to have up to four wives. The new law allow men to have only one wife with some exceptions (ibid)

The KWU district organisation through the KWU province organization has contact with government and other institutions in the province centre but has less contact with the women union affiliated with the KDP. It has good relationships with other civic organizations affiliated with the PUK like the Student Union and the Farmer Union but has no horizontal relationships with the local organization of KWU in neighbouring districts not only because of low road accessibility but due to the local norms and circumstances to rely more on central institutions.

The KDP was built in 1946 to lead the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. The KDP sub-district organization in Harir was established in 1992, one year after that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces took control over the major Kurdish areas in Iraq. According to the head of the KDP sub-district organisation in Harir, all governmental and political institutions are supposed to act for the needs and interests of the villagers. The KDP sub-district organization in Harir has about 6800 members who pay a small amount of membership fees each year and on regular basis attend meetings (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KDP sub-district organization in Harir, 26 April 2006).

Like the PUK and its affiliated organizations, one become a member of the KDP by sharing the same political believes. But, the family and tribal bonds play a leading role and it is easier to attract members in those families, which the household head is already an active member of the KDP. This could be recognized as a strong cognitive social capital that was negatively used during the armed conflict between the PUK and the KDP during 1990s.

About the role of the KDP sub-district organization in Harir compared with the role of the CBOs (such as the community herdsman group in Jamasor or burial fund in Old Batas) the KDP sub-district organization conducts regular visits in the villages to better understand the problems of the community people. As a powerful political actor in the area, the organization is capable to mediate the problems of the community people and institutions and make pressure on the governmental institutions to quickly respond to the needs. The role of the CBOs is different, which are more focused on providing social services based on their limited capacities.
The KDP sub-district organisation in Harir has a very good cooperation with the sub-district government and once a week they are meeting together to discuss and solve the local problems. Through the KDP district organization, it contacts the district government and through the KDP province organization and local government in Erbil has contact with the PUK and the local government in Sulaimanyah. However, the organization has considerable amount of influence on the government decisions and activities to act for the problems of rural people. Furthermore, it has good horizontal relationships with the KDP organization in neighbouring sub-districts not only to arrange political and cultural events but also to solve the social and tribal conflicts in the area. There is no independent civic organization in the sub-district except those affiliated to the KDP like the unions of respective women, students and farmers to which the KDP sub-district organisation has good relationships.

It has to be noted that among the surveyed organizations in the research area the only organization that has been involved in planning and implementation of the local development project, is the local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union (KFU) affiliated to the KDP to deal with the problems of farmers. This is considered as an increased power of politicized organizations (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KFU in Old Batas, 26 April 2006).

*Weak role of private and voluntary organisations*

The tomato sauce factory is the only agro-processing industry in the Harir sub-district which was established in 1976 by an agreement between the former Iraqi government and the Bulgarian techno-export company. It started to produce apricot jam, grape juice and wine and because of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the factory stopped its production in 1983. It was restored first in 1999 which as part of oil-for-food program a joint plan was made by the FAO, the KRG and the Italian Bertosti company to restore the production and develop the agricultural industry in the region. It restarted to produce tomato sauce and later in 2001 the production expanded to conserve the “stony” fruits like apple and grape juice. After the fall of Iraqi dictatorship in 2003, the FAO left the Kurdish region and handed the factory over to the KRG (Semi-structured interview with the head of the Harir tomato sauce factory, 26 April 2006).

The factory faced crises in 2005 because of the inefficient coordination among the ministries of industry and financing. There is lack of visions and effective polices and qualified staff within the KRG how to effectively manage the factory. The factory management team suffer from limited power to plan and implement the financial and technical activities which have caused many problems for the factory. For example, it has been a problem applying new technologies in order to make the production more cost-efficient. Moreover, there is no just-in-time delivery of the agricultural inputs and equipment accessories that in turn delays the supply of the products to the market (ibid). The head of the factory, in an interview, warned about the further negative consequences:

“Today the KRG has no vision for sustainable economic development in the region. The only policy has been to employ so many unproductive people in the public sector just to provide them an income which has created a low working moral and consumption culture among people. This can in long-term worsen the economic and political situation in the region. The farmers are also opportunistic and do not act according to the agreement with the factory, they simply turn to other buyers to gain higher prices for their products” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the Harir tomato sauce factory, 26 April 2006).
There are many obstacles to develop small scale agricultural-related industries and ecological tourism as a sustainable livelihood for the rural people despite that the Kurdish region is very rich in natural resources especially water and has a very fertile soil for agricultural production. There is no policy to use them in a sustainable way in order to achieve a long-term ecological and socioeconomic development in the region (Mahzouni, 2005a:10).

Indeed, the KRG lack appropriate management strategy and organizational culture to effectively cope with the corruption as companies owned by the political parties have the privilege to be granted business tenders. This behaviour is far from fundamental democratic values and effective planning necessary to establish participatory local governance for CDD. Because, it discriminates the private sector and creates mistrust to the governance system (Mahzouni, 2005b:12).

In an interview, the head of the Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People Aid (NPA) stated that:

“...clearing the fertile agricultural land from unexploded ordnance would bring many positive socioeconomic effects in the region. For example, it can prepare the fertile land for crop production and grazing land for livestock rising as the two main livelihood sources in the sub-district. Clearing the landmines decreases also health costs and social problems as the unexploded landmines have caused so many handicaps and dead of the breadwinners and increased number of orphans in the region. But, there is lack of coordination and collaboration mechanisms with other local institutions e.g. agricultural agency to gain synergy effect in mine clearance activities.” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the Mine Action department of the NPA, 16 April 2006)

It can be concluded that there is no enabling environment for the private and voluntary sector organizations to take part in local development. The independent civic organizations are missing to counteract the central decision-making power within the KRG and the political parties. The line agencies are the only institutions to provide social services in the sub-district which are far from efficiency and effectiveness and other institutions from private sector and civil society have no role in the provision of public services. The monopoly of the public sector institutions to deliver basic social services is not justified because it eliminates competition, transparency and accountability in the provision of social and livelihood services. Anyway, it is now evident that the governance system in the research area lacks democratic principles and communicative planning mechanisms to promote the participatory local governance and CDD. In fact, the system of the KRG is too much politicized and excludes the voice of civil society. In addition there is lack of political will to improve the situation on the ground (Baker, 2006: website).

4.5 Identification of gaps to implement existing institutional setup

In this section a further in-depth institutional analysis mainly on the governance system in the Kurdish region will be presented. The Figure 4.1 on page 131 highlights the formal process of decision-making within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the process which decision-making are implemented for providing services to the community people. A governance system analysis which is established in a post-conflict context such as in the Kurdish region in Iraq needs an in-depth look on the historical, socio-cultural, and economic context in which the political and institutional system has been shaped which were partly presented in the first chapter. After the Iraqi army withdrawal from the Kurdish region in 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from the
KDP and the PUK and other small groups tried to transfer themselves from resistant movement to political parties. They established the KRG and other institutions but the armed conflict between the KDP and the PUK was hindering any political and institutional development until the Washington agreement in 1998\textsuperscript{61}. Today, the structure and mission of the KRG is defined as follows:

\textit{“The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exercises executive power according to the Kurdistan Region’s laws as enacted by the democratically elected Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA)”} (KRG.org 2007: website)

Until the agreement between the KDP and the PUK in January 2006 to build a regional unity government, the province of Sulaimanyah was governed by a PUK-led administration, while the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk were governed by a KDP-led administration. The current unity government, led by Prime Minister (Nechirvan Barzani) assumed office on May 2006 to deal better with the Iraqi central government over the Kurdish issues. The broad-based coalition government consists of several political parties e.g. the KDP, the PUK and other small parties. Most ministers of the new unified cabinet are Kurds and belong to the KDP and the PUK but among the cabinet members there are a Chaldean, an Assyrian, a Yezidi, a Faili (Shia Kurd) and an independent Turkoman. The government is based in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region. The provinces of Erbil, Sulaimanyah and Dohuk are fully administrated by the KRG (KRG.org 2007: website).

\textsuperscript{61} For more see the sub-section of “The Kurdistan Regional Government” on page 2 and “Oil-for-food programme and Washington agreement” on page 9.
Figure 4.1: Formal decision-making process to community development

Analysis of the governance system to community development

The current institutional system to regional rural planning and community development in the Kurdish region is supposed to be hierarchic as illustrated in the above figure. In this system, formally, every level of decision-making from the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) appoints the staff of the next level and delegate task and responsibility downward in the hierarchy to the line agencies on community level. This means that every level is accountable upwardly only to the next level in the hierarchy and every manager assigns objectives or duties to a lower-level manager and grants the
authority needed to accomplish the objectives. The low-level managers and employees accept the delegation whether implicitly or explicitly and are held accountable for the results. There are many advantages with this system if implemented accordingly. Delegating tasks enables top managers to accomplish more than if they attempted to handle every task personally and allow them to focus their energies on the most crucial and high-priority tasks they need to do such as strategic planning, coordination among different departments, and so on. Delegation also allows subordinates to grow and develop even if this means learning from their mistakes.

It is obvious that in this system the public sector is the only actor in the governance system and the civil society organizations and the private sector are excluded from the decision-making, which is not in line with the approach of participatory local governance. But, the synthesized results from the empirical work, presented in the previous sections of this chapter show that even this management system and organizational structure with all shortcomings to participatory governance is not properly functioning in the Kurdish region. Within the KRG system, there are many “informal” decision-making bodies behind the formal structure illustrated in the figure 4.1 which cause many institutional gaps and obstacles that are discussed thoroughly in the following sections.

**Lack of rule of law and participatory governance**

About the rule of law KRG.org (2007) states that:

“The rule of law is the KRG’s supreme guiding principle. It is above every individual. Laws shall be drafted in a modern way and they shall be based on the principles of democracy and human rights” (KRG.org 2007: website)

But the reality is totally different as stated by a participant of sub-district focus group discussions:

“The KRG system lacks rule of law and clear administrative procedures to effectively meet the needs of civilians and instead the family and personal relationships play a significant role in the relationship between the government and the civil population” (A participant of the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil, 18 April 2006)

The problem is that the main political parties (the PUK and the KDP) highly dominate the governance system and other small parties have no influential power within the KNA and the KRG. Sometimes a high member of the political parties can enforce even the Prime Minister in achieving a task no matter if that would be against the rules. In the reality, the governmental officials are not able to work independently and they are more accountable to the tribal, kinship and party political obligations than to the rule of law. In an interview, the head of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) in the Chwarta district as an affiliated civic organization to the PUK stated that:

“The KWU gains much respect within the PUK and the KRG and the cooperation occurs under any conditions. Usually, the wife to a politician or high government official is an active member of the KWU who can more than the rule of law influence the key decision-makers within the government to act for woman rights” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KWU district organization in Chwarta, 16 April 2006).

Today both the PUK and the KDP are region-wide and have filials from the capital of the Kurdistan region to the community level. Their local organizations in each level of decision-making, which are not illustrated in the formal structure of the KRG in the Figure 4.1 on page 131, are really the influential power behind any decision-making
within the governmental institutions. For example, the KDP sub-district organization in Harir plays an important role to link the community people with the institutions on the top level of the KRG which often the members of the KDP have the privilege, for instance, regarding employment opportunities. The KRG (2007) states that:

“The mission driving the new cabinet’s program is to secure a bright future for all people at all socio-economic levels living in the region, through greater efficiency and more openness. The KRG is determined to establish strong constitutional institutions to further support the democratic process. Its main task is forming a system of good governance through the participation of all groups, with transparency and accountability, which means a modern, professional government. It is vital that confidence and trust be established between government and the people. Confidence is established when government runs its affairs in a transparent manner and is prepared to be held accountable and subject to examination” (KRG.org 2007: website)

The fact is that these missions and statements to reach real democracy and good governance do not fit into the current management system and organizational culture of the KRG highly lacking the rule of law and clear administrative procedure as the synthesized findings from the empirical work shows and have been discussed in different contexts in this chapter. It is really difficult to know who is in charge to act for the needs of civilians and there is no participatory system of governance. For example, the line agencies of health and primary school in the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) have no role in planning of activities and are working only as bigger agencies to provide basic health and education services for the sub-district centre and the surrounding villages62. When such a system is not able to allow the public sector institutions themselves to have a role in local planning, how to believe in the mission of the KRG which is:

“to reduce unemployment through development of the private sector as the economy cannot progress without major developments in the private sector” (KRG.org 2007: website).

How to achieve participatory governance when the current government system is not fitted to its purpose? The KRG lacks of appropriate strategies to achieve its ambitious goals of democracy and good governance, as Mahzouni (2006a) states that:

“We have to stop thinking that the people in the Kurdistan region have achieved a relatively high level of democracy, because there is a risk to imagine that the democracy is a static system of governing and not a process that needs to be maintained and flourished continuously in accordance with the new requirements and needs of the citizens” (Mahzouni 2006a:10)

To compare the Kurdish region with the rest of Iraq where the situation is continuously worsening has been an argument to ignore carrying out necessary reforms as important steps towards real democracy. But to gain a continuous and broad support from the international community for the Kurdish question in Iraq it is necessary to carry out fundamental political and institutional changes.

Lack of delegation of responsibility in a centralized governance system

Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (2006: leaflet) highlights that:

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62 See the section of “Sub-district level institutions” on page 123 for the result of semi-structured interviews.
“Only individual responsibility can give rise to competition, the constituent element in a free society. Only if persons are held accountable for both the good and harm resulting from actions, will they concentrate their energy on constructive action”.

Although delegation is critical in a democratic society and to organisational effectiveness, the managers in the current system of the KRG fail to delegate or delegate weakly. The managers feel more powerful if they retain decision-making privileges for themselves or they might believe that they can do it better themselves feeling that employees lack the ability to exercise good judgment. They simply refuse to face the risk that employees will exercise authority poorly. In fact, most top positions within the KRG are taken by people loyal to the political parties who sometimes are not fitted into the job requirements to effectively fulfil their duties. In such a system usually the managers fear that employees will perform the tasks so effectively that their own positions will be threatened. Many empirical evidences presented earlier in this chapter confirm the lack of delegation within the KRG63. Some more evidences will be highlighted here. The primary school director in Marwe highlighted that:

“Usually I am invited by the ministry to participate in education planning for the rural area but this is only a formal procedure and my views are largely ignored in the implementation phase” (semi-structured interview with the primary school director in Marwe, 1 April 2006).

Furthermore, the head of the health care centre in Jamasor stated that:

“It is the officials of health ministry in Erbil who decides which medicines and when they should be delivered. The health care centre has no authority to demand a specific medicine for the community people” (Focus group discussions in Jamasor, the head of health care centre, 20 April 2006).

Besides, there is a power deficit of all line agencies on the sub-district level, which can not revert to the district level as the next authority in the hierarchy64. Even the sub-district government is functioning as a line agency, where there is no elected sub-district council and the head of the sub-district government is appointed by the ministry of interior backed by the local political leaders. Now after the formation of the regional unity government, most decision-making power is concentrated within the line agencies on the provincial level and the ministries on the regional level, which is recognized as a highly centralized governance system.

In fact, the governance structure in most developing counties are characterised of such centralized decision-making power, which make people to lose their trust not only in local governments but also in the entire government system. For example, there are many reasons that teachers and administrators in Costa Rica usually avoid going through channels at the local and regional levels. Instead, they go directly to the ministry where they receive the resources that the agencies on lower-levels are unable to provide. The decision-making in a hierarchical organizational structure is too time-consuming and uncertain, which make the teachers and administrators to go to the ministry personally to get someone to make the decision. But, only those who have the resources and have already political and bureaucratic contacts or work close to capital city can do that. As a result, the centralized governance system has an exclusionary effect and is not in line with the CDD approach (Rondinelli et al., 1990:135).

63 Ibid.
64 Actually, this was the main reason to exclude the district level from the analysis as it has no role in the community development.
The barrier to effective delegation within the KRG comes from the centralized and commando-based system inherited from both the Kurdish Peshmerga period and the former Iraqi government, which is deeply rooted in the attitudes and minds of civilians. In such a system that deny any creativity and “learning by doing” on the lower level of the organization, the employees themselves resist accepting delegation because they lack self-confidence. In fact, the appointment of a job position with the KRG is not based on the technical and personal qualification but on the family and political connections of the applicant. Therefore, the employees would feel great deal of pressure when granted greater decision-making authority and additional duties because they fear to carry out their assignments poorly and receive criticism.

_Unnecessary and time-consuming administrative routines_

The above mentioned deficiencies in the KRG system have increased a considerable amount of frustrating administrative routines. The head of the sub-district government in Seweil stated that:

“For every simple administrative matter, I have to go a long way to many authorities in the province centre before a decision-making take place” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the sub-district government in Seweil, 12 April 2006).

The unclear administrate rules and long decision-making process within the KRG to deliver a certain public service leads to an ineffective interaction between the civilians and the public institutions and consequently losing confidence in the system and decreasing social capital. Indeed, the interviewees from all surveyed groups and institutions were complaining of increased unnecessary administrative routines inherited from the former Iraqi government. They felt very frustrated to be repetitively referred to different levels of government without any result. Therefore, they liked the idea to give more power to the sub-district government as the closest level of decision-making to the community which could reduce the administrative routines and thereby meeting the needs of the community people more efficiently and effectively.

_Ambiguous government system and accountability structure_

In many developing countries there are structural constrains on the effectiveness and efficiency of public sector institutions, which cannot be significantly improved only by sectoral training and consultancy programs (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 1993:103).

The tremendous institutional and structural problems make the KRG so unresponsive to the need of civilians. But it is important to know in which circumstance the KRG was created. In 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from different groups without any experiences in governance build the KRG and other institutions based on three different system of behaviour: tribal and family bonds; commando-based behaviour from the Kurdish Peshmerga period and centralized norms of former Iraqi system, which make the system very ambiguous. From the findings, there are many examples of losing confidence in the KRG system that is not clear who is accountable to whom. The people in Bewre complained that the non-inborn heath officials most of the time are not available in the community and were very dissatisfied with their services. They were very frustrated and confused to whom they have to revert to solve the problem because it seems that the officials don’t take the responsibility as an obligation toward the ministry and nobody knows to whom they are accountable (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006).
It is extremely difficult to define such a system when the officials lack accountability both downward to the community people and upward to the central government institutions. This is another example that the existing institutional norms and structures that must ensure the accountability of the officials upward to the central bodies (according to the formal structure illustrated in the Figure 4.1 on page 131), are not applied in the reality and can not at all conform to CDD. If the governance system is recognized as hierarchical, the head of the sub-district government must be accountable to the next level of decision-making (the district government), but in many cases the district government is bypassed as mentioned earlier and the sub-district government is more accountable to the ministry of interior and the local political party. In an interview, the head of the district organisation of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) in Chwarta stated that:

“My organization doesn’t need to have contact with the sub-district government of Seweil as it has very close contact with the district government which usually responds quickly to the needs of the organization” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KWU district organization in Chwart, 16April 2006).

In fact, there is no local organisation of the KWU in the Seweil sub-district centre, which recognizes the fact that the sub-district level is not taken seriously by the political leaders. This attitude of relying on central power is partly inherited from the former Iraqi system. Furthermore, the “village representative”, which is centrally appointed in the dominated area of the KDP and formally elected by the community people in the dominated area of the PUK, suffer from power deficit to act for community people. Its only task is to inform the government about the community problems and it is not clear to which level in the hierarchy it is accountable.

To conclude, the ambiguous system of the KRG lacks the “subsidiarity principle” as it fails to delegate control to the lowest appropriate level of decision-making. The participants on the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil (18 April 2006) agreed that those who have the real power on the community and sub-district levels are the local organization of the political parties and kinship and party affiliation play a great role in determining the relationship of the civilians with the governmental authorities. In such a system, the division of power with an independent judiciary as a core element of a democratic society is missing, which sometimes the informal rules largely determined by family bonds and party affiliation can determine for dispute settlement. In addition, this kind of system makes the follow-up and evaluation of the work of officials impossible, which creates space for corruption.

An enabling environment for corruption

It is evident that the ambiguous system of the KRG creates an enabling environment for corruption as there are limited sanctions capacities and enforcement laws. Based on the empirical evidences and the analysing of main features of the governance system presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that corruption is embedded in the system of the KRG. In the current governance system, the political leaders fail to demonstrate concern for the public interest and fail to set examples of integrity. Because of the underpayment and unfair distribution of the public resources, the civil servants develop a system of self-interested incentives to engage in corrupt behaviours and actions. In addition, the civil society organizations are too weak to make pressure on the political leaders for substantial reforms. Complexity of the rules and procedures; ineffective management; and lack of organizational capabilities allow for poor oversight,
insufficient accountability, and as a result a fertile ground for corrupt actions. The main political parties (the KDP and the PUK) are very secure in exercising power for their own benefits because their behaviours and actions in the KRG and in the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) is not monitored by an active opposition, highly informed voters and independent media.

To summarize, the monopoly interests; the weak political competition; and the absence of “watchdog” institutions within the KRG and the KNA contribute to a situation prone to the growth of corruption. Party political corruption is especially problematic in the Kurdish region where the civil society and private sector organizations are too weak to demand and make upward pressure to the system for a fairly redistribution of the public assets. In the long term, party corruption can undermine public trust in the political system and thereby eroding bridging social capital. The more control a party has over state institutions and society, the higher is the risk for corrupt behaviour. Indeed, the principles of participatory local governance such as: participation, social inclusion, competition, responsiveness, transparency and accountability are highly missing within the governance system in the Kurdish region as discussed in the following sub-sections.

Participation and social inclusion

In general, the direct link between the civilians and local government level is often absent. Particularly, when there are no local elections and the representatives are appointed centrally by the government and political parties. In such cases, local representatives are directly accountable to the higher levels of government and only indirectly to the local population. Therefore, in the current system of the KRG representation and inclusiveness in the decision-making process on local level, as a main principle of democratic governance, is not guaranteed. There is a strong social bias in political participation and within the political elites in favor of the wealthy, educated and persons of higher social status. In this case the access to resources is not equal for all civilians and the social and educational disadvantages of certain groups in the society are not taken into consideration.

Elections usually allow civilians to vote out political leaders whose previous performance was weak. But, if the ambiguous system does not allow transparency in the decision-making process and monitoring of the government activities, and if the illegally informal decisions with exclusionary effects are not institutionalized how to enable people to make their election choices.

Responsiveness, transparency and accountability

Responsiveness, transparency and accountability as core elements of good governance are missing within the KRG. The authorities are not acting according to the interests of the people and do not account their priorities and needs. The decisions made do not respect the will of civilians.

In addition, there are no mechanisms in place to make sanctions against the poor performance of the authorities and there are no transparency mechanisms to hold authorities accountable for their decisions and actions. For instance, the information about a certain governmental decision is not available for the public. The separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial), which is a precondition to increase accountability within the government and to ensure the political stability, is unclear. This gives space for “grand” corruption, which is not limited to large illegal transactions. The top-level political leaders and public officials can influence the
formation of laws, regulations, and other government policies to their own benefit. Furthermore, information on budget formulation is not transparent and available to the public. The system is characterized by the ambiguity between the executive and legislative branch of government; poor parliamentary processes; and lack of policy coordination.

To sum up, lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making process; unclear laws and procedures; and the broad authority given to less professional officials without effective oversight mechanisms to hold them accountable for their performance, provides an enabling environment for corruption. Nevertheless, there is a relatively freedom of speech and expression in the Kurdish region in Iraq. Some local media have recently played a significant role in awareness rising of civilians about their legitimate rights and awaking the public opinions about the misconduct behavior of some government officials and political elites. But, to be more effective in combating corruption, appropriate enforcement laws and sanction capacities must be incorporated in the institutional system.

Weak market economy as a result of cultural constraints

It is clear that the lack of responsiveness, transparency and accountability within the KRG system has consequently led to increased corruption. But there are other reasons to increased corruption within the KRG, for example, the mode of production in the Kurdish society. About the widespread corruption in the Kurdish society in Iraq, Khidir (2007) states that:

“People in Kurdistan, especially youths, complain about corruption and criticize the government for not fighting corruption, but economist and experts say many others in our society are corrupt” (Khidir, 2007:15)

In the traditional Kurdish society, the institution of the family is still not reduced into single household because the industrial economy and welfare state is not so developed to make the individuals free from family obligations and bonds. The market economy is too weak and the proportion of industrial manpower is too small. As a result, the KRG will lack sufficient fiscal revenues to carry out its “modern” functions and the majority of people will rely on their family or tribe for support. Many public officials are facing a moral dilemma because they have to give privilege to their family members and party political colleagues no matter if this is against the formal rules and constraints. The civilians in the Kurdish region still feel more accountable to their own family, tribe and political party than to the rule of law. But this is a problem of all traditional societies facing modern values, as Lutz and Linder (2004:10) notes that, “Corruption must not but can be a dilemma of competing moralities”. They give an example of an African traditional society where the villagers hired to work for the government might steal from the government but will never do that from their own family or tribe.

The Kurdish economy consists of agrarian subsistence economy and imported consumer goods, which has discouraged a productive culture among the population and therefore lacks any move towards industrial market economy.

4.6 Summery and conclusions

The comparative case study highlights both differences and common issues and provides an insight into the nature and phenomenon of the obstacles to the CDD in the research area.
Summery

The result of the assessment of service provision on community level shows that there was no vital improvement in the life/living standards of the people in the targeted communities over the past four years, after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship in 2003. The government institutions and NGOs have only helped to provide basic social services often not tailor-made to the needs and aspirations of local people. The situation has rather been worsening for many households particularly in the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district. The problem has been that the public sector institutions and the NGOs lack appropriate institutional mechanisms of participatory and interdisciplinary planning. Many empirical evidences presented in this chapter demonstrate that the investment choices have not encouraged broad local participation and have not been able to reflect the true needs of all community people and as a result had little chance of sustainability.

The people in the investigated communities of Seweil have a low access to vertical assistance and therefore have relied more on their own limited capacity by building users groups as membership organization e.g. for drinking water and electricity supply. It seems that the community institutions are less capable in providing the environmental protection services (e.g. waste water management and solid waste management) and livelihood generating services (e.g. access to an effective irrigation system, passable road, marketing facilities and agricultural support services) which are all needed to create a sustainable community. There is lack of appropriate polices within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to establish links to the CBOs and assist them in human and organizational capacity building necessary for CDD as the KRG itself lack these capacities.

The absent policies for regional rural development and CDD have had negative implications on the whole region. For example, in the investigated communities of Seweil, the children cannot keep studying after completing the primary school as there is no secondary school in the community or neighbouring community or town. Moreover, lack of communication infrastructure and road accessibility during wet seasons make the community people more isolated from outside world and consequently hinders building bridging social capital necessary for CDD. But above all there is lack of sustainable income sources. These shortcomings, in recent years especially after 2003, have forced the people in Seweil to out-migrate to urban area in order to have a better access to social services and income sources. The poor households remained in the community expect to see improvements that make their own community a better place to live.

The community people in the Harir sub-district have different needs. They have a relatively high road accessibility and better access to basic social services as the area is close to an urban area. In this area there are no organized groups to deal with irrigation water and credit services. The irrigation is done more individually by the farmers and the provision of the credit is more based on family and tribal bonds. The provision of basic social services on the community level is more the task of the governmental institutions. For example, the ministry of water resources is directly responsible for providing people with necessary water services, which has appointed a water manager in each community. But this does not mean that the community people in the Harir area can rapidly obtain the vertical assistance to deal with water problems, for example, as discussed there are serious water problems in the Jamasor community.

However, there are comparatively more coordination mechanisms on the sub-district level in Harir but not on the community level as the structural social capital in form of
the CBOs are very weak in this area. Even in the Harir sub-district people are suffering from the weak institutional arrangements not responsive to the local needs. There is no policy how to develop agricultural and tourism services as the two main potential livelihood sources in the Harir sub-district. The agricultural agency in the sub-district centre provides the farmers only with limited agricultural inputs and services.

Furthermore, in the research area there are no formal credit institutions to support the farmers and other local producers. There are only governmental banks in the province centre to pay the salary of the civil servants and have no role in providing people with credit.

**Conclusions**

In an environment that even the existing institutional norms and structures are not implemented accordingly, the chance to promote the participatory local governance for CDD is very low. In addition, the principles of democracy and good governance are missing in the Kurdish region. For example, there are no procedures to clarify the decision-making and legal authority of the province assembly to which more rights and decision-making authority should be delegated. The heads of the government in respective province, district and sub-district are appointed by the political parties and not by an elected assembly in the mentioned spatial units. The ineffective and ambiguous system of administration easily allows mass corruption and abuse of power. Prioritizing personal benefits and corruption of the elites has led to decreasing confidence of civilian population in the governance system and thereby losing a significant amount of social capital.

In addition, private sector has no function in providing the public services as there is no policy to strengthen the participatory local governance for CDD. Missing effective development policies has already created a consumption society that in the long-run will bring many harmful consequences for sustainable socioeconomic development in the Kurdish region (Mahzouni, 2006c:11).

To strengthen the rule of law in the Kurdish society, to a large extent, depends on what civilians believe and accept as a legitimate decision and action from the KRG. The civilians do not accept the decision-making process within the KRG as legitimate, if the results of the decisions are not corresponding with their preferences and needs. When, the civilians lose confidence in their own government, the consequence can be that they will act on their own behalf, irrespective of the decision of the authorities. If a large number of citizens disobey the authorities, the result will be uprisings or on the individual level unlawful behaviour as the government has lost its legitimacy over time. Lessons learned from other developing countries and regions show that any system which allows mass corruption and abuse of power and excludes the grassroots people in decision-making process and the sharing of the public resources will soon or later collapse (Mahzouni, 2006b:13).

There is no vision how to carry out necessary reforms within the KRG and enhancing civil society in order to tackle with the current development shortcomings. In addition, the uncertainty about the future status of the KRG has caused limited space for discussion about problems to sustainable development in the region. But, this should not be a justification to ignore conducting necessary institutional reforms as “planning” is largely about how to deal with insecurities in the future.

In the next chapter, the institutional gaps to CDD more thoroughly from a “participatory governance” perspective will be analysed and discussed.
5 Assessment of gaps towards participatory governance and CDD

The main conclusion in the previous chapter was that even the existing institutional norms and structures consisting of an ambiguous system of behaviour, are not applied in the reality and not favourable to the approach of CDD. The fact is that even a well-functioning governance system is not conformed to CDD when excluding private and voluntary sectors that can together with the public sector act for local development. In this chapter, a more in-depth analysis of the institutional gaps to CDD from a more “participatory governance” perspective is carried out, which was partly initiated in the previous chapter.

In the first and second sections, the highly interrelated gaps on local (community and sub-district) and policy levels are discussed to further analyse the enabling environment for participatory local governance and CDD. Then, in the third section it will be highlighted if there is a strong link between civic social capital and institutional social capital as a solid base to good governance and communicative planning system. In the fourth section, the degree of analytical generalization and major obstacles to participatory local governance and effective planning for CDD in the Kurdish region is presented. In the last section, the applied data collection methods will be critically evaluated and discussed.

5.1 Gaps/bottlenecks on local level

The main root of institutional gaps to CDD is not on the community level but on higher levels of decision-making. Lack of effective institutional arrangements on the sub-district level directly influences the shortcomings to development on the community level. In this section, the capacity gaps of sub-district institutions to establish effective local network for CDD, will be discussed. The cooperation among sub-district institutions, as horizontal bridging social capital, to gain synergy effect and their vertical links both down to the community people and institutions and up to the central bodies, as part of vertical bridging social capital, will be described. The aim is to know if there is any institutional arrangement and participatory governance mechanism on the sub-district level for the provision of public services.

Accountability structure of the line agencies

Most officials of line agencies who are appointed centrally lack accountability to the community people, which has caused many bottlenecks in the service provision. For example, the health care centre in Bewre is open only one day a week which is extremely insufficient for delivering of health services that should be available 24 hours a day (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006). There is lack of accountability even to the line ministries, which is not surprising in a confusing system of governance combined of family obligations, commando-based behaviour and centralized norms.
Power and resources of local institutions

There are many examples from the empirical work that the sub-district institutions have no role in planning of the activities. The governmental line agencies in the sub-district are lacking authority to hire staff and set up their own budget in order to rapidly respond to the needs of civilians. No annual budget from the interior ministry for the sub-district is determined and other governmental authorities and local civic institutions have no role in the process of drawing the budget, it is done centrally by the council of ministry. The fixed budget is only for the staff cost and upon the request the daily expenses are reimbursed from the ministry. The main role of the sub-district institutions is to forward the demands of local people to their respective ministries which nobody knows where the demand will last and who is responsible to act, again because of the ambiguous and ineffective system of governance. The sub-district government in Seweil, which has a major role in road maintenance and coordination of the governmental activities, lacks decision-making power and financial means.

The needs of community people are usually communicated through Moktar or village council to the sub-district government whose authority is only to report them to the higher decision-making levels. The task of village council and sub-district government is limited on following up the administrative process, which can be very long and frustrating if not having personal and family relationships with the officials. The head of all investigated community groups in the Seweil sub-district stated that much of shortcomings on the services depend on the fact that the sub-district government has very limited decision-making power to act for community people. Furthermore, they believed that it is frustrating to be repetitively referred to different levels of governmental authorities without any result.

In the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil (18 April 2006), the participants agreed that there is lack of effective policies to improve the situation of the farmers who are currently leaving the farmland and migrate to the cities to find a livelihood. All power and opportunities are concentrated in the council of ministry which decides what is needed in the sub-district and for the farmers. In most cases, the high-level officials are not responsive to the requested needs because they are too occupied with the daily routines, a work that can easily be done by the low-level officials if they are delegated power and resources.

The sub-district as a level in the governance system has very little impact on cross-sector policy-making to effectively provide basic social services and it has no position in mobilising territorial political power. The first problem to spatial integration is that the sub-district government lacks council of elected members to take the main responsibility for regional planning and development work. As a result, there is no guarantee of democratic control and transparency of the government activities. This has brought further negative consequences on trust between government and civilians and thereby decreasing the bridging social capital. The result from the Table 4.5 on page 103 shows that one of the reasons that the surveyed households had less confidence in an institution was that the institution in question didn’t bring any direct benefit to the households because the institution lacked adequate power and resources to act quickly for community people.

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65 See the section of “Sub-district level institutions” on page 123 for the result of semi-structured interviews.
Past experiences with participatory governance and planning

Based on the synthesized results from the semi-structured interviews with leaders of community organizations, none of the surveyed organizations has been invited to participate in development planning of government and nongovernmental organisations. Furthermore, the community organizations including the governmental and politicised civic organizations which have usually high access to vertical contacts are missing links to any project/program from government or other institutions.

The consensus-building mechanism among the sub-district institutions is highly missing to gain synergy effect in local development. There is some horizontal collaboration among government institutions that contribute only with limited bridging social capital to the CDD, because private sector and civil society organizations are excluded. For example, there is a governmental committee in the Harir sub-district consisting of representative of the agricultural agency, the sub-district government and the local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union (KFU). About the committee, the head of the agricultural line agency in Harir stated that:

“The main objective of the committee is to coordinate the efforts of agricultural production and jointly deal with the problems of the farmers. Depending on the problem the village representative Moktar and the head of the KDP sub-district organization can also participate in the meetings. The farmers have legal right to protest on any decision made by the committee” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural line agency in Harir, 26 April 2006)

Furthermore, the interviewee confirmed the high consensus between the governmental agencies in the sub-district where they are meeting together every month to discuss the progress of ongoing projects and follow-up of local needs within the higher governmental institutions.

Also in the Seweil sub-district some limited experiences with building local network have been observed where the international NGOs have been more involved in solving some local problems. For example, it has been a coordination effort between the sub-district government and the Mine Action department of the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to clear the landmines in some communities. Other cooperation has been between health agency and the NPA Mine Action department in awareness-raising of the community people to protect themselves against contaminated landmines (Semi-structured interview with the head of the sub-district government in Seweil, 12 April 2006).

Additionally, the agricultural agency has established contacts with a local civic organization called the Young Activity Organization where young people have offered free work to maintain streams and build small dams for irrigation purposes in seven communities in the Seweil sub-district. Furthermore, the municipality has a close collaboration with the sub-district government e.g. in road maintenance and in the provision of public services in the sub-district (Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).

As far as can be seen from a “political legitimacy” perspective, the participatory local governance of any kind is incomplete in the research area. There is lack of political support to legally accept the sub-district government as the main actor to organize local development. Thus the governance system fails to fulfil the legitimating bottom-up process of local development planning and management. As long as this weakness exists, the sub-district governments will suffer from a “power deficit” as they will continue to lack the tools necessary to become powerful local development actor.
Social responsibility for environmental protection

Not all gaps to CDD come from the government. The negative attitudes and behaviour of some local people, not to take social responsibility for their own community, can be also blamed for. There is lack of environmental awareness and common action to take responsibility for creating a healthy environment on the local community. In an interview, the acting mayor of the municipality of Harir complained about the low rate of cooperation from local people to protect the environment:

“They just throw the bottles and other solid wastes on the public places and expect the government to collect them. The wastes are transported by the rain water into the agricultural land in the Harir flat terrain and cause environmental problems” (Semi-structured interview with the acting mayor of the municipality of Harir, 26 April 2006).

As a matter of fact, lack of access to basic social and livelihood generating services in the research area make local people not to prioritize the protection of environment.

5.2 Gaps/bottlenecks on policy level

Most causes of the institutional gaps to CDD are neither on the community level nor on the sub-district level. Through the analysis of synthesized findings, they were tracked on the policy level that lacks of effective strategies to regional rural development.

Policy framework for regional rural development

Effective political and institutional arrangements as an enabling environment to regional rural development and CDD are highly missing in the research area. The urban area is currently booming of reconstruction and physical development without considering any other aspects of sustainable development e.g. environmental, human and social.

Absent of any kind of regional rural policies has actually caused the current rural-urban mass migration in the region. For example, the education for most children in the rural sub-district of Seweil ends after completing the primary school. The families are forced to migrate to the cities as they want their children being educated instead of continuing the traditional village jobs. This rural out-migration, as mentioned in the previous chapter is called the second Anfal campaign by many local people. The synthesised result from the empirical work and personal observation show that nowadays most young people in the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district are discouraged to stay in their own community. They refuse to work as poor farmers and herds and as a result no young manpower is remained in the sub-district and the villages have gradually become empty and unsustainable (Sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil, 18 April 2006).

There are no strategies to enhance sustainable livelihood based on local resources in order to improve the living condition of the farmers. One of the participants on the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil stated that:

“Nowadays, most food products are imported from outside of the Kurdistan region which compete with the domestic ones and this has further discouraged the farmers to stay in their villages and occupy themselves with agricultural production as

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66 Anfal campaign was pushed by the former Iraqi army to displace and systematically kill rural people of the Kurdistan region out of political reason. For more information see chapter one.
there is no demand for their products” (Sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil, a farmer from Marwe, 18 April 2006).

One more participant on the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil sent a strong message to the policy-makers:

“The former Iraqi government by force and a systematic plan removed us from our villages to the collective towns. The current government, which is a product of our own efforts, should have implemented a better plan to resettle us in the destroyed villages. It must help us to provide basic social services and livelihood opportunities convincing us not to voluntarily migrate back to the cities” (Sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil, a farmer from Bewre, 18 April 2006).

The participants of the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil agreed that rural people in the Kurdistan region are highly discriminated in resource allocating and consequently they are forced to migrate to the cities in searching for a better life.

One of the proposals on the rural workshop in the Sulaimanyah province (30 June 2005) was to establish a rural development institution that has a very high decision-making status and report directly to the council of ministry. This is another example to show how deeply the top-down approach to improve the situation on the ground is rooted in the minds and attitudes of local people. Indeed, any idea of institutional building to increase income sources for community people is worth considering but the great risk to build such an institution on high level is that it might rapidly shift from its original visions and missions and become a rigid governmental organization that are more accountable to the government than to the community people in the rural area.

Institutional and organizational obstacles to participatory local governance

The ambiguous government system, described in the chapter four, is behind the limited organizational capacity and weak coordination mechanisms among public institutions to support CDD. There are many reasons why the sub-district institutions can not properly respond to the community needs especially regarding the basic social services, for example:

– The officials in the ministries are not very responsive to the needs of line agencies on local level due to the lack of clear administrative procedures. Nobody knows who is in charge to act for civilians;
– The institutions have low capacity e.g. the municipality in the Harir sub-district has limited capacity of both staff and resources required to effectively collect the solid waste in Old Batas; and
– There is high lack of organizational coordination. One of the reasons behind the crises of the Harir tomato sauce factory in 2005 was inefficient coordination among the ministries of industry and financing.67

As part of deficiency of governance system, the governmental line agencies are the only institutions to provide social services e.g. health and education services in the sub-district. Other local institutions from the civil society and private sector have no role in planning and provision of the basic social services despite the fact that the governmental institutions have limited capacity. For instance, the agricultural agency is the only institution that provides limited agricultural inputs and services in the sub-district that are far from sufficiently. The agency lacks adequate power and resources to effectively

67 For the results of the interview with the head of the Harir tomato sauce factory see page128.
respond to the needs of the farmers. Indeed, the farmers have to go to the province centre and make the further follow-up of their demand within the ministry but they have little capacity to deal with the ambiguous and non-transparent system. It is always difficult to get the right person because the accountability structure of the system is unclear (Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre Basne, 12 April 2006).

One of the reasons of mass out-migration of rural people is that the private sector does not make any profit to participate in development activities in remote rural area because of low quality of road infrastructure and high transportation cost. Besides, the companies owned by the political parties have the privilege to a wide range of facilities against the principles of market economy and democracy. This institutional behaviour that discriminate the private sector is an obstacle to establish participatory local governance for CDD. Mr. Fasal Mirani, the secretary of the KDP, in an interview with a local newspaper states that:

“We need to implement a top-down institutional reform to establish a civil society in Kurdistan but the Kurdish political parties and the KRG are now the main obstacles to achieve this goal. Even if some of the leaders believe in civil society but in practice do not take any step to achieve that. The institutional reform to establish a civil society in the region should start from the political leadership”. (Hawlati weekly newspaper, 2005: No.231, p.3).

There is no political will from the top leaders to initiate institutional reforms. Therefore, it is essential to empower local people and institutions that can put pressure on the system for necessary reforms and gradually strengthen the civil society for building participatory local governance. Otherwise, the risk is that the corruption and abuse of power might be transferred from central bodies to the local elites when conducting institutional reform for decentralization.

The surveyed households in the research area had different attitudes about the work of sub-district government because kinship and party affiliation play a great role in determining the relationship of the civilians with the governmental authorities. Creating personal and informal relationships to the government officials are very helpful to build mutual trust and to produce bridging social capital. But, on the other hand in the absence of rule of law to protect the right of marginalized groups, this can have an exclusionary effect and thereby a negative impact on sustainable local development.

The incompatible mixed and ambiguous system of administration easily allows mass corruption and abuse of power. For example, there are competing moralities and attitudes between the top governmental officials loyal to the local political parties who before 1991 were guerrillas in the mountains and the administrators from the former Iraqi system who act strictly according to the administrative procedures. There is lack of rule of law, transparency and accountability as three major pillars of good governance and democracy and consequently the misuse of institutional power to obtain unjust advantages.

It is evident that increased corruption of the elites has led to decreased confidence of civilian population in the KRG. The latest discussions on the local media have been very much focused on the current management and organizational structure of the KRG that is unable to provide basic social services for civilians. Nowadays, there is a public movement against this kind of negative development. For example, in the town of

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68 See the table on page103.
Darbandikhan in the Sulaimanyah province, a centre for institutional reform and fighting corruption has been opened (Hawlati weekly newspaper, 2005: No.231, p.2).

There are no effective policies to ensure the sustainable socioeconomic development in the region. There is an urgent need to change the current structure of the KRG in order to promote civil society, increase transparency and alleviate the corruption as a main obstacle to build trust in government (Mahzouni, 2005b:12 ; 2006b: 13).

5.3 The link between civic and institutional social capital

The largest increments in social capital occur where beliefs in participation are reinforced by the existence of rules that are clear and fairly implemented. This is a good example of the mutually reinforcing role of civic social capital and institutional social capital. How the civic social capital is interrelated with institutional social capital (government system, rules of law etc.) in the research area? Does structural and cognitive social capital complement each other to produce bridging social capital necessary to participatory local governance and CDD?

Strong civic social capital

As was discussed in the previous chapter\(^{69}\) and can be seen from the Figure 5.1 on page 149, there is a strong cognitive social capital (social cohesion, trust and solidarity and collective action) on the community level as the community people are relative to each other, and there are good informal relationships among people. When it is about the structural social capital (associational life, information access and political action) on the community level, there are some local variations. Most important manifestation of the structural social capital in the investigated communities of the Seweil sub-district is a relatively high density of the CBOs such as users groups for drinking water and electricity supply. In addition, there is effective relationship among community institutions. The people are usually informed through the village council or mosque to participate in meetings with community organizations about a certain issue. In the Seweil sub-district, in general, there is no obstacle to get people organized on the community level and personal contact and common interests among community organizations play a significant role to create horizontal bridging social capital.

On the other hand, in the investigated communities of the Harir sub-district the family and tribal relationships among people are relatively high as part of cognitive social capital but unlike in Seweil sub-district the cognitive social capital has not been converted into the users groups as structural social capital to effectively deal with local needs and to efficiently demand government institutions for vertical assistance as part of “vertical” bridging social capital\(^{70}\). It can be concluded that there is local variations across the research area regarding the amount of civic social capital (both in form of cognitive and structural social capital). In general, people in those areas that have been subjected for displacement and targeted for reconstruction efforts have a comparatively high experience to convert cognitive social capital into membership groups as part of structural social capital.

\(^{69}\) See the section of “Interplay among different types of social capital” on page 114.

\(^{70}\) See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities. See also the tables on pages 108-110 on group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities.
Weak institutional social capital

Having high access to strong civic social capital on the community level is not enough to achieve CDD if the institutional social capital to promote an enabling environment for local governance, is not in place. In the research area, even in the Seweil sub-district with a relatively strong civic social capital, there is a missing link to the governmental institutions as weak “vertical” bridging social capital. In the Harir sub-district because of the location advantage, the vertical interaction of the community organizations with the government institutions is relatively high but not effective enough to produce bridging social capital. Some examples for weak “vertical” bridging social capital in the research area are highlighted as follows:

- In Jamasor the school has very limited vertical relationship with institutions outside of the community except formal relationship with the education ministry (Semi-structured interview with the assistant director of the secondary school in Jamasor, 21 April 2006).
- The vertical assistance from the government institutions has not been effective enough to solve the drinking water problem in Jamasor (Focus group discussions with men in Jamasor, 20 April 006).
- The capacity of the health care centre in all investigated communities is very limited to deliver the demanded health services which much depend on ineffective institutional arrangements for building the organizational and human capacity of the line agencies.

The community organizations are not capable to help each other in the process of capacity building as they all face the same problems and shortcomings and lack of effective vertical interaction with the government institutions and the NGOs. They have not been invited to participate in any development planning process and are not linked to any project/program, neither the KDP local organization which has enormous access to vertical contacts within the KDP and the government.

The main reason of weak “vertical” bridging social capital is the ineffective governance system where the kinship and party affiliation play a vital role in determining the links of the community people and organizations to the public sector institutions which is recognized as weak “vertical” bridging social capital. The results of the table 4.5 on page 103 shows that those households whose head were member of the local political parties (H2 in Marwe or H2 in Old Batas) or those who were close relatives to the governmental officials (H1 in Jamasor) had a relatively high trust in the government institutions as they have access to a wide range of services which the normal civilians are excluded from. In other words, there is a missing link between normal citizens and the government necessary to build participatory local governance for CDD.

To summarize, as can be seen from Figure 5.1 on page 149, civic social capital (cognitive social capital and to some extent structural social capital) operates very well on the community level. But, there are local variations across the research area regarding the amount of civic social capital both in form of cognitive and structural social capital. The ambiguous governance system as weak institutional social capital is the main obstacle to CDD, which make the coordination and consensus-building among the government institutions both on policy and sub-district levels very difficult. Furthermore, the centralized and ineffective governance system is the main reason behind power deficit of the sub-district institutions and in this manner an obstacle to create participatory local governance. Achieving CDD only a strong civic social capital
on community level is not enough. It also requires a strong institutional social capital that is linked to civic social capital in an effective system of local governance where local stakeholders are completing and strengthen each other.

Figure 5.1: The link between civic and institutional social capital to CDD

Source: Mahzouni, 2007

Figure 5.1: The link between civic and institutional social capital to CDD
5.4 Conclusions

Degree of analytical generalization

The problem of any case study is that the result is based on the special context and it must be carefully examined to make some analytical generalizations. It is now clear that the problems to community development differ greatly across the research area due to differences in socio-cultural, political and economic structures on local level. This diversity creates challenges to compare the obtained data across sub-districts and communities and to make generalizations about the root of the problems. The comparative case study provides a synthesis of the main findings to recommend relevant policies for establishing effective system of behaviour for participatory local governance and CDD.

In the final stage of the empirical work, focus group discussions on sub-district level were conducted. The aim was to already present the obtained data and initiate the analysis of the institutional problems to implement CDD. As can be seen from the tables on the following pages, “institutional reform” was presented as the output of focus group discussions in both sub-districts except that the participants in the Harir sub-district included also the “intellectual reform” which could mean that more education and individual capacity development are required in this area.

71 Originally it was planned to conduct a future workshop but later because of financial problems, and limited time and resources, the focus group discussions was conducted instead. Please note that the results of the discussions presented in the tables on the following pages are in fact the inputs and ideas of the participants but have been translated into English and reformulated to make them readable.
Table 5.1: The result of the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the key community problems</th>
<th>Collection of the proposed solutions</th>
<th>Most appropriate solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic social services</strong></td>
<td><strong>National level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No secondary school</td>
<td>- To establish security and political stability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack of teaching room</td>
<td>- To reach a sustained political solution for the Kurdistan region(^2)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- No playground for the pupils</td>
<td>- To increase the coordination between the ministries</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- No community library</td>
<td>- Raising food security</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- No centre for recreational activities e.g. sport and cultural events</td>
<td><strong>Regional level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inefficient delivery of drinking water</td>
<td>- To eliminate corruption and opportunistic behaviour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Low road accessibility</td>
<td>- To establish an effective planning system and management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ineffective sanitation system</td>
<td>- To create an integrated planning system for rural development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Non-satisfactory housing conditions</td>
<td>- To increase the transparency of the financial issues within the government</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihood support services</strong></td>
<td>- To increase the sense of responsibility of the civil servants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack of support services to farmers in input, production and marketing facilities</td>
<td>- To create a strong organizational culture that no one is above the law</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No veterinary centre to treat the diseases of livestock</td>
<td><strong>Institutional change:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional setup</strong></td>
<td>- To provide the sub-district government and village council more power and resources</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack of an integrated and strategic plan for agricultural and rural development</td>
<td>- To determine a sub-district annual budget</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Discrimination of rural people</td>
<td>- To increase the decision-making power and financial capability of the line agencies in the sub-district</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ineffective evaluation and monitoring of administrative tasks</td>
<td>- To involve local people in the planning and implementation process of development activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ineffective vertical relationship with the governmental institutions</td>
<td>- To increase the accountability of government to the local needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited vertical assistance</td>
<td>- To minimize the administrative routines and opportunistic behaviour and speed up the decision-making process</td>
<td>Institutional reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of transparency and civilians insight in the work of government</td>
<td><strong>Improvement of livelihood sources:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased corruption</td>
<td>- To invest more on education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To create road and market infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To create supporting price policies on agricultural and livestock products</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To create small scale agricultural-related industries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite active participation of the people in the Seweil sub-district in election and their efforts to demand for vertical assistance as strong *civic* social capital, the governance system characterising of weak *institutional* social capital has not been responsive. The

\(^2\) If the Kurdish region would be independent or remained in a federative and democratic Iraq.
conclusion is that the active participation of local people to gain vertical assistance is not enough if not supported by an effective governance system and a strong political commitment. As mentioned earlier, lack of accountability and transparency within the KRG system and weak institutional social capital have recently led to growing public mistrust and protest and thereby an additional deficit of bridging social capital.

Table 5.2: The result of the sub-district focus group discussions in Harir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the key community problems</th>
<th>Collection of the proposed solutions</th>
<th>Most appropriate solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic social services</strong></td>
<td>National level</td>
<td>Intellectual and institutional reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of secondary school</td>
<td>-To reach a sustained political solution for the Kurdistan region73.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of student room</td>
<td>-To increase the coordination between the ministries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-No play ground for the pupils</td>
<td><strong>Regional level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of the health equipments</td>
<td>-To eliminate corruption and opportunistic behaviour from regional government institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-No community library</td>
<td>-To increase the transparency of the government budget and financial activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-No centre for recreational activities e.g. sport and cultural events</td>
<td>-To create integrated policies for regional rural development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inefficient delivery of drinking water</td>
<td>-To implement awareness raising activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Low road accessibility to the communities</td>
<td><strong>Local level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ineffective sanitation and waste collection system</td>
<td><strong>Institutional change:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of housing projects</td>
<td>-To provide the sub-district government and the communities with more decision- making power and resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Nobody above the law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihood support services</strong></td>
<td><strong>Improvement of livelihood sources:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of support services to farmers in input, production and marketing facilities</td>
<td>-To invest more on education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of credit and irrigation services</td>
<td>-To create supporting price policies on agricultural and livestock products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of support for developing agricultural-related industries</td>
<td>-Market accessibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-To create small scale agricultural-related industries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional setup</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lack of follow-up and transparency mechanisms and civilians insight into the work of government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Increased corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Discrimination of the rural people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participants of the focus group discussions in the Harir sub-district discussed less openly with each other and in comparison with the focus group discussions in the Seweil sub-district not many inputs from the participants were received. For example, there were not many different ideas how to solve the discussed problems and the researcher had to actively encourage the participants for an interactive discussion. In addition, based on personal observations throughout the empirical work can be concluded that people in the Harir sub-district are relatively less willing to openly evaluate and criticize the work of governmental institutions in spite of living closed to the sub-district centre and having easier access to the institutions. It can be concluded that only the location factor does not play a significant role in determining the

73 Ibid
empowerment and political action of people. Other historical, socio-cultural and political circumstances must be considered as well.

The synthesized result of the focus group discussions in both targeted sub-districts as can be seen from the tables above, confirms that there are some variations in local needs due to the differences in geographical, historical and socio-cultural features. But, the differences are significantly decreasing on policy level which consists of the same governance system and institutional structure. However, on local level some common economic and socio-cultural issues were observed during the empirical work and based on the results of the analysis as follows:

- Limited availability of alternative livelihood opportunities, which makes people to give priority to income-generating rather than voluntary activities for sustainable community development;
- Limited capacity and low level of maturity of civil society organization; and
- Negative socio-cultural traits (e.g. people’s dole-out mentality and “wait and see” attitude).

Based on the historical and political development in the Kurdish region in Iraq during the last decades as discussed both in the first chapter and in the fourth chapter, the respective governance system of the PUK and the KDP share the same organizational structure and norms. As a result, they face the same obstacles to implement existing institutional arrangement to community development, which is also confirmed by the synthesized result of the focus group discussions in both sub-districts. As mentioned in chapter one, they have been facing many difficulties to build consensus for how to establish a regional unity government and work for creating a civil society.

However, the comparative case study provides a synthesis of the main findings to recommend relevant policies for establishing effective system of behaviour for participatory local governance and CDD. But, as mentioned, every case study is limited for broad generalisations. The findings for obstacles to CDD in both investigated sub-districts can only be generalized for those obstacles that are caused by the same policies within the KRG which will be discussed in the following section.

**Major obstacles to participatory local governance and CDD**

The results in the following tables are based on the synthesized result of all data collection methods and case studies. The first column highlights the methods from which the synthesised results about the problems are obtained. The second and third columns summarize the key results based on the empirical work and the fourth and fifth columns as the conclusions where the interpretation of the author from the left to the right is increasing to analyse the further impacts of the main causes of the development problems in a cause-effect relationship.
Table 5.3: Cause of the problems on local level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Immediate effect</th>
<th>Further consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>Social exclusion from services</td>
<td>Failure of NGOs to involve people in development planning</td>
<td>Decreased collective sense</td>
<td>Increased community division and reduced social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kinship &amp; party affiliation determining the relationship to government</td>
<td>Increased corruption and abused power</td>
<td>Decreased social cohesion and degrading bonding social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,4,5</td>
<td>Lack of organizational effectiveness</td>
<td>Kinship &amp; party affiliation determining the relationship with government</td>
<td>Missing link between normal citizens and the government</td>
<td>Decreased trust in government and degrading bridging social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6</td>
<td>Low vertical assistance to community</td>
<td>Lack of communicative planning</td>
<td>Weak bridging social capital</td>
<td>The goal of sustainable CDD is not achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>Power deficit of village council</td>
<td>Centralized decision-making structure</td>
<td>Lack of subsidiarity principle</td>
<td>Powerless community people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6</td>
<td>Ineffective service delivery</td>
<td>The market is monopolized by ineffective public sector</td>
<td>Shortages of social, livelihood, environmental services</td>
<td>The goal of sustainable CDD is not achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>Lack of local participation</td>
<td>Failure to incorporate the knowledge and initiatives of community organizations in project planning</td>
<td>Existing capacity is undermined rather than strengthened</td>
<td>Low sense of ownership and unsustainable use of community resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>Low capacity of CBOs</td>
<td>Lack of appropriate mechanisms to support CDD</td>
<td>Low contributions from beneficiaries to recurrent costs of social services</td>
<td>Community needs are ignored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6</td>
<td>Frustrating administrative routines</td>
<td>Centralized decision-making power within the line agencies</td>
<td>Views of agency staff are largely ignored in the planning phase</td>
<td>Community needs are ignored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,6</td>
<td>Shortage of accountability of governmental officials</td>
<td>Lack of evaluation and monitoring system</td>
<td>Increased corruption and abused power</td>
<td>Losing trust in the government and degrading bridging social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6</td>
<td>Ineffective service delivery to community</td>
<td>Poor complementary institutional arrangements</td>
<td>Increased dependency on central government</td>
<td>Investment choices do not reflect the true needs of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,4,5,6</td>
<td>Power deficit and lack of capacity of sub-district institutions</td>
<td>Centralized political, administrative and financial power</td>
<td>Institutions are not responsive to the community needs</td>
<td>Losing trust in the government and degrading bridging social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,3,4,5</td>
<td>Unsustainable development projects</td>
<td>Lack of bottom-up approach in local planning</td>
<td>Ineffective use of limited resources</td>
<td>Community problems remained unsolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5, and active observation</td>
<td>Low cooperation sense of local people to care for environment</td>
<td>Lack of polices to increase the knowledge and information of civilians</td>
<td>Degrading the environment</td>
<td>Unsustainable community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74 The data collections methods are coded as follows: 1=Integrated interview guide, 2=Semi-structured interview with leaders, members and non-members of the community organizations, 3=Group interview of the community key informants, 4=Focus group discussions, 5=Semi-structured interview with the sub-district institutions, 6=Sub-district focus group discussions.
Table 5.4: Cause of the problems on policy level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Immediate effect</th>
<th>Further consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,2,4,5,6</td>
<td>Lack of commitment and responsibility of policymakers</td>
<td>Weak civil society organizations and opposition parties</td>
<td>Low working spirit of governmental officials</td>
<td>Low confidence of civilians and losing of bridging social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,5,6</td>
<td>Lack of transparency and control of the government work</td>
<td>Lack of strong and organized opposition parties</td>
<td>Increased corruption, abused power and arrogance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,5</td>
<td>Low incitement of private investment</td>
<td>Lack of effective policies and institutional arrangements</td>
<td>Inefficient provision of social and livelihood services</td>
<td>Rural-urban mass migration and unsustainable spatial development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6, active observation and secondary data</td>
<td>Emerging a consumption society</td>
<td>Lack of effective policy to promote local economy</td>
<td>Farmers are discouraged and shift to other non-productive activities</td>
<td>Decreased national food security and unsustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,6, active observation and secondary data</td>
<td>Increased regional disparities</td>
<td>Ineffective policies to integrated regional rural development</td>
<td>Increased informal settlements in the urban area</td>
<td>Unsustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,2,4,5,6, active observation and secondary data</td>
<td>Lack of effective policies to promote regional rural development</td>
<td>Political parties have more power than government institutions</td>
<td>Weak civil society organizations</td>
<td>Lack of complementary institutional support to CDD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governance, partnership and collaboration are new phenomena in the Kurdish regional planning and development context and it is hard to find a comprehensive research about these phenomena. As presented in the tables, most causes to the problems on local level are a direct result of missing effective policies to promote local participation in development planning, which in turn causes other problems discussed in the following sections.

*Lack of horizontal and vertical co-ordination*

There are many problems in the ongoing governance system in the Kurdish region. First of all, there is the problem related to the creation of appropriate spatial administrative units that are able to integrate people and mobilize political power. Then, there is the horizontal coordination problem where no regional policy-making and implementation are expanded from the centralized governance structure to a more participatory governance structure. In addition, there is the vertical coordination problem, which relates to the extremely difficult balance between “top-down” and “bottom-up” policy in the centralized power structure. Lack of integrated institutional framework, which partly has been inherited from the former Iraqi government system, has created the rural sub-districts without any tools for regional rural planning.

In the current governance structure the horizontal integration problem is to set up cooperation and to coordinate the activities among different public organisations. There are also the vertical coordination problems among the line agencies of a ministry where lacking accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services have caused mistrust in the system and therefore a deficit of bridging social capital, for

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75 Ibid.
instance, in the case of health service provision in Bewre\textsuperscript{76}. The horizontal and vertical coordination problem among different public sector institutions continues to be the main obstacle for regional rural planning in the Kurdish region and this problem will continue to be impossible for the sub-district government to deal with.

\textit{Missing participatory approach in development planning and management}

One of the main strength and success determinants of any development project is to include the participatory approach and involving the institutions closed to the ground, which is not the case in the research area and as a result causes many problems to local development as highlighted in the Table 5.1 on page 151 and Table 5.2 on page 152. The sub-district has no elected council and the sub-district appointed governor lacks of decision-making power and the village representative is only a symbolic figure set up by the government or local political party. These shortcomings are greater in the Harir sub-district which lacks of CBOs to fill the gaps of an effective vertical assistance.

In fact, all surveyed institutions liked the idea to give more decision-making power to the institutions on the sub-district and community levels. Lack of participatory mechanisms in local planning has actually led to many unsustainable development projects in the research area\textsuperscript{77}.

\textit{Weak link between civic and institutional social capital}

Even in the Seweil sub-district with relatively high self-organized efforts, there is no strong link between CBOs as civic social capital and the governmental institutions as institutional social capital. For example, the water users group in Marwe has no formal link to the central government institutions. The leader of all surveyed organizations believed that community institutions can not help each other in the process of capacity building as they all face the same problems and shortcomings but in most cases the government can do that. But, the question is how an ineffective institutional system can help improving the situation on the ground.

Weak bridging social capital in the research area depends on the ineffective and ambiguous governance system causing lack of rule of law, transparency and accountability within the government institutions. There is shortage of effective policies and joint concepts to create synergy effect between different disciplines and stakeholders to support CDD. There are growing evidences that the problem of underdevelopment in the research area is, to a significant extent, a problem of underdeveloped institutions lacking of effective policies to ensure sustainable livelihood for rural people, which was the final output of the focus group discussions in both targeted sub-districts\textsuperscript{78}.

Furthermore, there is no institutional arrangement to increase access of the farmers to inputs and marketing facilities and supporting services to effectively use local resources. The capacity of community organizations is very limited, which are only providing basic social services and don’t play a vital role to promote local production and sustainable livelihood sources. This has led to low productivity in agriculture and poverty in the rural area and as a result mass rural out-migration and social unrest during recent years, which are listed in the Table 5.3 and the Table 5.4. Indeed, there is

\textsuperscript{76} For more information about the problems of health service provision in Bewre, see the sub-section of “Governmental line agencies” on page 119.

\textsuperscript{77} See Table 5.1 on page 151 and Table 5.2 on page 152. See even “Past experiences with CDD” on page 98.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
not much political will to improve the situation on the ground and the KRG is now under intense pressure to carry out reforms and regain trust from civilians.\textsuperscript{79}

To conclude, participation can have positive impacts on governance because it improves information flow, accountability, the transparency of the political process and it gives voice to those most directly affected by a public policy. But, the process to empower people, build social capital and strengthens local governance for CDD is highly lacking in the Kurdish region. Establishing participatory local governance for CDD requires not only an effective public sector but a strong commitment from the political leadership to create a solid base for the civil society organisations and the private sector that are capable to enforce policy reforms. Most causes of the problems on local level (community and sub-district levels) are rooted on policy level and therefore the macro variables are considered as independent.

Now, when it is quite clear where the causes of most problems to the community development are, it is relevant to propose appropriate strategies and a favourable institutional framework to CDD in the next chapter.

\section*{5.5 Critical evaluation of the empirical work}

The first period of the empirical work, which partly included the obtaining information about the social capital on macro level, brought significant amount of benefits. The relevancy of the research concepts and methodologies to the local context and requirements were pre-tested. It became clearer how the participatory methods of data collection and triangulation could increase the validity and reliability of the obtained data, where participants from different groups and disciplines are given the chance to discuss and cross-check the obtained information. In addition, the strength to involve the target group in the entire process of the research and build trust and confidence for what the result of the research is promising was confirmed.

The appropriate ways to analyze the obtained data and apply results were more determined after the empirical work based on the methodological triangulation\textsuperscript{80}. The institutional arrangements to CDD were analyzed through generating data on various dimensions and types of social capital in the selected sites. The rate of horizontal interaction of local people and institutions and their vertical links to the institutions on higher levels of decision-making as the community’s stock of cognitive, structural and bridging social capital was assessed.

It was really a difficult task to categorize the social capital as a cross-sectoral and highly complex issue in a post-conflict situation such as in the Kurdish region in Iraq. Anyway, a critical evaluation of the applied data collection methods is necessary to ensure that the analysis is more scientific and in this manner proposing the appropriate institutional arrangements that fulfil the needs of grassroots people and enhance the process of participatory local governance for CDD.

Was the triangulation successful

During the second period of the empirical work, data was obtained from community key informants, group of households and community institutions, where triangulation was applied to find more reliable data on institutional gaps to local governance and CDD. A

\textsuperscript{79} See the results of the interview with Mr. Fasal Mirani, the secretary of the KDP on page 146.

\textsuperscript{80} For a description on methodological triangulation see the section of “Triangulation” on page 65.
map of existing institutions and issues relating to social capital was provided on the community level for reference in the later phases of data collection. A consensus was also created about the definition of “community” in which the research had taken place that was used throughout the community profile exercise as well as for “the integrated interview guide” as most comprehensive data collection method to define the catchments areas of the institutions.

It was confirmed that the local context requires a different approach to data collection method. In general, face-to-face communication has always the advantages to avoid misunderstanding between sender and receiver of a message and thereby increasing the reliability of the exchanged information. Mahzouni (2000:16) emphasizes the need to use “personal communication channels” which allow for personal addressing and feedback in any cultural setting.

In particular, the circumstances in the research area e.g. low rate of literacy among rural people would not allow giving out questionnaire forms without any oral explanations. For example, it was important to cross-check with the respondents what was meant with “effective leadership” in local context, which would have not been possible if the questionnaire was left out to the respondent without any face-to-face communication. Therefore, the integrated interview guide was carried out making sure that the interviewee has understood the message and in this manner increasing the rate of response, the reliability of obtained information and the analytical generalization.

Before starting any personal interview or discussion, efforts were made to create an atmosphere that the interviewee feels comfortable and ensured that the obtained information would be taken confidentially and used only for the research purpose which helped to obtain more reliable data. Furthermore, respecting the principles of research ethic, the efforts were made to ask the questions in a neutral way not to influence the interviewee to answer in a certain manner.

Nevertheless, the application of triangulation required allocating limited time and resources on six different methods in different sites which made it impossible, for example, in the integrated interview guide to interview a larger number of the households in each targeted community. Only 2-3 households were interviewed but they were quite representative of the concern of the vulnerable groups and the community problems. The interview was very long and in-depth which partly cross-checked the information obtained from other methods as part of triangulation. If only this method had been applied, it would have negative implications on the results of analysis. It is evident that by taking six different methods for triangulation, less time and resources were left to take a big sample in each method and locality.

In addition, an active observation from the researcher was required to cross-check obtained information from different levels and disciplines. Applying many different methods in different sites would have made the analyzing and sensitizing the data very difficult if it would have been done by several people. Therefore, despite the limited time all planned activities were carried out by the researcher himself with the aim of providing a more consistent human judgment of the context of the problems and avoiding information bias and distorted result. But, in a qualitative research the human judgment of a given situation can also increase the information bias and thereby decreasing the neutrality to conduct a scientific study. Bridging this gap, the researcher was very aware about the principles of the research ethics to try to be neutral in collecting and analysing data and not to bring the results of the study in such ways that would negatively affect the reliability of the obtained data. However, in the social research it is impossible to achieve absolute neutrality in collecting and analyzing data.
The advantages of triangulation, as a tool to ensure the validity and reliability of the obtained data in the context of research area have been confirmed. In chapter four, many good cases of successful triangulation were presented where the information about a certain community problem from different people and institutions has been cross-checked and completed step-by-step and thereby increasing the reliability of the obtained data. A short summary of these cases are presented here.

The first case is about the beekeeping project in Bewre in the Seweil sub-district, which the information about the main reasons behind the failure of the project has been cross-checked and completed step by step. The obtained information from the agriculture agency in the Seweil sub-district did complete the already acquired information from community people and groups.

The second case is the problem of health care centre in Bewre, which the views of community people about the shortcomings of the health services was confirmed by the head of women association in the community who has been asked by her organization to write a report about the quality of the health services in the community.

The third case is about the demand of people in Bewre to establish a secondary school in the community. They complained that the ministry of education has ignored their demand. In an interview, the head of women association in the community confirmed the need to establish a secondary school in Bewre. But, she informed that the ministry of education did not agree on their demand because it had already planned to build the student houses in the district centre for secondary school pupils from Bewre.

The fourth case is about the water problem in Jamasor. During the interviews with many people and institutions, both on community and sub-district levels, other information about the main problems to carry out the huge water project in the Harir area was found which was unknown for the community people. It was found out that neither the community people nor the agricultural agency had been involved in planning and implementation of the water project. It was a central decision without any involvement of farmers, agricultural agency, the ministry of water resources and the geology experts at the university. The head of sub-district organization of the KDP in an interview stated that the main problem of finalizing the water project was lack of huge water pipes that must be imported from foreign countries about which the surveyed people and institutions in Jamasor didn’t leave out any information.

To summarize, there are many arguments that triangulation has increased the validity and reliability of the obtained information in the research area, which would not have been possible through applying conventional survey that misses the complex relationships between different people and institutions.

How local limitations were managed

There were some limitations in applying the methods especially regarding focus group discussions on the sub-district level despite carefully designed activities for effective group interaction. Some efforts were made to deal with limitations which are discussed as follows.

In social science research, there can be some interactive problems to establish a focus group as a method for collecting data through group discussions, for example, when the participants fail to add to a larger common ground. As the group members are supposed to represent various professionals, social groups and disciplines, an important problem can be that they do not act as members of the focus group and fail to contribute to the

81 Detailed information about these cases is presented throughout the analysis of the results in chapter four.
common ground. As a result, the possibilities of drawing conclusions from focus group materials will be limited as the group members fail to agree on the core problem and solution (Hyden and Bülow, 2003:311).

During the empirical work, it was frequently observed that the participants of a group discussion did not act and speak as members of a group but become instead individuals talking about a given topic even if proper selection criteria of the participants were already set up. Sometimes, the possible result was a collection of expressions that made it difficult to link it with the topic. This was really a problem when conducting the rural workshop in Sulaimanyah during the first period of the empirical work especially among an elite group whose composition was deliberately set up by the researcher for pre-testing. Therefore, for the second period of the empirical work some issues were considered in advance to establish a common communicative ground before conducting any group discussion. For example, the participants for group discussions were selected in accordance with the objective of the applied method that they temporarily share a situation and are able to focus their cognitive and visual attention on group discussion.

To some degree in both sub-district focus group discussions, the participates who belonged to different professionals, social groups and political parties did not talk and interact as individuals and instead tried to create a common ground for their present interaction. But, in some cases it was difficult to establish a common ground between some participants who had different intentions about what the problems, causes and effects were and which solutions would be appropriate to solve the discussed problems. It was hard to stop some group members to frequently talk as individuals or representatives of their own groups and make them understanding that they should act as members of an ad hoc group. Some members also shift between these different modes during the discussion which was taken into account when analyzing material obtained from focus groups. But, taking active observation was helpful to know in what capacity and from what perspectives the group members talked.

In the research area, it is very usual that the civic organizations e.g. the farmer unions or women organizations are affiliated with the dominant political party in the area, in this way they make efforts only for the interests of the party and are failing to contribute to the common ground during a certain group discussion. Therefore, the researcher had a very important role to find the local norms and ways to strengthen the communication atmosphere among the participants e.g. by referring to what someone else has said previously in the group or by presenting the topic in a way to wake interests that the participants start to act and view themselves as members of a group sharing a common ground instead of continuing to interact as individuals outside of the focus group. However, due to relatively low communication skills of the group members, it was sometimes very difficult to increase the social coherence among the group members.

The selected participants on the sub-district focus group discussions had different level of education and were from different groups and discipline. Therefore, it was expected that a participant would present a story that the other participants find it hard to understand or to which they are unable to respond. Actually, sometimes the participants were unable to contribute to the discussion as they lacked adequate experiences to effectively work in a group. The utopian visions of some people were regarded with horror by another, for example the idea of creating “modern village” which is to put small settlements of villages into a bigger one in order to offer the villagers better and more cost-efficient social services. Therefore, in some cases, the researcher had to take an active role not only in the group’s selection and composition but also as a moderator to control the topic and the group dynamics during the
discussion. Effort was made to build a consensus between the participants and find a middle course to come to a reasonable result, otherwise the researcher tried to keep a low profile and only facilitate application of the used tool. There were not many different ideas and inputs by the participants in the sub-district focus group discussions in Harir. The participants discussed less openly with each other and therefore the researcher, by asking some questions, took an active role in encouraging them into the discussion.

Other limitations and considerations

There were other local limitations in conducting the methods. Conducting any kind of group discussion needs cognitive performances e.g. communication, understanding, agreement and acceptance, etc. which takes its own time and needs a relaxed atmosphere to work creatively and can not be forced into a rigid time schedule which was a gap due to the time and resource limitation of conducting the empirical work.

Focus group discussions were carried out only in one session with men in the investigated communities of the Harir sub-district because the local traditional values did not allow gathering women in a group for discussion with a stranger and it was important to consider the further impact of this limitation on the analysis and the result of collected data. Closing the gaps other ways were found to capture the views of women on the community issues e.g. by purposely selecting one female-headed household in Jamasor for the integrated interview guide. Furthermore, a participant of focus group discussion in Bewre was stopped to dominate and divert the discussion for her own personal interests and as a result she angrily left the group.

Besides, the indicators of a sustainable community point to areas where the links between the economy, environment and society are weak, but to find out the problem areas was a limitation in the context of research area as there is no data for environmental assessment of a rural community.

To conclude, staying a few days in each selected community helped to build confidence with community people and involve them in the investigation process. This made it easier to have a good judgment of the local circumstances, avoiding information bias and consequently obtaining more reliable information about the community problems. Active observation to cross-check the consistency and reliability of obtained information from different people and disciplines helped to bridge the gaps of data collection and thereby conducting a neutral and scientific study. Despite all limitations a pure assessment of the current needs and problems on community level and the institutional bottlenecks to respond accordingly has been conducted. It is evident that analytical generalization of obtained data from macro level and to a large extent from meso level, which deal with the same system of governance and institutional arrangement, is very high\(^2\). The comparative case study provided a synthesis of the main findings to recommend relevant strategies for establishing effective system for participatory local governance and CDD which will be discussed in the next chapter.

\(^2\) See the section of “Degree of analytical generalization” on page 150.
6 Proposals for promoting sustainable CDD

The chapter is aimed to bring together both conceptual and evidence-based analysis. The attempt is not to solve a particular problem in the research area but to contribute to the creation of a new institutional and policy framework within which problems involving community development might be examined and solved and thereby creating a sense of right direction for appropriate solutions. The Kurdish region needs to move over to a new system and a significant policy shift to improve the situation on the ground. Recommending such a comprehensive and integrated strategy, it is important to develop an appropriate institutional framework including all three levels of analysis, namely, community, sub-district and policy. It is essential to know how different types of social capital can be produced; how the capacities can be developed; and what local limitations will exist.

In this chapter, some appropriate strategies and necessary actions are proposed to provide a space for discussion and key challenges for the future in order to remove the obstacles to sustainable CDD in the Kurdish region. The processes to change the situation on the ground are to empower people, build social capital and strengthen governance. These kinds of fundamental changes in a society need capacity development of all kinds both on local level (community and sub-district) and policy level. The goal is to create a favourable environment for sustainable CDD in form of policy reforms and institutional capacity development to strengthen links between community groups and government institutions.

6.1 Local capacity building

Empowering the sub-districts

Promoting participatory local governance, the appropriate decentralization policies must be designed and implemented. In this sense, decentralization is a strategy of governance to facilitate the transfer of power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of power. The main strategy is to strengthen the position of the sub-district in mobilising territorial, social and political power and transforming this to the central political power. The sub-district level must be seen as a participatory governance structure where in an institution-building process the horizontal link and coordination is expanded from the public sector to include the private and voluntary sectors.

In the participatory governance structure as it relates to local planning and development, the three sectors (public, private and voluntary) should be more or less equal partners when they set up their partnership agreements as the key solution to promote regional rural development. In this way the public sector is in a very different power situation compared to that of a centralized governance structure. By commands, instructions and control in the centralized government structure, the horizontal coordination can be achieved. But these power tools are not adequate as regards partnership-building which must be built on mutual trust, understanding and agreements to combine different resources and gain synergy effects. In the partnership-building process, the public sector should not take a dominant position because the other partners can increasingly become disinclined to participate.

In the participatory governance structure, the main question is to find an adequate balance between top-down and bottom-up power for different productions. The sub-
district level will be the most important producer of welfare state services for rural development. The district and province levels will thus become the ones responsible for regional planning and development work and for welfare state services such as upper secondary schools, communications, land use planning and management and so on. The sub-district as a society must however become stronger actor in both regional and global economic competition in order to strengthen the local identity, which can be done by creating and implementing the following strategies:

- Improving the road accessibility and providing basic social services in rural communities;
- Creating other sources of livelihood in addition to an environmentally compatible agriculture production, for example by promoting small scale rural industries which are integrated fully in backward and forward linkages; and
- Reinforcing the link between rural and urban economies.

The concept of the “Regionen Aktiv” (See page 40), initiated by the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in Germany in 2001 might be a good example for the Kurdish region to promote regional rural development and CDD. The ministry of agriculture can in cooperation with other government institutions initiative the process. But, the preconditions are that the capacity of local people and institutions to design and implement their own development strategies supported by a favourable policy and regulatory framework, is already in place. However, pilot projects on a certain sub-district where local people are more empowered and have more potential for community initiative and collective action can be implemented.

The rural area must be an attractive place to work and live. There is no doubt that ensuring sustainable livelihood as part of CDD in the rural area is a precondition to decrease or stop the current rural-urban mass migration in the Kurdish region that has brought social unrest and a consumption society in the region. The policy-makers must consider an integrated approach to regional rural development both on sub-district and community levels.

Enhancement of the sub-district government

In general, the elected sub-district council accountable to the local people must be in place before starting any effort to achieve CDD. Now, there is no sub-district council to represent local people in the government and the sub-district government functions as a line agency accountable to the ministry of interior by which the head of the sub-district government is appointed, which is far from the principals of local democracy. A sub-district council, which represent different people and civil society organizations, must be elected by the local people with the aim of appointing a head of the sub-district government accountable to the grassroots people. The sub-district council is absolutely needed to oversee the work of the local government; taking care of complains from civilians; counterbalancing the centralized power and thereby increasing the accountability downwards to the grassroots people. The sub-district elected council will become the main actor in the process of regional rural change that support the integration of people and sectors both horizontally and vertically in a participatory governance structure.

Actually, in all investigated communities people highly complained about being repetitively referred to different levels of governmental decision-making power without any result. Therefore, more power must be delegated to the qualified staff members of the sub-district government who are already in place to reduce the administrative
routines and thereby meeting the needs of the community people more efficiently. But, before any transferring of power, the local government must be provided with qualified and experienced staff to efficiently and effectively carry out the delegated tasks. Therefore, as a first step towards democratic decentralization reform, it is imperative to provide the staff of the sub-district government with necessary technical capacity and training in management, planning, accounting and financing. The capacity can be built internally by the central government institutions or can be accessed via partnerships and contracting arrangements with private sector firms or NGOs. There is no alternative to “learning by doing”, and other capacity-building support can only complement the necessary experiential learning. In addition, the sub-district government must be equipped with a budget based on the specific needs of the sub-district and determined independently from the district one to strengthen the role of local government in development planning and management.

In the participatory governance structure, the sub-districts should be given a position to play a major role in local planning and development work where each sub-district is expected to prepare a strategic plan which defines the long-term objectives, and an operational plan that describes how to achieve the objectives. In addition, the sub-district is to draw up a one-year budget and an annual report that includes accounts. But even if the democratic decentralization is successfully implemented it is important to consider the accountability structure of the sub-district government because elections can still be structured in ways that make the elected councils and officials upwardly accountable, for example in the case of the formally elected village council in the Seweil sub-district. When powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are more accountable to the community people, even if they are appointed centrally, the reform may be categorized as democratic decentralization as in the case of the line agencies of health and education in the targeted community of Marwe.

Fiscal arrangements to the sub-district government

To complement local tax revenues, which is currently not taking place in the Kurdish region, fiscal transfers from central bodies to elected sub-district governments can be made in different forms (general, block and specific grants). In the case of general grants, sub-district governments have full discretion over allocation of resources. Sub-district government officials are then accountable primarily to their constituents. The block grants are more restricted for sector-oriented development, for example, to improve the education level or health status in a certain region or community. The specific grants are even more tied to specific purposes within a sector, for example, to improve the education level or health status of female-headed households in a certain community. In contrast to the specific grants, the block grants give full space for local allocation decisions (Kroës, 2003:16-26).

Transferring more power and resources to line agencies

Steps towards administrative decentralization reform are also essential to empower the sub-district as a society. More power and resources from governmental ministries should be transferred to their respective agencies on community and sub-district levels. People in the remote rural area in the Kurdish region because of low road accessibility especially in the wet seasons are unable to access more advanced health and education services in the next town. Therefore, it is justified to increase the organizational capacity of the line agencies of health care and education in form of access to more decision-making power and resources enabling them to efficiently respond to the local
needs. In general, all line agencies on community and sub-district levels need human and organizational capacity development.

**Strengthen the existing institutional arrangement**

Findings show that there is some limited horizontal cooperation and consensus-building mechanism among the sub-district level institutions which based on the participatory governance can be further expanded. For example, in the Seweil sub-district some coordination efforts have taken place between the health agency, and international NGOs like Norwegian People’s Aid to raise awareness of community people in protecting against contaminated landmines. In the Harir sub-district there is a governmental committee consisted of the sub-district government, the local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union and the agricultural agency to jointly deal with the problems of the farmers.

These kinds of limited arrangements can be further expanded by involving other NGOs and local civic organizations of farmers, women and students and other civil society groups. Even if most civic organizations are currently affiliated to the local political parties, they could to some extent reflect the problems of different groups in the society. But they must be given more power and resources to make their voice heard. In any case, it is important to create links and consensus-building mechanisms among the existing local institutions in the sub-district development process.

Including other relevant stakeholders from civil society and private sector into a local network can provide a broad institutional landscape with plenty of experiences and expertises to support CDD. As a step towards participatory local governance, broad stakeholder participation can help to effectively use local resources and to support community initiatives. It can also ensure that local knowledge and preferences are incorporated in designing of development activities. Furthermore, as part of CDD approach building participatory mechanisms for community control and stakeholder involvement is essential to increase the community’s sense of ownership of a project or program to sustain outcomes. This implies providing inclusive community groups with knowledge, control, and authority over decisions and resources throughout all phases. Appropriate capacity building activities and decentralization strategies should be designed to engage relevant stakeholders at the earliest opportunity and dynamically over time.

**Capacity development of the CBOs**

Enabling community people to solve their own problems is absolutely the key point to the CDD. To know where to start a CDD could be a very difficult task as it requires many reforms and capacity building and inputs from many institutions. Based on the result of the analysis, the CBOs are the most accountable institutions to the community people and therefore building their capacity is very vital to any CDD intervention.

Contribution from the beneficiaries to recurrent costs is important for the sustainable delivery of the basic social services where the public sector has failed. User fees have been more applied on drinking water and electricity supply which tends to have greater revenue-earning potential and it has shown to be an important factor in building community ownership and thereby contributing to greater sustainability. In most cases, it has not been any risk of under-provision of services to poor people because the fees are very low only for covering the recurrent costs. These CBOs with clear lines of
responsibility, open decision-making processes, and direct accountability to the community people have shown the capability to improve service provision, and to make more effective use of the local resources and therefore are more sustainable if their capacity is increased. However, the following strategies are recommended to increase the capacity of the CBOs.

*Legal recognition of the CBOs*

For local organizations to be a vehicle for CDD, it is important that the KRG provide a supportive environment for strengthening civil society organizations especially the CBOs. At a minimum, this implies legal recognition of such organizations and of their right to do business. But, more important, it implies the government commitment to the enhanced participation and capacity building of these organizations for involving them in local governance. Furthermore, simplifying the rules; enforcing the laws transparently; reducing unnecessary bureaucratic requirements; and building support systems will all reinforce the ability of the CBOs to successfully carry out a CDD.

*Building local network institutions*

The Figure 6.1 on page 167 shows how to build up learning network institutions consisting of different channels and disciplines. Different institutions will enhance each other’s effectiveness in their respective tasks to increase the capacity of the CBOs as driving force behind any CDD. The network is able to pool the internal and external knowledge and facilitate a learning process through exchange of ideas. The comparative advantages must be analyzed to determine clear roles and responsibilities of each institution to effectively and efficiently provide the CBOs with a certain service and input.

The network can include many kinds of horizontal and vertical links among local actors from public, private and voluntary sectors that can make the network very complex. This requires an appropriate management and monitoring system to coordinate the activities and prevent any corrupted behaviour of the involved actors. The actors must agree on common objectives, rules and actions of plans to effectively collaborate and gain synergy effect in supporting the CBOs, where no actor dominate over the decision-making process. In initial stage towards participatory local governance, which unequal power among the actors highly exists, the main issue is how to create consensus and trust as part of social capital among involved actors. For more see the conceptual framework, the sub-section of “Local network institutions” on page 34.
Capacity building of CBOs is an important building block for CDD. The impact of CDD approaches is directly related to the strength of the CBOs driving the process. Capacity should be built on existing community strengths including local organizations, traditional knowledge, and culture-based skills so that the capacity is strengthened rather than undermined. In the research area there is latent cognitive social capital which needs to be activated and used effectively to produce a flow of benefits. Converting of cognitive social capital into the CBOs as part of structural social capital is necessary to produce bridging social capital. The following strategies are recommended, which depending on the kind of capacity development requirements of a certain CBO, the actors in a learning network illustrated in the Figure 6.1 can try to find best ways to implement them:

Source: Mahzouni, 2007
- The CBOs in the Kurdish region need the managerial and technical skills required for effective decision-making and to undertake the necessary tasks and the implementation of the activities.
- Much of the success of the CBOs to be responsive to the community needs depends on the personal capabilities and emotional intelligence of their leaders to establish trustful relationship with the political and governmental leaders. Therefore, there is a tremendous need to increase the managerial and communication skills of the leader of CBOs.
- Because some CBOs rely on volunteer efforts, they can dissipate at critical stages or can lack continuity. Therefore, an important component of any capacity-building activity is to institutionalize the leadership function in CBOs.

Training and capacity building of CBOs through “learning by doing” should thus be an important component of any CDD approach. Relying fully on community organizations to directly manage development interventions requires investment in training, both on how to manage the implementation of an investment and how to effectively deliver and maintain the services.

It is vital that the actors within the learning network including the CBOs understand and believe in the CDD approach. They must be able to reach a consensus how in the best way can help the CBOs to help themselves. Then, depending on the kind of expertise required to implement the planned capacity-building activity can the actors go in partnership with each other. For example, the ministry of water resources or municipality in partnership with international NGOs and private sector, if appropriate, can be directly responsible for the capacity building of water users groups providing community people with necessary water services. In agreement with the community people, a local person as water manager can be elected who has the technical expertise and can rapidly obtain the vertical assistance to deal with water problems on the community level.

Such a learning network can also be created to increase the capacity of the sub-district governments that need access to qualified personnel and systems in finance, planning, management, implementation and monitoring in order to manage the responsibilities being passed to them. Some sub-district governments may not have this capacity in house but are able to access it through partnerships with other local actors such as NGOs and private firms.

To summarize, the lasting impact of any CDD approach depends on the capacity of CBOs providing services and goods on a sustainable basis, often in partnership with responsive formal institutions or other actors illustrated in the Figure 6.1 on page 167. Capacity building of CBOs, and strengthening linkages with institutions both on the community and higher levels, is a critical area for investment. It is imperative to strengthen the links between CBOs as horizontal bridging social capital, which community people depend on for their day-to-day livelihood and create effective links of CBOs to government institutions and NGOs as vertical bridging social capital. It is frequently advisable for development agencies to work through existing community organizations. It is necessary to create a solid base for CBOs by encouraging them to enter a learning process and capacity building in partnership with appropriate institutions.
Institutional arrangements to support CBOs

The private sector or civil society and local government can provide critical support to CDD. There are many variations regarding the context and the exact roles of each player and careful investigation is needed to determine which approach is most satisfactory in a particular local context which is recognizing the value of a more local approach to enhance participatory local governance. The initiative to these kinds of partnerships can be from any actors in the learning network illustrated in the Figure 6.1 on page 167, but it is essential that the CBOs and other community groups are the main actors to define the needs for the capacity development and the kinds of the actions that must be done.

According to Dongier et.al (2002: 308), there are a range of institutional options to support CBOs. Among them depending on the local circumstances and the role of sub-district government, two broad sets of arrangements can be appropriate for the current situation in the Kurdish region as follows:

- CBOs in partnership with intermediary support organizations
- CBOs in partnership with elected sub-district government

CBOs in partnership with intermediary support organizations

The CBOs in partnership with intermediary support organizations (NGO or private firms) is appropriate alongside or in lieu of the sub-district government approach. But they are more relevant in the current situation of the Kurdish region which the sub-district government is not yet empowered to play as a network-builder and as intermediate link between central bodies and CBOs.

With increased sectarian violence in the centre and south of Iraq and the failure of US policy to establish security in the new Iraq, the future of the country including the status of the KRG is unclear. In such an unstable situation, the decentralization reforms might not be the priority of the KRG. Instead, a diversified strategy that engages local government and also works directly with NGOs or private firms or provides CBOs direct access to capacities can be appropriate. In addition, a diversified strategy can create healthy competition among actors and introduce incentives for stronger performance which duplication and coordination are thoughtfully considered. With an ineffective role of the KRG in local development, such a strategy may allow targeting of poor or marginal groups that may otherwise not be targeted by the sub-district government.

The KRG can finance and contract with intermediary support organizations to provide support to CBOs and facilitate the process of the CDD. This mode of support has been tested in many countries where important resources have been channelled through NGOs to support CBOs. Accountable village council, elected sub-district government and central government agencies, where appropriate, may be also involved in the process. In any case, as a long-term strategy toward local governance, it is important to create functional linkages between CBOs and government institutions and to promote an enabling environment through appropriate policy and institutional reform. It is also necessary to create a control system to fight against local corruption and the hidden agenda of many NGOs ensuring that the funds are really used to improve the situation of poor in the community.

In addition, partnership arrangements between CBOs and intermediary support organizations may be a suitable option, particularly where communities are characterized by highly polarized local social and power structures along class, tribe,
ethnic, or religious lines. Working directly with CBOs, without intermediaries, may worsen tensions, inequalities, and social exclusion. Therefore, in such cases, it can be appropriate to rely on intermediary support organizations to facilitate the formation and capacity building of new inclusive CBOs. But, there should be political support for development of these organizations and it is necessary to ensure that funds reach excluded groups.

These intermediaries support the CBOs by performing a range of functions, in some cases, focusing on facilitating and building capacity, and in other cases, also funding and providing implementation services. They all should use a community-driven approach to respond to the demands of the poor and build local capacity. Working through intermediary support organizations are overseen by a central government agency or the funding organization.

Nevertheless, careful screening of the NGOs and firms based on strict eligibility criteria is a key factor for success. Payments and funding levels for intermediaries should be tied to their performance, measured through evaluation against clear standards, including indicators related to sustained service provision and institutional sustainability of the CBOs, and not just to the physical outputs or service setup. Given proper incentives, NGOs and private firms can facilitate development of lasting links between communities and local governments.

Experiences in many countries have shown that an adequate supply of intermediary support organizations can be developed rapidly. Key to this growth is a demand for their services, at sufficiently attractive terms, over several years. Capacity building and training support are important, but more important is the power of market demand in inducing social entrepreneurs to create support organizations. The Kurdish region has not adequate human resources and entrepreneurial talent available to create and staff such organizations, but again it needs promoting an enabling environment for this kind of competence development. In the Kurdish region, it is possible to induce rapid development of intermediary support organizations by establishing consistent demand for their services and through programs of capacity building. NGOs and private firms can grow quickly as a result of entrepreneurial initiatives, but it is important to have a supportive government and the correct legal and regulatory environment to allow these organizations to flourish. It is equally important to put in place effective measures to screen these private players and to hold them accountable for their results.

Furthermore, it must be ensured that exit strategy is in place for intermediaries. While intermediary support organizations can play a key role in developing capacity as an important building block for CDD, an objective should be the eventual phasing out of intensive support. According to the group interview with the key informants in Bewre (7 April 2006), the NGOs and firms looking for work have sometimes extended their stay with community beyond what is required, particularly, the UN agencies which in 1996 were given mandate to carry out the oil-for-food programme in the Kurdish region in Iraq. Therefore, incentives need to be designed to encourage appropriate exit strategies, which may include funding of operating costs of intermediaries on a declining basis to be able to hand over services to CBOs and local governments, where appropriate.

CBOs in partnership with elected sub-district government

Partnerships between CBOs and sub-district governments are most appropriate where there is political commitment and where policies for democratization, decentralization, and revenue sharing are already in place with supporting administrative and fiscal
frameworks. This approach links the CDD with the decentralization agenda, which has not yet initiated in the Kurdish region but has gained momentum in many countries. The aim has been to strengthen the national system of intergovernmental transfer of functions and resources; to allow resource allocation decisions to be accountable to local priorities and to provide a sustainable source of CBO funding. When appropriate, the function of coordinating support to communities is decentralized to elected sub-district governments and village councils that are capable:

- To create an enabling environment for community efforts to flourish, ranging from building more participatory planning of local investment priorities to subcontracting with CBOs for the provision of goods and services for which CBOs have comparative advantages;
- To bring government closer to the people, increasing accountability and transparency, as well as building bonds of trust;
- To provide long-term financing of recurrent cost within a framework of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal flows, thereby creating a local funding base for CDD; and
- To help balance competing needs and demands and fair distribution of resources across diverse communities.

Experience suggests that environments with a long history of community empowerment and capacity building are more likely to foster inclusive local governance. Therefore, significant efforts must be made to empower grassroots people and to create community-level capacity in those communities that are needed. Mass communication campaigns and regular meetings with community people, if not manipulated by local elites, are essential to reach poor communities and inform them about the rules and available resources for making investments.

**Creating network of CBOs**

Over time, a successful CDD in a single community motivate surrounding communities to participate in CDD, which could be an effective strategy to rapidly demonstrate impacts and convincing neighbouring groups of the benefits of collective action, gaining credibility and spreading information about self-mobilizing demand for CDD activities. In a network of CBOs, lateral communication between communities and grassroots organizations can become very valuable. For example, such networks can inform members of the CBOs about changes in procedures or policies that affect their work. They can also coordinate activities; support horizontal learning; accelerate the establishment of new CBOs; build structural and bridging social capital; and expand into new strategic activities. Support for CBO networks can take the form of organizing meetings for clusters of CBOs, establishing a newsletter or annual conference and providing training for the leaders of CBOs in a particular area e.g. for all water users groups in the Seweil sub-district or rotating groups of irrigation water and livestock raising in the Harir sub-district.

Although CBOs learn by doing, the rate of learning and quality of implementation can be increased if CBOs learn from the good practices and innovations of other CBOs. Community-to-community exchanges provide opportunities to observe the potential benefits of participating in specific initiatives, and facilitate learning on how to replicate successful processes. The CDD must be supported on a large scale so that many communities can simultaneously drive investment decisions and gaining synergy.
effects. The horizontal cooperation among community organizations should be increased to provide the community people not only with good quality of basic social services but also with access to information in order to increase voice of vulnerable groups. Based on the result of the empirical work, additionally to natural barriers another reason to weak bridging social capital is lack of effective communication and information infrastructure to establish effective contact between community and the governmental institutions. Natural barriers to produce bridging social capital can be solved by establishing effective communication infrastructure to facilitate vertical contact with the institutions.

In general, in the research area men still do not account on women’s views about a particular issue and findings shows that all community institutions are man-dominated which can use mosque as a channel of communication and source of information. In this case, the local women association, for instance, in Bewre could have a significant role to give inputs to other CBOs such as informing the health care centre about the health status of women and how to take preventive actions against certain diseases.

Having a significant impact on macro indicators of sustainability and pressing ahead for policy reforms, CDD needs to take place in many communities simultaneously. It is no longer recommended to design CDD as small, nonreplicable and isolated interventions. The challenge of scaling up is not about bigger projects or bigger organizations but rather about achieving effective results in a large number of communities to make the CDD more sustainable. However, it must be ensured that approval and disbursement processes are as decentralized as possible to respond rapidly to demands from additional communities; to reduce delays; and making sure that the benefits from investment on the CDD can be assessed quickly by local groups. When the capacity of existing CBOs is already enhanced, a subset of CBOs may grow into larger networks or join more formally with public sector processes and in that way increasing the role of civil society organizations in local governance. Emphasis of policy interventions might be placed on improving the ability to make use of information available via a social network.

A coherent financing strategy to CDD

The key element underlying the interest in fiscal decentralization is to achieve efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the provision of public services. In any approach to support CDD, the optimum financing strategy should consider the affordability of subsidies and cost-recovery principles. This may encourage communities to search for private financing alternatives or mixed approaches that employ a complementary merge of public and private financing options. Financing for CDD has traditionally been provided either in form of public sector grants that match community contributions or by external donor support. However, additionally to the public sector grants, distinct strategies and policies will need to be in place to mobilize the different sources of funds. A coherent financing strategy should involve a combination of alternative financing options consisting of public sector grants, community contributions, credit, and private commercial investment tailored to the specific context.84

84 About the public sector grants see the sub-section of “Fiscal arrangements to the sub-district government” on page 164.
Community contributions

As discussed in the theoretical framework there is growing evidence that community-driven investments result in greater sustainability and at lower unit costs than centrally managed investments. The CDD can offer effective means of improving the efficiency of public financing and ensuring that public resources reach more communities. People seem to make better choices when they have their own resources at stake. The community participation and ownership should be increased as community contributions to investment and recurrent costs has shown to be an important factor in building ownership and ensuring that appropriate choices are made and investments are sustainable. The level and type of community contribution should be appropriate to the sector and type of service.

Contributions from beneficiaries and local actors in both initial start-up costs and the recurrent operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of services can help reduce the burden on scarce public resources and improve sustainability of service. Mandatory contributions have shown to be important in building community ownership, helping to ensure that cost-and service-level choices are not distorted by external grants, and determined through willingness to pay, all of which contribute to greater sustainability. Possible mechanisms for collecting local contributions should be established. User fees, in particular, have become important for the delivery of social services in the research area where the public sector has failed to provide adequate services. Some caution is warranted, however, when applying user fees to public goods, because of the risk of under-provision of services to poor people.

Credit financing and private commercial investment

Access to credit can help resolve cash flow constrains that prevent poor individuals and community groups from being able to afford upfront investment or contributions. Therefore, it is important to support the development of viable financial institutions, which allow poor people to access a range of financial services essential to address their short-term cash flow constraints and to increase their capacity to make the investments more durable. For example, the capacity building of the Community Fund in Bewre, which as a traditional institution has shown to be very responsive to the community needs, is an important area of investment.

Moreover, entrepreneurs as active investors and providers of local services in several sectors can provide essential services to poor consumers and compete with collective approaches in the Kurdish region, if there are supporting policies. Entrepreneurs may not invest if they risk being displaced by community grants. This shows the importance of defining financial policies for each sector and providing clear rules for community investments. Ignoring the potential of commercial private provision in certain sectors and contexts could reduce the total amount of services provided to poor people and increase the burden on public finance.

Defining roles of players and financing rules

Effective and undistorted local financing might need setting minimum levels of local contributions and maximum grant levels based on: poor people’s capacity-to-pay constraints; fiscal constraints relating to the affordability of subsidies; and cost-recovery principles. It is critical to recognize that financial policies on minimum levels of local

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85 See the section of “The main benefits of the CDD approach” on page 18.
contributions need to vary from sector to sector, to capture the higher local financing potential of the more private types of local services. In addition, the subsidies should be eliminated for private goods and services that could be provided on a fully commercial basis. This requires specifying those goods that can be provided to poor people by the private sector on a commercially viable basis and remove them from the list of services financed by CDD grants.

CDD requires integrated policies that coordinate institutional arrangements among different sectors. The difference in revenue-earning potential across sectors calls for different financial policies with respect to minimum amounts of community contributions and credit financing. For example, in a rural community electricity distribution or water supply seems to have greater revenue-earning potential than natural resource management or the provision of primary health and education. Similarly, the relevance and competitiveness of CBOs relative to other institutions will vary across sectors. These differences call for defining roles of players and financing rules.

A clear distinction must be made between support services that are recurrent or permanent in nature and those that are temporary. For recurrent services, sustainability requires putting in place permanent institution and financing arrangements at a cost that can be supported over the medium and long term. Temporary services, such as initial intensive capacity-building support to CBOs, may, however, not require sustainable financing or permanent institutional structures. For such temporary services, explicit exit strategies need to be designed and implemented that is a critical component of all CDD interventions.

To summarize, even in optimistic scenarios, the financing requirements to improve poor people’s access to basic services far exceed the availability of public funds. It is, therefore, important to finance as much of the community-driven investments as possible through private and community investment. In general, it is important to keep grants focused on those things that cannot be financed through private and community investment, and in those communities most in need of subsidies. One of the key challenges for scaling up CDD is to increase scarce public financial resources over a greater number of communities. This can be achieved by supplementing public financing with local and private finance sources, promoting market delivery of private goods, and retaining matching grants only for those goods and services that communities and the market will not sufficiently finance.

6.2 Promoting good governance

The synthesized result convinces that fundamental policy reforms to facilitate institutional building as part of social capital on local level is absolutely a great area of concern. There is no doubt that producing any form of social capital to enhance CDD is a long-term investment that persists over time. Social capital may take many years to form as it is a characteristic of specific culture that is not readily changed. Two major issues in the process of social capital building for CDD must be addressed: first, the conduction of fundamental change in the governance system as part of institutional social capital and the capacity building of local people and institutions as part of civic social capital; and second, the creation of benefits from social capital building by establishing participatory local governance to support CDD.

Based on the synthesised result, it is now clear that the main capacity gaps are on the policy level that causes many shortcomings on local level development. Therefore, the
enabling environment in form of carrying out substantial political and institutional reforms on policy level must be first created in order to obtain maximal benefits and sustainable results from any community-driven investment. In the Kurdish region, many political, institutional and organizational reforms are needed to create an enabling environment for good governance; eliminate the widespread corruption; and thereby promoting local governance and CDD, which are discussed in the following sections.

Political and institutional consolidation

Political consolidation requires establishing a system of political pluralism with a basic consensus on achieving political goals on accepted rules of fair competition among formal political actors. In a multi-party-system through direct and indirect elections, representative legislative bodies are established to build the government and continuously monitor its activities. The political consolidation is reached if all political actors are aware about and accept their own legal rights and obligations and act accordingly in interaction with each other. They must distinguish between their personal and the public interest. Furthermore, it must be commonly accepted norms that persons in charge for the public are not allowed to take any action for their own interest against the public interests.

Institutional consolidation means that formal rules on decentralization, competencies and the responsibilities of authorities on all levels including their power relationships are clearly defined to avoid any opportunistic behaviour from the major political actors. In addition, it is essential that the participation of civil society organizations is institutionalized and they are adequately empowered to have a say in policy formulation and implementation. In a political pluralism, no single actor either from political elites or from civil society is dominating the process of decision-making and the conflicts are resolved by consensus. The two dimensions of consolidation (political and institutional) are very interdependent, which need long time horizon to achieve. Indeed, stable and favourable political system as an enabling environment facilitates the institutional reform and consolidation. In order to create a favourable environment for political and institutional consolidation in the Kurdish region, the strategies in the following subsections are recommended.

Broaden the political landscape

The current electoral system in the Kurdish region, which is in favour of a power sharing of fifty-to-fifty between the major political parties (the KDP and the PUK), must be changed to increase the power of opposition parties within the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA). But at the same time a situation should be avoided where too many small parties with very different values and agenda make the agreement and decision-making within the KNA impossible. However, a multi-party coalition government can increase the transparency and leave less space for corruption and abuse of power. In long-term, the political landscape of the Kurdish region must be enlarged.

As part of social capital building, it must be on the top agenda of the regional unity government recently formed by the KDP and the PUK how to regain heart and mind of the civilians. Building the regional unity government seems like a significant move forward to eliminate any risk of internal division and armed conflict happening again. Especially, in the current situation of Iraq, the Kurdish community, must more than ever put the differences aside and strengthen the reconciliation efforts in order to create a stronger position in dealing with the central government in Baghdad and the
international community. This will not in itself solve all the problems but an important step in right direction to build institutional social capital and shared values as a key platform to common action and consensus-building towards participatory local governance and CDD.

Enhancing the role of the Kurdistan National Assembly

The separation between legislative, executive and judicial powers must be defined to ensure the transparency and the accountability of each entity within the governance system. Gradually, more decision-making power should be shifted from the political parties to the KNA as a representative and democratically elected body which could increase the transparency of the KRG and public control on financial issues. Increasing the role of the KNA in the supervision of financial matters and publishing the yearly budget will increase civilians’ insight into the government activities and ensure the transparency as one of the main pillar of democracy and good governance.

Promoting civil society and free media

Granting authority and resources to local bodies without accountability can lead to corruption and lower productive efficiency. Therefore, decentralization of the political decision-making process and privatization of some public goods and services need to be followed by reforms that guarantee the transparency and accountability of local governments and other local actors from civil society and private sector. A key to increase transparency is the development of a strong civil society which is able to provide citizens with information about government and business activities and an opportunity to have their voices heard. Civil society organizations can play a positive role in limiting corruption by means of their activities in education, oversight, and facilitating access to public services. In this process of information dissemination and awareness rising, an independent and responsible media can play a central role.

The civilian rights against any sort of power abuse and corruption must be institutionalized. As a main principle of good governance, the involvement of civil society organizations as control mechanisms will prevent corruption in public administration, public finance, law and justice. In addition, the private sector involvement in the development process should be encouraged to enhance free market economy and competition which leads to lower prices and higher quality of public services. By speeding up the democratization process and enhancing participatory governance, more international support for Kurdish question can be justified (Mahzouni, 2006d).

Appropriate management strategy

Political and institutional consolidation often requires organizational and management reforms such as:

- The role and authority of the leadership is clearly defined;
- The hierarchies and processes are defined by the rule of law;
- The divisions of tasks and competencies are well-defined; and
- The personal interest is separated from the official role.

Maybe, the mechanistic management strategy even if it is originated from western culture can be appropriate for the current situation of the KRG only for some routine tasks that can be carried out in a relatively certain work environment where greater importance and prestige is articulated to internal rules and regulations rather than to
general knowledge, expertise and skill, for example, in the case of accounting and financial activities of a ministry or line agency. However, the organizational structures and management processes must be compatible with traditional norms and practices. Otherwise, sufficient resources must be provided to reorient people toward the organizational values required by new management strategies.

**Enhancing public sector transparency and accountability**

The KRG is currently the most important actor in the distribution of the resources and provision of the basic services for the civilians in the Kurdish region but it is too fragile and lacks political commitment and institutional capacity to develop and implement pro-poor polices. As a step toward local governance for CDD, major reforms within the public sector must be carried out. Structures and regulations must be designed to enhance rule of law, transparency and accountability as three major pillars of democracy and good governance. Guarantee of democratic control and transparency of the government activities can be done in many ways and in many stages to combat corruption and power abuse (Mahzouni, 2005b; 2006b; 2007). In the following sub-sections, some appropriate mechanisms and strategies to strengthen good governance and to fight corruption within the public sector are discussed.

**Strengthen the rule of law**

It is essential to ensure that laws and regulations are clear and do not leave too much room for subjective interpretation and corruption, especially within the public finance sector that provides institutional mechanisms for monetary transactions associated with public infrastructure. In most transitional countries, political and economic development and the survival of the parties in government often depend on financial aid from international community. If a government in transition invests in good governance, transparency and accountability, it will contribute to its prestige and it is more likely that the country’s demand for grants, credits and investment will be more approved by the international aid agencies. Establishing clear rules, transparency, and accountability as core elements of good governance are important safeguards to prevent corruption or the capture of community resources by elites. In addition, Introducing participatory planning as core element of social capital enhances good governance and the sustainability.

Legislative framework conditions for administrative bodies, public sector and civil society and transferring of more decision-making power to low-level officials must be established. There is a need in the Kurdish region to put in place systems to monitor corruption. It needs watchdogs groups to control the performance of the public sector institutions on different levels.

**Autonomous and transparent regulatory system**

A precondition to achieve good governance and democracy in a society is to strengthen the rule of law by establishing autonomous and transparent regulatory bodies with the full authority for the enforcement of anticorruption laws. The integrity and competence of the officials within the justice sector, which are fundamental to effectively enforce the rule of law, should not be subjected to direct control and manipulation by other governmental and political leaders. The regulatory system should have full authority to push forward more aggressive enforcement of laws against corrupt practices and to punish those in authority who ignore the laws for their own benefits.
In addition, the government officials need a clear code of conduct, for example, it is essential to clarify the procedures and set limits on accepting gifts in return for professional actions, even if gift-giving maybe a cultural norm in the traditional Kurdish society. However, codes of conduct alone do little to reduce corruption unless there are effective means of communication, clear sanctions for violating the codes, and consistent support from top leaders.

**Leadership commitment**

No reform can be successfully conducted if not supported by public-spirited and committed leaders who are respected for their integrity and leadership skills. The leaders, who respect the rule of law; show integrity in their own transactions; promote transparency in the operation of their offices; and take legal action against subordinates who are found violating rules, can make a significant contribution in creating values against corruption. Improving the examples of leadership that encourage integrity is a critical anticorruption strategy. Changing public attitudes to become less tolerant of corruption and more demanding of a corruption-free-society depends on the sustained examples of integrity by senior leaders within public, private and voluntary sectors. Therefore, these sectors should jointly take important steps in encouraging and rewarding integrity in leadership. They can, for example, cooperate on the provision of training in ethics-based behaviour and judgment. Codes of ethics in each entity must be internalized and supported through training, dialogue, and enforcement if they are to be effective.

The role of leadership in motivating ethical and corruption-free behaviour is crucial to any success in eliminating corruption. Leaders who show integrity and demand the same from others inspire public service, and such leadership style must be directly supported. On the other hand, when top leaders are corrupt, they lack moral platform to demand honesty and anticorruption behaviour in others.

**Enhancing professionalism**

In the traditional Kurdish society, the industrial market economy and competition is not developed yet to encourage the individual performance. It is difficult for the governmental officials to identify themselves with the secondary roles as professionals than those in the family and make destination between a private and a public sphere. Therefore, capacity building of governmental officials can include more professional pride and values. The levels of professionalism and ethical standards of a certain institution together shape the effectiveness and the responsiveness of that institution to the needs of public. Therefore, it is recommended that:

- Appointments and promotions throughout public sector institutions are made on the basis of merit and in a transparent manner and not on family and party political bonds;
- Filling people into the right job and developing a remuneration structure and performance-based rewards system to provide better incentives and increase the accountability of public institutions to the civilians; and
- The public sector institutions must set a high priority for ethical training and capacity building efforts for appointed officials who interact with the private sector. The best way to raise awareness is through public education and open dialogue about the negative effects of corruption and how it affects the social capital of the
entity and the socioeconomic development in the society. The enforcement of codes of ethics must be institutionalized.

Besides, an economic and social solution to underpaid civil servants must be found. The civil servants are less engaged in corruption if they receive benefits and security of employment that allows them to achieve and sustain a reasonable standard of quality of life. It is simply not reasonable to expect integrity and the provision of high-quality services from the civil servants who are underpaid, undervalued, inadequately trained, and as a result poorly motivated. It is important to increase their professionalism that they are more efficient in performing their tasks. Working within the public sector must be made economically viable so that talented, competent, and public-minded individuals can be attracted and retained.

Administrative reforms

Within the institutions of the KRG, there are many unnecessary and counter-productive procedures that are not very helpful to efficiently and effectively provide the civilians with public services. In many cases, the complexity of the administrative system is artificially imposed by the corrupt officials to create a market for corruption. Therefore, reviewing all bureaucratic procedures at the interface between public and government officials is essential to increase transparency and accountability and reduce opportunities for corruption. Corruption does not grow in an environment open to public inspection and in which the law and administrative procedures clearly define the obligations of public officials to be accountable for their performance and action. Alongside, the use of external independent auditors to provide oversight of the performance of government agencies and institutions would reduce opportunities for corrupt transactions.

Use of information technology

Information technology seems to be an important strategy in reduction of corruption because it can de-personalize and simplify the transaction between citizen and government official. Appropriate information technology applications provide important potentials and opportunities to make government function more efficiently and openly. It can also remove many government operations from inappropriate manipulation by self-interested officials especially regarding public finance, tax administration and court records. Better use of information technology to monitor accounts and performance of the public sector institutions can increase transparency and accountability that provide less space to corruption and abuse of power.

From institutional monopoly to institutional pluralism

All other things being equal, pluralism promotes accountable, efficient and effective administration. Accountable administrative systems manage resources more efficiently and effectively. In an institutional pluralism when the power is delegated to private sector and civil society organizations, the main question is how it can be assured that the procurement of public goods and services is done fairly and competitively. In the current situation, many central ministries will not enthusiastically support “devolution” of power to local-level units. In addition, public sector provides most employment in the region according to Khidir (2007:15) and the private sector and civil society organization are not yet empowered and lack adequate capacities to take over the
responsibilities and task-related roles from the public sector. Therefore, the transition toward institutional pluralism in the Kurdish region must be a gradual process.

The fundamental question is how the KRG can move from conventional administrative structures, where roles are highly monopolized, to new structures where roles are shared through devolution and delegation. Actually, this question is at the very heart of current political and institutional development of many developing countries to increase accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness in the provision of the public services. Decentralization, as a strategy of governance to facilitate the transfer of power closer to those who are most affected by exercise of power, is now dominating the agenda of most developing countries. The probability to succeed in carrying out a top-down decentralization reform in the absence of a strong civil society is very slight. Kokor and Kroës (2000:4) emphasise the transition problem of decentralization in Ghana, where limited organizational and management capacities on district level to effectively take over the responsibilities and delegated tasks has been one of the major obstacle to successfully implement the decentralization policies.

According to Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1999:17), national policies about decentralization in most developing countries, for example in Kenya, have generally come to nothing because of the enormous resistance by the existing bureaucracy. While Kenya’s decentralization strategy has led to some gains in efficiency and effectiveness, it has not led to increased accountability through the sharing of roles related to tasks through “devolution” or “delegation”. It was difficult to find a complementary strength between central and local governments. The Kenyan case suggests that it is difficult to achieve accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency in a highly centralized administrative system. Indeed, most developing countries have succeeded to implement only “de-concentration” as central monopoly and have done little success in devolution and delegation and as a result have achieved less efficiency and accountability in the execution of public sector tasks (Cohen and Peterson 1999:164-165).

In fact, many countries have been forced to re-centralize the system because of not taking appropriate policies to enhance the institutional capacity on local level. An enabling environment for developing civil society and institution-building on local level must be in place not only to counterbalance the power from the central authorities but to prevent local elites to capture the benefits. The community people must be empowered and the capacity of CBOs must be developed that gradually put pressure upward to the system for more step-by-step transfer of power and resources to those who are most affected by exercise of power.

It can be concluded that a fast move from centralized role and structure to decentralized role (delegation) and structure in the current context of the Kurdish region is not recommended. Instead, the decentralization process can be carried out in two stages as follows:

- From centralized role and structure to spatially decentralized structure (de-concentration or devolution) but still centralized role. For example, from the central ministries sufficient legal power and financial capacity to the line agencies in the sub-district centre should be transferred in order to rapidly meet the needs of local people. A coherent financing framework should be developed of different funds to finance basic social infrastructure on the community level, and productive activities and economic infrastructure on the sub-district level. In this stage, the sub-district government if accountable to local people, can have the authority of financial allocation.
• Then, from centralized role and spatially decentralized structure (de-concentration) to decentralized role and structure (delegation). In this stage besides line agencies and sub-district government, where appropriate, the civil society organizations and private sector are also involved in the planning process. However, the current political and institutional framework in the Kurdish region, where the roles are monopolized and structure is centralized, is not particularly helpful to create participatory local governance for CDD. The problem is that local-level people and institutions lack adequate capacities especially in managerial and technical capacity to take over the delegated roles. Therefore, the core strategy in the current governance system must be de-concentration; local capacity building; and greater participation of the civil society and private sector that can gradually lead to devolution and delegation.

Towards a corruption-free-society

The corruption in the Kurdish region like many other developing countries and regions has been viewed as inherently cross-sectoral. Therefore, anticorruption strategies can be more effective if they are supported and guided by coherent principles of strengthening governance (accountability, transparency and participation) and reinforcing the foundation of civil society. Reforms must focus on personal ethics and the societal attitude toward ethical behaviour. There must be a common belief in the society that ethics matter and ethical behaviour must be rewarded, and the rewards must exceed the risks of engaging in corrupt behaviour. In addition, there must be a public awakening what negative effects the corruption can have on the social capital building and socioeconomic development.

Significant progresses in fighting public sector corruption can be achieved by ensuring political will, effective and civic-minded leadership and competent and well-trained public sector staff. Reform-minded political leaders have a vital role to lead public anticorruption campaigns and reforms. The practices, procedures and values of any given public institution directly influence the behaviour of that institution and its exposure to corruption. Moreover, improving in public expenditure management by using modern information technology can reduce opportunities for corruption as they can increase transparency of transactions and budgets, as well as increasing accountability of institutions and decision-makers, which can lead to a significant reduction in corruption. Other strategies to combat corrupt behaviour in a certain institution within the KRG are:

• Introducing clear and open administrative procedures and regulations;
• Reforming the decision-making process to be more transparent where the level of authority and judgment exercised by the officials are increased and as a result the accountability of the officials to the public and to the laws are ensured;
• The degree of oversight throughout all levels of that institution should be enhanced; and
• Control mechanisms and sanction capacities must be in place where the manner in which the officials of that institution interact with the public is evaluated in order to decrease the chance for corrupt behaviour and ensure the accountability of the officials.

Involving the public as full participants in fighting corruption is the most powerful and effective approach available because it starts at the place where corruption hurts the human being highly. However, it has been recognized that the most sustainable
anticorruption strategies are those that combine the elements of preventive reforms, law enforcement, and public awareness. Many positive initiatives are being taken in countries around the world to reduce the opportunities for all kinds of corruption at all levels: petty, grand, and state capture. These initiatives may be small, but they are important steps in the right direction, which slowly transforming cultures of systemic corruption into societies that demand greater transparency from government; strict accountability of officials for their actions; and strong enforcement of existing laws and regulations. These changes require commitment of political leaders, citizens, and the media over the long term to ensure that preventive reforms are widely institutionalized to reduce opportunities for widespread corruption. In this process, it is important to ensure that the public is educated about the social costs of corruption and about legal and civil rights.

6.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, the fundamental reforms both on local and policy levels are recommended where the process and necessary actions to build local capacity and promote good governance have been described. In some cases, if necessary and relevant to the research questions and objectives, detail information about how the strategies can be implemented has been provided. A “strategy” is more than a “plan”. It is both an ambitious vision and a pragmatic approach for achieving that vision. Therefore, in this research, more guidelines and long-term strategies on what should be done are provided than describing in detail what different activities by whom and how can be implemented. For proposing who should do what and how in a fixed time frame, a SWOT analysis for each strategy is needed, which is beyond the task of the work because it needs more investigation on the ground and an assessment of the potentials and limitations to achieve a certain strategy.

However, the benefits of social capital would be long-lasting by creating and maintaining more interconnections among people and institutions e.g. cooperative activities, networking for information or at least maintaining or reinforcing the existing social capital structure. The main issue is how the positive aspects of social capital can be encouraged while avoiding the destruction of existing social capital. This requires developing an integrated policy framework ensuring that social capital on both local and policy levels are rather enhancing and completing each other in order to gradually remove the obstacles to CDD. Creating an enabling environment for CDD is vital in any development process and in any context. In the Kurdish region as a long-term strategy, incremental steps in the right direction towards participatory local governance must be undertaken.

Local capacity building

The appropriate mechanisms must be designed to increase the capacity of local institutions before integrating them in participatory local governance. Particularly, the common action of community people as cognitive social capital should be transformed into structural social capital to effectively obtain the vertical assistance. This can be done by human and organizational capacity building of local people and organizations. The technical and organizational capacity of the CBOs like water and electricity users groups must be developed. For example, it is critical to increase the communication skills of the leader of CBOs because in an ineffective system of governance such as the
KRG consisting of unclear rules and procedures, the personal capability to create trustful relationships with different institutions appears to play a significant role. In addition, enhancing CBOs require different institutional arrangements in accordance with the local context of each rural sub-district. But, the community people must initiate the CDD process and the government institutions and NGOs should only create an enabling environment for CDD in form of capacity building.

The norms related to types of institutional networks cannot be assumed a priori and must be investigated independently for each separate context. What is social capital in one context can be unsocial in another as any social capital formation is specific to a particular cultural domain and may have little or no value outside that domain. Therefore, a contextually approach to social capital formation and intuition-building on local level is essential. Nevertheless, the CBOs could have long lasting effect on the CDD if they are supported by an appropriate institutional arrangement. It is important to note that all arrangements to support the CBOs, both in initial stage towards local governance and later on, can be more or less community driven. The extent to which communities have control over investment and management decisions is determined less by the model applied than by the division of roles between the partners. Partnership arrangements in which the key investment decisions for example, choices of level of services, contracting decisions are made primarily by a support organization cannot be described as community driven. Furthermore, partnership with CBOs that do not include women or minorities, or do not represent their interests, can be described as neither community driven nor inclusive because key members of the community are excluded.

Partnerships between CBOs and intermediary support organizations is appropriate institutional arrangement for the Kurdish region now, while taking incremental steps towards real decentralization by devolution of more power and resources to the sub-district government. First stage towards good governance must be to prepare the civil society on local level and increase the public support for any fundamental change. As a starting point to create a solid base for good governance, empowering local people and capacity development of local institutions is the key area of investment.

In the current situation of the Kurdish region, the political environment does not support the expression of local choice. The local governance is very weak and the local government lack the mandate to promote community empowerment. The sub-district government is not responsive to the community initiatives and not inclusive of the poorest. But on the other hand there is a strong cognitive social capital, sometimes, transformed into CBOs as structural social capital. Indeed, CBOs can help demonstrate the benefits of local participation and accountability as well as local revenue-earning potential, which, in the medium term, have the positive spill-over effect of strengthening sub-district government. However, the following guidelines must be taken into consideration to make any CDD investment more sustainable in the research area:

- The grassroots people and existing social institutions are actively involved in the development process.
- The strategies for social justice and democratic participation are embedded into the development process to ensure equity, gender equality and the right of ethnic and religious minorities.
- The income generated from agro-economic activities is based on local resources; incentive mechanisms and political stability are in place to encourage the reinvestment in the community or region; and sustainable use of land, water and other natural resources is ensured.
To achieve sustainable development in the rural periphery of the Kurdish region, it is absolutely necessary that the social, economic and ecological objectives to be balanced and integrated in a multi-disciplinary and participatory local governance. Local network institutions should build as much as possible on existing roles and relationships to strengthen the local identity and the sense of responsibility.

**Incremental but secure steps towards participatory local governance**

Based on the obstacles to CDD discussed in the previous chapters and local circumstances, on each level of decision-making (community, sub-district and policy) structural change must be carried out towards effective CDD. There is no fixed starting point and necessary actions can be sequentially or independently implemented on each level but it is important to ensure that the result of actions are rather reinforcing than counteracting each other to gain synergy effect. The overall strategy to strengthen the CDD is to take small steps in the right direction which requires developing a coherent strategy to CDD including areas of action and time frame. Different political and institutional reforms are needed to successfully achieve a real decentralization reform as a core strategy for enhancing participatory local governance and CDD.

During the transitional period towards participatory local governance, it is recommended that only the public sector initiates spatial planning to obtain horizontal and vertical coordination within the public sector itself rather than within the complex formed by the public, private and voluntary sectors. Because, in the current context of the Kurdish region, the public sector institutions themselves lack capacities and effective policies to set up examples of integration and coordination. Therefore, the recommended strategy is the *administrative* decentralization enhancing horizontal and vertical coordination between public institutions, which gradually create an enabling environment for local governance and CDD. In the transition stage, when still a top-down tradition is an essential part of the KRG system, sub-district is part of the nation-building process and a tool to decentralise power and responsibility to territories within the Kurdish region.

In addition, in the initial stage towards participatory local governance for CDD, more involvement of community people and institutions in planning and implementation of the development activities must be encouraged in order to increase the sense of ownership and set up a culture of participation. Another step to enter into the process of *democratic* decentralization is to increase the legal status of a really elected village council and increase its accountability downwardly to the community people. In this situation the local planning is discussed in the context of “political will” seeing it as a legitimate process focusing on the interaction between the higher levels of decision-making and the local institutions.

The sub-district government must be given adequate power and financial recourses to respond quickly to the need of the community people and strengthen its role to coordinate development activities in the sub-district. In addition, the line agencies on the community and sub-district levels must be involved in planning of their respective activities. For example, to the agricultural agency should be given sufficient authority and resources to assist farmers in increasing crop production and livestock raising as two main livelihood sources of the villagers.

Anticorruption reforms must create incentives for good behaviour, but also set up systems of external accountability, using citizen monitoring as well as government oversight institutions. Supporting these structures, anticorruption efforts must foster a
broad coalition of reformers both inside and outside the government. Such coalitions are critical to sustaining reforms in the face of change in the government political or any disagreement. Indeed, fighting corruption is not a one-time action which requires constant maintenance and sustained commitment. Therefore, it is important that effective systems and incentives backing by broad coalition are already in place in fighting corruption.

To summarize, recovering from the past conflicts, genocide and ethnic cleansing conducted by former Iraq government, people in the Kurdish region need to take many steps towards a real democracy including the creation of strong institutions and rule of law. As society is based on capable institutions to compromise and build consensus on common issues, where the commitments and challenges to institutional capacity building must be from both government and civil society. However, the main strategies in the initial stage towards participatory local governance for CDD are as follows:

- Carrying out administrative decentralization reform;
- Enhancing the capacity of CBOs and other civic organizations to put pressure on the central power for necessary reforms towards good governance and communicative planning; and
- To gradually empower the sub-district government to take over responsibility and resources for local development planning.

In the next chapter, the challenges for institutional capacity development as comprehensive social capital-building in the Kurdish region will be recommended. Further, the contributions of this thesis to the scientific world and the aspects for future research will be highlighted.
7 General outlooks

Social capital is considered as an asset that can be accumulated to create a flow of benefits. Social capital in the research area is a highly complex phenomenon, varying in a number of dimensions. There are many examples about the positive impact of social capital on community development in the research area e.g. the benefit of collective action to effectively manage water or electricity supply system as common resources. The question of policy interventions which make use of social capital is of particular interest. But, at the same time, local people and institutions must be empowered and their capacity must be built to take genuine initiatives from their sides and to ensure that the policy reforms are in line with their needs and aspirations.

In the first section of this chapter, some challenges for institutional capacity development towards participatory local governance and CDD are discussed. In the second section, the contributions of this thesis to the current academic debates about the role of social capital and institutions for development will be highlighted. In the last section related to the development topics discussed in this dissertation, the aspects for future research will be indicated.

7.1 The challenges for institutional capacity development

The need for a gradual move toward institutional pluralism

Participatory local governance is a kind of social reconstruction which needs to pass through a painful process and many efforts. Therefore, the overall strategy might be to take incremental but secure steps towards a real democracy and local governance in the Kurdish region. The real circumstances in the Kurdish region in Iraq must be examined in more detail to increase the chance for a successful implementation of the proposed strategies. Decentralization, as a strategy for participatory local governance, is not only a policy reform but a socio-cultural movement from the civilians. Decentralization is not a linear process, which needs continuous reviewing, monitoring and maintaining the obtained results. In addition, it is essential to find appropriate mechanisms for capacity enhancement of the civil society organizations like the CBOs before designing any decentralization reform.

Evidences show that lack of human and management capacities on local level especially in remote rural area in many developing countries, for example in Ethiopia and Kenya, has been the main constrain to successfully implement the devolutionary strategy, where tasks, roles and relationships between central and local government were not well-defined and as a result “de-concentration” dressed up as “devolution” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:119-138).

The main objective of the institutional pluralism is to promote administrative principles of accountability, management efficiency, effective resource mobilization, and, ultimately equity. The constitution of the Kurdish region must clearly describe the new structures, tasks and roles within a new framework of institutional pluralism. The legal relationships between different levels or units of governance must be clearly defined otherwise it might create space for many non-negotiable disputes and slow down the process towards decentralization reforms which can in turn increase the risk for re-centralization of the system.
Institutional pluralism can assist in maximizing the accountability of governmental institutions and making them more productive. Changing of the administrative culture can be done by increased competition from private sector. But, in the current context of the Kurdish region the reduction of the state’s role in carrying out public sector tasks can be a threat to civil servants holding jobs within the different public sector institutions. As a matter of fact, the public sector is the biggest employer in the region and mass of people has no other alternative income.

Local approach to capacity development
In the Kurdish region, there are great local variations regarding socio-economic and topography features that call for a local approach to promote local actors to design their own institutional arrangements for local development. Therefore, any standard design of institutional arrangement to enhance the capacity of local people and institutions in the research area must be avoided. For example, as discussed in previous chapter\textsuperscript{86}, while the CBOs in the Seweil sub-district is more capable to go in partnership with the intermediary support organizations, the Harir sub-district lack of essential CBOs, which need more individual and organizational capacity building.

Consolidation of the civic culture
Achieving stability and legitimacy of good governance requires not only the political and institutional consolidation but also a consolidation of the behaviour of the individuals and civic culture that take account for both bottom-up and top-down decision-making process. It is easier to reach consolidation on a cognitive basis but in a modern society there is a great need for co-operation beyond the family ties. Achieving the consolidation of the civic culture all individuals in a society must distinguish between their individual or family rights and duties and those of a larger community. It is also essential that the political and institutional system is transparent and accountable to the civilians and in this manner building mutual confidence between state and the civilians. For example, it must be explicit for everyone that taxation and access to public goods is fair and people accept their rights and duties as citizens.

However, the adaptation of behaviour of individuals and civic culture to new values, attitudes and systems of behaviour need more efforts and time and might take generations to change. The consolidation of the civic culture is much harder to achieve than the political and institutional consolidation particularly when the low education level and low skills of the civilians allow manipulation by the political elites. Linder (2004) emphasised that:

“\textit{it is the elite’s behaviour, attitudes and values that stimulate and promote civic culture in a "trickle-down" process}” (Linder, 2004:46).

In the Kurdish society applying CDD approach could be a dilemma because the civil society organizations are still not empowered and the elite groups are less committed to work for fundamental changes. Therefore, in the initial stage the CDD strategy can be a combination of both top-down and bottom-up. But, in the process of local capacity building the risk for the dominance of a top-down approach must be excluded. This is particularly true in the Kurdish region where the governance system and the

\textsuperscript{86} See the section of “Institutional arrangements to support CBOs” on page 169.
organizational behaviour are largely inherited from the centralized system of the former Iraqi government.

**Limitations of implementing participatory local governance**

In the political power structure of the Kurdish region, the territorial and horizontal power is weak compared to that of sectoral and vertical power. This is, however, a particular problem as the instrumental rationality and top-down policy initiatives seem to dominate over the communicative rationality and bottom-up policy in the governance system. During the transitional period towards participatory governance structure, other values such as democracy, participation, and equality should be highly promoted among the civilians. Otherwise, powerful professions and their respective sector authorities who are basing their existence on instrumental rationality can maintain their dominant positions in the society. The solution to this problem is to mobilize territorial power to meet sectoral power in a political process. In a participatory local governance context this means that communicative bottom-up power can be used to counter instrumental top-down power, and thus contribute to the empowerment of local people and institutions.

**The dilemma of fighting corruption**

It is not in the interest of all individuals in a society to conduct change. Those individuals and groups best placed to influence the reforms in public policy are usually top leaders and managers of political parties including their affiliated organizations and public sector institutions, who are also the ones who lose the most from a system change towards a corruption-free-society. The effect of anticorruption strategies can be limited and stopped by the fact that those officials who are most influential in bringing about change (e.g. political leaders, bureaucrats, chief executive, etc) are often the ones who may lose the power and benefits when corruption is reduced or eliminated. As a result, both political elites and managers of the private sector organizations who have gained power and market assess may out-compete non-corrupt colleagues and firms.

**7.2 Contributions to the scientific world**

In this section, it will be discussed how far the research is contributing to the existing knowledge of development theories about the role of social capital and institutions in sustainable local development.

**Interdisciplinary study of the development topics**

Many sectoral studies about the post-conflict issues in the Kurdish region related to social and political sciences, economics and anthropology have been carried out but not related to planning and development theories. It was impossible to find a research about the participatory and interdisciplinary planning in the Kurdish region. This research has conducted a study of sustainable CDD, social capital and local governance as complex issues that require a locally-based and an integrated approach to analyse the problems on many levels and among many sectors. This might be a significant contribution to current scientific debate about the central role of democracy and good governance for
sustainable local development in the Kurdish region and other neighbouring regions and countries with similar circumstances.

Social capital needs a comprehensive investigation framework

One of the main contributions of this research is to develop a framework to easier examine and understand the phenomenon of social capital as a very complex and context-based issue. Analysing social capital in any particular context needs a comprehensive view on most significant influencing factors. Only a single factor like the location or the rate of access to the government institutions can not alone determine the amount and type of social capital necessary to community development. Only the physical closeness of a community to the central government institutions doesn’t mean more access to effective vertical assistance and basic social services. In addition, the homogeneity of the community people is not the only factor to increased community action.

Many different factors such as historical, political, socio-cultural and personal highly interrelated can play a significant role in building social capital stock and are important in determining the rate of empowerment and political action of people. Therefore, taking a comprehensive view on these factors is essential to find out, for example, why people in a certain community have not been able to effectively convert the latent cognitive social capital into the structural social capital. Contribution to the development of an integrated framework to examine and build social capital on all three levels of micro, meso and macro is another key input of this research to the existing social capital theories for local development.

Trust as most important component of social capital

There are growing evidences in the Kurdish region that the problem of underdevelopment is to a significant extent a problem of underdeveloped institutions and weak institutional arrangement. Trust as most important component of any form of social capital and institution-building, has a vital role in creating more interaction between people and institutions and thereby producing more bridging social capital. In another word, trust has a lasting and spill-over effect not only in creating institutions but in maintaining effective formal and informal relationships among institutions, which could in turn build base for further institution-building. For example, by creating the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) different local tribes gather in one institution; put the differences aside; and create more positive attitudes to each other by interacting on the daily basis. In fact, many local civic organisations even if highly politicised have been created as a result of trust-building. Therefore, it can be concluded that building institutions for any purpose can build trust and connection among local people and thereby producing bridging social capital.

Producing bridging social capital need an enabling environment

Bridging social capital is defined as both horizontal interactions between community organizations and as vertical links to the institutions on higher decision-making levels. People on community level possess a very strong cognitive social capital but a much weaker bridging social capital. An additional contribution of this research work is that active participation of community people to demand for vertical assistance is not
enough if it is not supported by an effective governance system and responsible policymakers. The democratic principals such as rule of law, transparency and accountability are very vital to produce bridging social capital necessary to promote sustainable CDD. When the tribal and party political bonds play a significant role in the relationship between the governmental officials and the civilian population, there is little chance for establishing a stable democracy, good governance and sustainable development in any given context.

It is true that common action can only work on the basis of common values as part of cognitive social capital but not enough to achieve a sustainable CDD. Therefore, the appropriate political and institutional reforms, discussed in the previous chapter, should be carried out to create more structural and bridging social capital and thereby using the cognitive social capital more effectively. The collective action and cooperation in the research area appears both as output of community’s cognitive social capital and as input to more organized and structural social capital such as the CBOs. The CBOs have a potential role to link the community people to the government institutions and to produce bridging social capital for sustainable CDD but need an enabling environment to flourish. Moreover, creating effective communication and information infrastructure is considered as an important input to establish effective links to the governmental institutions and creating vertical bridging social capital. However, the people in rural hinterland who receive less vertical assistance needs to rely more on their own social network and CBOs to compensate the ineffective vertical assistance.

**Sustainable CDD for increased global security**

Last but not least, the common action from international community to prevent violence and war and combat terrorism for increasing global security cannot be achieved without creating social and economic justices and democratic principals on local level in developing countries. Nowadays, there is an economic boom in the Kurdish region in Iraq mainly in housing sector without considering the fair distribution of resources among civilians. As a result, new mass out-migration of young people to Europe in searching for a better future has started. Increasing freedom, peace, democracy and creating sustainable livelihood sources for local people in developing countries are central issues to decrease mass migration to developed countries and prevent social unrest and thereby increasing global security. These issues are actually major areas for investment from international development agencies.

**7.3 Aspects of further research**

The serious study of the role of social capital and institutions in local development in the Kurdish region in Iraq has just begun. This study might be the first of its kind in the Kurdish region to conduct a pure assessment of the inter-institutional relationships both horizontally and vertically as part of social capital for local development. The focus is more on analysing the capacity of CBOs as most accountable institutions to the grassroots people. In addition, the study evaluates the governance system in the Kurdish region that does not create an enabling environment to CDD. But, due to the limited time it was not possible to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the entities within the system. An effective system of governance to local development is not just about to make effective policies on central level but how to successfully implement the policies and continuously evaluate their impact on local level. Indeed, if there are no effective
organizations with qualified staff on local level, the policies cannot be implemented effectively and efficiently. Therefore, further research related to the organizational capacity development of the entities both on local and policy levels can be done. Particularly, it is of high significance to investigate how to facilitate effective inter-organizational relationship between entities and stakeholders from the public, voluntary and private sectors in participatory local governance which in turn includes the following research questions:

- Based on organizational theories, how to increase the expertises and communication skills of the employees of a single entity to effectively and efficiently perform the tasks within the entity and build trustful relationships with other entities within the KRG system;
- How to increase the work moral and ethical behaviour of the employees within the entities to be service-minded and responsive to the civilians;
- How to create and maintain administrative resources and mechanisms in order to promote accountability within the public sector such as building an elite administrative cadre that is committed to reinforcing professionalism; and
- Can introducing E-governance challenge the ambiguous system of the KRG and increase transparency, rule of law and accountability which in sequence includes the following questions:
  - How the modern information system can reduce the unnecessary administrative routines, decrease corruption and contribute to effectiveness of public sector institutions;
  - The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. Can by introducing E-governance more responsibility and authority be delegated to low-level officials and thereby enhancing transparency and accountability within the public sector; and
  - What are more cost-efficient tools than computer-based applications to promote good governance and reduce corruption.

Before entering into a local network in a participatory governance structure every entity must have a clear mission and strategy how to build consensus with other entities to build a solid base for common action. Then, a further research can be about how to build an effective organization with a shared vision which everyone agrees on. When it is about governmental institutions on policy level, an area of research is definitively how to enhance the strategic management and “management by objectives” where the top managers at each ministry with the managers of line agencies on local level jointly set up common goals.

Last but not least, the historical, social and cultural factors, which all together have caused the current management and organizational problems and poor governance in the Kurdish region, are important areas for investigation. For example, how degradation of Kurdish cultural heritage and social norms and conducting genocide policies by former Iraqi regime has negatively influenced the social capital and organizational behaviour within the KRG system.
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## 9 Appendix

Table 9.1: Surveyed households and groups in the Seweil sub-district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applied data collection methods(^{87})</th>
<th>Marwe</th>
<th>Bewre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated interview guide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Farmer from Kawlan settlement (2 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Village council representative (8 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civil servant from the village centre (2 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Victim of landmines (9 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Farmer excluded from piped drinking water in the Zeber settlement (3 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interview of leaders, members and non members of community organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Health care centre (Head and assistant head and a group member, 1 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Community fund (Head and a community member, 8 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Primary school (Director, a teacher and father of a pupil, 1 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Water users group (Head, a female group member, 8 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Water users group (Head, a female group member and a household head with no access to drinking piped water, 2 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Women association (head, a group member and a female not member of the group, 9 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group interview of the community key informants</td>
<td>7 participants (Three elderly persons, school director, a teacher, assistant head of the health centre and village council representative, 31 March)</td>
<td>7 participants (Three elderly persons, head of the Community Fund, a member of the local organization of the PUK, village council representative together with his spouse, 7 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate sessions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Seven male participants (three farmers from different settlements, two elderly persons and two merchants, 1 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Seven male participants (two elderly persons, village council representative, household head who has lost his legs of landmines and his son, one shopkeeper and a herd keeper, 8 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Eight female participants (two elderly women, two housewives, two girls aged 18-20 staying at house, two intermediary school girls, 2 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ten female participants (two elderly women, six housewives aged 18-40, a female-headed household who lost his husband in the Anfal campaign(^{88}) and a young girl staying at home, 8 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interview of sub-district institutions (12-16 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The head of the sub-district government (12 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. The head of the sub-district government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The mayor of the municipality (12 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. The mayor of the municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The assistant director of the health care centre (12 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. The primary school director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The primary school director (12 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. The head of the agricultural line agency (12 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The head of the agricultural line agency (12 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5. The head of the district organization of the Kurdistan Women Union(^{89}) (16 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The head of district organization of the Kurdistan Women Union(^{89}) (16 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6. The head of Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People Aid (16 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The head of Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People Aid (16 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-district focus group discussions (18 April)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The head of the sub-district government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The mayor of the municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The primary school director</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The head of the agricultural line agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. One engineer from the agricultural line agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Two civil servants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Five farmers from the Bewre community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Two representatives from the Marwe community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. A PhD student in spatial planning from Erbil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{87}\) All data collection methods were carried out during April 2006 except the group interview of the key informants in Marwe on 31 March 2006.

\(^{88}\) For information about the Anfal campaign see on page 6 in chapter one.

\(^{89}\) There is no sub-district organisation of the KWU in Seweil.
Table 9.2: Surveyed households and groups in the Harir sub-district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applied data collection methods$^{90}$</th>
<th>Jamasor</th>
<th>Old Batas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated interview guide</td>
<td>1. Female-headed household (21 April)</td>
<td>1. Retired civil servant (25 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Farmer excluded from piped drinking water (21 April)</td>
<td>2. Active member of the KDP (26 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Landless worker (21 April)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interview of leaders, members and non members of community organizations</td>
<td>1. Secondary school (assistant director and father of a pupil, 21 April)$^{91}$</td>
<td>1. Local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union/Head, a group member and a male not member of the group, 26 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Water users group (Head, a group member and a household head with no access to drinking piped water, 21 April)</td>
<td>2. Primary school (Director, a teacher and father of a pupil, 24 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The KDP local organization (assistant head, a group member and a male not member of the group, 21 April)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group interview of the community key informants</td>
<td>Ten participants (Five elderly persons, former village council representative Moktar, three farmers and a merchant, 20 April)</td>
<td>Four participants (An elderly person, head of local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union, primary school director and a member of the KDP, 25 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions with male group</td>
<td>Eleven male participants$^{92}$ (two civil servants of the mosque, village council representative Moktar, head of health care centre, assistant director of secondary school, assistant head of local organization of the KDP, one herd keeper, one young jobless, one member of the KDP, one retired, and a farmer, 20 April)</td>
<td>Six male participants$^{93}$ (Two elderly persons, one teacher, one worker, one civil servant and a member of the KDP, 26 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interview of sub-district institutions (26 April)</td>
<td>1. The assistant head of the sub-district government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The acting mayor of the municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The head of the agricultural line agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The head of the sub-district organization of the KDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. The head of the Harir tomato sauce factory as the only agro-processing industry in the sub-district</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-district focus group discussions (27 April)</td>
<td>1. The head of the agricultural line agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The assistant director of secondary school in Jamasor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The assistant head of the KDP local organization in Jamasor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. One farmer from Jamasor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. One farmer from Old Batas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. A journalist from local press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{90}$ All data collection methods were carried out during April 2006.

$^{91}$ The interview with staff members of the school was not conducted as they were absent by the investigation time.

$^{92}$ Due to the local traditional restrictions no focus group discussions with the female members was conducted.

$^{93}$ Ibid.
Questions for tabulations in the following tables
1) Over the past 12 months, what have been the 3 main income sources of the household?
2) Does the household own any farmland? If yes, which type(s) of land?
3) What is the food availability for the household?
4) In the past 12 months, did your household have to sell some properties in order to have money to buy enough food, clothing, or to pay health care?
5) Compared to the last year, what is the safe status of your household now?
6) How many female respective male children aged 5-14 is living in the household?
7) Of them, how many female respective male children do regularly attend school?
8) Which are the 2 most important drinking water facilities that the household uses?
9) What lighting facilities does this household have?
10) What cooking fuel does this household use most often?
11) What toilet facilities does this house use?

Table 9.3: Household livelihood and welfare in Marwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tabulated questions</th>
<th>H1 (settlement of Kawlan)</th>
<th>H2 (village centre)</th>
<th>H3 (settlement of Zeber)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Income sources</td>
<td>-Crop production</td>
<td>Civil servant and the head of electricity users group</td>
<td>-Crop production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Livestock raising</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Livestock raising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Type of farmland</td>
<td>Irrigated land</td>
<td>Has no farmland</td>
<td>-Irrigated land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Wasteland/Grazing land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Food availability</td>
<td>Has a variety of foods</td>
<td>Has a variety of foods</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sold property</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Saving status</td>
<td>More savings</td>
<td>More savings</td>
<td>Fewer savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) children aged 5-14</td>
<td>Female: 2  Male:1</td>
<td>Female: 0  Male:1</td>
<td>Female: 3  Male: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) School attendance</td>
<td>Female: 2  Male:1</td>
<td>Female: 0  Male:1</td>
<td>Female: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Drinking water</td>
<td>-Public standpipe</td>
<td>-Public standpipe</td>
<td>-Spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Spring</td>
<td>-Spring</td>
<td>-Taking water from neighbours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Lighting facilities</td>
<td>-Community power generator</td>
<td>-Community power generator</td>
<td>-Community power generator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Kerosene lighting</td>
<td>-Own power generator</td>
<td>-Kerosene lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Cooking fuels</td>
<td>-Natural gas</td>
<td>-Natural gas</td>
<td>-Natural gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Kerosene</td>
<td>-Kerosene</td>
<td>-Kerosene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Firewood</td>
<td>-Firewood</td>
<td>-Firewood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Toilet facilities</td>
<td>Outside latrine chal</td>
<td>Inside flush Auwdad</td>
<td>Inside flush Outside latrine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9.4: Household livelihood and welfare in Bewre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tabulated questions</th>
<th>H1 (farmer)</th>
<th>H2 (handicap of landmines)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong> Income sources</td>
<td>-Crop production /orchard -Livestock raising -Wage of being Kurdish militia</td>
<td>-Handicap benefits of being landmines victim -Wage of his son as a police in the sub-district -Farming (only for household consumption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong> Type of farmland</td>
<td>-Irrigated land -Non-irrigated annual crop land -Waste- and grazing land</td>
<td>-Non-irrigated annual crop land -Waste- and grazing land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong> Food availability</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(4)</strong> Sold property</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(5)</strong> Saving status</td>
<td>Fewer savings</td>
<td>The same amount of savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(6)</strong> School attendance</td>
<td>Female: 1 Male: 0</td>
<td>Female: 1 Male: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(7)</strong> Drinking water facilities</td>
<td>-Public standpipe -Spring</td>
<td>-Public standpipe -Spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(8)</strong> Lighting facilities</td>
<td>-Community power generator -Owen power generator</td>
<td>-Community power generator -Kerosene lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(9)</strong> Cooking fuels</td>
<td>-Gas -Kerosene -Firewood</td>
<td>-Gas -Kerosene -Firewood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(10)</strong> Toilet facilities</td>
<td>-Outside latrine chal</td>
<td>-Outside latrine chal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(11)</strong></td>
<td>-Toilet inside the mosque (only for men)</td>
<td>-Toilet inside the mosque (only for men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9.5: Household livelihood and welfare in Jamasor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tabulated questions</th>
<th>H1 (female-headed)</th>
<th>H2 (farmer)</th>
<th>H3 (landless worker)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong> Income sources</td>
<td>-Crop production -Retirement and social benefit</td>
<td>-Crop production -Livestock raising -School cleaner</td>
<td>Construction work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong> Type of farmland</td>
<td>Non-irrigated annual crop land</td>
<td>Non-irrigated annual crop land</td>
<td>Has no land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong> Food availability</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(4)</strong> Sold property</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>Household properties e.g. fridge, air cooling device, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(5)</strong> Saving status</td>
<td>Fewer savings</td>
<td>More savings</td>
<td>More savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(6)</strong> School attendance</td>
<td>Female: 1 Male: 3</td>
<td>Female: 2 Male:5</td>
<td>Female: 0 Male:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(7)</strong> Drinking water facilities</td>
<td>-Public standpipe -Community well</td>
<td>Community well</td>
<td>-Public standpipe -Community well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(8)</strong> Lighting facilities</td>
<td>-Public power grid -Kerosene lighting</td>
<td>-Public power grid -Kerosene lighting</td>
<td>-Public power grid -Kerosene lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(9)</strong> Cooking fuels</td>
<td>-Natural gas -Kerosene -Firewood</td>
<td>-Natural gas -Kerosene -Firewood</td>
<td>-Natural gas -Kerosene -Firewood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(10)</strong> Toilet facilities</td>
<td>Outside latrine chal</td>
<td>Outside latrine chal</td>
<td>Outside latrine chal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(11)</strong></td>
<td>-The toilet inside the mosque</td>
<td>-The toilet inside the mosque</td>
<td>-The toilet inside the mosque</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.6: Household livelihood and welfare in Old Batas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tabulated questions</th>
<th>H1 (retired)</th>
<th>H2 (KDP member)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Income sources</td>
<td>Retirement and social benefit -Wages from the KDP -Crop production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Type of farmland</td>
<td>Has no land</td>
<td>Non-irrigated annual crop land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Food availability</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
<td>Has enough but simple food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sold property</td>
<td>-Land</td>
<td>-Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Livestock</td>
<td>-Household equipments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Saving status</td>
<td>More savings</td>
<td>More savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Children aged 5-14</td>
<td>Female: 2 Male: 0</td>
<td>Female: 2 Male: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) School attendance</td>
<td>Female: 2</td>
<td>Female: 2 Male: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Drinking water facilities</td>
<td>-Indoor tap -Spring</td>
<td>-Indoor tap -Spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Lighting facilities</td>
<td>-Public electricity -Kerosene lighting</td>
<td>-Public electricity -Own power generator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Cooking fuels</td>
<td>-Natural gas -Kerosene and firewood</td>
<td>-Natural gas -Kerosene and firewood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Toilet facilities</td>
<td>-Outside latrine -The toilet inside the mosque</td>
<td>-Outside latrine -The toilet inside the mosque</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>