Spatial Planning, Urban Land Management, And Political Architecture In The Conflict Areas - Jerusalem Case Study

A Doctorate Dissertation Submitted

By

Raed F. Najjar

November, 2012

to the Faculty of Spatial Planning at Dortmund University of Technology in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Engineering (Dr.-Ing.)
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Date of Disputation: 2nd May, 2013
Declaration

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Raed Najjar
November, 2012
Theories pertaining to spatial planning and sustainable development have magnificently grown during the second half of the past century and still witness increased rate of attention concerning the manifold aspects encapsulated by their subjects. However, both of these themes still remain underestimated and require further investigation and even augmentation when exploring areas of ‘political turbulences’ or ‘unbalanced powers’; in other words, regions of ‘conflict areas’. The development process in the conflict areas seems to depend ultimately on the scale and magnitude of power between the different contested groups, i.e. the ‘dominant group’ and the ‘weaker group’; where sustainability becomes very vulnerable, and if exists, belongs to the dominant group neglecting the weaker one, and even in many cases, exploiting the resources and opportunities of the weaker for the advantage of the dominant, resulting therefore, more marginalizing and social degradation. Hence, new arguments pertaining to sustainability in the conflict areas conclude that sustainable development in these areas can be considered as a ‘terminology game’ which does not resolve the older growth debate, but disguises it.

Spatial planning in the conflict areas may shape fast-changing or dynamic spatial policies accompanied with irreversible physical layouts that create in many cases multi-dimensional challenges for inhabitants. Especially, for the indigenous residents when considered for one reason or another ‘a group of minority’. Therefore, clarifying the relationship between spatial planning, power and politics is a prominent issue in this doctoral research. Understanding this relation reveals the range of influence of politics upon planning objectives and role. Accordingly, it is a marvelous question to know if planning is an organic reflection of politics or not; as well as, to explore whether spatial planning, in the conflict areas, is used to mitigate or intensify conflict. Based upon theoretical framework, this doctoral research presents comprehensive set of interrelationships between the main parameters affecting the development process in the conflict areas, namely (space, politics, power and planning); these are interestingly elaborated and conceptualized by the researcher within referenced spatial context; i.e. Jerusalem (the case study). Moreover, the direct and implicit role and impacts of these relations were examined. The examination through logical framework (theory – analysis – conception) of the aforementioned parameters (in conflict areas) reveals a maze of dynamic interrelationships which outstandingly guide the development for the benefit of the dominant group. This doctorate research provides critical review for the role of planning whether it acts as ‘progressive’ or ‘regressive’ agent of change, especially in the conflict areas with unbalanced powers. In Jerusalem, it has been shown that power and politics are the major planning drivers which set out the development pattern and objectives. Consequently, the spatial and social profiles of Jerusalem have been changing very fast producing new norms of urban fabrics and geographical extents, which all together, constitute manifold challenges to the ‘indigenous’ Palestinian residents.

Keywords: Spatial Planning, Land Use, Master Plan, Spaces of Risk, Secured Spaces, Spatial Scenario, East Jerusalem, West Jerusalem
Acknowledgement

To My Parents
Basema Zibda & Fawzy Najjar
who raised me on the culture of science.

AND

To My Supervisors - Professors:
Christa Reicher & Michael Wegner & Jamal Amro
who enlightened my way towards knowledge.

And To The
Faculty of Spatial Planning in TU Dortmund
The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)
who did all the possible efforts to enhance my stay and study in Germany
Dedication

To my wife: Sara & my daughter: Basema

AND

Parents
Fawzy, Basema,

Sisters
Nibal, Fidaa, Haneen, Raya, Batoul

Brothers
Mohammad, Moayad

As Well As

To Jerusalem, and to, TU Dortmund
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................ III
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................ V
Dedication ....................................................................................................... VI
Table of Contents .......................................................................................... VII
List of Figures ................................................................................................ IX
List of Tables .................................................................................................. XIII
Abbreviations ............................................................................................... XIV
Preface ........................................................................................................... XV

## Chapter One

Prologue .......................................................................................................... 2
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 2
1.2 Research Rationale ................................................................................... 7
  1.2.1 Research Significance .......................................................................... 7
  1.2.2 Research Scope .................................................................................. 8
  1.2.3 Research Problem ............................................................................... 9
  1.2.4 Research Hypothesis ......................................................................... 11
  1.2.5 Research Objectives ......................................................................... 12
  1.2.6 Research Questions .......................................................................... 12
1.3 Research Methodology ............................................................................. 13
1.4 Research Structure ................................................................................... 17

## Chapter Two

Space, Planning, Power and Politics ................................................................. 19
2.1 Overview .................................................................................................. 19
2.2 Spatial Planning ....................................................................................... 22
2.3 Spatial Sustainability ............................................................................... 25
2.4 Space Dialectics ...................................................................................... 28
2.5 Explicit Review of the Implicit Planning-Politics Interrelationship .......... 30
2.6 Fundamental Scopes of Imperfect Planning ............................................. 33
  2.6.1 Spatial Context .................................................................................. 34
  2.6.2 Methodological Scope ...................................................................... 35
  2.6.3 Socioeconomic Scope ....................................................................... 36
  2.6.4 Cultural Scope .................................................................................. 36
2.7 Spatial Visions and Scenarios ................................................................. 37
2.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 42

## Chapter Three

Spatial and Social Space Structure in Jerusalem ............................................. 44
3.1 Historical Outlook .................................................................................... 44
3.2 Social Structure of Jerusalem .................................................................. 48
3.3 Spiritual Reflections of Jerusalem ............................................................. 56
  3.3.1 Jerusalem in Judaism .......................................................................... 57
3.3.2 Jerusalem in Christianity .......................................................... 59
3.3.3 Jerusalem in Islam ................................................................. 62
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................. 63

Chapter Four
Spatial Planning Development in Jerusalem ........................................ 66
4.1 Background ............................................................................... 66
4.2 Planning Jerusalem during the Ottoman Rule (1516-1917) .......... 69
4.3 Planning Jerusalem during the British Mandate (1917-1948) .... 73
4.4 Planning during the Division of Jerusalem (1948-1967) ............. 84
4.5 Planning after Reunification of Jerusalem (1967 thenceforward) .. 91
4.6 Analytical Conclusion ................................................................. 95

Chapter Five
Political Architecture in Jerusalem .................................................... 99
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................. 99
5.2 Political Jerusalem – A Legal/Illegal Entity ............................... 103
5.3 Political Engineering in Jerusalem .............................................. 105
  5.3.1 Architecture of Separation and Fragmentation .................... 112
  5.3.2 Architecture of Security and Surveillance ......................... 117
  5.3.3 Architecture of Paradox ...................................................... 132
5.4 Green Architecture – Gray Planning .......................................... 149
  5.4.1 Urban Morphology ............................................................ 149
  5.4.2 Historical Development of the Green and Open Spaces in EJ 151
  5.4.3 Discussing the Urban Green Spaces’ Status Quo in Jerusalem 155
5.5 Study Cases .............................................................................. 165
  5.5.1 The Case of the Northern Areas ........................................... 169
    5.5.1.1 Beit Hanina and Shu’fat ............................................ 169
  5.5.2 The Case of the Middle Areas .............................................. 177
    5.5.2.1 Wadi Al-Jawz ........................................................... 178
    5.5.2.2 Silwan .................................................................... 187
    5.5.2.3 Ras Al-Amud ........................................................... 192
    5.5.2.4 Jabal Al-Mukabir ...................................................... 195
  5.5.3 The Case of the Southern Areas ............................................ 198
    5.5.3.1 Arab A-Sawahra ....................................................... 199
    5.5.3.2 Sur Baher ................................................................ 202
5.6 Discussion .................................................................................. 209
5.7 Conclusion ............................................................................... 221

Chapter Six
Epilogue ......................................................................................... 224
6.1 Concluding Summary ............................................................... 224
6.2 Outlook for Jerusalem .............................................................. 228
6.3 Spatial Scenarios for Jerusalem ................................................... 231
  6.3.1 Scenario One: Jerusalem Segregated City ......................... 235
  6.3.2 Scenario Two: Jerusalem Twin City ................................... 237
  6.3.3 Scenario Three: Jerusalem Open City ................................ 239
  6.3.4 Scenario Four: Jerusalem Bi-National City ....................... 242
6.4 Conclusion ............................................................................... 244

References .................................................................................... 246
List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Palestinian loss of land resulting from Israeli occupation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Proportion of planning of lands in East Jerusalem</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>The doctoral thesis methodological approaches</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Methodology in formulating the research rationale</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>The doctoral thesis framework</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>The triangle of conflicting goals for planning</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Sustainability science within a divided world</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Clarifying reality, outlook, and vision within time horizon</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>Historic Timeline of Jerusalem</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>Administrative changes in Jerusalem since 1863</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>Jewish immigration by continents between 1948 – 1991</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>Population of Jerusalem by population group, 1922 – 2009</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>Annual growth of population in Jerusalem by population group</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>Age structure of population in Jerusalem by population group</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>Source of population in Jerusalem, 2009</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>Population projection of Jerusalem 2000-2020</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>Percentage distributions of private households in Jerusalem</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>Percentage distribution for households in Jerusalem</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>Madaba Map</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>Bunting’s map1580 presenting Jerusalem as the centre of the world</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>Historical powers that controlled Jerusalem before Ottomans</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>Historical administrative development of Jerusalem since Ottomans</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>Quarters of Jerusalem Old City</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>Characteristics of Ottoman Jerusalem</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>McLean Master Plan 1918</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>Geddes Master Plan 1919</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>Geddes -Ashbee Master Plan 1920-1922</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>Kendall Master Plan 1944</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>Percentage of geographical distribution for Kendall Plan 1944</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>(a) Schematic plans 1918; 1919; 1920-1922; 1940</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>Jewish Immigration into Palestine during 1919 – 1941</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>Rau Plan 1948 – 1949</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>Rau schematic plan</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>Shaviv schematic plan</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>Shaviv Plan (1955-1959)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>Reunification of East and West Jerusalem</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>Hashimshony Plan 1968</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>Administrative changes in Jerusalem</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>Socio-spatial administrative changes in Jerusalem</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.51: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Har Homa ..... 163
Figure 5.52: National green profile of Jerusalem ............................................. 164
Figure 5.53: Natural green profile of Jerusalem ............................................. 164
Figure 5.54: Clarification chart of the Israeli gray planning process ................. 166
Figure 5.55: Urban management percentages in East Jerusalem municipal area ..... 167
Figure 5.56: Approved planning categories in East Jerusalem.......................... 168
Figure 5.49: Location of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat relative to the Old City .......... 169
Figure 5.50: Beit Hanina Plan #3457A .......................................................... 170
Figure 5.51: Shu'fat Plan #3456A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B .......... 171
Figure 5.52: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Beit Hanina.... 173
Figure 5.53: Open landscapes in Beit Hanina ............................................. 174
Figure 5.54: Jewish-only settlement established upon Palestinian lands .......... 174
Figure 5.55: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Beit Hanina.. 175
Figure 5.56: Reches Shu'fat settlement built on confiscated lands in Shu'fat .......... 175
Figure 5.57: Reches Shu'fat Jewish-only settlement ..................................... 176
Figure 5.58: The main street leading to Reches Shu'fat Jewish-only settlement ...... 176
Figure 5.59: Location of study cases in middle areas relative to the Old City ...... 177
Figure 5.60: Old City’s northern gate that leads directly into Wadi Al-Jawz ......... 178
Figure 5.61: General view of Wadi Al-Jawz neighborhood in East Jerusalem ..... 179
Figure 5.62: Attachments added into one Palestinian building .................. 180
Figure 5.63: Additions made to serve households’ basic needs ...................... 181
Figure 5.64: Incremental growth in Wadi Al-Jawz ..................................... 181
Figure 5.66: Scattered urban fabric in Wadi Al-Jawz .................................... 182
Figure 5.67: Urban sprawl and scattered skyline in Wadi Al-Jawz .................. 183
Figure 5.68: Spatial urban Paradox between Wadi Al-Jawz & adjacent settlement . 183
Figure 5.69: Poor infrastructure at the commercial area in Wadi Al-Jawz .......... 184
Figure 5.70: Poor infrastructure at the industrial area in Wadi Al-Jawz .......... 184
Figure 5.71: Wadi al-Jawz and American Colony Plan #2639 ......................... 185
Figure 5.72: Large zones earmarked as open landscapes in Wadi Al-Jawz ........ 186
Figure 5.73: Open landscapes in Wadi Al-Jawz ......................................... 186
Figure 5.74: General view of Silwan village in East Jerusalem .................... 187
Figure 5.75: Location of Silwan relative to the Old City of Jerusalem .............. 188
Figure 5.76: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Silwan .... 189
Figure 5.77: Silwan Plan #2783A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B .......... 190
Figure 5.78: Over saturated space in Silwan ............................................. 191
Figure 5.79: Vacant lands in Silwan ..................................................... 191
Figure 5.80: Planning categories for Ras Al-Amud ..................................... 193
Figure 5.81: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Ras Al-Amud .. 193
Figure 5.82: Ras Al-Amud Plan #2668A .................................................. 194
Figure 5.83: Planning categories in percent of planned area in Jabal Al-Mukabir ... 196
Figure 5.84: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” Jabal Mukabir .. 196
Figure 5.85: Jabal Al-Mukabir Plan #2691 ............................................... 197
Figure 5.86: Location of Arab A-Sawahra and Sur Baher relative to the Old City... 198
Figure 5.87: Planning categories in percent of planned area for Arab A-Sawahra ... 200
Figure 5.88: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in A-Sawahra .. 200
Figure 5.89: Arab A-Sawahra Plan #2683A ............................................. 201
Figure 5.90: Sur Baher and Um Tuba master plan ................................ ...... 202
Figure 5.91: Percentage of construction density in residential areas in Sur Baher .... 203
Figure 5.92: Planning categories for Sur Baher and Um Tuba .................... 204
Figure 5.93: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Sur Baher ... 204
Figure 5.94: Sur Baher and Um Taba Plan #2320 ..................................... 205
Figure 5.95: Steps needed to obtain a building permit in East Jerusalem ............... 206
Figure 5.96: Municipal receipt for the sewage and water fees ............................ 208
Figure 5.97: Municipal receipt for the betterment levy fees ............................... 208
Figure 5.98: Schematic outline of the spatial context in East Jerusalem ............... 209
Figure 5.99: Special conditions imposed upon Palestinian neighborhoods in EJ ..... 210
Figure 5.100: Palestinian scattered housing units with low construction densities 212
Figure 5.101: High-rise buildings & high construction densities in Har Homa ...... 212
Figure 5.102: Percentage of the residential areas in EJ ................................ 213
Figure 5.103: Percentage of the open landscape areas in East Jerusalem ...... 214
Figure 5.104: The borders of the built-up areas of the Palestinian neighborhoods ... 215
Figure 5.105: Green spaces of risks ................................................................. 216
Figure 5.106: Green spaces of life in Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem ......... 216
Figure 5.107: Green spaces of life produce social interaction in EJ .................. 217
Figure 5.108: Open landscapes do not hinder residential development in EJ ..... 217
Figure 5.109: Comparison of open public spaces in Jerusalem ....................... 218
Figure 5.110: Percentage of the public areas in neighborhoods in EJ ............... 219
Figure 5.111: Percentage of the roads’ areas in neighborhoods in EJ ............... 219
Figure 5.112: Percentage of the commercial areas neighborhoods in EJ .......... 220
Figure 5.113: Percentage of the industrial areas in neighborhoods in EJ .......... 220

Figure 6.1: The influence of ‘politics’, ‘power’, and ‘planning’ in Jerusalem .... 225
Figure 6.2: Unbalanced space in Jerusalem ...................................................... 227
Figure 6.3: Geopolitical centrality of Jerusalem .............................................. 229
Figure 6.4: Jerusalem city’s different spatial scenarios' dynamics ................. 233
Figure 6.5: The dialectical characteristic of Jerusalem spatial definition ....... 234
Figure 6.6: The dialectical nature of Jerusalem space .................................. 235
Figure 6.7: Scenario one: Segregated Jerusalem .......................................... 236
Figure 6.8: Scenario two: Jerusalem The Twin City .................................... 238
Figure 6.9: Scenario three: Jerusalem The Open City ................................... 240
Figure 6.10: Scenario four: Jerusalem The Bi-National City ......................... 243
List of Tables

Table 3.1: Administrative changes in Jerusalem city and Jerusalem district ..........46
Table 3.3: Population projection of Jerusalem, by Population group, 2000 – 2020....53

Table 4.1: Ottomans planning perception–reflection interrelationship ...............72
Table 4.2: Percentage of land use categories for McLean Plan 1918 ..................77
Table 4.3: Percentage of land use categories for Geddes's Plan 1919 ...............79
Table 4.4: Percentage of land use categories for Geddes-Ashbee’s Plan ..........80

Table 5.1: West Bank land use categories in 1998 ........................................108
Table 5.2: Geopolitical Land Classification ....................................................111
Table 5.3: Consequent impacts of the Israeli separation policies .....................131
Table 5.4: Comparison between level of services in Jerusalem - East and West ..137
Table 5.5: Unequal Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem - East and West .......138
Table 5.6: Land use categories in Har Homa master plan ............................163
Table 5.7: Urban Management in East Jerusalem .........................................167
Table 5.8: Bayt Hanina and Shu'fat land use plan categories .........................172
Table 5.9: Silwan land use plan categories .....................................................189
Table 5.10: Ras Al-Amud land use plan categories .......................................192
Table 5.11: Jabal Al-Mukabir land use plan categories .................................195
Table 5.12: Arab A-Sawahra land use plan categories .................................199
Table 5.13: Sur Baher and Um Tuba land use plan categories .......................203
Table 5.14: Municipal fees and cost for obtaining a building permit in EJ ..........207
Table 5.15: Land use categories in East Jerusalem .......................................211
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARIJ</td>
<td>Applied Research Institute Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>EJ</td>
<td>East Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIGA</td>
<td>German Institute of Global and Area Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>GJ</td>
<td>Greater Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Km</td>
<td>Kilo meters</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoLG</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OET</td>
<td>Occupied Enemy Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASSIA</td>
<td>Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PENGON</td>
<td>Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>Palestinian Land Authority</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>West Bank</td>
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<td>WJ</td>
<td>West Jerusalem</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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<td>WZO</td>
<td>World Zionist Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

"Let our advance worrying become advance thinking and planning"
Winston Churchill

Planning is a short word, but represents borderless consequences and endless meanings. The first attraction between “me & planning” - by its broad definition - began when I was at school. It was during one of the English lessons which introduced to me the conceptual output of planning as: “Planning is the first step of any successful project”; the echo of this descriptive phrase has never left my ears. Although my perception in that time was not capable to comprehend ultimately what does planning mean, a quick-rigid bond between us has shaped itself in my consciousness.

What is planning?

I would like to start with the most fundamental requirement for studying a phenomenon – its definition. I believe that everybody has his own perception to express the basic meaning of planning, since everyone prepares – albeit casually – a plan for his activities and future needs. However, a brief review of literature pertaining to ‘planning’ in terms of physical development would immediately reveal that the word has a wide variety of meanings. I do also believe that "urban and regional planning" (or ‘town and country planning’ and ‘city planning’ as it is also called in the UK and North America, respectively) is ideally represented by the term Spatial Planning. One of the earliest definitions of spatial planning is given by the European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter, adopted in 1983 by the European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning:

"Spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the physical organization of space according to an overall strategy"

Albrechts (2001) delineates spatial planning to be not a single concept, procedure, or tool; it is rather a set of concepts, procedures and tools that must be integrally tailored if desirable outcomes are to be achieved. From this standpoint, the perception of spatial planning alludes to the need for coordinating various sectoral policies that concern a particular space in order to create positive synergies (OECD, 2001). Spatial planning is directly related to space, even in its definition! It depends on the basic historical and institutional differences between the various settings where planning is practiced. Yiftachel et al. (2001) exemplify the variances for the perception of planning according to the spatial reference that originates the definition. Italian intellectuals for instance, habitually perceived ‘planning’ as an element of city aesthetic art. On the other hand, British researchers have often concentrated on the
regulation of physical development in cities and regions. Meanwhile, American scholars have often referred to planning as a loose concept, dealing principally with policy efforts of different governmental levels and semi-public bodies of community. Regardless of its definition, the basic role of planning could be argued as to improve the welfare of people and their communities by creating more convenient, equitable, healthful, efficient, and attractive places for present and future generations.

Professionally (career wise), my story with ‘planning’ was crowned with success. My passionate love for ‘spatial planning’ forced me to deepen my knowledge and experience in this challenging field. As a result, in 2007 among skilled professionals I was chosen to be the ‘first’ Urban Planner who works and establishes the department of planning and development at Ramallah Municipality. My planning vision never stopped, so I found myself permanently able to improve and introduce mass production in town planning remarkably. Consequently, in 2010, I was chosen among competitive professionals to be the ‘first’ Manager of the Engineering Department in Birzeit Municipality. In context to the theoretical part of this field, I would like to commence by quoting Adrien Katherine in his writing “Healing Spirit Injuries” where he highlights the hope of establishing an independent Palestinian state:

“At some point, peace may come to the Holy Land and the independent state of Palestine may sit side by side with Israel. At that time, the Palestinians may wish to come to terms with the spirit injuries that have affected their people since 1948 when the state of Israel was created, or since 1967 when the now forty-year old Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem began. Spirit injuries represent a combination of “physical, emotional, and spiritual harms.” Spirit injuries can lead to the “slow death of the psyche, the soul and persona” on a personal level. On a group level, spirit injuries can result in the “devaluation and destruction of a way of life or of an entire culture.” When spirit injuries accumulate, the result can be spirit murder. Some spirit-murdered souls may be likely to commit literal or figurative homicide or suicide.” (Katherine, 2008:140).

The ‘question’ and the 'hope' to live the moment when East Jerusalem becomes the Palestinian capital city have been moving hand in hand in my psyche. Theorization the creation of this state, may make me address it as "the state of the not yet" and, respectively, ‘East Jerusalem’ as the "capital of the not yet"! The increasing debate pertaining to the “existing gap and uncountable voids” of the Palestinian planning policies and researches reached heyday perhaps after the unilateral Israeli decision of evacuating the existing Jewish settlements in Gaza Strip in 2005. Since no Palestinian ‘vision or plan’ was either prepared or clear of: what shall the Palestinians do after the Israeli removal of those settlements in Gaza Strip? This event was by itself the major impulse which formed my enthusiastic intention to work on future vision of East Jerusalem as a future Palestinian capital city. Thus, to gain the fruits of this goal, firstly the current planning policies adopted in Jerusalem should be analyzed. Accordingly, the basic theory-analysis-concept of my doctoral research came out; and eventually, I formed scientific planning approach to formulate, evaluate, and propose future scenario-impact relationship for East Jerusalem in terms of spatial planning comprehensive perspectives.

However, start working on this topic revealed to me how challenging shall it be, to cover, the dimensions of this fundamental research. In fact, I realized that the Israeli planning in Jerusalem was very fast and dynamic. I may introduce it to have “the formless form” and its policies to have “the shapeless shape”! Planning in East Jerusalem is to the extremist limits challenging. It can be perceived as paradoxical to the desired outputs of planning even. Advanced Israeli planning policies in East

XVI
Jerusalem created de facto statuses which result in most cases irreversible consequences and inevitable burdens to the native inhabitants, the Palestinian Arabs ‘Jerusalemites’. Therefore, after extensive review of East Jerusalem status quo - in terms of its historical-spatial context - I concluded that to: investigate, search, explore, look through, scan, analyze, and question the ‘Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem’ is not a choice, but rather an urgent need. Hence, for me the decision was taken, and it was also irreversible! I knew that the complexity of analyzing planning in Jerusalem shall be aggravated when the political dimensions are considered. Thus, in such situation it is notable to recall a quotation of Winston Churchill which states: “If you are going through hell, keep going”. Yes, discussing the Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem will reveal a hell which burns every effort to sustain ‘peace and hope’ of the Palestinians who live there. For the case of Jerusalem, both: ‘hope and future’ have had only a tenuous hold. However, here emerges the power of planning which overcomes space and people, if prepared firmly, to sustain the development process equally.

It is worthwhile looking more closely at the case of Jerusalem in terms of conflict relations’ context, and unbalanced powers’ critique, since Jerusalem presents the case of: historically conflict area with unbalanced powers. I would like finally to refer by quoting to Yuval Shany in his paper “Years After 1967” which clears out that the occupational powers often fail to sustain the needs of the occupied nations:

“The law of occupation, as largely codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations, ..., has traditionally strived to protect the basic rights and interests of the population of occupied territories through the introduction of legal standards which serve as constraints on the power of the occupying force. At the same time, the laws of occupation confer upon the occupier considerable powers of government, which it may (and sometimes must) exercise in lieu of the displaced sovereign state. Still, in some, if not most instances where the law of occupation is applied, the interests the rights and interests of the local population appear to remain under-protected and the occupier arguably fails to satisfactorily exercise its governmental authorities. This begs the question to what extent do the specific norms and principles of the law of occupation and the legal discourse that affects their application actually shape reality under conditions of conflict and occupation” (Shany, 2008:6)

All previously discussed shortcomings faced me during this doctoral research, and formed confusion at the beginning. However, confusion faded away by time for two reasons: first, the wise guidance from my supervisors Prof. Christa Reicher, Prof. Michael Wegner, and local advisor Ass. Prof. Jamal Amro, who directed my study approach and helped me to reach and discuss input-output relations objectively. Second, the solid spatial planning knowledge I gained through reviewing related literature. Hence, eventually, the purpose of my dissertation became more polished and refined, and thematic questions became clearer and more lucid. At the end, I am grateful for everyone shared me thoughtful comments, suggestions, and superb criticism that made my doctoral research becomes what it is now.

"To accomplish great things, we must not only act, but also dream; not only plan, but also believe"
Winston Churchill

Reed Najjar
Researcher, 2012

XVII
Chapter One

Prologue
Chapter One

Prologue

"Never look back unless you are planning to go that way"
Henry David

The prologue is an introductive gate of this doctorate research study, in which, an overview of the research rationale is described, starting from the initial incentives that pushed the researcher to focus on this topic, specifically, for referenced explained significance. This introductive chapter is formulated to define comprehensively the scope of this doctorate study combined with the: research problem statement, research hypothesis, research objectives, research questions, and the research methodology. Furthermore, at the end of the prologue, the researcher introduces brief summary about each chapter of this doctorate research.

1.1 Introduction

The total area of “historical Palestine” is estimated to be 26,320 km$^2$ of land in addition to 704 km$^2$ of inland water (ARIJ, 2004). After the Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1948 and 1967, the Palestinian Territories as stand today consist of two physically separated land masses: West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS) (Fig. 1.1). Its total area including the area of the Dead Sea reaches approximately 6,210 km$^2$ (UNEP, 2003), the WB comprises an estimated 94 per cent of that area (World Bank, 2004). The population in the Palestinian territory has risen by almost 40 per cent in the past ten years, one of the highest growth rates in the world. The population of the West Bank has increased to 2.5 million Palestinians with annual growth set at 3.5% (PCBS, 2008), for WB with GS set at 4.8% (UNDP, 2002), the urban population comprises 72 percent of the total (ARIJ, 2002). The West Bank is also inhabited by Israelis, according to Levinson (2009) there are 300,000 Jewish settlers interspersed throughout it.

Figure 1.1: Palestinian Territories, (ARIJ, 2004; edited)
Few cities evoke such sharp expressive response from so many people all over the world as does Jerusalem. Sacred to at least three major faiths, Jerusalem has been a source of inspiration to adherents of these religions since very long ago (Efrat and Noble, 1988). Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian people; it has been a focal point of attraction for the universal powers during many different eras. Until 1917, Jerusalem was an “Ottoman Province”, after the end of WWII\(^1\); particularly, after the Battle of Jerusalem the British Army captured the city of Jerusalem. The League of Nations, through its 1922 ratification of Balfour\(^2\) Declaration, confided the United Kingdom to administer the “Mandate for Palestine” and help establish a Jewish state in Palestine (Mendelsson, 2007). During three decades of British Mandate (1917-1948), Jerusalem northern and western parts examined the construction of new garden suburbs (Tamari, 1999; Eisenstadt, 2002). At the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jerusalem found itself “divided” between Israel and Jordan. The ceasefire line established through the Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Israel and Jordan, cut through the center of the city from 1949 until 1967, during that time West Jerusalem (WJ) was part of Israel and East Jerusalem (EJ) was part of Jordan. In 1949, Israel declared West Jerusalem as its capital.

Following the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, asserted sovereignty over the entire city, and later in 1980 declared Jerusalem, "complete and united", to be the capital of Israel\(^3\). However, the status of a "united Jerusalem" as Israel's "eternal capital" has not been officially recognized by most of the international community, and nearly all countries maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv (Kellerman, 1993). Nonetheless, East Jerusalem has been seen by the Palestinian as their capital of a proposed Palestinian state (Abu-Toameh, 2007). Palestinians also refer to United Nation Security Council Resolution 252, which considers invalid expropriation of land and other actions that tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem. The status of Jerusalem and of its holy places remains contended up to date.

Jerusalem is now the largest city in Israel in both area and population with more than 795,000 inhabitants\(^4\) in an area of 126 km\(^2\). The walled area of Jerusalem, which

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\(^1\) WWII (First World War) was a military conflict centered on Europe lasting from 1914 to 1918. This conflict involved all of the world's great powers, assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies and the Central Powers (Willmott, 2003).

\(^2\) Arthur Balfour was the British Prime Minister (1902-1905), later as Foreign Secretary; he authored his declaration in 1917 to reconstruct Palestine to be the Jewish homeland.

\(^3\) Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1968, 05, 21).

constituted the entire city until the 1860s, is now called the Old City, and was added to the List of World Heritage Sites in danger in 1982 (Welfare, 2004). Jerusalem has been one of the holiest cities in the world; it is the focal point for the three monotheistic religions. Since 64 years (45 years for EJ & Old City)\(^5\), Jerusalem has been suffering from the Israeli occupation which aimed at Judaizing\(^6\) the city; by erasing its Arabic culture, history, and evacuating the city from its Palestinian "Arab" inhabitants. Jerusalem may be the key to achieving a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In addition to its religious, cultural, and historic importance, Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian people, their most important economic centre of their social, health and educational services (Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2003).

Planning could be defined as preparing for actions through a methodological approach that will eventually lead to the “right” decisions to be taken (Ruiter & Sanders, 1998). Planning has different types and paradigms, Spatial Planning is one of the most important fields of planning that is needed for the development process needed to sustain the nations’ resources and prosperity. Despite this significance of planning; Mayer & Miller (1984) argue that the world moves into the future as a result of decisions not as a result of plans. Rapid urbanization is a global phenomenon, and cities require an increasing amount of land and other resources (Yokohari et al., 2000). Expanding cities also generate air, soil, water, light, and noise pollution (Haughton and Hunter, 1996). However, urban citizens expect a high quality of life, including good public health, an unpolluted environment, good food and safe drinking water, as well as, possibilities for recreation in open green spaces (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Satisfying these aspects, along with economic and social well-being are the important components in the development of sustainable urban environment (UN, 1992).

In Palestine, urban and physical planning has lately begun, almost since the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993. Development planning in the context of the Israeli military occupation presents the PA with substantial challenges in terms of leadership and oversight capability. Since 1948, the Israeli occupation has not stopped blocking the Palestinian social, economic and human development, imposing heavy constraints on Palestinians’ freedom of movement and investment in both private and public sectors. These restrictions have been intensified since the year 2000, with the tightening of closures through roadblock and checkpoints. Since 2000, Palestinian

\(^5\) According to the date of this doctorate research.

\(^6\) Judaizing also known (Israelizing): a process of changing the Arabic/Palestinian features of the city/space into Israeli features through organized methodologies defined within planning policies.
businesses have failed and deteriorated because access to markets has been blocked, restricted and employees have been unable to reach their jobs (Coad, 2005). All of these conditions created many problems and challenges in urban planning especially in urban expansion and how it can be controlled while saving natural resources and making sustainable development. The accelerated growth, which took place during the last few years, exacerbated to serious congestion problems in the urban fabric for cities (Isaac, 2000). It is noteworthy to mention that since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948; Palestinians neither have the power nor the jurisdiction to play any role of planning in Jerusalem.

On the other hand, Brutzkus (1964) argues that roots of physical planning in Israel existed even before establishing the state of Israel, so that attempts were made by professional planners to initiate an advisory physical planning on national scale guided by the Jewish National Institutions during the British Mandate in Palestine. Particularly, these attempts were vital source for the explication of main aims and outlining primary attitudes for future spatial planning in Israel. After the dissolving of the Mandate and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, new situation was born, in which physical and urban planning were of essential value to accommodate the requirements resulting from the massive influx of Jewish immigrants to the new state, and the highly varying socio-economic standards accompanied with accelerating development process. Therefore, the urgency of comprehensive planning, and the significance of physical planning on national level are easily elucidated. Israel had hastily responded to this fact, accordingly, in July 1948, just two months after the declaration of the state, a National Planning Department was established on the initiative of the professional organizations of architects and city engineers. Main duties of this department were to initiate comprehensive planning on the national, regional, and local levels, surpassing by that the limited regulative planning practices of the Mandatory Government, which also were carried out by this department. In the first years of its functioning it was at Tel-Aviv until 1953, and was openhandedly granted financially, supported a big staff of planners and designers, and enjoyed far-reaching autonomy. Later it was transferred to Jerusalem; continuing to assume the same responsibilities as before (Ibid).

In light of above discussion, apparently Israel has deep-rooted experience in physical and spatial planning; Jerusalem is a remarkable case study in which this practical experience has resulted irreversible de-facto situations in the city. The city is
"outwardly unified"; however, Jerusalem is, in reality, still a "divided" city, since Jerusalem is intentionally planned to grow in totally two different unequal spatial systems resulting a “socio-physically-separated” city, i.e. East and West. Accordingly, growth and expansion manifested itself in two distinct ways, one is a growth initiated and implemented by the central government in (WJ); the other is a confined growth with very limited provision of expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods in (EJ). On the western side, construction is public and of enormous scale, with whole sectors of cities designed by a single architect, housing projects with standardized, repetitive units characterized the neighborhoods of western Jerusalem. Palestinian "Arab" development in (EJ), on the other hand, was small-scale and piecemeal, the largest construction is initiated by a family or perhaps a small group of buildings by a developer, nevertheless, this small-scale development is hindered by sophisticated planning tools and regulations. Currently, the "Jerusalemites" are facing high natural growth rates accompanied by on-going shrinking land; therefore, their future sustainable existence in the city is an important questionable issue (Najjar, 2007a).

The “threatened existence” of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem emerged the story behind this doctoral research, starting with different pivots in terms of: the future sustainable living of the Jerusalemites in EJ; the cultural and historical identity of the city; and the future status of EJ as a Palestinian capital city. All these aspects have inevitably originated a lot of inquiries for the researcher to investigate the real targets and aims of the Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem; as well as, to seek for exploring the planning tools used to achieve those aims. Moreover, the researcher noticed the sharp changes in the image of the city of Jerusalem occurred during the last few decades, where there is a sever shift from the Palestinian "Arabic" features of the city to the Israeli "Jewish" landmarks imposed by planting tens of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. This challenge of the city identity and the changing style of life were also noticeable forces that pushed the researcher to deepen more in the research, especially in the absence of integrated and comprehensive studies from the Palestinian side that deal with this serious challenge the city and its Palestinian residents have been facing.

To attain the overall goal of this doctoral research, there was a need to combine both a theoretical debate and an empirical analysis as backbones to support this study. In addition, the current political conflict between Israel and Palestine and the

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7 Jerusalemite: is a title name given to the Palestinian who lives in East Jerusalem.
accompanied future uncertainties, make any attempt to create predictions for the future extremely difficult, therefore, the researcher chose the scenario approach to develop different visions regarding EJ as capital city for Palestine, setting different assumptions in sight of the "status quo", and the proposed "peace" situations.

Insight of the limitations of this research, the outcome of this study is a comprehensive analytical exploration and evaluation of the Israeli planning policies (aims & tools) used in East Jerusalem; besides, a description of the challenges the Palestinian Jerusalemites are facing from those policies in East Jerusalem. Finally, it draws future visions for East Jerusalem as a Palestinian sustainable capital city. In total, this doctoral research forms a rigid scientific study that outstandingly contributes in filling the gap in terms of the Palestinian related researches.

1.2 Research Rationale

This section connects the researcher’s observations on the current Israeli spatial planning policies in Jerusalem (East & West) to the problem formulation and the research hypothesis by deducting the research questions from the observations. The research rational is divided accordingly into five main parts: (1) research significance; (2) research scope; (3) research problem statement; (4) research hypothesis; (5) research objectives; and finally, (6) the research questions.

1.2.1 Research Significance

This doctoral research provides crucial comparison-based study in the conflict areas; particularly, where planning is used against what it promises to be. It provides critical review for the "Israeli planning policies" and "role of planning" in Jerusalem. It demonstrates how planning is 'misused' and utilized as a 'control tool' over the indigenous Palestinians in East Jerusalem. This research provides spatial analysis for the context of Jerusalem, and highlights manifold scales for different parameters between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. Furthermore, it draws up future visions for Jerusalem as a “peaceful capital city”; and therefore, achieving translation from ‘post-conflict era’ into ‘status of urban stability’. Thus, it could be argued that the output of this doctorate research establishes a scientific cornerstone for researchers, politicians, and decision makers who are interested in Jerusalem spatial context and future status.
1.2.2 Research Scope

Jerusalem has witnessed successive administrative and socio-physical transformations since the early start of the twentieth century. Jerusalem, therefore, has re-identified its physical structure and social texture totally in variant patterns. Even the city spatial boundaries were divergent, the city was divided, then unified, and even during its unification, the city is still growing fragmentally in terms of the physical and socio-economical perspectives. Regarding its jurisdiction and political boundaries, Jerusalem – even – has more than one definition; the first is "municipal" Jerusalem. Municipal Jerusalem is 126 km² and includes the areas of Jerusalem that Israel had annexed after 1967. Municipal Jerusalem has a population of 795,000; it includes 16 Jewish settlements among which 12 are in East Jerusalem. Municipal Jerusalem also includes more than 250,000 Palestinian in East Jerusalem. A second definition of Jerusalem is “greater” Jerusalem; it comprises an even larger area and includes areas of the West Bank and vast Israeli settlements. The last and largest definition of Jerusalem is “metropolitan" Jerusalem; it encompassed large sections of the West Bank and would incorporate both Bethlehem and approximately half of the district Ramallah and Al-Bireh. Recently, after the construction of the apartheid wall in the West Bank, the physical boundaries of Jerusalem are being depicted (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003; Khamaisi, 1997).

Apparently, the research dimensions concerning planning in Jerusalem could have taken many tracks, dealing with the Israeli spatial planning policies on several (international, national, regional, district, and local) levels. However, the researcher selected a 'regional scope' applies to Greater Jerusalem and Metropolitan Jerusalem boundaries; and 'local scope' applies to Jerusalem municipality boundaries, for the study of this doctoral research.

Limitations

By perforce, there were various reasons influenced the researcher to limit the doctoral research to the above mentioned "regional-local" scope; most importantly:

- The current ongoing escalated Israeli-Palestinian conflict that implies:
  - High risk in conducting fieldwork-oriented research between Jerusalem Governorate boundaries and the Palestinian Authority lands, due to the researcher’s nationality.  

8 The researcher holds Palestinian nationality; Palestinians are not allowed to enter Israel unless they are given special permission issued by Israel. These permissions are rarely issued for the Palestinian especially during the current political instability; however, the researcher recently has held permission.
o Security threat to conduct surveys and field observations in Israel, which limits retrieving direct data (e.g. personal interviews, questionnaires, etc.) in the Israeli areas, due to conflict and researcher’s restricted accessibility to Israel.

o The fluctuant openings & closures of the main entrances connecting the Palestinian cities with each other, and the restricted accessibility and mobility in the Arab Areas in Israel for Palestinian.

- The overall lack of official Palestinian documentation about the Israeli planning policies, in terms of studies, reports, agreements, minutes of meetings, accords, protocols, researches, etc.
- The high-speed changes in the political situation which results in new and continuously alternating Israeli plans on all levels.

The research scope was extremely an important phase in funneling the research observations towards the specificities of the research problem.

1.2.3 Research Problem

The Israeli government has organized and managed all urban activities in terms of planning and regulations in the West Bank after occupation in 1967 (Kuttab and Isaac, 1994). Since that time, the Israeli occupation has blocked Palestinian social, economic and human development, imposing heavy constraints on Palestinians’ freedom of movement and investment in both private and public sectors (Coad, 2005). The Palestinian cities since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1948 have been subjected to expropriation policy by the Israeli planners (Fig. 1.2), consequently, considerable challenges are facing the Palestinian cities and people. East Jerusalem was not an exception to this illegal policy, where 24,500 dunums9 (one third) of the total area of 70,500 dunums have been expropriated, mainly for the construction of new neighborhoods intended for the Jewish settlers. Of the 45,500 dunums remaining after the expropriations, planning has been completed and approved for approximately 38.7% of the area (17,600 dunums) as shown in (Fig. 1.3). Planning procedures for the remaining area (61.3%) have yet to be completed: approximately 7,100 dunums are at an advanced stage of planning, and an additional 5,000 dunums are at preliminary planning stages. Of the planned areas approximately 40% are defined as open space in which no construction is permitted; approximately 37% are zoned for residential construction. The approved plans earmark approximately 6,100 dunums for residential

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9 1 hectare = 10 dunums; (1 dunum = 1000 meter square).
construction. Of this total, approximately 1,000 dunums require the preparation of unification and re-parcellation plans that will take many years to prepare and approve before building permits can be issued.

![Diagram showing Palestinian land loss](http://www.muzonline.de/photos2/palestine.jpg)

Figure 1.2: Palestinian loss of land resulting from Israeli occupation

Therefore, approximately 11.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem only is available to the Palestinian population for residential construction. Arnon (1998) argues that the study of the aerial photographs shows that this construction is possible mainly in existing built-up areas. The total potential for additional housing units in the

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Source: [http://www.muzonline.de/photos2/palestine.jpg](http://www.muzonline.de/photos2/palestine.jpg) Viewed on 15.01.2008; edited.
approved plans (excluding areas requiring unification and rep parcelation) is approximately 5,000. From this number one must deduct an unknown number of housing units for which building permits cannot be received for various reasons. Of the total area of East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations, approximately 7.3% only is available for residential construction, and approximately 0.6% for commercial and industrial construction. The remaining areas are zoned for various needs that do not enable private sector exploitation, or are unplanned areas. Consequently, small area of the total area of East Jerusalem is available to the Palestinian sector for any kind of private sector development.

In light of the above discussion, after more than forty four years of Israeli occupation for EJ, it is evident that the Palestinian development and existence is controlled and confined by the Israeli planning policies. Forty four years of Israeli planning have left indelible marks on the geography and demography of East Jerusalem. As such, deliberate and discriminatory actions against the Palestinian population continue and include (Jerusalem Unit, 2010):

- Land expropriation;
- Neighborhoods fragmentations and economic siege by the Separation Wall;
- Massive construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem;
- Building restrictions upon the Palestinian;
- Destruction and confiscation of homes;
- Lack of adequate public infrastructure;
- Prejudicial land regulations and zoning laws;
- Changing residency rights and permits.

1.2.4 Research Hypothesis

Jerusalem city space is growing magnificently with manifold layers in terms of its hard infrastructure and physical layouts, namely the expansion of built up areas. This ‘rapid’ urban expansion is, however, accompanied with variant growth rates in the city soft infrastructure, i.e. the city population, which is characterized mainly into two major national affiliations, Israelis and Palestinians. The Israeli communities are growing fast according to the ‘empowered development’ process guided by the government; whereas, the Palestinian communities face ‘restrained development’ and limited growth rate. Consequently, the Palestinians’ future existence in East Jerusalem and their cultural identity are severely threatened. Moreover, the “spatial sustainability” will not be achieved according to the current Israeli planning policies.
1.2.5 Research Objectives

According to the research scope and to the research problem statement, the research goal and objectives were developed. The overall goal of this doctorate research is:

To investigate and analyze the “aims and tools” of the Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem; and to explore their consequences upon the future development of the Jerusalemites.

According to this goal, the research objectives are described as the following:

- To analyze the pattern of urban development according to the current spatial planning and urban policies in East Jerusalem and to clarify their future impacts with respect to the Palestinian future needs.
- To explore relationships between space, planning, power and politics.
- To highlight the challenges imposed on the Palestinians in East Jerusalem in terms of socio-spatial and geopolitical conflicts.

1.2.6 Research Questions

In context of the research problem, and after the research overall goal and objectives were defined; the research questions were formulated as described below to cover the research scope and the related problem statement. The main research question is:

Is planning in Jerusalem used to mitigate or intensify conflict, and if so, how does it attempt to do so and to what extent is it successful?

The consequent questions this doctorate research will answer are:

- In the conflict areas, who is the leader: planning or politics? How can urban policies be employed to achieve political goals?
- Is there any relation between spatial planning and ideology of the regime? Is government ideology part of planning?
- To what extent can planning tools restrain native minorities? What are the main challenges the Israeli planning policies impose upon the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem?
- How do the Israeli land management techniques (zoning, land uses, master plans, etc.) alternate according to the Arab demographic factor? Do these plans match the Palestinian residents’ needs? Do these plans allow sustainable future development for the Jerusalemites?
1.3 Research Methodology

Applied research in social sciences has more tendencies and concerns about its methodological approaches than do the natural sciences (Sechrest and Sidani, 1995). The research’s dimensions can be investigated via manifold research techniques of data collection (such as field survey, interviews, questionnaires, observations etc.). The selection of a relevant technique (method) predominantly depends on the subjects under investigation, objectives of the study as well as on the knowledge to be acquired. However, a review of literature reveals that scholars may use different methodological and analytical approaches to investigate the same issues in different research settings. Researches dealing with spatial planning outstandingly demonstrate that variation. For example, in their research about housing (a spatial planning element) Rapoport (1999) and Kellett (1995) highlight a great emphasis on social and cultural anthropology as a mechanism to understand the connection between residents (families) and housing (production process). On the other hand, Shawesh and Awotona (1999) argue that investigating the relationship between housing and residents could be described largely with reference to quantitatively measured variables. Meanwhile, Aravot (1999) used descriptive approaches to study housing adaptation to changing conditions in Israel. Spatial planning policies combine interdisciplinary dimensions, therefore, during this doctoral research the following methodological approaches are utilized as shown in Figure (1.4).

![Diagram of methodological approaches](image-url)

Figure 1.4: The doctoral thesis methodological approaches, (researcher)
Many social researchers argue that in-depth events and behavior of people are aligned through words and actions, and if numbers are used, a rigor results and creditable conclusions can be obtained (Denzin & Lincoln 1998; Lofland & Lofland, 1984). In general, the documentary data is considered helpful in gaining insight, in-depth, and powerful enhancement of the interpretation process (Creswell, 1994). Nevertheless, to sustain 'objectivity' during the research, this requires in this process using different resources with high attention. It is useful in many research fields to adopt a case study during the research (Yin, 1994). Therefore, the researcher utilizes case study approach to identify the problem dimensions clearly. During this doctoral research, it is worthy to point out that there was a lot of data in hand, some was relevant to the study and some was not. Therefore, to get more clear analysis and precise results, the data that was relevant to the research scope was focused on.

Reviewing the literature about the Israeli spatial planning policies and the use of official reports and documents from various governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, ministries, and NGOs [such as: the Jerusalem Unit of the Palestinian President Office, the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)\(^\text{11}\), the Ministry of Local Governor (MoLG), the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the Palestinian Land Authority (PLA), Local Building and Planning Commissions, and National Organizations that deal with the Israeli Palestinian affairs such as: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), and Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON)] were utilized during the process of data collection, analysis, and evaluation. Tangible aspects of spatial planning [such as land management, land confiscation and land use plans, population densities, etc.] were the standard indicators during the investigation process. Opdam (2002) argues that “success” in reaching positive results depends on whether more than one approach can be integrated during the research. Therefore, the researcher used different interactive approaches during work on this doctoral research as was explained previously in this section. Primarily, to cover the research dimensions, the historical, analytical, comparative, descriptive, and future scenarios approaches are Interestingly intervened. Related literature, maps, available statistics were studied and evaluated. Figure (1.5) shows the researcher's methodology in developing the research rationale.

\(^{11}\) After establishing a separate Ministry for Foreign Affairs, MoPIC became MOP (Ministry of Planning).
Using theoretical approach during qualitative or quantitative research should be accompanied with special attention through formulating the methodological questions, procedures and canons used, and evaluative criteria for final judgment on results (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The researcher developed this doctorate research in the framework of "Theory – Analysis – Concept" interrelationship as shown in (Fig. 1.6).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORITICAL PART</th>
<th>Phase I: THEORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Review</td>
<td>Spatial Planning Theories, Sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Planning, Scenario Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical Theories, Role of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of Space-Place, Totality against Partiality</td>
<td>Planning Theories in Conflict Areas [Unbalanced Powers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning, Space, Power, Politics Interrelations [Geopolitics]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph. I: Development of the doctorate thesis rationale:</td>
<td>Problem, Objectives, Questions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase II: ANALYSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli planning policies (Effects &amp; Consequences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic, cultural, and historical dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph. II: Implication of the theoretical basis upon the case study and relating the results of the analysis to the next phase.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase III: CONCEPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced Jerusalem, Secured Spaces, Spaces of Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem the Open City, Jerusalem the Bi-national City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph. III: Conclusions, future vision and scenarios.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.6: The doctoral thesis framework, (researcher)
1.4 Research Structure

This doctoral research study is divided into six chapters that cover the logical framework of this dissertation, i.e. theory – analysis – conception. The “first chapter” is an introductive module where the research rationale and methodology are presented. The “second chapter” formulates the theoretical backbone as well as covers the literature review of this research where interesting exploration of space, planning, politics and power and the complex set of interrelationships (cause-effect) amongst these subjects are discussed, in addition to presenting interesting debate about the spatial sustainability and the role of planning in the conflict areas. The “third chapter” points out the main characteristics of Jerusalem (the case study) dealing with the historical, social and spiritual context of Jerusalem standing upon spatial planning point of view. The “forth chapter” deals with analysing the chronological development of spatial planning in Jerusalem since the Ottoman era hitherto (i.e. since 1516 – to present); it presents analytical discussion of urban planning for Jerusalem during the different governing powers of Jerusalem in that era, specifically Ottomans, British, Jordanians and finally Israelis. The “fifth chapter” presents the researcher major examination for the role of spatial planning in Jerusalem (East and West - the conflict areas) through deep analysis for seven selected Palestinian urban centres distributed evenly (north, centre, south) inside the case study with comparative discussions for some Israeli urban settlements. Finally, the “sixth chapter” of this doctoral research highlights the researcher major spatial conceptions; it also closes out with executive summary of the overall research findings and results, and presents future outlook, as well as spatial scenarios for Jerusalem’s geopolitical status.
Chapter Two

Space, Planning, Power and Politics
Chapter Two

Space, Planning, Power and Politics

"The theory has to be interpreted that extra dimensions beyond the ordinary four dimensions the three spatial dimensions plus time are sufficiently small that they haven't been observed yet"  
Edward Witten

This chapter provides interestingly an philosophical outlook for spatial concepts as well as remarkable theoretical debate pertaining to dynamic spatial relations of space, planning, power, and politics. It reasserts how spatiality is highly correlated with the dialectical mode of argumentation, and presents outlook pertaining to spatial planning and sustainability. Moreover, it presents the differences between Cartesian and dialectical viewpoints of the space-place interrelationship, and shows how space and place are different aspects of unity. In addition, the researcher highlights space traits and the power of spatial planning in regulating space. Furthermore, the researcher illuminates the concrete bond between planning and politics, and eventually, argues how planning may act as a regressive tool serving provident groups against the minor ones.

2.1 Overview

The transformation of a given status is not, unquestionably, the core theme of philosophy. The abstract character of the philosophical work in the past and present is rooted in the social conditions of existence. Adhering to the abstractness of philosophy is more appropriate to settings, and closer to certainty, than is the pseudo philosophical concreteness that condescends to social struggles (Herbert, 1968). Social struggles reach climax when various socio-political dimensions merge together. Thiong'o (1997) points out that the struggle between the intellectuals (arts) and the power (state) can best be observed in the battle over performance space, i.e. space where the social and natural processes of production take place. Spatial presentations of space outline complex set of variables (spatial relations); power and politics surface to the top in this manner. Shome (2003) asserts that the role of space in the production of cultural power and politics has been largely ignored in cultural theory and criticism. Shome also addresses that focusing on power as a spatial presentation helps researchers to precisely theorize the manifold social reproduction processes.
Space in a merely metamorphic sense refers to mental image, or nonphysical presentation. According to many viewpoints, this is illusionary, invoking space as a metaphor rather than a physical ‘quantifiable’ subject is problematic, because invocations of space habitually adopt space as known, specified, and unproblematic (Smith and Katz, 1993). Space is exceedingly correlated into social relations and is the convenient medium of power that is socially constituted through material relations that enable interaction of definite politics. Foucault (1980:149) interestingly highlights the political nature of space, stating: “A whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of power”. Power reflects through its definition energy, movement, circulation, strength, might, and force. In this sense, Massey (1999) articulates space as a dynamic, non-static or closed thing; it is rather a product of relations that are themselves active and constantly changing.

Instability addresses ‘implicitly’ conflict of powers whichever the kind it represents, i.e. physical, natural, political, or social power. Spatial configurations constitute unequal relations and thus the emergence of differences and seeking for power. Theorization utilizes that ‘mess’ of relations; to theorize space ‘unbalanced powers’ and ‘unequal relations’ in terms of social complexity (classes, races, gender, etc.), terms to differentiate between strong powers (dominant relations) and weak powers (marginal relations) arise. Grossberg (1996) argues that the ‘differences’ - emerging out of the spatial relations - consist part of the social and the cultural theory. Massey (1995) assures that spatiality of powers constitute and reconstitute our social marks (identities), furthermore Massey urges that space and spatial relations should be considered as active components in the unequal and heterogeneous production and distribution of social marks (identities), politics, and powers (actions) which altogether highlight places:

“\textit{In daily life, in politics, in battles over development and conservation, we often operate in ways which mobilize this point of view of place. Arriving in Paris, say, on the first day of a much-needed holiday, \ldots}, ‘ah’ we sigh with satisfaction, ‘this is the real France’, \ldots, Or again in London’s docklands ‘the local community’, itself a term of a municipality of interpretations, \ldots, but shouting also ‘this is a white working area’, \ldots. Different as these examples are in terms of their political import and practical effect, they are all calling upon a particular way of conceptualizing ‘place’”. Massey (1995:182).

In this context, Shome (2003) asserts that in order to avoid misapprehension of the socio-spatial relations of space and place; it is important to refuse considering the framework of social marks (identities) as the sole background against which all other
investigations of social (cultural) relations occur. For that the social marks are constantly variable parameters which are continually altered, disputed, and reproduced. Furthermore, Shome interestingly retrieves the dynamism of space and the spatialities of power, he illuminates that space comprises an active and constantly changing site of power, however, he argues that the theory of ‘politics of location’ does not capture that critically.

Drawing upon the very deep meaning of space, demonstrates how essential it is to clarify the dimensions of interaction between the ‘social attributes’ of space and its ‘material processes’ of production. To illustrate this metaphoric concept, space representation helps clarifying this issue. Considering a place’s socio-physical form (e.g. the city concept – a subunit of space) outlines matchlessly how space is a non-static mass, rather it is a dynamic organism. Thus, understanding the nature of this organism magnifies a clear illustration of how space can constitute, interact, and affect the spatiality of relations. Mumford (1968) highlights the city concept by raising many questions e.g.: what is the city? how did it come to existence? what relations (functions) does it perform? what processes does it fulfill? Mumford urges to understand the relations carried out within this ‘closed container’ before analysing its components, and to accept that ‘the city’ is not merely a container. Another exciting explanation for the city concept is introduced by Gruen (1964) who conceived city as a place where there is still a recognizable concentrated, teeming, dynamic expression of urbanism; it is a place which becomes very enjoyable for its inhabitants and lots of visitors every year. Gruen eventually asks whether it becomes a city just by the act of being incorporated, or must it offer social, cultural, recreational and political consciousness to its inhabitants.

The previous interpretations for the city concept (a subunit of space), apparently show that the core meaning of space or place is a relative norm, highly correlated to social and cultural concepts. It depends on the cognitive images of a place conceived by the manifold experiences and backgrounds of people. The dynamic sociality in the place definition is interestingly presented by Gruen:

“... the city is the place articulated in the countless cafes and sidewalks of Vienna, it is the crowded sidewalks and covered galleries in Italy, it is the parks, ......, it is the holy feeling expressed from mosques and churches; ......, it is a six years boy who ask another “do you want to play with me?” and later becomes his lifelong friend; ......, the gentleman who asks for a permission to sit at a sidewalk café with another and ends up writing a book with him; it is the millions of chances of meetings that turn out to be the important events of lifetime; ......, A place of full of life, it is a place of different moods, between morning, afternoon and evening. It is a mirror of everything
human, for love for hate, for spirituality and for social activities, it is the well functioning place with different choices between be socialized to feel private, to act people together or give opportunity to escape alone, it’s the base that link different classes together, ......, it is a place with a high social dimension (Gruen, 1964).

Tracing the previous descriptions outlines the contextual and metaphoric meaning of the space, which is to some extent linked implicitly to the human cognitive (mental) images. Furthermore, it determines the character of the spatial representation in terms of its physical, social, ideological and spiritual aspects that altogether are articulated in this form. Indeed, the case in which the interrelations between space, power, and politics are outstandingly presented lies in Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem the image is even dramatically more interesting, upon examining the social and power spatiality, two predominant realities, diametrically tied, strike one’s mind: the physical displacement, and the social struggle. In order to make the space politics in Jerusalem accurately understood, the researcher found it is outstandingly important, at first, to investigate different theories and concepts pertaining to: the power of planning to act either as progressive or regressive agent of change; and the probability of using planning as a “control tool” instead of “reforming tool” principally upon ethnic minorities. The study of East Jerusalem uniquely elucidates a model of: contested cities, political conflicts, unbalanced powers, and urban instability. Hence, abstraction to these concepts arises several questions: In conflict areas, which is the leader: planning or politics? How can urban policies be employed to achieve political goals? Is there any relation between spatial planning and ideology of the regime? Is government ideology part of planning? Lastly, to what extent can planning tools restrain native minorities?

2.2 Spatial Planning

Planning - is defined in the ‘linguistic meaning’ as: the activity of setting in order and time in advance of some act or purpose; in other words, an act of formulating a program for a definite course of action. On the other hand, planning - in the ‘conventional sense’, simply, refers to: the process of setting goals, developing strategies, and outlining activities and schedules to accomplish desired objectives (Ruiter & Sanders, 1998). The emerging ‘compound nouns’ of planning, have attracted scholars to explore and investigate the meanings and semantics of those “flexible names”. For example, the terms 'land use planning', 'regional planning', 'town planning', and 'urban planning' are often used interchangeably, and in many cases will
depend on the reference country, but do not always have the same meaning (see e.g. Palemro and Ponzini, 2010; Yiftachel et al. 2001). In the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, the term "town planning" is common. Meanwhile, in the United States and Canada, the term "urban planning" is more familiar. However, in Europe the preferred term is increasingly "spatial planning".

Spatial planning represents the interrelationship between the concepts of space and place. It explores how such concepts reflect the shift in geographical thought to a dynamic, dis-contiguous, relational conceptualization of spatiality (Healey, 2004). Moreover, spatial planning is a multidisciplinary, hermeneutic discipline, which integrates the acquaintance of many other disciplines to explain spaces and eventually to optimize strategic mechanisms in developing spaces towards a more sustainable and equal living conditions (Albrechts, 2001; OECD, 2001). In this context, a good definition for the spatial planning is derived by the British¹²: “going beyond traditional land use planning to bring together and integrate policies for the development and use of land with other policies and programs which influence the nature of places and how they function”. Spatial planning, therefore, refers to the methods used by the public sector to influence the distribution of people and activities in spaces of various scales. This definition is integrative, it highlights the flexibility in providing the planning authorities with opportunities to simulate their areas, develop strategic approaches to planning that will deliver sustainable development and reflect the local distinctiveness of the area and the aspirations of the local community.

Spatial planning is a wider, more inclusive approach to considering the optimal use of land than traditional 'land-use planning' which is defined as¹³: “the scientific, aesthetic, and orderly disposition of land, resources, facilities and services with a view to securing the physical, economic and social efficiency, health and well-being of urban and rural communities”. Young (2003) argues that land use planning is the process of methodical assessment of major resources (land and water), alternatives for land use, and socio-economic conditions in order to select and approve the optimal land-use options. Uncontrolled growth and random development cause deterioration in the social, economic and environmental conditions (SNCPEDEC et. al, 2009). Land use planning developed, to envision the changes that development would cause and mitigate the negative effects of such change. Land use planning is often guided by

¹² This definition is proposed by the British Government and available at the Customer Service Centre, Winchester City Council, UK.
¹³ This definition is proposed by the Canadian Institute of Planners CIP 2011.
laws and regulations, commonly referred as 'zoning' - an effective regulative instrument; besides, it is historically tied to the practice of zoning and generally used in the developed countries (Lefcoe, 2005).

Zoning first emerged to protect the interests of property owners in the late nineteenth century in America. According to the American Planning Association, practicing of zoning expanded and was found to be constitutionally sound by early twentieth century. Barnet (2004) argues that zoning controls the sorts of events (e.g. construction) that can take place on a particular piece of land, the amount of space devoted to those events and the ways that construction may be established and shaped. Conventional zoning, however, has not normally regarded the manner in which the events (e.g. buildings or constructions) relate to one another or the public spaces around them, but rather has provided a practical structure for complying jurisdictions according to approved land use. Although Walters (2007) argues that zoning provides remedy for the uncontrolled development patterns and that its practices evolved as an attempt to overcome these challenges, Barnet (2004) points out that suburban sprawl is generated if zoning is used without planning.

Progressively more, land use planning is prepared at larger scales and involves manifold concerns. It becomes an important part of socio-economic policy, ensuring that resources (land and water) are used efficiently to meet the needs of people and environment. According to the American Planning Association, the goal of land use planning is: to further the welfare of people and their communities by creating convenient, equitable, healthful, efficient, and attractive environments for present and future generations; enhancing, therefore, sustainable development and optimizing resources (Cherry, 1988; Faludi 1973). Urban planning, on the other hand, is the integration of the disciplines of ‘land use planning’ and ‘transport planning’, to investigate a very wide range of aspects of the physical and social environments of urbanized spaces. Meanwhile, regional planning deals with a still “larger” socio-physical environment, but at less detailed level. Regional planning, on the other hand, is conceived as the science of efficient placement of infrastructure and zoning for the sustainable growth of a region. Early visions of the planning movement and the regional planning (in America) flourished in the late decades of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth (Hall, 2002).

Both concepts of - land use planning and regional planning - are encapsulated in 'spatial planning' using a 'Eurocentric' definition. The European Conference of
Ministers Responsible for Regional Planning (adopted in Spain, in 1983) introduced the concept, the core concern, and the characteristics of spatial planning as:

"Spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the physical organization of space according to an overall strategy, ..., Man and his well-being as well as his interaction with the environment are the central concern of regional/spatial planning, its aims being to provide each individual with an environment and quality of life conducive to the development of his personality in surroundings planned on a human scale. Spatial planning should be democratic, comprehensive, functional and oriented towards the longer term."

Spatial planning investigates the interaction of different policies and practice across regional space, and sets the role of places in a wider context. Consequently, it moves focus from "traditional" land use planning based on regulation and control of land, to a "wider" more far ranging approach that aims to ensure the best use of land by assessing competing demands, and setting out a strategic framework to guide future development and policy interventions (OECD, 2001). Integrating the manifold dimensions of spatial planning arises complexities. For instance, Eccles and Bryant (2007) illustrates that including environmental impacts of significant developments remained ‘somewhat’ unclear. Accordingly, various environmental guides were developed (Burchell and Listokin, 1975; Beer, 1977). Moreover, Kunzmann (2004) points out that in the past, important subjects (such as culture) were neglected in spatial planning, but it attained more attention from planning professionals in the period of globalization and increasing urban competition. Thus, spatial planning expanded its scopes gradually to cope with the dynamic changes of communities, resources, technologies, and environment. To this end, social, economic and environmental factors are taken into account in producing a decision that is more conducive to sustainable development.

2.3 Spatial Sustainability

Years after the Industrial Revolution witnessed fast transformation in both the norms of knowledge, and the communities’ growth patterns. Unfortunately, the fast mode of production and unregulated urban growth resulted - in many cases - social degradation, poor living conditions, and environmental concerns (Vitousek et al, 2007; Stearns, 1993). ‘Rethinking’ the development processes and urban growth became urgent need consequently. As a result, the concept of “sustainable
development”, or “sustainability” floated to the surface introducing various challenges and questions for planners and policy makers as well (UN, 1993). Sustainability is, therefore, a major concern of all the scientific communities with reference to the crucial need to protect the global environment while attaining better life for the people (Dooge et al., 1992; Grubler, 2000). Noticeably, sustainability is closely tied to the environmental concerns which both introduced changes in knowledge and sciences (Adams, 1990).

Sustainable development attained intense concern in the late decades of the twentieth century. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development in its “Brundtland Report - Our Common Future” identified that concept as: ‘paths of human progress that meet the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. However, Pearce (1990) argues that the concept of sustainable development was already promoted by the World Conservation Strategy. Brundtland Report incorporated components of sustainability within the economic and political context of international development, as well as, it combined ethical norms of welfare, democracy, and environment (Naess, 2001). Sustainability is a concept that provides new visions for the national and international development, and formulates new solutions for the recurrent socioeconomic needs. Hassan and Zetter (2002) argue that assuring the adoption of sustainable developments requires establishing national committees (local pressure groups) who can formulate new governmental policies. However, responses to meet the increasing needs of a growing population in an interconnected but unequal and human-dominated world are undermining the Earth’s essential life-support systems (Kofi, 2000; Watson et al., 1998).

Modern interdisciplinary mode of thinking has interestingly succeeded in linking the traditionally separate intellectual norms of critical social theory and environmental science (e.g. Wilson, 1992; Ross 1994). Ideally, sustainability evokes steering the development wheel towards environmental protection, economic growth, and social equity; thus, towards improved and balanced living conditions. However, Campbell (1996) argues that planners work within the ‘tension’ generated among these three fundamental aims (social justice, economic development, and environmental protection), which, collectively, Campbell calls the "planner's triangle", with 'sustainable development' located at its center as shown in (Fig. 2.1).
Sustainable development aspires to offer a fascinating, holistic way of evading these conflicts, but they cannot be resolved so simply. Kates et al. (2000) argue the world’s present development path is not sustainable. Sophistication of the development and production processes reaches climax when considering the increasing consequences of the global environmental changes and the profound transformations underway in social and economic life. Major indications for such consequences are the global climate warming, degradation of biological diversity, deterioration of living conditions and increase in poverty levels, excessive utilization of resources with unprecedented levels rates of pollution (McNeill, 2000; UNEP, 2000; UNDP, 1997). In this context, Campbell (1996) argues that the current concept of sustainability is vulnerable to the same criticism of vague idealism prepared against comprehensive planning. Yet, planners have faced tough decisions for utilizing optimal solutions, even compromises, to meet organic demands, provide sufficient supply which all together shall stand on protecting environment, promoting the economically growing city, and advocating social justice. To this end, planners need to combine both their procedural and their expanding skills, and thus, become central players in the battle over demanding growth, shrinking environment, and threatened social justice. An interesting conclusion of the threatened sustainability is proposed by Kates et al. (2000), who believe in the sharp contrast in both perceptions and realities of resource distribution between countries of the North and South, and thus, expanding gaps between them. Eventually, the socio-economic, environmental, and knowledge oppositions are aggravated by the deepening digital divide, as shown in
In this concern, Burgh and Mooij (1996) argue that the discussion surrounding ‘sustainable development’ can be considered as ‘terminology game’ that does not resolve the older growth debate, but disguises it.

![Figure 2.2: Sustainability science within a divided world, (Kates et al., 2000)](image)

2.4 Space Dialectics

The interest in place and region has significantly grown during the last decade; it is reflected by the development of the so-called new regional geography (Pudup, 1988). Arguments concerning the theory of space have reappeared on the agenda of many scholars and theorists in recent years. The claim that space presentations (place themes) became something provident during the 1980s (Massey and Allen, 1984) and repeated invocations about spatial perspectives within the geographical imagination (Agnew and Duncan, 1989). Thus, recognizing that spatiality of places is not equal in its socio-political relations and that this inequality is significant in affecting argumentations has floated to surface once again. Many scholars and theorists assure that the problematic nature of space can be resolved through a dialectical mode of argumentation. Ollman (1993) remarks the philosophy of dialectics is both a proclamation about what the world is and a method of arranging this world for the purpose of analysis and presentation. The cornerstone in the dialectics philosophy commonly concern to address the question of change (spatial, social and physical), interrelations, interconnections and interactions, processes, activities, flows, relations
and eventually contradiction (Mao, 1954; Harvey, 1993). Accordingly, dialecticians often conceptualize ‘dynamism’ as the basic framework to all matter and thus ‘stability’ is irrelevant status which necessitates explanation. In this sense Ollman states:

> “given that change is always a part of what things are, the problem for research can only then be how, when and into what they change and why they sometimes appear not to change” (Ollman, 1990:34)

According to the dialectical mode of argumentation, the complex composition of space (spatial relations, power, politics, productions, and phenomena) is conceived just as a single entity (wholeness). Lefebvre (1968:111) demonstrates wholeness (totality) as “the way the whole is present through internal relations in each of its parts”. Although it is not achievable to comprehend manifold interrelated elements of a whole without understanding how the elements relate to each other within this whole, Bohm (1980:11) signifies totality in its wholeness: “a need to look on the world as an undivided whole”. Capra (1982) opposes to dialectics and contrasts markedly with the concepts of totality, he believes in 'discrete' objects by breaking up of thoughts and problems into pieces and in arranging these in their logical order. Capra mode of thinking stems out of Cartesianism which posits an essentially mechanical and mathematical representation of reality. In this sense, space is articulated as: absolute, a passive empty container independent of physical phenomena (Smith, 1984). Totality from this viewpoint amounts to nothing more than the sum of the parts. On the other hand, dialecticians oppose the reification of fragmentation and the separation of different aspects of reality. Alternatively, dialectics epistemological and ontological commitment affirms the unity of knowledge and the total character of reality. Space, therefore, in this sense is a unity containing within itself different aspects.

Conceptualizing the physical meaning of space necessitates highlighting the material interrelation among its components. To clarify this issue, the interaction between space (whole) and place (space subunit or element) here is crucial one. The 'whole' and the 'part' are, in fact, closely tied together forming a dialectical unit. Lefebvre (1991) argues that the production process does not occur solely in some abstract sense, it has to be represented in particular places, if it to have any meaning. In other words, space 'the whole' earmarks its definition though place 'the part', likewise, the accumulation of parts through their interrelations constitutes the whole.
Needless to say, the dividing line between the whole and the part is invisible. It is arguable, therefore, to say that both space and place have a real ontological status and their distinction depends on the comprehensive integration for grasping the interconnected relations (social, power, politics, process) among them. Lefebvre stresses politics among the heterogeneous and conflictual elements of space as an internal parameter and major player; he argues that the overall production process of space and place is genuinely a political event (Ibid). Consequently, Lefebvre matches the concrete foundation of dialectics, i.e. contradiction, which is the ground on which all the phenomena are acknowledged. Spatial contradictions (political conflicts), therefore, between socio-economic interests and forces - express themselves in place, a subunit of space. Yet, from dialectical standpoint, these elements are different parts of the same unity, however, the significance of these qualitative aspects of place and how they, in turn, shape space cannot be downplayed.

2.5 Explicit Review of the Implicit Planning-Politics Interrelationship

In their definitions for the individual and communities' social capital, Lippert and Spagnolo (2005) introduced the networks of relations as implicit contracts. Relations in their regional and international context urge theorists to develop various theories regarding the role and importance which they constitute to regional powers. GIGA (2006) reveals that modern literature with respect to international relations argues - conflicts to achieve or to frustrate regional dominance - will become more potent in the future. Moreover, international politics addresses concepts of power relations and power hierarchies interestingly in conflict areas. From objective point of view, the researcher believes that planning, power, and politics all are perfectly interrelated though the study of socio-spatial relations in conflict areas. In context to the theoretical debate on politics, the researcher highlights such relations by quoting Waltz:

"... students of international politics with their yen to get the power out of power politics, the national out of international politics, the dependence out of interdependence, the relative out of relative gains, the politics out of international politics, and the structure out of structural theory” (Waltz, 2000:8).

Clarifying the explicit and implicit relation between planning and politics is a prominent issue in this doctoral thesis. Understanding this relation reveals the range of influence of politics upon planning objectives and role. Accordingly, it is a marvelous
question to know if planning is an organic reflection of politics or not. It might be argued that the revolutionary ideas of spatial planning direct their role in changing the space in addition to improving its conditions; and so to spread equity, justice, enhancement of community, and protection of amenity (Ward, 1994). Moreover, Kivell (1993) argued that political sector in the eighteenth century began to bracket land and space (spatial planning) together with control and power. As per the theoretical debate on powers, the researcher highlights such conception by quoting Walt:

“The concept of power is central to realist theory, yet there is still little agreement on how it should be conceived and measured. We still lack a firm conceptual foundation on which to base valid measures of national power” (Walt 2002:222).

Spatial planning - previously conceptualized as the regulator - by its terminological definition integrates those elements of space, especially such dynamic ones (powers). This is why many theorists argue planning to be a primarily ideological activity. In analyzing this dialectical conception, Friedmann stated:

“Planning is done by individuals whose fundamental motivations derive in part from an ideological interpretation of the function of planning in society. This influences the choice of problems, method of work and proposed solutions.” (Friedmann, 1992)

According to many researchers it has been shown that the relation between politics and planning is also paradoxical. For example, Friedmann (1987) believed that modern planning practice is apolitical process, and Planning was regarded as an alternative to politics. However, Simmie showed that there is a strong relation between planning and politics:

“Town planning is political in three senses. First it was set up by government presumably to execute political wills on the subject of land use and regulation. Second, as an executive branch of government it is directly linked to the political power structure, ... Third, the way town planning decisions are taken is political”. (Simmie, 1974)

The researcher supports the second interpretation which is more realistic and convincingly touches the ground on which planning is happening, i.e. planning is to some extent influenced by politics. Bilski (1980) points out that there are many cases in which planning reflects the political ideologies of members in governmental bodies; and thus planners have political roles, they take the politicians’ perspectives into account during planning process. Accordingly, it might be argued that planners pave the way to serve politics and control, also it could be concluded that the
assumption “planning is apolitical process” is far away to touch truth - especially in Jerusalem -where extensively the community is addressed to be politically-oriented.

The effects resulting from attempting to plan upon political and administrative relationships at national and regional levels are highlighted by Hayward and Watson (1975), who conceived the planning-politics interrelationship as a technique of public economic policy-making of the political and administrative institutions. The interest in defining the role of ideal planning has generated intensive debate on its relation with the government ideology. Many scholars considered what the researcher conceptualizes “ideal planning” as a reform tool which improves the living conditions of mankind and allows exploiting resources sustainably. However, some theorists like Oren Yiftachel argued that this viewpoint of planning is narrow, too idealistic and often unrealistic. Furthermore, theoretically this idealism of planning role has ignored the position of planning as an arm of the modern nation state; whereas empirically it has overlooked the numerous cases in which planning functions as a form of deliberate social control and oppression mainly exercised by elites over weaker groups in various societies. In this context, Smooha (1990) concluded that planners in many situations may seek to attain, preserve, and strengthen the dominance of one ethnic group that is related directly to the government, and to control sectors of the community. Supportively, Flyvbjerg (1996) added that planners could be servants to the interests of the state which expect them to promote the goal of government, and that the state and planners can accomplish what they seek by playing the game of power covered up as technical reasoning.

Imperfection of planning idealism – i.e. using planning as a control tool – is discussed by Thomas (1994), who provided arguments on how housing, zoning, and development policies have systematically excluded and distanced blacks from opportunity and wealth in America. Likewise, Yiftachel (2009, 2008, 1999, 1996) reveals the dark side of planning in Israel and proves the regressive impact of Israel's regional development and settlement policies, which in total have profoundly shifted land along with economic resources from indigenous Palestinians to Israeli settlers and Jewish immigrants. Accordingly, those examples among others assure that "planning as oppression instrument” not only does exist in a variety of settings but also constantly affects a range of dynamic socio-spatial relations of space.
2.6 Fundamental Scopes of Imperfect Planning

'Imperfect planning' is a conceptual representation the researcher used for the cases in which planning is oriented to function as a "control tool" achieving oppressive objectives. Once again, questioning the role of planning is a good commencement to demonstrate this issue. After the early start of the Industrial Revolution the world witnessed rapid transformation process from simple agricultural communities into massively urbanized ones (Stearns, 1993). This quick transformation resulted in many cases unhealthy living conditions, social dilemmas, and environmental hazards. Cherry (1988) argues that planning was born as a reaction to heal the ills of urbanization, then grew up – as an organized field of human activity – in response to the exigent need of reforming all that unacceptable conditions. This basic definition of planning inspired the first planners to introduce ‘ideal’ concepts such as utopianism, equity, public interest, maximizing economic growth, and improving living conditions. These basic thoughts formed the foundation of planning theories. In his articulation of planning Yiftachel (1995) showed that most of planning theories addressed two prominent questions: What is a good city? And what is good planning? In this manner, perfect planning could be conceived as a problem-solving activity which relates knowledge to action in different ways (Simon 1957, 1960; Tinbergen 1956; Faludi 1973).

Thus, regardless of the socio-spatial reference, planning challenging problems and tools always seem to be fraught with a considerable degree of uncertainty and vagueness; not only does this affect the effectiveness of planning, but also its legitimacy, consensus and sustainability in real contexts. Consequently, this widespread uncertainty of planning perception continues to raise doubts regarding a presumed disciplinary statute and even professional conception for planning and its expected - and in many cases - unpredictable roles. In this sense, issues concerning physical development - especially within spatially sociopolitical instability - simultaneously recall crucial questions to the fore; in addition, interactive powers relationships clearly exist between contingent styles of planning and their institutional and cultural contexts which illustrates to some extent the differentiation in planning tools and the variety of outcomes (Booth et al., 2007; Faludi and Janin, 2005; Freestone, 2000; Newman and Thornley, 1996). Examining theoretical and empirical studies regarding planning practices in different contexts could help clarifying a solid core of common trends and problems constituting a series of challenges, dilemmas
and limitations which are valid in different institutional frameworks, government models, economic and administrative structures (Rodwin, 1981; Bruton and Nicholson, 1987; Alexander, 1992; Taylor, 1998).

Hence, any study in this sense must specify, insofar as possible, its underlying references and points of view. Understanding the context in which planning is transformed into what the researcher conceptualized as imperfect planning “i.e. planning as an oppressive tool” addresses substantial exploration of particular scopes that reveal how planning is used as a socio-graphical control tool. Those scopes are categorized into four folds: spatial context (territorial scope), power relations and decision-making processes (methodological scope), physical consequences (socioeconomic scope), and impacts on identities and mode of thinking (cultural scope).

2.6.1 Spatial Context

The spatial context of planning outlines issues with regard to space, geography, time, and people. Its widespread territorial policies may represent the regulations in term of land titles, land use, land development, land settlement, land boundaries, etc., linking land into people highlights planning (ideal) role which according to Ward (1994) is to regulate land uses and improve living conditions along with environmental standards. Thus, ideally planning territorial scope is supposed to effectively serve the needs of people, improve their ways of living, and minimize the gap between different social groups, especially for ethnic minorities.

However, the territorial scope is not always utilized ideally during planning process, it can be oriented paradoxically. For example, Yiftachel (1995) in his writing about - Planning as Control – states: “ ... territorial policies can also be used as a most powerful tool of control over minorities, particularly in deeply divided societies, where ethnic group often reside in - their own- regions”. In this sense, Haider (1994) points out that land use policy (which is a tool of territorial scope) is an active instrument that can be employed for either progress or retardation in society. Moreover, Badcock (1984) shows that government can controversially exploit territorial scope, it can develop ordinances regarding land tenure to restrain minorities landownership and to block their housing needs and future growth, which in total creates socio-spatial fragmentation. In this manner, particularly in spaces where multi-ethnical groups exist, territorial policies can harmfully be utilized by regime or
by the prevailing and wealthy classes. In many cases inhabitants belonging to poorer and dissimilar ethnic groups are prevented from power-sharing, decision-making, and land-ownership. Thus, imperfect territorial policies result ‘unseen barriers’ which form “walled-spaces” within ‘one space’ along with recognizable social fragmentation.

2.6.2 Methodological Scope

Planning is typically connected to powers. Attaining planning objectives forces the governments to develop dynamic mechanisms and active methodologies through which the regime’s aims can be accomplished. Wherever power dominates high rates, plans can touch the ground and achieve desired goals. An international, national, regional or local influence of these goals is highly correlated to the regime’s power. Keohane (1969) classifies a state according to power point of view as:

“A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system; a secondary power is a state whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in itself decisive, on that system; a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through international institutions; a small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (Keohane 1969: 296)

According to Yiftachel (1998) the methodological or procedural scope includes statutory aspects that determine the formal relationship between regime and the public in a space; also it incorporates the formulation and implementation of plans and respective policies. The methodological scope is meant “ideally” to enhance social reform though allowing all community groups of a space to share in the process of decision-making, which genuinely empowers the disadvantaged groups, and creates kind of balance to the scattered parts of the community through the access of power relations of a space. However, Friedmann (1992) argues that this scope could be viciously employed to marginalize specific groups of a space, thus enhancing segregation and exclusion of – ethничal or minority groups – from the active and real participation in the process of decision-making. According to Yiftachel (1995) regime can practice this kind of control whether explicitly by using ‘top-down approach’ thus imposing decisions ‘from above’, or implicitly through complex techniques of information misrepresentation and meaningless structures of public consultations.
2.6.3 Socioeconomic Scope

In many contexts in literature, economy was perceived as the concrete foundation which sustainable and remarkable social reform can firmly stand on. This vitality of the economical roles in enhancing the stability of a space tends to attract the regime of that space to dominate over this “economic” scope, and to orient this scope by all the possible means to serve its policies. Thus this scope is a double-edged weapon; it can ameliorate the quality of economic condition, improve social relationships, and achieve progress in the communities. However, Mclaughlin (1992) argues that this scope could be used through rearranging the costs-benefits interrelations to serve the interests of the dominant party, and thereby contribute to create weaker groups of a space who become more dependent on the dominant party which in turn manipulates the regime of that space to increase its influence and power. Moreover, Garnett and O'Hara (2007) point out that the government takings that are justified by the need for “economic development,” but occurring outside of a comprehensive development plan, may become constitutionally suspect and has pretextual rationale. In this sense, the researcher highlights how socioeconomic scope could be used as a control tool by quoting Garnett:

“... The district court found that the Authority’s assertion that the condemnation was necessary to prevent the “reestablishment of blight” was “palpably without reasonable foundation” and thus, invalid ... The court reasoned that the asserted public purpose of future-blight prevention was pretextual: In this case, the evidence is clear beyond dispute that Lancaster’s condemnation efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of property from one private party to another...” (Garnett and O'Hara, 2007:455)

As shown in the above quotation, the regime – authority – can influence positively specific group and impact negatively another. Accordingly, protecting community civic rights is a prominent issue. Bray (2010) identifies the concept of ‘power rules’ for understanding how law can protect a vulnerable person from a powerful one. In his concept, Bray helps illustrate patterns in the use of legal rules, especially in the contexts of violence, competition, and the performance of relational statuses. Eventually, it could be concluded that socioeconomic scope is also a paradoxical control instrument.

2.6.4 Cultural Scope

Space is like humankind each has his own character; however, in many cases where space includes humans it starts to re-identify, re-define or even re-shape its
identity. This identity-transformation process is happening either by natural growth and development processes or by enforced policies imposed by humans. In fact, it is almost impossible to find a space of homogenous soft infrastructure “i.e. humankind”; most spaces incorporate heterogeneous soft infrastructure shaping what is known in literature as multicultural spaces. The cultural scope deals with the influence of planning policies on the various cultures and collective identities within a space. Burgess (2009) introduced the concept of “strategic culture” who considered it as an explanatory variable for the regime’s suboptimal performance in the external relations and internal powers. The role of ‘ideal’ planning in multicultural space is very essential in preserving minor groups’ identities and integrating multi-ethnic cultures. However, Yiftachel (1998) argues that planning strategies are practiced by dominant ethnic group which often aims to minimize and alienate the other ethnic cultures. Hence, the sense of intellectual ‘cultural’ scope could be employed progressively or oppressively forming catastrophic weapon for planning as a control tool.

2.7 Spatial Visions and Scenarios

Exploring any spatial context within geographical area depends upon the existing situation on the ground and the available spatial and attribute data ultimately. The more availability of data leads to more comprehensive analysis and better understanding. However, integrating the analysis to include physical, socio-economic, and political aspects generates complex set of relations that require interdisciplinary backgrounds to clarify objective conclusions and to identify fruitful recommendations. The science of planning grasps the ‘conclusions’ and integrates the ‘recommendations’ within scientific approach to improve the “existing” spatial status, and then, to direct that “concurrent” status into more 'desirable' situation and better conditions. Linking this gap between the “current” status and the “future” status has been subjected into unquiet debate lately. Visions and outlooks have been driven to compensate this time difference and unforeseen varieties between these two temporal statues. Unlike ‘strategic planning’ which has conditionally supported that, ‘scenario planning’ has bridged the gap between the ‘present’ and ‘future’ uniquely.

A vision is an advanced step of an outlook and recommendations; IPCC (2005) identifies the vision as:
“..., a coherent, emotionally appealing and convincing statement about a desired outcome – it is an articulation of the way we wish we could live ... A vision is composed of two parts: the visible part, that we can see and feel, and the invisible part, those political, cultural and social processes which make the visible part possible.” (IPCC, 2005:19)

The above definition highlights the core theme of vision, and how does the vision link the present towards an oriented target and desired status. The vision will be optimizing the opportunities and strengths identified within a spatial context in order to draw up the best status of the future, as shown in (Fig 2.3). Moreover, the vision in order to be more comprehensive and realistic must cover both dimensions mentioned above; i.e. the visible part (places, images, etc.) which is also referred to as the “feelings”; and the invisible part (analysis, logic, language and description etc.) which is also known as the “mind”.

Figure 2.3: Clarifying reality, outlook, and vision within time horizon, (researcher)

In practice, applying any of the aforementioned techniques within conflictual space, i.e. in regions of political instability, or more specifically, in the conflict areas,
becomes excessively complex and requires numerous effort and manifold assumptions. Standing upon this viewpoint, Rollier and Turner (1992) argue that ‘uncertainty’ about the future increases, and relying upon ‘quantitative’ decision-making approaches for strategic planning becomes less appropriate; therefore scenario analysis is an effective ‘qualitative’ technique for enhancing strategic planning. In other words, in periods of stability, the past may serve as a rationally reliable model for predictions about the future. But in the turbulent environment (conflict areas) the guideposts of the past become unreliable, and generally the planning processes become less formalized.

The debate over forecasting and future projections has met huge momentum during the past years. According to (Toffler, 1990; Camillus and Datta, 1991) the acceleration of change and increased uncertainty in environment in recent years has made it less and less appropriate for plans to be extrapolated from previous year tendencies. Highlighting the turbulent environments and the un-useful dependence upon past to project future in such environments, Godet (1979) points out:

“the results of our actions today will occur in a world profoundly different from that in which they were taken” (Godet, 1979: 5)

In this context, Wack (1985) criticized the “ordinary” or “classical” strategic planning which depends ultimately upon, stability, in order to project proper forecasting – stating:

“Forecasts are not always wrong, more often than not, they can be reasonably accurate. And that is what makes them so dangerous. They are usually constructed on the assumption that tomorrow’s world will be much like today’s. They often work because the world does not always change. But sooner or later forecasts will fail when they are needed most: in anticipating major shifts in the business environment that make all strategies obsolete.” (Wack, 1985:83)

This debate pertaining to the dynamic upheavals and the continuous spatial changes of today’s world highlights again the dialectical nature of space, where change is a must. According to James (2005), a basic principle of dialectic philosophy is in the belief of: things’ dynamicity, change is real and stability is illusory, not only everything is changing but all is flux. Dialectics, therefore, recognize reality as a structure of evolving processes. On the other hand, Bohm (1983) referred to the flexibility in dialectic thinking to consider wide scale relational analysis rather than concentrating on restricted analysis of objects. In other words, dialectic thinking spotlights on integrating and interrelating relations, processes, flows and fluxes to
scrutinize elements, objects, dynamic systems and physical structures.

Prior to introducing the definition of scenario, and within this conceptual “dynamic” and changing nature of the space, it is important to cope with the meaning of spatial planning, which the researcher delineates as “a multi-dimensional interactive process of dynamic future arrangements of spaces within their socio-geographical context, by means of understanding space as a complex set of processes and relations which explicates the structure of elements, items, and events in a space”. Thus, space is conceived dialectically as a dynamic system that presents ongoing interactions among various dynamic components (e.g. population, and environment), which are again interrelated with each other through various spatial and temporal interactions and feedbacks. Therefore, misunderstanding the dynamicity and the generic behavior of space components as discussed by Shuvo and Lay (2010) will generate a theoretical gap between the planning process and responses of planning strategies.

In this complex and continuously ‘changing’ spatial system, surpassing the classical planning paradigms becomes crucial. Interestingly Grayson and Clawson (2007) discuss this subject, and state:

“*The single-line forecasts that are often the essence of strategic planning are appropriate only for stable word. If the world is highly dynamic, straight-line projections quickly become obsolete.*” (Grayson and Clawson (2007:1)

Therefore, ‘new thinking’ and critical considerations to redevelop the classical approaches arose. For instance, creativity and innovation have been increasingly important for planning and have become much more desirable planning characteristics. Imagination is closely related to creativity Rollier and Turner (1992); in this sense, Hogarth (1987) emphasizes the significance of imagination in developing choices and argues that large powers of imagination improve and enrich more livable and functional alternatives. Subsequently, scenario planning has appeared to overcome deficiencies of the ordinary strategic planning. According to Grayson and Clawson (2007) this evolutionary approach (scenario building) came into its own during the 1970s as an alternative to the ordinary strategic planning. On the other hand, Mietzner and Reger (2005) and Heijden (1996) argue that the roots of scenario planning has grown since 1940s and gained remarkable public awareness after the WWII. Literature presents wide arguments for the original emergence of scenario planning; these arguments conclude that scenario planning was first
introduced to serve the military planning (Mietzner and Reger, 2005; Kahn and Wiener, 1967; Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, 1972).

The definition of “scenario” has gained numerous interests, it is considered to be a “fuzzy concept” (Mietzner and Reger, 2005) which is misleading in many ways and has also various shades of connotations. Roubelat (2007) looks at this term standing upon rigid linking with previous planning approaches and points out the “theoretical” and “empirical” dimensions of this term, stating:

“... In theory, scenarios are a synthesis of different paths (events and actors’ strategies) that lead to possible futures. In practice, scenarios often merely describe particular sets of events or variables” (Roubelat, 2000:4)

Basically, there are diverse definitions about scenarios. Godet (1990) believes that scenarios are introduced as 'alternative' futures. The idea behind this concept, assures that scenarios are not themselves points forecasts; rather, they are distinct possible futures developed so that the real future will lie within the borders of diverse scenarios identified together but independently. Within this framework, scenario planning is considered an evolutionary process of constructing a range of probable futures to use as a background for discussing strategies. Scenarios are distinguished by creative thinking and imagination, they help to clarify interrelationships, identify emerging patterns and reduce complexity (Schwenk, 1983), and they support strategic planners in considering a spectrum of possibilities (Wack, 1985). Another interesting identification for the conceptual meaning of scenario is introduced by Godet and Roubelat (1996) as a description of a future status and the course of events which makes it possible to move forward from the original situation to the future. The terminological meaning of scenario was captured by Mietzner and Reger (2005) as:

“... narrative description of a possible state of affairs or development over time. It can be very useful to communicate speculative thoughts about future developments to elicit discussion and feedback, and to stimulate the imagination. Scenarios generally are based on quantitative expert information, but may include qualitative information as well.” (Mietzner and Reger, 2005:223)

Scenarios are the preferred approach in futures studies (Sohail, 2002). Scenarios are powerful since they offer distance from the present, explore the future and allow the creation of alternative futures. Eventually, it could be argued that the scenarios’ distinct value is in the stimulation of imagination and the generation of ideas.
2.8 Conclusion

The philosophical interrelations, as well as theoretical debates, between space, power, politics and planning are outstandingly presented in this chapter. In summary, it has been shown that the spatial presentation of “space” outlines complex set of spatial relations (variables). Power and politics surface to the top in this manner. Understanding these relations reveals the range of influence of politics and power upon planning in terms of its objectives and role. Theories and concepts pertaining to the power of planning to act either as, progressive, or regressive, agent of change; and the probability of using planning as a “control tool” instead of “reforming tool” principally upon ethnic minorities were discussed. It has been shown that “space” by its nature, is a dialectical entity. According to dialecticians, space is conceived as a dynamic whole which can only be grasped through the contradictions represented by the conflictual relations it constitutes. Thus, space is not merely an abstract term; it is rather a terrain where basic socio-political practices (relations) are lived out. Accordingly, spatial planning is conceived as a multi-dimensional interactive process of dynamic future arrangements of spaces within their socio-geographical context. Exploring the future of spaces can be achieved by many approaches; scenario building and planning has been shown to be one of the most effective, creative, and evolutionary methodologies in this regard.
Chapter Three

Spatial and Social Space Structure in Jerusalem
Chapter Three

Spatial and Social Space Structure in Jerusalem

"The materials of city planning are: sky, space, trees, steel and cement, in that order and that hierarchy"
Le Corbusier

In this chapter, the researcher summarizes the socio-physical outline of Jerusalem in terms of its historical context, social structure, and spiritual reflections respectively. In the first section of this chapter, the researcher goes back to the historical roots when the city was found showing the passionate events the city underwent through. After that, the researcher explores the social structure of Jerusalem analyzing the demographic characteristics and the existing social fabric in the city for the current demographic status quo accompanied by some future projections. The last section in this chapter investigates the spiritual bond between Jerusalem and the major three world’s religions, i.e. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

3.1 Historical Outlook

The history records reveal that the first civilization found in Jerusalem is dated back to the sixth millennium BC (Fanni, 2003). According to the Hebrew Bible, the original inhabitants of Jerusalem were the Canaanites:

"And say, this is what the Lord has said to Jerusalem: Your start and your birth was from the land of the Canaanite; an Amorite was your father and your mother was a Hittite." (Ezekiel, 16:4)

Walter (1992) concludes that the land of Canaan was inhabited by multicultural groups who occasionally fought but mostly traded and collaborated and their histories are intertwined. In that time Jerusalem was named “Ur-Salem”, a Canaanite word meaning, the city of Salem, an ancient God-King of the Jebusite clan. Although Redford (1992) argues that archeology provides ample evidences of the prosperous and relatively peaceful Canaanite civilization coexisting with nearby civilizations, Jerusalem was attractive for invaders and conquerors and has been destroyed and reconstructed more than eighteen times (Armstrong, 1996; Benvenisti, 1976). King David captured the city and changed its Canaanite’s name to the City of
David in 997 BC proclaiming it the capital of the united Israelite Kingdom. Less than forty years, the Egyptian recaptured the city and demolished the Israelite Kingdom. Subsequently, the city was captured by the Babylonians, the Persians, the Hellenistic and then the Roman-byzantine Empire when in 132 AD the Roman Emperor Hadrian renamed the city “Aelia Capitolina” (Prawer and Ben-Shammar, 1996). In 636 AD, Muslims led by Caliph Omar Ibn Al-Khatab conquered Jerusalem. Since then, and except the period of 1099-1187 AD when Jerusalem fell to the Crusaders, the city was under Muslims control relating to the Umayyad, Abbasid, Tulunid, Ikhshidid, Fatimid, Seljuk, Ayyubid, Mameluke, and the Ottoman, Figure (3.1) shows the historical timeline in Jerusalem. The city of Jerusalem remained under Muslims rule until 1917, when Ottomans surrendered to the British (Biger, 2005). The British mandate ended directly after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Shortly following Israel’s proclamation of independence, a war broke out which resulted in the division of Jerusalem into two parts, the western part ruled by Israel and was declared as a capital of Israel and the eastern by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Pollack, 2002). In 1967, another war broke out and ended for the Israeli side (Stein, 1991), consequently the Jordanian eastern part of Jerusalem fell under Israeli occupation, and in 1980 the Israeli parliament declared unilaterally East Jerusalem part of - United Jerusalem - the capital of Israel.

Figure 3.1: Historic Timeline of Jerusalem, (RISSC, 2010; edited)
The fast-accelerating events inside the history of Jerusalem made it more passionate to reflect how the city has been a bridge of diverse civilizations and political entities that have ruled it and left marvelous imprints and monuments, and thus producing a space of several layers of fabulous landmarks. During the intense course of its history, Jerusalem resembled a range of provident roles: it was a central, a capital and a provincial city. Table (3.1) illustrates an overview of the administrative changes in Jerusalem city and the Jerusalem province.

Table 3.1: Administrative changes in Jerusalem city and Jerusalem district, (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003; edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>The establishment of the municipality in Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>The establishment of the municipality in accordance with the Ottoman Municipalities Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>The division of the city into two sectors and the establishment if an Israeli and an Arab municipalities. The annexation of demolished Palestinian villages to West Jerusalem sector. No villages were annexed to East Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The establishment of the neighborhood councils (neighborhood administrations in Jerusalem).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>The Jerusalem province is declared as one of six provinces in Palestine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>The Jerusalem province is divided between Jordan and Israel by political borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>The delimitation of the Israeli Jerusalem Province and the Jordanian Jerusalem Governorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>The appointment of village councils in some of the Palestinian villages surrounding Jerusalem. Mukhtars continue to present the central authority in other villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Israel dismantles the Jordanian Jerusalem Governorate and divides it between Ramallah, Jericho and Bethlehem provinces. Major parts of the Jerusalem Governorate were added to Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The formation of Jewish regional councils in the West Bank in order to manage settlements with the announcement of the establishment of the Civil Administration and maintenance of the Palestinian governorate whose boundaries were determined by Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The redrawing of the boundaries of Jerusalem Province which is located within the boundaries if Jerusalem prior to 1967. This province is not recognized by Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The formation by the PNA of municipalities, local councils and development committees in the villages surrounding Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the previous table, the first municipality of Jerusalem was established by the Ottomans in 1863 when Jerusalem was the centre of the Sanjaq of Palestine in the Ottoman Empire who controlled the city around four centuries (Auld, 2000). Referring to its importance, the British considered Jerusalem to be the capital of their Mandate in Palestine. After being divided in 1948, east and west Jerusalem each has its own municipality, the west operated under Israeli government and functioned as a capital of the newly established state, which also intensified its administrative institutions and governmental bodies there, while the other left under Jordanian control affiliated with Amman the capital of Jordan. After the 1967 war,
Israel annexed East Jerusalem to the western part; it also dismantled the Arabic municipality in East Jerusalem and imposed Israeli laws with one municipality operated totally under Israeli control up to date (Wasserstein, 2001). Figure (3.2) shows the geopolitical administrative changes in Jerusalem since the establishment of the first municipality in 1863 up to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993.

As a holy city for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Jerusalem has always been of prodigious symbolic importance (Kanaan, 2005). The Old City of Jerusalem characterized by its encircling wall consisted for long period of time the spatial definition of the city. Jerusalem lies less than 55 kilometers from Jaffa, 85 kilometers from Amman, 290 kilometers from Damascus, 388 kilometers from Beirut, 528 kilometers from Cairo and 865 kilometers from Baghdad. This centrality of that position entitles Jerusalem with more logistical value and adds points to its credits of distinction. The present city of Jerusalem has evoked from the Old City, after 1948,
the city extended towards the north and west where the Israeli government established new and massive Jewish neighborhoods, whereas since the year 1967, Israel has concentrated its settlements construction works in the eastern part of the city, so that to accomplish desired demographic balance which will be discussed later in this doctorate research. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem has been dramatically intensified since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967. Jerusalem has been described as a deeply divided city due to the intensity and persistence of the ethnic conflict it has faced for decades (Hasson, 2007; 2004; Benvenisti, 1995; 1996). Furthermore, Khalidi (1997) argues that the future perspectives of Jerusalem are unpredictable due to the status the city has faced in the modern ethno-national identities of Palestinians and Jews. Moreover, Jerusalem has also been characterized as a frontier city (Klein, 2005; Bollens, 1998; Hasson, 1996; Kliot and Mansfield, 1999), according to Kotek (1999), frontier cities are not only polarized along ethnic and ideological lines, but are also disputed foremost because of their location on fault lines between ethnic, religious or ideological entities.

3.2 Social Structure of Jerusalem

Like many other features in Jerusalem, the demographic and social fabric have witnessed massive changes since the declaration of independence for the state of Israel in 1948 and more specifically after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967. The population of Jerusalem represents large scale heterogeneous layers with manifold social cultures, Pressouyre (1999) points out that the cultural characteristics of the historic centers in Jerusalem are changing, not without unfortunate consequences for the consistency of the urban fabric and authenticity of the buildings. The dynamic changes in the social as well as the political entities in Jerusalem produced unbearable burden over the space of the city, according to many researchers, this far-reaching alteration influenced both the social space viability of the Old City and the originality of its cultural heritage (see e.g.: Albin, 1992; Katz, 1995; Khamaisi, 1997; Amirav and Siniora, 1992; Ben Arieh, 1989). Jerusalem was recorded on the UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1981, however, the radical consequences and dramatic changes in the socio-physical urban form of Jerusalem enforced UNESCO to inscribe the city on the World Heritage in Danger List in 1982 (Welfare, 2004).
The social aspects of Jerusalem are mainly classified by two major categories, the Israeli Jewish and the Palestinian Arabs (Jerusalemites). The cultural backgrounds for the Israeli Jewish people are amazingly divergent; immigrants compromise large volume of the population slice in Israel, Figure (3.3) shows the routes of Jewish immigrations by continents for the years 1948 – 1991. According to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS, 2011), Jewish compromises the overwhelming majority of the population in Jerusalem, and even in East Jerusalem as well as (Ju'beh, 2010). The Jewish multicultural origins with their divergent cultures to the Arab population; Jerusalem space faces endless challenges to meet the needs and interests of residents that seriously affect the overall socio-physical image of the space. This conflict of interests and various cultural dimensions make it more complex for planners to involve the integrity of the socio-cultural needs with the value of the places without influencing the surrounded built environments in Jerusalem. In his writing Moore highlights this critical relationship between defined spaces (places) and social needs:

"We need places where people can exercise their wills and enjoy the willfulness of others within a pattern of accord that is physically rooted to the place – more enduring than, but enlivened by the transit interests of those who each day can give it a new life and point" (Moore et al., 1974).
In the case of Jerusalem, especially for its enriched cultural space accompanied by the political instability and socio-economic turbulences, the change of the city structure in both: city soft infrastructure (*population component*) and city hard infrastructure (*built up environment*) is inevitable. In this context, Touqan (2004) argues that social classes moved and concentrated in specific geographical areas, for example Arab Jerusalemites from elite and middle class families moved toward the new neighborhoods around the Old City while low income families stayed at the city core centre. Pressouyre (1991) on the other hand, points out that Jewish made expansion towards the Arabic quarters and the open spaces.

Demographically, the British Mandate Census of 1922 characterized Palestine’s population at 88 percent of Muslim and Christian Arabs while 12 percent of Jews. During the British mandate in Palestine, the Jewish community grew from one-sixth to almost one-third of the population. Immigration accounts for most of the increase in the Jewish population at that time, while the increase of the non-Jewish population was due to natural birth rates (Justin, 1990; Morris, 2004). By the end of the British mandate, the Jewish immigration influxes raised the Jewish population to more than six times than that was before the mandate period (Morris, 2001), Figures (3.4 – 3.8) show: the population of Jerusalem by national affiliation, the population growth in Jerusalem by population group, the age structure of the population in Jerusalem by population group, source of population and population projection respectively.

![Figure 3.4](image_url)

Figure 3.4: Population of Jerusalem by population group, 1922 – 2009, (JIFS, 2011 a, edited)
Figure 3.5: Annual growth of population in Jerusalem by population group, 1999 – 2009, (JIIS, 2011b; edited)

Figure 3.6: Age structure of population in Jerusalem by population group, 2008, (JIIS, 2010; edited)
The following Tables (3.2 – 3.3) present the population and population growth in Jerusalem by population group, and the population projection of Jerusalem & Jerusalem district by population group, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jews &amp; Others</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. thousands</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>272.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>103.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. annual growth rate 1967-1977</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>346.1</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>136.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. annual growth rate 1977-1987</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>429.1</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>193.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. annual growth rate 1987-1997</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>487.1</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>260.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. annual growth rate 1997-2007</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>492.2</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>268.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>497.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>275.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. annual growth rate 2008-2009</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Population projection of Jerusalem, by Population group, 2000 – 2020, (JIIS, 2011 f; edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projection Area</th>
<th>2000 (%)</th>
<th>2005 (%)</th>
<th>2010 (%)</th>
<th>2015 (%)</th>
<th>2020 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total areas of Jews and others</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total areas of Arabs</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem District</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews and other</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average number of rooms per housing unit in Jerusalem governorate was 3.3 rooms and the average housing density in Jerusalem governorate was 1.6 persons per room (PCBS, 2005). Moreover, the average family size in Jerusalem was 5.2 capita and the nuclear family composes more than eighty percent of the total family categories in Jerusalem Figure (3.9). The average house dwellers density was 1.5 capita per room for the year 2009; Figure (3.10) shows the housing density in terms of number of persons per room (PCBS, 2010).
Data presented in the previous figures and tables regarding the social characteristics of Jerusalem community show that almost 45% percent of the population in Jerusalem fall under the age of twenty years. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics the Arab population in Jerusalem governorate is considered a young community; since it is estimated that 36.8% of the total population in Jerusalem governorate are aged less than 15 years, while those aged 65 years and over were estimated at 2.9% (PCBS, 2010). The average growth rate for the Jews is around one percent, while for the Arabs around three percent, furthermore, sixteen percent of the population growth relates to immigration factors while the remaining stands for natural growth of the population. Although statistics indicate that Jerusalem society is becoming gradually urbanized, a large segment of the population
– mainly in the Arab community – still manifests the characteristics of a rural society. Jewish population are demonstrated as urbanized social groups who dwell within highly developed spaces, mainly in west Jerusalem and in the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. On the other side the Arabic community can be divided into a number of secondary social groups, each with its own special characteristics (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003):

1. The indigenous residents: include the urban population of noticeable families that developed under the Ottoman and British mandate before the rural migration with activated in 1920s-1960s; this group does not exceed 20% of the Arab population in Jerusalem.
2. The Immigrants originated from the West Bank, this group compromises 50% of the Arab population in Jerusalem.
3. The villages annexed to Jerusalem, this group represents 20% of the Arab population in Jerusalem.
4. The refugees who were forced to leave their native towns and cities, this group dwells in two refugee camps in Jerusalem and represents 5% of the Arab population in Jerusalem.
5. The Bedouins who principally live outside the municipal boundaries and expand especially in the eastern part of the district. Those who live within the municipal boundaries adopted the rural life style. This group represents almost the remaining percentage of the Arab population in Jerusalem.

By time, those above mentioned social groups are undergoing transformation process with respect to the social, geographical and economical dimensions in a way of normalizing differences and minimizing gaps in between. These transformations may be concluded as the following (Ibid):

A. The urban society which is becoming socially more apparent as a result of the improved education and employment, consequently, the society in Jerusalem has been transformed from a traditional society controlled by traditional noble families, into a more socially mobile one. Hence, individuals who previously belonged to the lower and middle classes or to the immigrants or villager groups have now moved to the middle or higher classes.
B. The rural society is experiencing a continuous urbanization process with different acceleration rates, some geographical areas represent rapid urbanization (e.g. Silwan, At-Tur, Kafr Akab) while others showed low urbanization process (e.g. Sour Bahir, As Sawahirah, Um Tuba) in which differences in the social structure are still visible in the institutional structures, the level of spatial development and the availability of services.

C. The refugees are also undergoing social transformation but with more limitations. Some have gradually moved out of the camps seeking better services and work opportunities, while the others remained in the refugee camps and have improved their living and socio-economic conditions there.

D. The Bedouins can be clustered into two groups, the first group lives in As Sawahirah and has become ruralized and partially urbanized and the other group is the Jahalin Bedouin tribe that lives in the valleys of the East Jerusalem mountains and a traditional Bedouin lifestyle.

3.3 Spiritual Reflections of Jerusalem

The tangible relationship between human being and places has long been described in the literature. One way in which people have experienced and expressed their sense of holiness, was in their relation to space and places. Among those thoughtful descriptions is what Hernández (2007) states:

“Place attachment is an affective bond that people establish with specific areas where they prefer to remain and where they feel comfortable and safe. Place identity, however, has been defined as a component of personal identity, a process by which, through interaction with places, people describe themselves in terms of belonging to a specific place” (Hernández et al., 2007).

Holy spaces are such places that are considered holy by virtue of the bond that binds human groups to the earth on which they live. It is a bond of gratitude and love that undetectably turns into reverence, according to Eliade (1954) sanctity of place reflects eruption of the sacred. However, some holy spaces acquired their holiness as a result of historical circumstances and events, or places that are holy because either in theory or in actual fact they were constructed so as to reflect cosmic reality. Jerusalem represents a substantial example for globalized sacred space, in this sense Peters states: “Jerusalem, therefore, because of its biblical centrality, serves as a definitive image and symbol of sacred place” (Peters, 1987:4838). With all the manifold
challenges that Jerusalem poses, Bovis (1971) in his writing “The Question of Jerusalem” introduced its special value:

“The Question of Jerusalem” introduced its special value:

“Jerusalem holds a place of honor in the hearts of the followers of the three major monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Here is situated the Wailing Wall, a remnant of the western wall, ..., there are now the Muslim sanctuaries of the Haram al-Sharif, ..., stands over the spot from which the tradition says Mohammad made his night journey into Heaven, ..., Here in Jerusalem is also situated the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which stands over the supposed sites where Jesus was crucified and buried.” (Bovis, 1971)

The following three sections outline the interrelation and the connection between Jerusalem and the major three world’s religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, and Islam respectively. These relations among religion and Jerusalem have been considered the major engine of the ideological conception for all the city conquerors and defenders.

3.3.1 Jerusalem in Judaism

The fact that Jerusalem is correlated into the Jewry as a major center dates back some three millennia (Ma’oz and Nusseibeh, 2000), ultimately since King David considered Jerusalem the capital of Israel (Bard, 2002). Thus, Jerusalem represents for Jews the superlative focus of their spiritual, cultural, and national life (Feintuch, 1987). Friedland (2000) describes this historical connection between Jewish people and Jerusalem:

"Israel was first forged into a unified nation from Jerusalem some three thousand years ago, when King David seized the crown and united the twelve tribes from this city, ..., Jerusalem was the seat of Jewish sovereignty, the household site of kings, the location of its legislative councils and courts. In exile, the Jewish nation came to be identified with the city that had been the site of its ancient capital. Jews, wherever they were, prayed for its restoration." (Friedland et al., 2000:8)

In the Jewish tradition, Jerusalem is a part of the Holy Land promised by God to the children of Israel in the Torah. The Books of Samuel and Psalms portray King David’s struggle to arrest Jerusalem with yearning to build a temple there (Kaplan, 1992). The construction of the Temple by Solomon gave the city its holiness to Jews as the place with which God chose to distinctively associate His Holy Name (Deuteronomy, 12:5). Moreover, Jews believe that the earth used to create Adam was taken from Jerusalem and that Adam was created at the site of the Temple (RISSC, 2010). Jerusalem thus served as the focus of the spiritual unity and purpose of the Jewish people (Psalm: 122).
Within the common and recent spatial definition of Jerusalem city, the Jewish people who dwelled there were mostly Sephardi natives prior to the mid-1850s, Grenville (2005) argues that the Jewish community constituted the prevalent single religious group in the city by 1840, whereas Weiner (2003) points out that from the 1880s onward the Jewish constituted the majority within the city. In the nineteenth century Jerusalem witnessed arrival of Ashkenazi Jewish communities who intensively lived in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and later expanded to the outer walls of the city. The massive Jewish immigration fluxes into Jerusalem and the Israeli destruction of some parts of the Old City and its transformation into a purely Jewish place of devotion altered the city’s character permanently (RISSC, 2010). Moreover, Jewish expansion into Muslim and Christian spaces are seen by Jewish religious extremists as the only way to prevent the soiling of the race chosen by the God of the Israelites (Deuteronomy, 2:6). Hoppe (2000) argues that even those secular Jews respect the spiritual value of Jerusalem:

"The centrality of Jerusalem to Judaism is so strong that even secular Jews express their devotion and attachment to the city and cannot conceive of a modern State of Israel without It, ..., For Jews Jerusalem is sacred simply because it exists". (Hoppe, 2000:6)

Jerusalem has long been embedded into Jewish religious life and consciousness; it has got a pivotal position for the Jewish people over the past three millennia. Countless expressions of the intimate ties to Jerusalem maintained and strengthened the Jewish memories of and attachment to the city; apparently with the citation of Psalm (137:5-6)

*If I forget you, O Jerusalem,*
*Let my right hand wither;*
*Let my tongue cleave to my palate*
*If I cease to think of you,*
*If I do not keep Jerusalem in memory*
*Even at my happiest hour.*

Smith (1987) demonstrates that it is unlikely that the choice for Jerusalem was merely an arbitrary political decision. Although Peters (1987) argues that Jerusalem is never mentioned in Torah (Pentateuch), the symbolic and religious core of the entire Hebrew Bible; Jerusalem represents for all the Jewish people a sacred and matchless religious symbol as what Heschel states: “We come to you, Jerusalem, to build your ruins, to mend our souls, and to seek comfort for God and men” (Heschel, 1967:17).
It is noteworthy commencing with what Rodney Stark demonstrated for how successful emerging religions consistently adopt symbols of previously established religions and use them to set up their creditability (Stark and Bainbridge, 1996). However, Peters (1987) argues that the essential nature and sense of Christian Jerusalem is not the same as Israelite Jerusalem; Christianity demonstrated its entire domination over Jerusalem by shifting the spiritual focus of the city from the Temple Mount symbolizing the old Israelite religion, to the Holy Sepulchre symbolizing the essential act of Christianity: the passion and resurrection of Christ, and thus creating new sacred geography for the city. In the Christian tradition, Jerusalem had to be transformed in order for it to be a principal and empowering centre for Christianity (Mathew 21:10-14). Jerusalem became spiritualized in the early Christian context and therefore got many distinct expressions that reveal its value. It is a “new Jerusalem” (Revelation 3:12) and a “heavenly Jerusalem” (Hebrews 12:22). For Christians, Jerusalem's place in the life of Jesus provides it with inordinate significance, it is the place where Jesus was brought as a child to be presented to the Temple (Luke 2:22) and to attend festivals (Luke 2:41). Moreover, the defining act of the Crucifixion that would both symbolize Christianity had to occur there, and in order for Jesus’s death and resurrection to have an impact as a significant event they had to have occurred in Jerusalem; furthermore the divine authority of Jesus was established by association with the holy city (Luke 13:33-35).

Christianity according to the spiritual and blessed events related to Jesus makes Jerusalem the most sacred place in the world, besides Jesus Christ’s love for Jerusalem means that it is the spiritual home for all those followers who believe in Jesus (RISSC, 2010). Christian tradition as cleared in the Gospels reflects how Jesus conceived Jerusalem. In Luke (13) for instance, Jesus started by rebuke Jewish for their disobedience to prophets:

*Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing. Look, your house if left to you desolate. I tell you, you will not see me again until you say, ‘Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord’”. * (Luke 13:34-35)
The true home of the Christians - according to the medieval conception - is the *heavenly Jerusalem*. Grabar (1996) clears that Jerusalem acquired its special character of piety and spiritual wealth through the wide presence of saints and holy men and women. Thus the value of Jerusalem crossed and even surpassed the conceptual definition for the terrestrial or *earthly Jerusalem*, in this sense; Christ’s followers are promised placement in the heavenly Jerusalem:

> But you have come to Mount Zion, to the heavenly Jerusalem, the city of the living god. You have come to thousands upon thousands of angels in joyful assembly, to the church of the firstborn, whose names are written in heaven. (Hebrews 12:22-33)

A good example that represents geographical confirmation of the Christian status of Jerusalem in the sixth century is Madaba Map shown in Figure (3.11). The map locates Jerusalem in the inner center of the map considering it as the central core of the universe (Levine, 1999).

![Madaba Map](image.jpg)

Figure 3.11: Madaba Map depicting the biblical world from Egypt to Syria centered by Jerusalem (Fanni, 2003)

In the early start of the seventh century, Christians lost Jerusalem when the Persians army seized the city. Yarbrough argues that the symbolic value of Jerusalem was not touchable for the Persians on contrast to that value which the Christians hold:
“But if the seizure of Jerusalem meant little to the Persians, it meant a great deal to those who were defeated – the Christians who had controlled the city for almost 300 years. Its loss was a devastating event that demanded explanation. ....... An eyewitness himself, Strategous sought to explain the loss of Jerusalem by claiming that the Persians were instruments of God, who was punishing the Christians for their sins”. (Yarbrough, 2008:67)

The originality and the nature preserved inside the holy city apparently served to emphasize the splendors of its monuments and shrines (Tsafrir, 1999). On the other hand, Yarbrough (2008) points out that Jerusalem attracted bishops and saints from around the Christian world who then established more churches and monasteries, as well as, imperial Christian women enhanced those remarkable establishments and facilitated Christian’s pilgrimage not only in Jerusalem but also throughout Palestine Burman (1991) which attracted dramatically more flow of noble Christian pilgrims (Wilkinson, 2002).

This Christianity of Jerusalem’s identity was empowered by the Jesus willing to remove the most symbolic reference of the Jewry, namely the Temple. One of the most convincing assessments comes from Sanders who focuses on Jesus’s cleansing of the Temple and his saying about its coming destruction, Sanders concludes also that Jesus saw himself eschatological prophet called to proclaim that “the end that was at hand and that the temple would be destroyed, so that the new and perfect temple might arise” (Sanders, 1985:75). However, according to RISSC (2010) new Christian dominations made their presence in Jerusalem, namely groups like Christian Zionists who believe the current state of Israel is a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy and by supporting it they may speed up the second coming of Jesus Christ, and hasten the Apocalypse.

Yet for later generations of Christians, Jerusalem is the scene on which the most uniquely momentous events of history had been enacted. These challenges notwithstanding, Jerusalem status as Christian city is still well recognized. Its historical significance, its imperial patronage, and the resulting importance of Christ’s childhood and manhood there insured its standing in the minds of Christians around the world. Thus, when Jerusalem fell in the Persians’ hands Strategos states: “there took hold of all the Christians of the whole world great sorrow and effable grief” (Strategos, 1910:510).
3.3.3 Jerusalem in Islam

The symbolic value of Jerusalem according to Muslims’ (believers) perception is deeply established and foundational, although finding several parallels with Christian and Jewish traditions; the Islamic association with Jerusalem remains unique, Jerusalem is the city of the prophets, the most powerful and universal symbol of monotheism (Peters, 1987). Jerusalem is the first direction of prayer in Islam (Mourad, 2008), however, the sole sanctity of Jerusalem was represented in the miraculous night journey in which Prophet Mohammad was transported from Mecca to the holy city in Jerusalem, and then ascended through Jerusalem, the gateway, to heaven (Elad, 1995; RISSC, 2010). This exceptional event has decisively affected and changed the status of Jerusalem, and influenced its consolidation as a centre of Muslim devotion; it is anchored onto the first verse of the seventeenth chapter of the Holy Quran, known as Night Journey:

Glorified be He who carried His servant by night from the Inviolable Place of Worship to the Far Distant Place of Worship (Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa) the neighborhood whereof We have blessed, that We might show him of Our tokens! Lo! He, only He, is the Hearer, the Seer. (Quran 17:1)

Needless to say, the night journey is considered as a benchmark in Islam. Following arriving into the holy city, Mohammad leads the other prophets in prayer; then he ascends the seven levels in heaven and receives a number of divine gifts which guide him and authorize his personal behavior to become the highest norm for Muslims throughout the world and through history. All of this is authorized and authenticated through the acknowledged sanctity of Jerusalem, the holy city (Peters, 1987). The emblematic value of the holy city of Jerusalem is outstandingly supported by the erection of magnificent Islamic monuments and features. Although some of the Islamic features are influenced by the architectural style used by the Christians in Palestine (Grabar 1959; Chen 1999); Grabar (1986) magnifies the Islamic erections in Jerusalem, specifically the construction of the Dome of the Rock; Grabar depicts it as “the first consciously created masterpiece of Islamic art”. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the inspiring encircling wall of the holy city of Jerusalem was built during the supremacy of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the early
sixteenth century. Furthermore, Al-Tabari (1987) points out that Jerusalem was a point of attraction for the Muslims’ rulers; it was the place where one of the caliphs preferred to be crowned.

Among the most important worships in Islam is Pilgrimage which is also connected with Jerusalem. As per Islam, there are three places as the only destinations of Pilgrimages:

“The messenger of God said: You shall only set out on pilgrimage for three mosques: the sacred mosque (in Mecca), my mosque (in Medina), and the Aqsa mosque (in Jerusalem)” (Al-Wasiti, 1978: 3-4, no.1).

To stress the special advantage for visiting Jerusalem during Pilgrimage, Islam offered special accounts for those conducting it through Jerusalem:

“He who makes pilgrimage [to Mecca], prays in the mosque of Medina, and [prays] in the Aqsa mosque in one season, is purified from his sins as if he has just been born”( Livne-Krafi, 1995:161, no. 215)

What can be inferred from these observations is that Jerusalem’s significance lies in the very centre of the hearts of Muslims believers. All this explains why Muslims are bound to protect Jerusalem by virtue of their religious beliefs. Yet, unquestionably East Jerusalem including the old city is considered to be under Israeli occupation. From Islamic point of view, that is why the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is qualitatively different from any other conflict in which Muslims are involved.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, the researcher starts outlining the historical background for the city of Jerusalem since its early existence, approximately six thousand years ago, up to date. The researcher briefly continued mentioning the successive civilizations that fought and controlled the city starting by the Canaanites and ending by the Israelis. After that, the researcher explores the social space of Jerusalem highlighting its social and demographic structure. It was shown that the major two social groups in Jerusalem are the Arab (Palestinians), and the Jewish (Israelis). The latter are mainly
urbanized groups occupy West Jerusalem and lots of space in East Jerusalem; while the Arabs are living only in the eastern part of the city and categorized into four social groups: urban community, rural community, refugee camps, and Bedouins. All these groups are undergoing socio-economic transformation and moving towards being more urbanized.

The last section in this chapter interestingly investigates the religious connection between Jerusalem and the major three monotheistic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The researcher clarifies what Jerusalem has meant to Jews, Christians and Muslims, and what it means to them today. Moreover, the researcher attempts to show the differences in the nature of the bond, in the origins of the sacred character, and in the quality and functions of the holiness involved. This religious bond and interrelation is one of the fundamental bases that form the ideological background for the city conquerors and defenders. It has been shown that Jerusalem has long been embedded into Jewish religious consciousness; it represents for Jewry the superlative focus of their spiritual, cultural, and national life. Likewise, Christianity glorifies Jerusalem for the historic facts of Jesus (i.e., his life and death) and the relative events (e.g., the resurrection and ascension), and both combined to create holy places in the city. Eventually, the Islamic connection with Jerusalem, undoubtedly, provides us with perhaps the most impressive example of how a holy city can acquire an explicit holiness on the basis of miraculous events, Prophet Mohammad’s divine authority was established though his personal association with Jerusalem, and therefore, locates Jerusalem as a major Islamic centre for all Muslims throughout the world. Jerusalem thus represents an early example of a sacred place that transcends cultural and religious boundaries.
Chapter Four

Spatial Planning Development in Jerusalem
Chapter Four

Spatial Planning Development in Jerusalem

"Planning is bringing the future into the present so that you can do something about it now."
Alan Lakein

In this chapter the researcher analyzes the evolution of planning in Jerusalem resulted by the historical administrative authorities; exposing to their historical development in terms of spatial planning. The researcher is shedding light on the special characteristics of each authority, attached by an overview analysis of the planning perceptions in terms of jurisdiction, policies, and achievements. In particular, this chapter explores mainly four administrative and planning authorities in Jerusalem chronologically, that is, planning in the era of: (1) Ottoman Rule; (2) British Mandate; (3) Jordanian Control; and (4) Israeli Occupation. The researcher aimed to divide this chapter into different sections to ensure that an analytical study of planning in Jerusalem can be grasped historically.

4.1 Background

Over three millennia ago, during the first four hundred years of Jerusalem’s existence, a tradition developed which envisioned Jerusalem as a "Holy City". By the first century AD "Holy Jerusalem" became known as the birthplace of Christianity. When Islam appeared in the seventh century, it also perceived Jerusalem as "Sacred Centre" (Enis, 2004). By time, Jerusalem became core of all monotheistic religions and was regarded as the “origin” of all cities, so pertinently represented in Bunting’s Map1580 which shows Jerusalem in the heart of three continents (Fig. 4.1).

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14 This chapter of this PhD research has recently been submitted in a research paper authored by the researcher and the supervisor; the publication is referenced as: Najjar, R. and Reicher, C., 2011, Spatial Planning In The Conflict Areas – Chronological Analysis: The Case of Unbalanced Powers in Jerusalem, London Art and Architecture Magazine. London: Lonaard (Paper in press).
Jerusalem is a unique case study in terms of its historical development, especially during the last century where the city had passed through different ruling and administrative powers. Within less than fifty years, the city of Jerusalem was controlled by four different Administrations, i.e. (Ottoman, British, Jordanian, and Israeli occupation). During these subsequent administrative transformations, the city of Jerusalem had witnessed quick and variant development patterns, which in total had produced different challenges to the city; more particularly, in terms of the fast changing composition of both: its soft infrastructure "city population", and its hard infrastructure "city built-up areas". Hence, the overall experience in the field of physical planning in Jerusalem, offers unique and special aspects of profound interest for any scholar in spatial relations, history and human geography.

Today Jerusalem stands reflecting two divergent images, one in which the city shows one of the most historical pictures in the world; while the other expresses one of the most modern cities there. These two contradictory representations of the city are accompanied with amazing heterogeneous population, resulted mainly during the last century. Consequently, to understand this exceptional mixture of the city, it is crucially important to go back to the historical roots of the physical and demographical development the city went through. The successive occupations and authorities in Jerusalem have created a maze of wide rules and regulations, making the planning system complex and in many ways inefficient. The historical powers that had characterized the official planning system in Jerusalem are listed chronologically in (Figs. 4.2 & 4.3). In this chapter the researcher analyzes the administrative planning systems shown in (Fig. 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers that controlled Jerusalem before Ottomans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Roman 400 AC - 638 AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims 638 AC - 1099 AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crusaders 1099 AC - 1187 AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim &quot;Ayyubids&quot; 1187 AC - 1129 AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crusaders 1129 AC – 1134 AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim &quot;Arabs&quot; 1134 AC – 1516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.2: Historical powers that controlled Jerusalem before Ottomans, (PASSIA, 2002; edited)
The previous figure reflects the quick and dynamic transformations of the administrative authorities in Jerusalem; it is quiet noticeable how fast these transformations were in the last century. During the ruling time of each authority the city of Jerusalem was defined “spatially” in completely different approach, the smallest definition was definitely during the Ottoman Rule, in which Jerusalem was mainly developing in the boundaries of the Old City, which is conveniently and precisely defined by its impressive encircling wall which depicts the feature of the traditional old fortification cities, built during the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the early sixteenth century. The properties of planning during the Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem are analytical discussed in the following section.
4.2 Planning Jerusalem during the Ottoman Rule (1516-1917)

Ottomans had stepped their first rule in Jerusalem in the early sixteenth century, in that time; Jerusalem was met with great concern from the Ottomans Government, consequently, strict laws and orders were imposed, various public works were undertaken to renovate the city infrastructure, the walls of Jerusalem were rebuilt, drinking fountains were installed especially in places where worshippers and pilgrims were expected. Imposing security and socio-political stability in the city was quite enough to originate increase in population accompanied by economic prosperity. However, inconsiderable prints of this prosperity and urban renewal remained in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, during which Ottoman Jerusalem underwent a period of arrested growth, which lasted until the early 1830's.

Contrary to the 16th century, Scholch (1996) argues that Jerusalem's revival came about not because of economic expansion but because of the political, religious and administrative developments of the 19th century; during which, Jerusalem was a subject to massive foreign missionaries along with consulates establishments, which Ottomans proved hard dislodgment. In the middle of the 19th century, the profound administrative redevelopment of Jerusalem was a dominant parameter of the Ottoman centralization in Palestine. As a result of the institution of municipal and administrative councils, Jerusalem's political life was revitalized; more attention was paid to the city urbanization, and the growth of the city population rose. All of these European-inspired changes quite naturally accelerated the building boom in the city, and new European building style and architecture continued to appear influencing the urban landscape without interruption until WWI.

Although Mahrouk (1995) points out that on the national level of Palestine Ottomans had no direct spatial policies and they did not integrate to a comprehensive planning system; Ottomans had recognized Jerusalem as main province in Palestine in terms of physical planning; this special conception towards the city was translated by large scale actions. The first windmill in Jerusalem was built in 1839; in 1863 the local authority ordered the removal of all market platforms in order to create additional space

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15 The first European consulates were those of Great Britain (1838), Prussia (1842), Sardinia (1843), France (1843), America (1856) and Russia (1857).
for pedestrians. In 1885, old-street tiles were replaced in all the city's allays and main streets, with the provision of side drainage channels. A railway line was opened in 1892 between Jerusalem and Jaffa; the first major highway joining the two cities was completed in 1867; and the city hospital was rebuilt in 1891. Also Post offices and other channels of international links were opened in Jerusalem (Auld, 2000; Amn, 2001).

This unique value of Jerusalem has always made it a point of attraction. To assure sustainable and guided pattern of development, Ottomans had developed remarkable social system constructed by flexible laws and regulations, including residency rights, of both: native inhabitants, and visitors. The natural composition of the city population was of Muslim majority, secondary Christian parties, and small minority of Jews; among this diverse population, no discrimination was reported. According to (Cohen, 1996) Ottomans never prevented any of the Christian communities from exercising their historically acknowledged rights of free passage into Jerusalem; even Jews though were minority, enjoyed some religious freedom during the Ottoman period unprecedented in any European country.

However, the interaction of the Ottomans sectarian policy with the international politics in the late Ottoman era when the Ottoman Empire declined had negatively affected the social life in Jerusalem and produced unanticipated results. Since Ottoman-European treaties were originally agreed upon under provisions where the Ottoman Empire was dealing with its European partners from a position of strength; while Ottoman declination continued, the treaties remained and the Europeans spent all the efforts to interpret them in the sense of increasing their influence upon and control over various areas and communities (Jews, Americans, etc) in the empire. Accordingly, more European and American missionaries were settled in Ottoman Jerusalem, since Jerusalem represented a coexistence and plurality of faiths and confessions (Salibi and Yusuf, 1995). When, around 1860, the Ottoman government began allowing European Christians to build outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem extensive western style compounds continued to grow.

The Jewish desire to establish Jewish national state in Palestine was announced initially by Dr. "Theodore Herzl", the founder of Political Zionism, by his publication of "Der Judenstaat" in 1869. Immediate refusal to settle Palestine with Jewish colonists was
declared by the Ottoman Sultan Abd-al Hamid II\textsuperscript{16}. In 1897, First Zionist Congress, meeting in Basel, Switzerland, issued the Basel Program on Colonization of Palestine and established the World Zionist Organization (WZO). In response to First Zionist Congress, Abd-al Hamid II initiates policy of sending members of his own palace staff to govern province of Jerusalem. Besides, Ottomans devised a series of entry restrictions that prohibited all foreign (non-Ottoman) Jews, with the exception of pilgrims, from visiting Palestine. However, Jewish immigration in Jerusalem did not stop, and was facilitated by foreign Consuls who had usurped a large role in the conduct of minority relations with the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Jerusalem governor perceived that laws were not firmly connected to prevent the sale of land to foreign Jewish immigrants (Oke, 1982).

In conclusion, Ottomans had controlled Jerusalem since the early sixteenth century up to the end of WWI, after which the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and Jerusalem was captured by the British Army. Although Ottomans did not develop planning regime with comprehensive and detailed (laws and regulations; Master Plans; etc.), Ottomans did integrate different factors during their development process. An outstanding aspect was the social integration of the city, reflected by its amazing quarters. Jerusalem Old City quarters (Fig. 2.4) are one of its most distinctive features, forming a clear-cut division along well defined geographical and demographical lines. The formation of these quarters reflects the integration of the social aspects with the physical appearance of the city, since each quarter contained a group of people having more or less similar background, and who preferred to live in proximity with each other forming "homogenous space" in a relatively large "heterogeneous population".

Moreover, Ottomans renovated and reconstructed the Old City physical structure which reflects up today a vivid presentation of the "old fortification towns", by this

\footnote{16 Sultan Abd-al Hamid II was the 34\textsuperscript{th} and the last Ottoman Sultan to rule the Empire with absolute power, ruling from August 31, 1876 until he was deposed on April 27, 1909.}
Ottomans inherited to the world a distinctive city which in the current conventional planning no such amazing city structure was created elsewhere in Palestine. Finally and most remarkably, Ottomans had distinguishingly conceived the religious value of Jerusalem, and developed their planning policies to make Jerusalem as what the researcher describe "Religious Open City", so that, even foreign (non-Ottoman) Jews and Christians could always visit and most probably inhabit the city for religious purposes. The researcher sums up in (Fig. 4.5) and (Table 4.1) the planning perception and the resulted spatial reflection on Jerusalem during the Ottoman Era.

Figure 4.5: Characteristics of Ottoman Jerusalem, (researcher)

Table 4.1: Ottomans planning perception–reflection interrelationship, (researcher)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Era in Ottoman Rule</th>
<th>Planning Perception</th>
<th>Spatial Reflection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Fortress City</td>
<td>Building and reconstructing the encircling city walls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>place the old city as a monolithic unit serving as a regional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernacular City</td>
<td>Old style city quarters structure with narrow allays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Open City</td>
<td>Always foreign Jews and Christians are able to visit the city for religious activities &quot;e.g. Pilgrim, etc.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing the heterogeneous city population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Province</td>
<td>Renovate the city infrastructure, besides installing public services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Centre</td>
<td>Concentration of international Consulates and political missionaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Planning Jerusalem during the British Mandate (1917-1948)

Political life in "Mandatory Palestine" (1917-1948) was matchlessly more rigorous and passionate than during the late Ottoman epoch. Historic benchmarks were born from the conflict with the British because of their unilateral Jew-biased policies: the appointment of a Zionist Jew as first High Commissioner for Palestine in 1920 and periodic changes of his successors; a set of government "White Papers" planned to outline the destiny of Palestine, in 1922, 1930, and 1939; several inquiry commissions; and a British plan to divide the country, in 1937. Hence, the paramount question was the future of Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular, which for more than one time was intended to be internationally administrated. Rising tension between the native Arab people and the immigrant Jews erupted into bloody riots in 1920 and 1929, followed by the Arab revolt of 1936-1939. The turbulence reached a climax as the British Mandate drew to a close (O’Ballance, 1957; Begin, 1951; Garcia-Granados, 1948). Therefore, to understand precisely the British planning policies in Jerusalem; the researcher finds it is noteworthy to highlight briefly the historical background (within the next three paragraphs) about the exceptional socio-political events during the British Mandate, before focusing on the planning footprints the mandate left in Jerusalem.

The British control over Palestine began when the WWI verged on its end, more specifically, when the British forces entered the Old City of Jerusalem on December 11th, 1917 (Glubb, 1959). This act marked the end of more than four hundred years of the Ottoman rule and the beginning of thirty years of British rule. In November 1918, a military edict was issued dividing Ottoman territories into occupied enemy territories (OET) (Biger, 2005), and the British had established their military government in Palestine, which had later been changed into mandatory administration system as per "Article 22" of the Covenant of the League of Nations as stated at the "Paris Peace Conference" in 1919. The League of Nations mandatory also declared general aim of entrusting - territories from the dissolved Ottoman Empire inhabited by citizens incapable to stand by themselves – to advanced nations until such time they are able to stand alone (Encyclopedia Judaica, 1972). However, British Mandate in Palestine had paradoxical objective than the stated above; since it was international recognition for the purpose of establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home.
In 1920, "San Remo Conference" pointed out that the British Mandate of Palestine comprised territories in present-day Jordan (called in that time Transjordan), Israel, and the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Aruri, 1972), which in total allocate the boundaries of the British Mandate in Palestine that were extending to the western boundaries of its mandate for Mesopotamia (Feith, 1994); nevertheless, Biger (2005) argues that "San Remo Conference" did not precisely define the boundaries of the mandated territories. In 1921 Jordan was split off and given separate Arab administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine17 (Lustick, 1988), and in September 1922 the League of Nations Council approved the memorandum of the "Churchill White Paper" of excluding Jewish settlements in Transjordan. Also in 1922, the British Mandate was modified to stand within Palestine which consists in the present-day Israel and the Palestinian Territories (Pappe, 2004). This new delimitation of the boundaries merges with main purpose of the British Mandate in Palestine according to Balfour's Declaration of 1917, in which the British promised to create and foster a Jewish national home in Palestine. Accordingly, the terms of the British Mandate incorporated the language of the Balfour Declaration and were approved by the League of Nations Council in July 1922. Although the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, a joint resolution of the United States Congress in June 1922 endorsed the concept of the Jewish National Home. Besides, Pappe (1994) argues that even though Britain and France in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 proposed Palestine as an international enclave, the mandate in Palestine was pure British to commit with Balfour's promise mentioned previously.

The mandate system in Palestine was designed by the British with the appealing of terms that denied the principle of majority rule or any other criteria that would give the Palestinian “Arab” majority control over the government of Palestine. To encounter this problem, massive influx of Jewish immigration to Palestine had taken place during the British Mandate, raising the Jewish community from one tenth to almost one third of the populations. Between 1920 and 1945, more than 365000 Jews were immigrated to

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17 "Hebert Samuel" a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine. By assigning a Zionist Jewish commissioner, the British assured creating Jewish National Home in Palestine.
Palestine\textsuperscript{18}, and more than 60000 Jews had illegally immigrated, the accuracy of these numbers was boosted by sequent studies (McCarthy, 1995). Therefore, according to the demographic policy of the British Mandate, the Arab population in Palestine grew naturally, while immigration accounts for most of the increase of the Jewish community.

The administration centre of the British Mandate was headquartered in Jerusalem. Hosting the headquarters of the political administration of the country, Jerusalem acquired a new value of political significance adding to its position of religious importance, and became the capital of the whole country again for the first time since Crusader days. This in itself was an outstanding source of urban growth which accelerated rapidly after the WWI. Thus, it was in Jerusalem that most of official British buildings were erected, building activity began almost immediately, and Jerusalem expanded to the north, south, and west. During these years, Jerusalem began its transformation from the provincial town of Ottoman times to a modern administrative, political, religious and cultural center.

The unique composition of Jerusalem's character had attracted the famous pioneer European planners and architects. Many of the most eminent architects and planners of that time were invited to Jerusalem to draw master plans, develop guidelines, and design buildings. The building boom embraced every sphere, from office buildings, commercial areas, luxurious hotels, residential districts, and sport facilities to industrial plants and religious institutions. During the British Mandate, Jerusalem saw the arrival of Sir Patrick Geddes and Charles Ashbee, William McLean, Henry Kendall, and Rau whom in total had played significant role in shaping the city image of the new extension of Jerusalem. Many of these planners were known of their support of the "garden city" idea; therefore, they tried to translate this support in terms of drafted outlines and master plans to the city of Jerusalem.

In light of above discussion, one of the most significant signs of British Mandate was the start of the "conventional town planning" in Jerusalem\textsuperscript{19}. The British perceived the need to conserve the old city exclusive identity and historic heritage, while transforming Jerusalem into a modern city. That is why the preservation component was


\textsuperscript{19} i.e. the start of designing urban “advisory and master” plans for Jerusalem.
always present in their conception. The British aware of the political, cultural and religious meaning of their governance in the city, they aimed to demonstrate this weighty task by preservation and renewal of the historic city with its environs integrally. Consequently, the British planning conception for Jerusalem old city and its surroundings was entitled by the "Romantic Approach".

This romantic conception of planning has inspired the most important contribution of saving the space originality of the old city of Jerusalem; the regulations of buffering the old city and for building with original stone only were firstly introduced by Roland Storrs\textsuperscript{20} who said:

\begin{quote}
“No person shall destroy, improve, change or repair the structure of any building in Jerusalem or its surroundings within 2500 meters radius from the Damascus Gate without first obtaining a written permit from the Military Governor”\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

The regulations which Storrs instituted show sensitivity to the care for the city’s appearance and the preservation of its beauty. His regulations served as a thoughtful basis for subsequent plans, British and others that have shaped Jerusalem from then to now. Storrs also forbade using sheet metal and stucco for building and prohibited the use of beaten iron and stucco within the walls. Within the 30 years of British administration, five plans were prepared for Jerusalem. Three of these plans were advisory and two statutory outline plans. In 1918 Sir William McLean was invited to Jerusalem by Ronald Storrs in order to prepare city outline plan. Three months after his arrival McLean submitted the first proposed master plan of the city (Fig. 4.6). The strategic principles of this plan are important even to this day, and serve as foundations for the

\textsuperscript{20} The British Military Governor of Jerusalem from 1918-1926, he announced his order of regulations on the 8th of April 1918, i.e. four months after the capture of the city.

planning of Jerusalem, the plan identifies a practical implementation of the principle of green space around the walls. The plan which was designed according to a common baroque urban model, draw the first touch of the romantic conception in planning Jerusalem, it treated the historic centre of Jerusalem as a monolithic unit, architectural and emotional focal point for the entire city, however, it does not serve it as a functional focus. In this plan all the radial roads, streets and paths are connected to the park around the walls of the old city. Between it and the new city which developed to the west there were left open spaces with no building in them whatsoever. Another space was created towards the east and the north-between the old city and Mount of Corruption, Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus. The area west of the old city was for the development of the new city with no limitations besides the road system to the old city that was laid out. Although McLean plan was not a detailed plan, it has got its power though solid architectural components such as forbidding building with materials such as corrugated iron, stucco and cement, use of traditional building forms such as domes and stone paved roofs. These considerations enhanced urban uniformity throughout the city and created harmony between all space components of the built environment. Table (4.2) shows the percentage of land use management of McLean plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use category</th>
<th>Designated area(ha)</th>
<th>Percent of total area*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development and Building Area</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Building</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Prohibition</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total area of the Plan is 1791 ha

The above table reflects the pure preservation criterion that McLean practiced to save the privacy of the Old City. In order to ensure the basic principles of this plan Ronald Storrs forbade new building, within a radius of 2500 meters from the Damascus Gate, without his written permission. Regulations were enforced as to heights of buildings in order to preserve the skyline. Later, a crucial law promulgated by the
administration of Sir Ronald Storrs requiring that all new buildings must be faced with only "native Jerusalem stone", regardless of the actual construction material. This law is the most influential contribution to the character of architecture in Jerusalem and has done a remarkable job of preserving the city's unique beauty. McLean succeeded in preparing a master plan which has, in many respects, determined the course of Jerusalem's urban development with an emphasis on preservation.

Within a decade three more master plans were prepared. In 1919 Professor Patrick Geddes submitted the second master plan establishing lesser open green area in the western side of the city (Fig. 4.7). In his plan Geddes inspired the general idea of McLean plan. Nevertheless, Geddes was more flexible in terms of the preservation criteria, he proposed guided development process near the walls of the Old City, and significantly minimized the amount of land where building was prohibited. The direction of future development was almost the same as McLean plan, i.e. in the north and the west of the Old City, while the restriction remained on the eastern and southern side. The road system remained as that proposed by McLean but the large radial axes lost their visual importance and became simple movement routes. The park around the walls remained and was integrated into the Mount of Olives area in which building was restrained. Table (4.3) shows the percentage of land use management of Geddes's master plan.

Figure 4.7: Geddes Master Plan 1919, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited)
Table 4.3: Percentage of land use categories for Geddes's Plan 1919 according to (Shapiro, 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use category</th>
<th>Designated area (ha)</th>
<th>Percent of total area*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development and Building Area</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Building</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Prohibition</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total area of the Plan is 1780 ha

Among the first architects whom planned Jerusalem was Charles Ashbee\(^{22}\), his planning philosophy was collaborated with Geddes, and both of them only one year later after the Geddes Plan, produced Geddes-Ashbee's plan which continued to develop until 1922 (Fig. 4.8).

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\(^{22}\) Ashbee served as a civic advisor during the British Mandate in Palestine since 1918 till 1920, also served as planning advisor to the Governor in 1922
Geddes-Ashbee advisory plan had introduced greater emphasis on neighborhood planning and established building criteria according to zones. The plan was influenced by Ashbee’s fascination by traditional Palestinian vernacularism, and he contended to shield its dignity and beauty from disruptive random development. The basic urban structure of Geddes-Ashbee plan was not changed from Geddes plan, although some aspects were widened and along the major transportation routes were located industrial areas. This plan for the first time indicated clear designations of land use “Zoning”. As observed in the plan, the Old City was encircled by green belt and open spaces which are more intensive in the northern and eastern parts of the city, the designated areas under special control to save the originality of the location were increased. Geddes-Ashbee’s plan is considered more comprehensive than the proceeded plans; it allocates wider range for development while maintaining the privacy of the Old City of Jerusalem. Table (4.4) shows the percentage of land use management of Geddes-Ashbee’s plan.

Table 4.4: Percentage of land use categories for Geddes-Ashbee’s Plan 1920-1922 according to (Shapiro, 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use category</th>
<th>Designated area (ha)</th>
<th>Percent of total area*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development and Building Area</td>
<td>1437</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old City and Villages</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Spaces</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total area of the Plan is 2216 ha

The impulse of the British desire in planning Jerusalem was incomparable; three years latter to Geddes-Ashbee’s plan, architect Clifford Holliday⁴ introduced his plan in 1925 which was officially approved in 1930. The importance of this plan lies in the fact that in effect it determined the character of building in Jerusalem in its peak period from 1924 to 1944⁵. From the Holliday plan, detailed local plans were derived and all parcellation and building plans in the city were adapted to it. This plan became therefore from 1930 the first legal outline plan and its detailed regulations defined the land uses,

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⁴ Clifford Holliday worked in Jerusalem as a city planner from the beginning of 1923 while involved in beginning in preparation of the formal outline plan for the city.
⁵ Holliday plan served officially from (1930-1944) and is considered the plan which served for the longest time period (i.e. 14 years) during the British Mandate control over Jerusalem.
the building setbacks, building densities, heights and building materials. According to principles which were in force at that time, to the axial transportation routes were added natural road systems that encircled the city at its margins and were meant to enable interurban traffic to bypass the city. In accordance with land use designations, special zones in the city, especially along the main roads the largest of which was Jaffa Road, were designated for commercial activities; this road is considered up to date one of the most popular commercial road in Jerusalem.

The four previously discussed master plans (McLean's Plan, Geddes's Plan, Geddes-Ashbee’s Plan, and Holliday’s Plan) outlined the general shape of the city space and the respective urban development process. However, even during the WWII times, the city continued demanding new ideas and more comprehensive details about its physical context and future pattern of development. As a result, in 1944 Henry Kendall as a British Town Planning Adviser, toward the end of WWII developed the last plan to be initiated by the British Mandate Authority (Fig. 4.9).

In his plan, Kendall was inspired to some extent by the Abercrombie Plan for Greater London of 1944. It is noteworthy to mention that the total area of Kendall Plan is almost twice the area of the preceding (Geddes-Ashbee) Plan which is understandable, since the population according to Efrat (1984) had grown from 62578 capita in 1922 to 165000 capita in 1946, i.e. the population was almost 2.6 times the population during the previous plan. Kendall had significantly

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25 WWII: the Second World War, it was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, which involved most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers: eventually forming two opposing military alliances, the Allies and the Axis. Source (Sommerville, 2008).
reduced the amount of area earmarked as open spaces especially in the westward, southward, and even northward of the Old City, which means, enhancing the development towards these directions, and that is why he located the commercial frontage besides the concentrated central business district in the northwest direction. The plan added to the city new residential zones in areas which were in the older plans part of the park surrounding the walls. Kendall who was sensitive to the social isolation tendencies of the different communities, religions and economic classes planned his neighborhoods according to the model of separate neighborhoods “zones”. (Fig. 4.10) shows the geographic proportion of planned lands in Kendall plan.

![Figure 4.10: Percentage of geographical distribution for Kendall Plan 1944, according to (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited)](image)

In conclusion, it is possible to say that most of the British plans and regulations with respect to Jerusalem were all crowned with sensation. For their “romantic approach” in planning, the major dominant principle that underlay all the plans was the separation of the old city of Jerusalem “holy city” from the new city “secular city” around it. From this concept emerged the other planning and architectural principles. Although British plans were directed to be restraining and limiting “conservative plans”, they also aimed at preventing accelerated and uncontrolled development while encouraging sustainable interrelation among the historic centre and the demanding future expansion of the near
environs. So that British planners laid down standards for design and building regulations which enriched the vernacular space of Jerusalem. Planning during British Mandate was passionate, progressive and innovative; however, the natural British conservatism prevented harming the old. (Table 4.5) shows the planning perception and the resulted spatial reflection on Jerusalem during the British Mandate Era.

Table 4.5: British planning perception–reflection interrelationship, (researcher)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Era in British Mandate</th>
<th>Planning Perception</th>
<th>Spatial Reflection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Significance</td>
<td>• The administration centre was headquartered in Jerusalem</td>
<td>• Conserve the old city exclusive identity, while transforming Jerusalem into a modern city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Jerusalem became the capital of the whole country again for the first time since Crusader days</td>
<td>• Building regulations show sensitivity to old city’s appearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic Conception</td>
<td>• Conserve the old city exclusive identity, while transforming Jerusalem into a modern city.</td>
<td>• Master plans treated the old city as a monolithic unit, architectural and emotional focal point for the entire city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden City Concept</td>
<td>• Design buffer zone around the old city walls where building is prohibited</td>
<td>• Control heights of buildings to preserve the skyline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern City</td>
<td>• Jerusalem began its transformation from provincial town to a modern administrative, political, religious and cultural center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Attractive City</td>
<td>• Start comprehensive town planning by the most eminent British planners</td>
<td>• Produce five Master Plans and powerful building regulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that the foundation plan which formed the basic planning strategy for Jerusalem and inspired all the other plans during British Mandate is the McLean plan of 1918. All the proceeding plans followed McLean’s basic concept in preserving the old city of Jerusalem while directing development outside and away from its fascinating encircling wall. The comparison between these plans is shown schematically in (Fig. 4.11). Although the Ottoman Rule had lasted in the Jerusalem more than four hundred years, it did not inherit a lot of "plans and regulations" in terms of spatial planning as the Mandatory Government did. If Ottomans inherited Jerusalem originality, the British preserved it and introduced the modernity to the city! After thirty years of the British Rule in Jerusalem, the British left irreversible physical and social textures as well as remarkable political changes.
Planning during the Division of Jerusalem (1948-1967)

The League of Nations gave Great Britain a mandate to govern Palestine including Jerusalem after WWI (Hanna, 1942). Although in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 Britain and France had proposed to divide the Middle East between them into spheres of influence with "Palestine" as an “international enclave”, the imperial administration
attempted to divide the city of Jerusalem into separates boroughs (Pappe, 1994). However, the plan fails and so does the mandate, thus Great Britain in February 1947 declared its Mandate in Palestine "unworkable". By the end of the British Mandate in Palestine, Jerusalem as a "Palestinian Capital" turned into a question of hope!

Again between the years of 1947 – 1948 the United Nations (UN) called for partition of Palestine and the "internationalization of Jerusalem" (Rakauskas, 1957). However Arabs rejected the plan, then the “Arab-Israeli” war broke out and ended by proclamation of independence for Israel in 1948, the event which represents practical translation of the British commitment to the establishment of a “Jewish homeland” in Palestine (Balfour Declaration of 1917). During the fighting in 1948, most of the new city of Jerusalem fell under the control of the Israelis. The Arabs took over the Old City and the eastern edges of the new city. Approximately thirty thousand Palestinians were driven out of their new city homes. Jerusalem was divided into what became known as West Jerusalem, under the Israelis, and East Jerusalem under the Jordanian administration. With the resignation of the British Mandate, the “passionate and romantic planning” fruitful days came to an end, while an establishment of a new colonial administration in Jerusalem took place.

It is noteworthy to mention that the demographic composition of Palestine has drastically changed during the mandate. Massive Jewish immigrations were arranged to Palestine in that time (Sachar, 1979), the influx of Jewish settlers was forcing the Palestinian fellahin (native peasants) from their land, consequently the mandatory government tried to control the absorptive capacity of the country (Cohen, 1970). Nonetheless, the mandatory government allotted thousands of hectares of the Palestinian cultivable land to the Jews (Auman, 1975). In 1937 British Government discussed this issue in the report of Peel Commission which stated:

"The heavy immigration in the years 1933-36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews."

The previous discussion reflects how the mandatory consciousness realized this artificial shift in the Palestinian population composition and did not stop it. Avneri (1984) shows that during WWI the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of

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war hard times; also Porath (1974) points out that during the early years of the British mandate in Palestine the overwhelming population majority was Muslim and Christian Arabs, therefore in the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily. (Fig. 4.12) shows the record number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine during the early start of the mandate to the first years of the WWII.

![Figure 4.12: Jewish Immigration into Palestine during 1919 – 1941, according to (Porath, 1977; edited)](image)

It is clearly shown that by the early start of the British Mandate, Jews felt rested and even free to direct their travel into Palestine. However, (Simpson, 1930) argues that Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan and Syria was considered illegal and recognized to have the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants. Along with this immigration policy, Israel spent every effort to own lands from Palestinians (Teveth, 1985), by 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres27 (Granott, 1952). As a result of this imperial acts which Jewish practiced during the mandate time, Arabs organized more and more riots to liberate their lands and protect their rights (Kimche, 1973). After its independence, Israel continued to support Jewish immigration, in 1950 Israel issued the “Law of Return”, which granted every Jew the automatic right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen of the state.

For nineteen years (1948-1967), the two parts of Jerusalem developed in total

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27 1 acre = 4046.86 meter square
separation from one another. While it was a period of major development and change in “West Jerusalem”, the rate of growth was much slower in “East Jerusalem” where the city was marked by economic stagnation and development was modest. Although Khamaisi (1997) argues that Jordanian planning regime in Palestine made some changes by legislating new planning laws which replaced and amended the British planning acts, the Jordanians did not produce any new master plan for East Jerusalem. They simply kept Kendall Plan of 1944, which was considered the statutory plan and the only available reference to guide and development of the city. In planning point of view, after the division of Jerusalem into west and east, it might be said that Kendall Plan was no more “healthy” to function as a master plan. Since in the time it was planned, Jerusalem was envisioned as one entity that shall grow in one overall spatial system of development, in contrast to the divisional status!

In addition to the economic losses, Jerusalemites (Arab residents) also suffered the political and social consequences of the division of the city. Not only did they lose property, businesses, and jobs after the division of Jerusalem but they also lost a way of life. The development pattern in East Jerusalem was "organic," it was small-scale and piecemeal. The largest construction is initiated by a family or perhaps a small group of buildings by a developer. The design of individual buildings is highly differentiated, and the single-family house in its diverse forms is the predominant building type.

On the other hand, West Jerusalem which was declared as a capital for Israel experienced the opposite scenario. The city growth initiated and implemented by the central government on large scale projects, construction is public and of enormous scale, with whole sectors in the city designed by a single architectural view. Housing projects with standardized, repetitive units characterized the neighborhoods of western Jerusalem during the 1950s and 1960s, the law of stone buildings was overlooked, and permits were given to construct buildings in concrete or stucco (Najjar, 2007b). The architecture of West Jerusalem produced during the years of division displays the “International Modern Style”, indeed this modernity of the new city was introduced in the mandate period, however the Israeli colonial planning regime made that style primarily "international" and

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28 The researcher means: the city growth was depending on the individuals in terms of their natural needs of investment and construction.
secondarily "Jerusalem".

Although Khamaisi (1997) argues that with regard to the legacy of the Mandatory plans which Israel continued to use as an effective tool for controlling land use by Palestinians, Israel created two other master plans for West Jerusalem. The first was Rau Plan (Fig. 4.13) which was a conceptual plan, during the time this plan was in place, the end came of the British Mandate in Palestine.

![Rau Plan 1948–1949](image)

Figure 4.13: Rau Plan 1948–1949, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited)

Rau Plan was a natural outcome of the new situation which demanded to amend and update the previous plan and to establish new strategy for the planning of the city. The plan was formulated by architect Heinz Rau who considered the space of the entire city without strict considerations for the armistice lines which were widened extensively westwards. The plan proposed to apply the principle of designating the valleys as parks to
the older areas of the city as well and the park of the old city was thus incorporated in its dimensions as proposed in the mandatory plans. It also introduces more detailed zones that serve both public and private needs integrally. Moreover, special emphasis was expressed to create efficient inner road network. (Fig. 4.14) shows Rau schematic plan with its effective internal loops that incorporate the different land use titles.

As previously mentioned, Rau plan purely was a conceptual plan; hence, Israel decided to prepare a legally binding plan of the city. In 1955, this desire of the government was accomplished by the architect Michael Shaviv who introduced his master plan distinctively, at first the plan was generally discussed and schematically analyzed (Fig. 4.15). There was much emphasis on the road network to cope with the existing infrastructure and also links into the railway same to some extent with the previous Rau conceptual plan.
During the approval process of Shaviv Plan, arguments went hand in hand between various planning authorities including ministerial and municipal levels after which the plan was finally approved in 1959 (Fig. 4.16). This plan shaped the major physical benchmarks of the new western city up to today. The plan does not subject to the question of “preservation” as did those of the mandatory, that is why the plan allows destruction of many traditional neighborhoods along commercial roads, and expansion of building rights in old neighborhoods. The main aim of the plan was to expand the Jewish population westwards and to strengthen structure of existing neighborhoods. Also, to allow for population growth based on existing infrastructure of roads and public buildings, without any large investments in new areas. In order to encourage development of old neighborhoods building rights were expanded in them which brought about changes in their appearance, especially concerning building heights and form. However, Shapiro (1973) points out that the older neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city were zoned in a rather general and monotonous way, almost totally lacking land for public amenities, while the new quarters in the western part of the new city were planned down to the last detail.

Figure 4.16: Shaviv Plan (1955-1959). (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited)
4.5 Planning after Reunification of Jerusalem (1967 thenceforward)

In his speech at the opening ceremony for the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1925, Professor Weizmann\textsuperscript{29} stated:

"It seems at first sight paradoxical that in a land with so sparse a population, in a land where everything still remains to be done, in a land crying out for such simple things as ploughs, roads and harbors, we should be creating a center of spiritual and intellectual development. But it is no paradox for those who know the soul of the Jew. It is true that great social and political problems still face us and will demand their solution. We Jews know that when the mind is given fullest play, when we have a center for the development of Jewish consciousness, then coincidentally, we shall attain the fulfillment of our material needs" (Eylon, 1999)

The above quotation reflects the fundamentality inside the Jewish desire of controlling and directing the Palestinian Arabs land throughout the geographical existence of that native population even since the early start of mandate administration in Palestine. Standing on that Jewish desire, in the mid of 1960s there were numerous border clashes between Israel and its Arab neighbors who developed strategic defense agreement as a consequence (Gawrych, 2003), and whom the Palestinians fighting groups called their aid (Schiff, 1974). However, Oren (2002) refers that Jordanians were complaining from the weakness of Arab strategic support. Therefore, Jordan asked for support by Iraqi army (Churchill & Churchill, 1967), as well as, Egypt increased degree of attention into maximum on Egypt-Israel’s border (Shlaim, 2007; and Mutawi, 2002). Accordingly, Israel kept emphasizing that any closure of the straits would be considered an act of war, or eventually a justification for warfare (Cohen, 1988). Ultimately, on the first of June 1967, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet, and on the forth of June the decision was made to originate war. The day after, Israel initiated rigorous large-scale air strikes that were the official beginning of the Six-Day War\textsuperscript{30}.

By the end of the Six-Day War which was addressed as an "in advertent and preemptive war" (Stein, 1991) Israel won, then imposed dramatic consequences on the conquered states in general, and on the Palestinians in particular. Resultant impact on Palestine was the Israeli occupation for East Jerusalem and West Bank which was under...

\textsuperscript{29}Prof. Chaim Weizmann was the first president of the State of Israel 1949-1952.
\textsuperscript{30}Also known as “June War”, “War of 1967”, and the “1967 Arab-Israeli War”; it was fought between 5\textsuperscript{th} – 10\textsuperscript{th} of June 1967, by Israel on the one side; Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other.
the Jordanian Rule, and Gaza Strip which was under Egyptian control\textsuperscript{31} (Pollack, 2002). This new occupational status directed Israel to adopt more Jewish oriented policies, Hinnebusch (2003) argues that those policies with regard to the Palestinian occupied territories resulted pressing issues in the international law and have far-reaching consequences in global affairs.

Among the first steps that the Israeli government conducted was the announcement of “reunification for West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem” (Fig. 4.17). This event addresses with less than fifty years, a new start of colonial administration for the city, this time with more complex geopolitical status. Reunification of Jerusalem introduced the city of Jerusalem to jump over the scale of city into the scale of district. Highlighting its significance from political, religious, historical, and cultural points of view, Jerusalem stands top among other districts in Israel. In his criticism for the Israeli planning policies, Khamaisi (1997) argues that the Israeli district plans achieved the goal of restraining the development of the native population, the Palestinian Arabs, while giving the central colonial government an effective tool and mechanism for applying occupational policies and achieving targets likely to oppose the interests of the native people. Such planning strategy forces Israel to keep proceeding in work through all planning levels to corporate the challenging status which Jerusalem witnessed after unification.

It is worth noting that directing the Central Business District in West Jerusalem westward was inevitable result of the Armistice Lines before the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. Traders and shoppers would prefer to be some distance from a volatile border, a point further west would make the

\textsuperscript{31} Israel also occupied Sinai Peninsula, which it evacuated under the 1977 Camp David accords, & Syrian Golan Heights, which it continues to occupy. Israel removed its settlers from Gaza Strip in 2005 but continues to control all access points into the Strip.
commercial areas more central relative to the western suburbs, and it would be more convenient for those coming to the city from the coastal plains. Moreover, Dumper (2002) argues that in the mid of 1960s the available reserves land for the municipality of West Jerusalem was almost consumed, so the municipality had debates to re-orient development pattern towards vertical expansion model. Thus, it might be argued that the lebensraum for West Jerusalem was pressing catalyst for the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. This factor also adds an important spatial planning dimension to the political factors that led to the annexation. In addition, it helps explain the speed and determination with which construction took place after the 1967. The greater availability of space suitable for construction in the annexed areas of Jerusalem was a major impulse behind the Israeli settlement policies there.

One year after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, Israel developed Hashimshony Master Plan for reunified Jerusalem (Fig. 4.18). The basic objective of Hashimshony plan was to solve the problem of urban growth for West Jerusalem by providing wider range of space for construction purposes (i.e. lebensraum) in the eastern part of the city. The plan matched the desired goal unequivocally, hence served as regulatory plan about to mid-1980s. With more than seven effectively distributed land use categories, Hashimshony plan introduced Jerusalem as well planned reunified capital.

If we look, search, analyze, and eventually come out with conclusions, it shall be undeniably clear that lot of the planning tribulations coupled with the

![Figure 4.18: Hashimshony Plan 1968, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited)](image-url)
The development of Jerusalem in the “post-1967 epoch” emerged from the political situation concerning the annexation of East Jerusalem and the adjacent parts of the West Bank. The fortitude to assert “political sovereignty” and “demographic dominance” over the eastern parts of the city have key impact upon the "rational development" of Jerusalem over and above the problems associated with rapid growth and modernization. In fact, it could be debated that the perception of "enlarged Jerusalem" in terms of local, regional, and national levels as the capital of a Jewish state inflicts planning priorities unfavorable or even inimical to its native inhabitants, the Palestinian Arabs. As they see it, the major determining factor in the Israeli planning process, overriding any topographical, ecological, legal, and historical factors, is once again the issue of "political sovereignty" which represents the ethnical, prejudiced, and demographic sovereignty.

Quick review for Jerusalem in terms of various planning perspectives reveals the presence of a scarce, rigid, complex, challenging, dynamic, changing, and very influential “urban or physical, or even spatial” planning pattern coincident with very unique inputs and amazing unexpected outcomes. Indeed, the change of Jerusalem political and municipal boundaries required urgent steps to “re-balance” the physical and social existence of the city. In other words, a start of practical shift from the stage of “theory and concept” to the stage of “schematic town planning”, that is why the proposed plans for Jerusalem before 1967 could be described in general as “advisory and overall guidance plans” rather than “regulatory detailed plans” as those prepared after the 1967 when neighborhood schemes witnessed profound interest and precise details based on spatial and quantitative studies.

The dimensions of the Israeli planning policies with regard to Jerusalem status after the reunification announcement grow fast and to some extent oscillate dynamically, in such way confusing both: outside observers, and those affected native population, the Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, in order to comprehensively cover the Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem for the post-1967 period, the researcher was convinced to decide to shift analysis and discussion of those policies to the next chapter of this doctorate research, where the major characteristics, aims, methodologies, and consequences of those variant and challenging polices are deeply outlined.
4.6 Analytical Conclusion

The researcher used *history* as a major tool during analysis to: provide a clear-eyed view of planning in Jerusalem since Ottomans times up to today, and to assess the prospects of Jerusalem *space-changing-behavior* in spatial planning perspective. Although it might be argued that Jerusalem does not have extended history in urban planning, its relatively recent history in any case has been extremely intensive. In the past century, planning in Jerusalem has been strongly connected to the politics of the area, Jerusalem experienced five administrative systems with less than fifty years, this by itself was a major factor to enrich “regardless negatively or positively” the planning history of Jerusalem (Fig. 4.19).

![Diagram of Administrative Changes in Jerusalem](image)

Figure 4.19: Administrative changes in Jerusalem, (researcher)

Because of its strategic settings and religious backgrounds, Jerusalem presents endless challenges to planners. Ottomans, British, Jordanians, and the Israelis each have
had different even sometimes contradictory perspectives on the city, but none has been “entirely successful” in guiding its development. However, each left non-erasable benchmarks on both sides of the city: hard infrastructure “built up areas” and soft infrastructure “population” (Fig. 4.20).

Figure 4.20: Socio-spatial administrative changes in Jerusalem, (researcher)

It could be argued that the “first generation of urban planning” in Jerusalem developed during British mandate in Palestine where the first record for a “conventional town plan” for Jerusalem appeared in the early 20th century. Ottomans who governed the city of Jerusalem for more than four centuries (1516-1917) had not produced such town plans the British did; however, they inherited the British planners the “reference planning point” of Jerusalem, i.e. the Old City with its standing encircling wall. Thus the researcher may address that Ottomans adopted “conservative approach”, while the British who governed Jerusalem for three decades (1917-1948) adopted the “romantic approach” during their planning acts in Jerusalem. During their governance in Jerusalem, the British prepared five master plans for Jerusalem, three plans were advisory while the other two were statutory outline plans. After the termination of the mandatory government Jerusalem was divided for nineteen years (1948 – 1967), it has been generally introduced
in a threefold division: the Old City, East Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem. The Old city is conventionally defined by the area included within Jerusalem impressive encircling wall. East Jerusalem usually refers to the eastern parts of the city outside the walls of the Old City, both East Jerusalem and the Old City of Jerusalem remained under Jordanian rule until 1967. West Jerusalem refers to the western parts of the city outside the walls of the Old City and was controlled by Israel after 1948-War. During this divisional status of Jerusalem, Jordanians did not produce any master plan, while the Israeli developed two master plans, one advisory and the other regulatory. Thus during this time scale the researcher may address that Jordanians adopted “primitive regulatory approach”, while the Israeli adopted “colonial approach”. After 1967, Jerusalem fell in total under Israeli occupation post the 1967-War; accordingly, East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem were reunified and subject to Israeli planning up to today. Fig 4.21 shows mass production of planning during different planning eras in Jerusalem.

Figure 4.21: Planning mass production in Jerusalem, (researcher)
Chapter Five

Political Architecture In Jerusalem
Chapter Five

Political Architecture In Jerusalem

"Poets, priests, and politicians, have words to thank for their positions, words that scream for your submission, and no one's jamming their transmission."

Gordon Sumner

This chapter investigates through critical review and analysis the extent to which power, politics, planning and architecture are intertwined in the current spatial context of Jerusalem. It highlights within a framework of case studies the paradoxical city architecture in Jerusalem, as such illustrating the strong relation between architecture as a means for politics, and the respective effects upon the city socio-spatial structure, i.e. place and space morphologies. Moreover, this chapter traces evidences of the influence of the political decision-making process upon the creation of ethnic related regions and settlements in Jerusalem; as well as, investigates the power/politics in difference to social or economic dimensions and the extent to which superimposing the former has shaped and influenced the latter. Thus, this chapter explores the Israeli planning policies adopted in Jerusalem, and provides critical review for the key discrepancies in the urban spaces in Jerusalem and the standing Israeli planning policies behind them, shaping what the researcher conceptualizes “political architecture” in the city.

5.1 Introduction

According to various viewpoints in literature, “political architecture” in many places in the world, is yet, a subject to be thoroughly investigated. Despite the fact that the role of politics in shaping cities, and architecture across history, has been central in understanding the evolution of certain typologies, urban features and spatial elements of architecture of cities, this subject has been scarcely touched as an exclusive research in the architecture of the Arab World in particular. Little can be noticed in literary sources that address the subject as an independent comprehensive research to shed light on the role of politics as a narrative chronology of time, or place within the architectural context. Moreover, tracing back the roots of such an influence was less obvious in available
writing, particularly studies which examine the extent to which politics was evident in the outcome in architecture of the city in the conflict areas (Al Sayed, 2011).

Political decisions pertaining to governmental national and international policies, normally, result unquiet debates. These debates utterly, float to the surface, when political policies impose: visions, outlooks, discussions, recommendations, decisions, treaties, agreements, and charters especially in the conflict areas. In many cases, such decisions create - on the ground - physical layouts (spaces) that rely totally upon political backgrounds. These spaces produced by 'political decisions', create, what the researcher conceptualizes as "spaces of political architecture". In other words, spaces which appear as a reflection and a translation of political decisions. For instance, an interesting debate followed the proposal for establishing a continuous wall or fence along the borders between Mexico and the United States, submitted by the latter during the mid-last decade. Hamilton (2006) criticized that political proposal, and argued by a surprising critic to highlight the political nature of the event occurring at territorial border:

“As a classic design challenge, The New York Times asked 13 architects and urban planners to devise the "fence." Several declined because they felt it was purely a political issue.” (Hamilton, 2006:1)

The political nature of that event is, outstandingly, acknowledged by architects. As stated, architects did not favor participating, but rather dismissed the consequences and challenges expected to follow. Thus, it might be argued that political architecture is, at frontier and conflict areas, repulsive and architects avoided. However, architecture will never devoid itself of politics. This is crucially critical; the outcome of such political proposal shall un-doubtfully not only affect environment, biodiversity, geography, history, and identity, but also humans’ feelings. During the last decades of the twentieth century, human societies have, inevitably, had to overcome new challenges, having to deal with sustainability, and with outdated politics incapable to resolve new problems. The growing discourses of power and sovereignty accompanied by unilateral actions pushed tragedy to millions of people seem to lead politics and politicians into dead-ends. Thus, the new world ‘political architecture’ has been addressed as, a major objective, that needs international collaboration (Petrella, 2006).

The international political structure built in the previous era is losing effectiveness
and authority. Consequently, contemporary politics is often confined to spontaneous reactions to the manifold and unparalleled challenges. Among the collaborative responses to these challenges, in 2006, an international seminar under the title “A New World Political Architecture” took place. The seminar focused on the revision of international politics in terms of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘security’, no more coinciding with nations, but with the various non-state stakeholders and multidimensional organizations influencing today politics at all levels. Moreover, the seminar emphasized the importance in the reform of international institutions system, that should enhance more collaborative global governance, respectful of social justice to all world citizens through sustainable development, education, the improvement of health and environment conditions and the promotion of women’s rights (WPF, 2006).

Urban planning in the conflict areas, in addition to the unquiet debates discussed earlier in this chapter, may shape fast-changing and dynamic spatial policies accompanied with irreversible physical spaces (political architecture spaces) that create in many cases multi-dimensional challenges for the inhabitants there. Especially, for the indigenous residents when considered for one reason or another a group of minority. In Jerusalem, this case applies; since Jerusalem, as will be shown in this chapter, is directed to grow ‘divergently’ in two comparative images. One image is in East Jerusalem, where the Palestinians live in Arabic neighborhoods surrounded by Israeli Settlements. The other is in West Jerusalem, which is almost considered purely inhabited by the Israelis (Najjar et al., 2011). The direction of growth wheel in Jerusalem is tightly correlated into political backgrounds, rather than rational planning principles. This is clearly shown in the political discourses of prominent Israeli politicians/officials. For example, since the early Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, during the municipal council meeting held on thirteenth of August 1967, Rabbi Cohen declared:

“And dare I say frankly that we have to do everything within our power to make Greater Jerusalem the largest Jewish city in the world, a real Jewish city, both in terms of the population numbers and in giving a permanent Jewish character to the whole city” (Halawani, 2006:41)

The last few words in of the above quotation established, the corner stone, of the political architecture in Jerusalem. A political architecture of the city that should reflect in its: hard infrastructure (built up areas and physical spaces) a Jewish identity, and in its
soft infrastructure (population) a majority of Jews. Regarding the latter component – city population, Amir Cheshin who served as government adviser on Arab affairs in Jerusalem, wrote:

“Since 1967, Jerusalem was considered to be the largest city in Israel, .... The decision to strengthen the Jewish population was accompanied by another government decision: to also preserve a demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in the city. This required several measures, namely, considerably increasing the number of housing units available for Jewish residents in the city and taking any steps possible to prevent a significant increase in building aimed Arab population” (Halawani, 2006:42)

The influential political dimension demonstrates over all other factors included for the future development in Jerusalem. Political architecture is, therefore, a natural output of the governmental and official decisions taken by the Israelis who seek every opportunity to achieve more and more political goals. Mordechai Ish-Shalom, former Mayor of Jerusalem, declared:

“What is required - and quickly - is Jews, many Jews in Jerusalem. No, more trickles of immigration” (Halawani, 2006:41)

The Israeli determination to introduce, and emphasize totally, Jerusalem as a Jewish city, has seriously, affected the Israeli planning principles and policies. Politics, therefore, becomes the basic and the solid foundation upon which Jerusalem’s architectural space must stand. This combination between politics and development has, persistently, established unique “political architecture” in Jerusalem. Cheshin et al. (1999) interestingly argue with fascinating detail that proper “political” governance of Jerusalem would not have risked Israel's claim, but instead, would have eased tensions over the city's future; and sadly, that error in judgment is the tragedy of Israel's rule in East Jerusalem since 1967. Furthermore, Al Sayed (2011) outstandingly highlights and argues the political dimension and its effects upon Jerusalem’s architecture, stating:

“In modern times, architecture as 'political' tool has been apparent as a result of ideological conflicts. This has been most evident in Jerusalem and was detected by the policies of ruling powerful authorities that left strong marks upon planning as a means to express apartheid policies”. (Al Sayed, 2011:169)

Hence, the need arises to assess and re-read the space in Jerusalem in the context of changing socio-political power. Accordingly, it was the aim of this chapter to bring under scrutiny such influence upon East Jerusalem’s architectural space after the Israeli
occupation in 1967, and to explore this interaction between architecture and politics, where the later has strongly and directly influenced the former.

5.2 Political Jerusalem – A Legal/Illegal Entity

The end of the 1967 Six-Day War has resulted dramatic consequences. Israel had, unilaterally, annexed 70.5 square kilometers of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) including East Jerusalem which presents 6.5 square kilometers of the total. Israel’s domestic jurisdiction (sovereignty) was extended to East Jerusalem through the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) in 1967. The city’s unification and its status as the eternal capital of Israel were declared through the Basic Law on 30 July 1980. However, the status of a United Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital has not been officially recognized by most of the international community, and nearly all countries maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv (Kellerman, 1993). These acts are contrary to international law. Israel, therefore, continues to violate international law, along with United Nations resolutions and agreements with Palestinians. Palestinians also refer to United Nation Security Council Resolution 252, which considers invalid expropriation of land and other actions that tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem. The status of Jerusalem and of its holy places remains contended up to date.

According to international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention, East Jerusalem represents ‘territory occupied by Israel’ in 1967 as a result of war. As such, Israel is obliged to uphold the rights of the residents of the territory, refrain from attempting to change the status or demography of the territory and provide appropriate services to the occupied people. In really, opposite Israeli actions happen on the ground. The adopted Israeli planning policies have succeeded in imposing dramatic changes in Jerusalem’s demographic compositions, urban fabric, physical identity, ethnic culture, borders and legal status, aiming therefore, to Judaizing the city making it as its united capital. Instead of preserving the rights of the Jerusalemites, Israel continues to violate Article (47) of the Fourth Geneva Convention which stipulates that residents of an occupied territory are to be afforded the rights of the Convention regardless of changes imposed by the Occupying Power, such as annexation of all or part of the territory. Israel
is in violation of Article (49) (1) of the Geneva Convention and Article (49) (6), which forbids “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations”, and the “deport [action] or transfer... [of] parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Article (53) of the Convention provides that states “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons ... is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” In addition to, Article (147) of the Convention which also prohibits “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”\(^{32}\).

Moreover, Israel is in clear violation of the following: UN Security Council Resolutions [242, 252, 338 and 478], among others; the Hague Convention; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention for the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifically: Article (7), denial of equal protection under the law; Article (9) arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; Article (13) denial of the right to return to one's country; Article (17), arbitrary expropriation of personal property; Article (18) interference with religious worship and observance. Furthermore, Jerusalemites living in East Jerusalem did not obtain Israeli citizenship, but maintained Jordanian citizenship. According to the Israeli legal system and laws they are considered rather ‘holders of conditional permanent residence’. Palestinian political resistance has been active since 1967 against the illegitimate Israeli control over East Jerusalem. Thus, although Jerusalemites are not prohibited to vote in the municipal elections of Jerusalem, only a minority exercised this right (less than five percent in the recent elections), assuring support an effective boycott of the Israeli political system. Likewise, Palestinians from East Jerusalem did not stand for election in the Municipality. On the other hand, Israel seeks every opportunity to prevent Jerusalemites to practice democratic and developmental rights in Jerusalem. Israeli preventions regarding the establishment of

\(^{32}\) See Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Palestinian national institutions in East Jerusalem, the closure of many NGOs and as well as prohibitions and restrictions on the work of Palestinian national bodies, have weakened, almost to the extent of political paralysis, the representation of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Thus, Palestinians are forced to become dependent on the Israeli planning system, which imposes manifold negative impacts on their daily lives (Jerusalem Unit, 2010).

Palestinians since the early Israeli occupation of east Jerusalem in 1967, have pursued various strategies including resistance, confrontation, and ultimately, negotiations. Most remarkably, in 1993, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) made the decision to pursue Palestinian independence through negotiations. Accordingly the PLO and Israel signed a number of agreements between 1993 and 1999, known collectively as the Oslo Agreements. According to Nasrallah (2008) until the signing of Oslo Accords (1993-1994), Jerusalem represented the metropolitan commercial and economic centre of the West Bank, as well as, the undeclared Palestinian Capital. However, the status of East Jerusalem was deferred to the permanent status negotiations. As stated in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, all of Jerusalem (not solely East Jerusalem) is subject to final status of negotiations. Yousef (2008) argues that the donors’ funds became reluctant to support and finance Palestinian activities in East Jerusalem in order to avoid any disruption of the fragile situation of the negotiations, funds have been directed for projects and infrastructure in Ramallah promoted by the PA. Thus, the international community focused on strengthening the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the WB and GS which has impacted support to East Jerusalem negatively (Jerusalem Unit, 2010).

5.3 Political Engineering in Jerusalem

The role of politics in shaping the physical layouts and in forming the future outlines of the Palestinian areas (oPt) is underestimated relative to the significant effects it has over the interdisciplinary aspects of the Palestinian’s life. The architectural and spatial context, which examines the extent to which politics was evident in the outcome in architecture of the city (space) in the conflict areas, is an outstanding tool of argumentation of this case-effect interrelationship. Indeed, “politics” has played
magnificent role in defining the style of life of the Palestinians forcing it to meet more and more challenges and constrains. In this manner, Abuleil (2008) argues that after the Israeli annexation of the WB, GS, and EJ in 1967, Israel used the land use planning as a control tool to direct the Palestinian development opportunities toward ‘unsustainable’ manner. As these land use plans are designed to make the land – as much as possible – 'unavailable' for the Palestinian utilization, through prohibiting Palestinians from building and construction by designating wide areas as natural reserves, closed military areas or for security reasons through several military orders (Fig. 5.1, 5.2).

![Closures and Requisitioned Land in the Gaza Strip and West Bank](image)

*Figure 5.1: Closures and requisitioned land in oPt, (Abuleil, 2008)*
Before exploring in detail the political reflections upon architecture and space in Jerusalem, the researcher finds it fruitful to overview the Israeli political dimension upon the Palestinians’ lands in the West Bank, to highlight how this dimension is targeting all the Palestinian development in general and the Jerusalemite’s development in particular. For example, ICAD (2008) points out that 37% of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are established on Palestinian land temporary confiscated by Israeli military orders.
and for security reasons. These Jewish-only settlements house more than 300,000 Jewish settlers interspersed throughout the West Bank Levinson (2009). As such, the Israeli settlement policies threaten the Palestinian existence and local communities' growth; since these Israeli settlements are surrounding the Palestinian localities and established on wide confiscated Palestinian lands, which are either agricultural lands or lands designated for future urban expansion of these localities, and in both cases the natural growth of the Palestinians is prevented. Moreover, Hosh and Issac (1996) assure that these settlements are direct violation for the international laws, and are a focal point for land destruction and pollution of the Palestinian environment; they impose threats to the quality of the Palestinian environment and have been one of the leading causes of its degradation by: consuming the biggest amount of the scarce Palestinian water resources, disposing waste water to the open valleys reaching the Palestinian villages destroying wide agricultural areas and polluting surface and ground water, as well as, by dumping solid waste without restriction on Palestinian lands.

According to ARIJ (2004), Israel has limited the Palestinian built up areas in the WB and GS under the pretext of its security and by means of more than 1500 military orders. Thus, the Palestinian built up area in the WB is estimated to consist only 6.3 %, and over 70% of the WB lands are inaccessible to Palestinians. The Israeli land use policies in the WB aimed restraining the Palestinian development and exploiting their natural resources. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 show the land use items and their areas in the West Bank.

Table 5.1: West Bank land use categories in 1998, (Abuleil, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use Category</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Percent of Total Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian built up</td>
<td>367.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural reserve</td>
<td>292.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military bases</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli settlement</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed military areas</td>
<td>1214.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead Sea</td>
<td>195.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: represent cultivated areas, grazing areas, and unused land</td>
<td>3583.0</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5838.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ‘political’ dimension of the Israeli planning policies at the Palestinians’ lands is clearly translated in the aforementioned figure. According to Abuleil (2008) the designated land use as closed military areas encompass about 20% of the total West Bank land area, mainly located in its eastern region, these lands are currently empty of any Palestinian communities, and most have been made unreachable to Palestinians. These lands are considered major resource to allow future expansion for the Palestinian residents who suffer from high rate of population densities which reach approximately 870 capita per square kilometer in the West Bank and 3400 capita per square kilometer in the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli planning policies did not stop at adopting that unsustainable land use plans in the oPt, but it has added geopolitical dimension into the planning system which is a controversial criterion upon which the Palestinians’ future development can be achieved. This geopolitical dimension was introduced within Oslo Accords, specifically following the Oslo II Interim Agreement. It imposes a fragmented geographical division for Palestine into three major areas each has different control authorities and regulations, namely, ‘Area A’, ‘Area B’, and ‘Area C’ in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip (Fig. 5.4, 5.5 and Table 5.2).

Figure 5.4: Land geopolitical classification in the West Bank, (OCHA, 2011)
As noted in the previous geopolitical map, the Palestinians’ spatial contiguity is not any more achievable, since ‘Area A’ and ‘Area B’ are physically separated from each other by ‘Area C’ which forms the overwhelming majority of the total area, i.e. 74% of the total area are fully under Israeli control. Statistical evidence shows that 70% of ‘Area C’ is off-limits to Palestinian construction; while 29% is heavily restricted. This severely constrains the living space of and development opportunities for Palestinian communities, as the Israeli Civil Administration has planned only less than 1% of ‘Area

33 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table. 5.2).
C’ for Palestinian development (UN, 2011). PENGON (2002) argues that this geopolitical division forms countless Palestinian disconnected enclaves encircled by settlements and bypass roads. Moreover, Palestinians living within each area according to this geopolitical definition must have respective identification cards, Palestinians living in ‘Area A’ and ‘Area B’ hold green identification cards while those living in ‘Area C’ hold orange identification cards, nonetheless, all Palestinians whose identification card is either green or orange are not allowed to access into areas inside Israel (Yousef, 2008). This geopolitical division affects severely the socioeconomic basis and the spatial sustainable aspects of the Palestinians, and therefore, enhances spatial fragmentation and hinders any integration and articulation of the Palestinian urban and urban-rural relations. According to Hosh and Issac (1996) this geopolitical division prohibits the Palestinians from constructing an effective national infrastructure, or formulating an integrated national policy for the agricultural and water sector. Hence the planning process proposed by the Palestinian Authority and the progressive economy required for independent Palestinian entity is facing more and more challenges imposed by the Israeli political planning dimensions.

5.3.1 Architecture of Separation and Fragmentation

An interesting quotation that resembles the political segregation which Jerusalem has passed through since the first Israeli occupation in 1948 up to today is appealingly introduced by Omar Yousef:

“Palestinian East Jerusalem: Born out of division, raised under occupation and chopped to pieces during the ‘peace process’”. (Yousef, 2008:21)

The previous few lines express frankly how Jerusalem was directly affected and progressively influenced by the various political eras the city moved under. It is also shown how dramatic is ‘the conclusion’ of the final status of East Jerusalem’s spatial context, “pieces” – wrote Yousef, during the political negotiations, or in other words, during the peace process. It is still crucially, underestimated, to describe what happens in Jerusalem by words, political consequences have put burden upon the daily life of the Jerusalemites making it unbearable. Yousef (2008) argues that after Oslo Agreement and the respective political implications in the region, many Palestinians who used to live and
work in Jerusalem for many years, but began to hold green or orange identification card as they do not live inside the territory marked by Israeli municipal boundary of Jerusalem became unable to access the city and lost their emotional, spiritual, economical, and in many cases family relations in Jerusalem. In the spatial consciousness of East Jerusalem, Palestinian neighborhoods are part of the urban continuum of their fabric of life. However, the political implications were driven against these considerations and realm. In this manner, Yousef (2008:21) wrote about one Palestinian who lived in Eizaria: “Our families are spread throughout this area and now, all of the sudden, they do not belong to the city”, then he continued describing the transformation of identity for one Palestinian who has long been considered a Jerusalemite but after the political changes he lost this title:

“... he is and has always been a Jerusalemite. He studied at Jerusalem’s schools, ...., and knows all of the cities pubs in east and west! But since the imposition of checkpoints and the Separation Wall, he has become an “illegal alien” inside the annexed zone. In the census carried out by the Israeli authority after 1967 war, he was registered as a resident of a house that lies one hundred meters away from the arbitrary borderline, which illegally annexed Palestinian land to the Israeli municipality”. (Yousef, 2008:21)

Thus, the social life of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is no more coherent or sustainable, unity and spatial integration if not built upon social integration will not achieve stability or future consistency. Intensifying the status of social cuts, Yousef (2008:22) described how Palestinian became unable to move freely to their works and to meet their families in Jerusalem, he wrote:

“it’s a pity, but they [Jerusalemite] can’t do it [to give a ride for Palestinian who had green or orange identification card] for their mothers and sisters, which must be even more painful for them. Now I understand the situation and don’t expect rides anymore. The sad thing is that all of this injustice is seen as legal and my normal life is considered illegal”. (Yousef, 2008:22)

Accordingly, the Palestinians neighborhoods in East Jerusalem have collectively faced sudden rupture of their social and economic life, not only those Palestinians who live outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, but also Jerusalemites living inside the municipal territories. Figure 5.6 shows part of the harsh life style Palestinians found themselves forced to deal with in order or in a trial to amend their spiritual, social, economic and cultural cracks, the picture show Palestinians on the one side and Israeli soldiers with the separation wall in between.
It could be argued that Palestinians in general did not pay much attention to where they lived until the Oslo Agreement was signed and political implications followed. This fact applies in particular for people who lived within the Palestinian urban fabric in Jerusalem, which indeed, had developed gradually as a natural extension of the city’s neighborhoods especially after the division of Jerusalem in 1948 when East Jerusalem was developed under the Jordanian control and Palestinians neighborhood developed inside the city without Israeli restrictions until 1967 when the eastern part fell under Israeli occupation. Since then, the annexed part has been subjected to a continuous policy of spatial and demographic engineering which aimed at achieving Jewish majority in both sides of the city (Jabareen, 2010). In this manner, Yousef (2008) argues that Israel used spatial planning as a tool to impose restrictions on the Palestinian development and the Palestinian housing within the municipal area, in order to limit the numbers of Palestinians within the Israeli municipal area in Jerusalem and to utilize vacant Palestinian lands for the construction of Jewish-only settlements.
The separation policy in Jerusalem is generated by the urban territoriality which aims at controlling geography through influencing and controlling the actions and interactions of people, things and relationships. It involves categorizations, border settings and urban policies in its generic term (Sack, 1986). The outcome of the Israeli territoriality in Jerusalem has fostered the urban instability and created two groups living together under one municipal border but separately. These are one overwhelming Israeli group and the other subordinate Palestinian group, in other words, a Jewish group of majority, and an Arab group of minority. Yousef (2008) argues that the regime ideology in Israel has an outstanding influence upon the spatial policies in Jerusalem; which has been employed for the benefit of the Jewish community. As a result, the urban morphology of Jerusalem has been changing and shifting towards more Jewish identity and physical layouts. The Jewish settlements spread in East Jerusalem are constructed around and between the urban Palestinian neighborhoods devastating their future continuum and fragmenting the Palestinian urban space, thus, increasing discrepancies in terms of urban ethnic conditions between the Israelis and Palestinians (Fig. 5.7).

Figure 5.7: Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, (Yousef et al, 2008)
The previous figure portrays how is the distribution of the Israeli Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem planned in a manner that creates two ethnically separated communities classified by national affiliation: an Israeli/Jewish communities and Palestinian/Arabic clusters respectively. Figure 5.8 illustrates the ‘pure Arabic’ fabric in East Jerusalem during the period 1948-1967, and how these Palestinian communities expanded after 1967 in the eastern, northern, and southern directions of the city; meanwhile the western side remained ‘pure Jewish’ yet.

Figure 5.8: Expansion of Arabic Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (Najjar et al, 2006)
5.3.2 Architecture of Security and Surveillance

Between the years 1967 and 1993, Israel utilized the political engineering which employed urban planning for fragmenting the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. However, Israel continued fostering this political engineering which intensified the ethnic separation between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews by adopting sophisticated physical segregation policies on the ground: flying checkpoint, permanent checkpoints and, eventually, the Separation Wall, also known as “Isolation Wall”, “Colonial Wall” or, “Apartheid Wall” (Juma, 2003). These divisional tactics were formulated after the beginning of political negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, more specifically, after the adaption of Oslo Agreement in 1993, starting by installing checkpoints on the major roads that link East Jerusalem to the West Bank, and then where intensified at the early years of the second millennium, particularly after the year 2003, when Israel began constructing the Separation Wall on the ground. These policies have created unique political architecture in Jerusalem that delineates the military and security morphologies over the city spatial context and socioeconomic fabric.

Since the early adaption of the “security architecture\textsuperscript{34}” in Jerusalem by Israel, the style of life for the Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem has been changing dynamically, to meet more social damage and urban struggle in their isolated neighborhoods and controlled transport and road systems. In this manner, Najjar (2007c) exemplifies part of the suffering that many of the Jerusalemites face, stating:

\textit{“Until (recently - 2003), when any of the hundred thousand people in Al Eizaryya, Abu Dis or Sawahre [Arabic Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem] wanted to reach Jerusalem, all they had to do was take Al Eizaryya’s main road, which connects to the Jerusalem-Jericho road, and within minutes they could reach the Old City, those days are gone. Today Al Eizaria road comes to a sudden halt at a wall eight meters high, topped by rolls of barbed wire, …. If you want to get to Jerusalem, you must turn around, drive east to a checkpoint at the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, turn around again and head northwest to the A Zaim checkpoint, then to French Hill, …, and finally to East Jerusalem. Even if you take this approach, however, your arrival in Jerusalem – supposing you’re a Palestinian – depends on additional factors. First, the checkpoints, …. Second, …, must have a blue identity card, …. This measure rules out half the people of East Sawahre and the vast majority of those from Abu Dis. These may enter only by a special [Israeli] permit, rarely granted.”} (Najjar, 2007c:55-56)

\textsuperscript{34} Security architecture - is a norm used by the researcher - which refers to the physical layouts created in the city of Jerusalem under the Israeli claim of security, such as the Separation Wall and the permanent checkpoints on the main roads leading into Jerusalem.
Since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli policies have targeted the Palestinian presence in the city. Firstly, Israel changed the total area of Jerusalem and extended its domestic legislation over the city. Subsequently, Israel constructed the Separation Wall (Fig. 5.9) to isolate Jerusalem from the rest of oPt which severed the city from its demographic, geographic, and economic support base (Jerusalem Unit, 2010).
Israel constructed illegally and in direct violation of the International Law the Separation Wall, which ethnically divides, two communities living in one city and above one land, to form segregated clusters and discrete spaces. In nonurban areas, the separation wall is more than forty meters wide, consisting of barbed wire, an anti-vehicle ditch, a dirt path to pick up footprints, an electric fence, another dirt path, an asphalt road, yet another dirt path, and more barbed wire (Fig. 5.10). In urban areas, it becomes an eight-meters-high wall of reinforced concrete (Fig. 5.11).

![Figure 5.10: Section in the Separation Wall in the nonurban areas (Najjar, 2007c, edited)](image1)

![Figure 5.11: Section in the Separation Wall in the urban areas in Jerusalem (Najjar, 2007c, edited)](image2)
Recalling the 'illegality' of the Separation Wall, Palestinians stand firmly upon the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the principal judicial organ of the UN, which found that: “the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law; Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto”. In accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion, “Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction... including in and around East Jerusalem; all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States party to the Fourth Geneva Convention...have...the obligation, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention”, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010:21).

Further social disintegration, displacement and fragmentation of families has taken place due to the construction of the Separation Wall and the extension of Israel’s jurisdiction such as the 2003 Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, forbidding residents of the oPt to live in Israel with their spouses. The Separation Wall disconnects entire communities from what used to be their economic hub, and in turn, disrupts the entire Palestinian economy by constricting the flow of income. Security architecture, therefore, has had severe impacts on Jerusalemites’ social life. The expansion of Israeli settlements and the continuous spreading of inspection checkpoints have shrunk the space available for Palestinians to live and work, confiscation of land and property has deepened a general feeling of insecurity and uncertainty. These factors, coupled with the fragmentation of Palestinian families and due to the Separation Wall and a multitude of discriminatory practices, have resulted in a profound identity crisis for the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, especially for the new generations within in a scattered spatial context.
Constructing the Separation Wall in East Jerusalem and other areas in the oPt attracted wide world debates and controversial conclusions. Juma (2003) argues that the purpose of constructing the Israeli Separation Wall is coming out of the Israeli ethnic and discrimination policies, stating:

“You can call it a “Separation Wall,” “Isolation Wall,” “Colonial Wall” or, as we call it, “Apartheid Wall”; but certainly not a “Security Wall.” Yet, none of these names reflect the shocking reality of what the Wall really is.” (Juma, 2003:138)

Furthermore, Najjar (2007c) questions the status of ‘security’ of the separation elements in Jerusalem, arguing that if these barriers in Jerusalem are intended for security, still, their course is very odd, emphasizing that function of the wall is not to achieve security purposes, but rather to devastate the Palestinian social unity in Jerusalem, Isolating East Jerusalem and cutting the Palestinian geographical continuity in the West Bank, stating:

“It [the wall] does not separate Jews from Arabs, or Arab villages from settlements. It separates Arabs from Arabs. ...., It [the wall] divided the West Bank into separate cantons, north and south. ...., It [Jerusalem] supplied the villages not only with goods and services, but also with great job opportunities. The wall cuts through all that. ...., Now comes the barrier, dividing blues [blue ID holders] and greens [green ID holders], ...., separating the store from its customers, the farmer from his lands, the pupils from their school, the sick from the hospital, the dead from the cemetery. ...., Security, as said, is a pretext.” (Najjar 2007c, Pp.58-59)

The above quotation shows well how ‘territoriality – explained earlier’ is outstandingly translated and physically clarified by the separation architecture adopted by Israel, especially in Jerusalem. Figure 5.12 shows the Israeli separation (fence map) on large scale territories of the West Bank. The map shows how that only short sections are needed to isolate Jerusalem from the oPt in the West Bank, i.e. keep it clear of Ramallah in the north and Bethlehem to the south. According to this objective, no fence is needed either west or east of the city except opposite Abu Dis. On the other hand, Israel aims to maintain effective connection between the city and the Jewish settlement quite the opposite of what happens in the Palestinian neighborhoods there. In this way, much more than just the city becomes incorporated. This cannot be achieved by fencing Jerusalem in, but by fencing in the near-by cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem to the tightest possible parameters. Moreover, territoriality serves effectively the Israeli definition of Greater Jerusalem (Fig. 5.13), by swallowing over 90% of the whole Palestinian district named
after the city, Palestinian urban areas will be transformed into the shape of a huge territorial wedge, which will tear the West Bank apart into two separate pieces, one in the north and one in the south, while emptying it of its Arab metropolitan core (Juma, 2003).

Figure 5.12: Separation Fence in the West Bank, (Juma, 2003)
The map of Greater Jerusalem clearly renders the fragmented spatial context in East Jerusalem. It shows the scattered Palestinian urban localities – shaping what is described as isolated ghettos or cantons, these are classified as: ‘north ghetto’ which includes: Beit...
Hanina, Qalandiya, Beir Nabala, Al-Jeeb, Jodaira and Kufr Aqab; ‘northwest ghetto’ which includes: Beit Duqqu, Beit Ijza, Qbeba, Beit Sourik, Beit Anan, and Qatana; ‘east ghetto’ which includes: Ar-Ram, Jaba’, Hizma, Shu’fat and Issawiya; ‘southeast ghetto’ which includes: Abu Dis, Anata and Eizarya; and ‘southwest ghetto’ which includes: Silwan, Sur Baher and Beit Safafa. On contrast to the disconnected Palestinian urban spaces in East Jerusalem, the map portrays the continuity and connectivity of the Israeli neighborhoods and settlements, which was the main objective to shift excessively the proposed boundaries of Greater Jerusalem towards the north and east, deliberately, such that to include more Jewish settlements, and thus, enhancing the dominance of Jewish demography inside Jerusalem.

The Israeli separation policies significantly reshape the Palestinian physical spaces by approaching the 'de facto' status over the Palestinian lands, which in total, are aggravating urban dilemmas and more social struggles. Juma (2003) argues that the Separation Wall is the last phase of the Zionist colonial project aimed at the complete control on the West Bank, and whose implementation has continued in a well-planned manner, and through the fortification of the Separation Walls, Israel will achieve the following:

- Israel lays hold over Palestinian lands while surrounding the residential areas in order to make them unlivable, controlling the number of Palestinians able to survive, with the goal of ensuring a Jewish majority in all of historic Palestine.
- Israel makes certain that no Palestinian state will be viable through the control of Palestinian water resources and fertile agricultural lands that could otherwise be the base for any future socio-economical development.
- Israel effectively erases the 1967 boarders and redesigns them accordingly to meet their political ambitions of maintaining full control over the West Bank.
- Israel completely isolates Jerusalem from the West Bank through the building of settlement blocs on all sides, strangling the city whereby no room for Palestinian expansion, demographically as well as socially and economically, remains.
According to many Palestinian viewpoints, the Separation Wall is the most critical step of Israel’s annexation in East Jerusalem. It makes certain for Israel of achieving socio-economical and institutional subordination in the Jerusalemites’ life aspects. It aims in East Jerusalem, as in the rest of the West Bank, to expropriate as much Palestinian lands as possible and sever the territorial connection between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. The route of the Wall reinforces the settlement blocks and expropriates additional lands for the settlement expansions and other development projects. Furthermore, Israel adopts sophisticated closure policies in East Jerusalem, consisted of creating a series of military checkpoints around Jerusalem (Fig. 5.14), as such Jerusalem is permanently closed away from the neighboring Palestinian cities and villages.

Figure 5.15: The Wall and checkpoints map in Jerusalem. (PENGON maps archive)
The Israeli checkpoints monitor and prohibit Palestinian movement from the West Bank to Jerusalem; they were placed in positions to delineate the borders of Greater Jerusalem. These checkpoints are not only designed for Palestinians living in West Bank, but also for Jerusalemites, which means, every Jerusalemite who wishes to leave the city must pass through Israeli check points for inspection that may take several hours during the rush hours. East Jerusalem was the center of services and the core of the cultural, administrative, and political Palestinian life. Today however, the Israeli closure policies damaged that connectivity of the daily life of the Palestinians, and thus, foster the Israeli goal of strangling East Jerusalem politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The closure also accomplishes the complete separation of the transport system linking northern and southern parts in WB. Consequently, dramatic changes were imposed upon the road networks that Palestinians must use instead of those passing through Jerusalem. The only way where more than million Palestinians can travel from the north to the south is Wadi Annar Road, which means the Valley of Hell; a road with steep and deadly curves which do not sustain the heavy traffic (Figure 5.16).

Figure 5.16: Israeli checkpoints and the north-south artery road in WB passing through Jerusalem, (Yousef et al, 2008)
The architecture of security created in East Jerusalem, as shown, fragmented neighborhoods physically imprisoned by walls and fences, and surrounded by Israeli checkpoints which upraise the feeling of ethnic segregation and social siege, and therefore, producing more feelings of unsecured space for the Palestinians. That architecture forced Palestinians to redistribute their geographical existence to maintain their residency rights in Jerusalem. Najjar (2007c) argues that the Separation Wall depopulates many Palestinian villages, as well as, tearing social tissues, families and communities apart. For instance, more than 80% of the population of West Esawiya village deserted their homes in order to remain within Jerusalem municipal boundaries. Out of a population of 5000 people, only around 1000 Palestinians now remain in this village, and because of the Israeli wall, they are prevented from entering Jerusalem. The visual impact of the security architecture in East Jerusalem deepens the ‘unsecured feeling’ Palestinians practice in their ghettoized neighborhoods (Figs. 5.17 - 5.23).

Figure 5.17: Palestinians moving towards an Israeli inspection point, (Yousef et al, 2008)

Figure 5.18: Palestinian building located nearby uncompleted segment of the Separation Wall, (Yousef et al, 2008)
Figure 5.19: Security architecture – landscape of the Separation Fence, (Juma, 2003, edited)

Part of the Fence complex shown in Fig. 5.10 presenting features of architecture of security

Figure 5.20: Israeli bulldozers during constricting the Separation Fence, (Juma, 2003, edited)
Figure 5.21: Notice sign at Qalandia checkpoint – the main northern gate into Jerusalem. It states that by 27.3.2006, passing through this checkpoint will be only allowed for those holding Israeli permission, no Palestinians will be moving through this checkpoint without holding a valid permission. (researcher)

Figure 5.22: Welcome sign at 'Atarot checkpoint – main industrial area in northern Jerusalem. It states, welcome at 'Atarot checkpoint – Happy Stay, which means, it shall take time before passing that point. (researcher)
Figure 5.23: Caution sign at the Separation Fence near military zone, (Juma, 2003)
The architecture of separation and security has manifold negative impacts on various aspects of the Palestinians’ lives. ARIJ (2006) summarizes these negative impacts as shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Consequent impacts of the Israeli separation policies according to (ARIJ, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>• For the second time, Israel delineates, unilaterally, the political boundary of occupied Jerusalem.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The segregation wall manipulates the geographical balance of Jerusalem governorate with more than 44% of its area taken in towards Israel, thus forces Jewish majority to the city’s demography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The wall cuts the organic tie between Jerusalem and other Palestinian governorates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economical</strong></td>
<td>• The segregation plan stands to cause severe damage to the Palestinian agriculture sector and to the Palestinian farmers as a result of land confiscation and the constraints imposed on mobility and marketing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Israel maintains control over the Palestinian trade and tourism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase the unemployment and poverty levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inflammation in land prices and more diminishing investment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>• Thousands of Palestinian citizens are cut-off from the main urban centres where health, educational and social services located.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Harsh measures are imposed on Palestinian mobility and movement, transportation from or to the segregated areas will be extremely difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased urbanization pressure and population densities.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Palestinian Christian and Muslims will not have access to the holy sites in Jerusalem unless they have special permits to enter Jerusalem issued by the Israeli civil administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental</strong></td>
<td>• Decline the space area designated for landfills and wastewater treatment sites.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diminish in area designated as natural reservations, forests, pastures, open spaces, and recreation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Loss of grazing area and increase in desertification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Distort wildlife cycle and cuts-off different kinds of animals from their natural habitat particularly during migration seasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The segregation plan is altering the Palestinian natural landscape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Many archaeological and historical related to Palestinian cultural heritage will be segregated behind the wall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Loss of open space which poses a threat to the sustainability of the urban and rural areas as well as a threat to more loss of the natural resources and biodiversity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.3 Architecture of Paradox

As a holy city for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Jerusalem has always been of prodigious symbolic importance (Kanaan, 2005). Given its spiritual, cultural and historical values, Jerusalem outlines the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These values also make Jerusalem important to people around the world. However, East Jerusalem is a city whose people suffer from poverty, social fragmentation, and the daily targeting of their presence. The process of spatial planning is usually constructive, just and legitimate (Stein and Harper, 2003), aiming at improving the living conditions by producing better urban, social and economic human environments. Thus, urban citizens expect high standards of services and well-constructed infrastructures raising into higher quality of life (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Satisfying these needs is part of sustainable urban environment (UN, 1992); however, Kates et al. (2000) argue that the world’s present development path is not sustainable. Urban planning has been optimally characterized as reformatory norm (Hall, 1988). However, as will be shown in this research, urban planning in Jerusalem has paradoxical outputs which demarcate it to be inequitable, implicitly biased and not what it promises to be (Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000).

Urban spaces in Jerusalem are produced utterly in two divergent modes of production. The first is through "progressive" planning policies, in West Jerusalem; while the second is through "regressive" planning role in East Jerusalem. These unequal planning modes reflect two-sided planning paradigms in the current Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem. Although the city of Jerusalem is 'unified' in its political (municipal) boundaries, it is totally 'separated' in its spatial development and physical fabric. In other words, an “active and dynamic space” in West Jerusalem, whereas an “inactive and fragmented space” in East Jerusalem as shown in Fig. 5.24. The Palestinians’ presence, cultural heritage, and future development in East Jerusalem are, therefore, vulnerable and extensively threatened. Accordingly, examining the current adopted Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem is not a choice, but rather an urgent need.

35 This section of the PhD research has recently been published by the researcher and co-authored by the supervisors, the publication is referenced as: Najjar, R., Reicher, C., and Amro, J. 2011, Critical Two Sided Urbanism: The Case of Jerusalem-East and West. Politics and Power: The Impact upon Architecture and City, London Art and Architecture Magazine, 1(5):158-168. London: Lonard.
During the last decades, many cities witnessed hyper-segregation, ethnic separation, and persistent racial discrimination, as what happened in America, where debates increased for ending racial discrimination and social segregation in housing policies (Kushner, 2008). However, the case in Jerusalem is more passionate, it presents the case of “deeply divided city” due to the intensity of the ethnic conflict it has faced for more than sixty years (Hasson, 2007), and eventually, perceived as a frontier city (Klein, 2005). Israel occupied West Jerusalem after the termination of the British Mandate in 1948, then annexed East Jerusalem after the end of 1967 War. Since then, Jerusalem has been subjected for extensive Israeli planning policies aiming at expropriating more of the Palestinian lands and expelling native Palestinians from East Jerusalem.

East Jerusalem is the area that extending from Kafr Aqab in the north to Sur Bahir in the south, this area totals approximately 70,500 dunums (Figure 5.25). The Six Day War created planning vacuum in East Jerusalem which has only gradually been filled by the Israeli planners. As mentioned previously in the research problem statement, one-third the municipal area of East Jerusalem (i.e. 24,500 dunums) have been expropriated for the benefit of Jewish-only settlements (Figure 2.26). Thus approximately one-third of East Jerusalem has been removed from the reserves of land available to the Palestinian Arab population. Of the remaining area, only 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations (i.e. 9,100 dunums) is zoned for residential purposes of Palestinians. Additional planning is needed in many of these areas before building...
permits may be received. Thus the planning of the east of the city has almost been completed and valid town plans exist. Yet these do not meet the needs of the Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem nor allow for sustainable development there (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003).

Figure 5.25: Jerusalem border after 1967, (Arabic Studies Association, edited.)
Noting that of the 45,500 dunums remaining after land expropriations, planning has been completed and approved for approximately 38.7% of the area. Planning procedures for the remaining area (61.3%) have yet to be completed. Of the planned areas approximately 40% are defined as open space where no construction for the Palestinians is permitted while large areas of these spaces are used for Jewish settlements\(^{36}\); approximately 37% are zoned for residential construction. The approved plans earmark approximately 6,100 dunums for residential construction. Of this total, approximately 1,000 dunums require the preparation of unification and re-parcellation plans that will take many years to be prepared and approved before building permits can be issued. Therefore, approximately 11.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem is only available to the Palestinian population for residential construction. Arnon, (1998) points out that this construction is possible mainly in existing built-up areas. The percentages of the land categories according to the current planning policies in East Jerusalem are shown in Figure 5.27.

\(^{36}\) This topic is deeply analyzed in the next section of this chapter.
Najjar (2007c) argues that the adopted Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem have aimed at constraining the future development of the Palestinian residents there. However, the Palestinian growth rate was higher than the Jewish up to the year 2009 (as shown in Table 3.2/chapter three), accordingly, Israel intensified more efforts to control and restrain that natural growth rate of the Jerusalemites. The Israeli unequal planning policies have been forcing the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem to suffer in satisfying their basic daily needs, and eventually, forced them to depend on the Israeli system of services which is based on ethno-national affiliation with approximately 10 percent of the municipal budget services allocated to Palestinian Jerusalemites who comprise, according to Israeli statistics, 35 percent of the total population (Jerusalem Unit, 2010, Yousef, 2008). Israeli planning policies with all the inevitable consequences against the Palestinian population continue and include:

- Palestinian land expropriation;
- Palestinian clusters ghettoizing;
- Socioeconomic fragmentation;
- Palestinian building restrictions;
• Destruction and confiscation of homes;
• Lack of adequate public infrastructure;
• Prejudicial land and zoning laws;
• Changing residency rights and permits;
• Construction of the Separation Wall around the Palestinian localities;
• Installation of military checkpoints;
• Considerable construction of Jewish-only settlements around the Palestinian localities;

Yousef (2008) argues that Israel has closed essential and active Palestinian Jerusalem-based organisations in order to eliminate the Palestinian identity, and thus, obliges the Jerusalemites to become completely dependent on Israeli institutions. Some of the discrepancies in the level of service between East and West Jerusalem are shown in Table 5.4. These differences clearly manifest discriminatory treatment of Palestinians. Moreover, some of the unequal Israeli planning policies adopted in Jerusalem are shown in Table 5.5, as well as (Figs. 5.28 - 5.33) present urban paradox in Jerusalem.

Table 5.4: Comparison between level of services in Jerusalem - East and West (Jerusalem Unit, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>East Jerusalem (primarily Palestinian population)</th>
<th>West Jerusalem (primarily Jewish Israeli population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status of sewage network (km)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of buildings not linked to sewage network</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of roads (km)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of pavements (km)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of social care centres</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of public parks</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of persons per public park</td>
<td>7,362</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of family health centres (motherhood and childhood)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of children per centre</td>
<td>68,882</td>
<td>1,821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.5: Unequal Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem - East and West (Najjar et al, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unequal Israeli Planning Policies In Jerusalem East and West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction Densities After Expropriation In 1968 (Units per dunum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population Living in Densities ≥ 3 (Person per room)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


10,473 housing units were added between 1967 - 1996. Number of housing units in the Arab sector grew by 83% during 1967-1997. One housing unit was added for each additional 9.7 Palestinian residents during 1967-1997.


70692 housing units were added between 1967-1996. Number of housing units in the Jews sector grew by 123% during 1967-1997. One housing unit was added for each additional 3 Jewish residents during 1967-1997.
Figure 5.28: High-rise Jewish residential complex in West Jerusalem planned by Jerusalem Municipality and implemented by the Israeli government, (researcher)

Figure 5.29: Scattered Palestinian residential area in East Jerusalem developed by the local residents, (researcher)
Figure 5.30: High-tech infrastructure in Pizgat Ze'ev Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher)

Figure 5.31: Deteriorated infrastructure in Shu'fat Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem, (researcher)
Figure 5.32: Wide roads with adequate parking in Reches Shu'fat Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher)

Figure 5.33: Insufficient right of way and inadequate parking spaces in Beit Hanina in East Jerusalem, (researcher)
The urban fabric, growth and expansion in Jerusalem are, therefore, manifested in two distinct ways: the first is a growth initiated and implemented by the central government, located in West Jerusalem and Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem; while the second is a restrained pattern against the organic needs of the native Palestinian residents, located in East Jerusalem. Yousef (2008) highlights interestingly these two parallel societies in Jerusalem, stating:

“A look at Israel’s demographic and territorial policies in Jerusalem and the West Bank reveals how these policies laid the foundation for the development of two different and separate system of living, which nourished the conditions of ethnic segregation. Both systems run along different but overlapping urban fabrics and each has its own geographic flow. Both connect and interact at certain points but are relatively autonomous, governed by different laws, and with a life of their own”. (Yousef, 2008: 29)

The first system serves the Israeli tissue and governs the Jewish fabric. This progressive system adopts an integrative approach among the Jewish localities spread in West Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, by providing well established services and modern infrastructure, and by providing physical and spatial connectivity between these two east and west geographies achieved by comprehensive by pass roads (Fig. 5.34-5.36). This system is developed and promoted by the regime. Planning is prepared by the state where housing is financially designed in affordable pattern for the Israeli. In this system, projects are characterized by rabid, mass production, and undertaken with special facilitation from Jerusalem Municipality (Yousef, 2008). Construction is public and of enormous scale, with whole sectors of neighborhoods designed by a single architect. Housing projects are standardized with repetitive units characterized the Jewish neighborhoods in East and West Jerusalem (Fig. 5.37).

Figure 5.34: Highways for Jewish settlements and meandering streets for Palestinian communities in EJ, (Yousef, 2008, edited)
Figure 5.35: Large scale infrastructure in main streets and transport systems in West Jerusalem using bridges, tunnels and elevated street sections, (researcher)

Figure 5.36: Poor structure of the major road used by Palestinians to enter East Jerusalem from West Bank, (researcher)
The second system exists in the Palestinian fabric in East Jerusalem. However, this system is controlled by two different authorities which, still aim at the same objective, restraining the Palestinian development. Jerusalem Municipality controls the system of living of the Palestinians who live within its borders, while the Israeli military authorities control the system of life of the Palestinians living in Jerusalem district but outside the municipal boundaries. On contrary to the first Jewish system, the Israeli authorities in this system do not undertake any significant development or infrastructure projects. Accordingly, Palestinians in East Jerusalem are subjected to two different sets of laws, the annexed 70 square kilometers around the Old City were governed by Israeli civil law, and the rest of the governorate is controlled by Israeli military laws. Although the municipality is a non-military organization, the Jerusalemites in East Jerusalem feel that it is the major source of fear and threat, Yousef (2008) described that ‘unsecured feeling’ of one Jerusalemite, stating:

“... in Jerusalem, the municipality is more dangerous than the army”. (Yousef, 2008:27)

Jerusalem municipality’s planning law is restrictive towards the Palestinian construction and development. Because of the difficulties Palestinians face to obtain building permits within the municipal area in East Jerusalem, they are forced to move outside the municipal boundaries where construction is more available but with much
more lower level of services. The Israeli Planning and Building Laws organize and control all aspects of planning and development in East Jerusalem, they set forth the principles according to which statutory planning and development are to be undertaken. For example, there should be an approved ‘Detailed Urban Plan’ in order to obtain a permit to build a house, extend an apartment, add a balcony, pave a street, or develop land for economic or public purposes. The complexity of building regulations and unprecedented bureaucratic steps required before obtaining a building permit (which normally take many years) make the Palestinians incapable to develop small scale standardized neighborhoods, and force them to build scattered individual houses, and in many cases, they are even unable to add any extension to the existing buildings. Palestinian development is, therefore, restrained, small-scale and piecemeal. The largest construction is initiated by a family or perhaps a small group of buildings by a developer. The design of individual buildings is highly differentiated, and the single-family house in its diverse forms is the predominant building type as shown in Figure 5.38.

![Figure 5.38: A ghettoized Palestinian neighborhood with low housing density & poor infrastructure in East Jerusalem surrounded by the Israeli Separation Wall in the front and back layers of the picture, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010, edited)](image-url)
Eventually, it could be concluded that since the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, the Israeli planning policies and actions have targeted the Palestinian presence in the city. The determination to assert political sovereignty and demographic dominance over the eastern parts of the city have key impacts upon the rational development of Jerusalem over and above the problems associated with rapid growth and modernization. In this concern, Israel continued imposing radical spatial facts over Jerusalem and changed the total area of Jerusalem extending its sovereignty over the city (Fig. 5.39). According to the Israeli planning policies, Palestinians living in Jerusalem must remain a minority, Israel assumed the right to evict and deport them out of the city in order to restrict Palestinian presence. At the same time, Israel confiscated and seized Palestinians’ lands and properties and built more Jewish settlements.

Figure 5.39: Arab east Jerusalem within Greater Jerusalem, (PASSIA maps archive)
Standing on an urban planning point of view, the case in which the interrelations between "space, power, and politics" are outstandingly presented - lies in Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem, the image is even noticeably more evident. Upon examining the social and power spatiality, two predominant realities, diametrically tied, strike one’s mind: the physical displacement, and the social struggle. This social struggle is shifted into turbulence through the Israeli application of the architecture of separation and security in Jerusalem. People living within urban ghettoized neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, before the completion of the Israeli Wall, could have ‘risky accessibility’ into the city. That was possible through partial openings in the Wall, so that Palestinians approached dirt roads to breakthrough fences and climb concrete blocks in order to go to work, reach schools, conduct social family visits, and eventually do Friday prayer in Al Aqsa Mosque (Figs. 40, 41).

Figure 5.40: Palestinian students climb concrete wall to reach school in Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010)

Figure 5.41: Palestinian women standing at Qalandia checkpoint – the main northern gate into East Jerusalem, while Israeli soldiers prevent them to enter Jerusalem to do Friday Prayer at Al Aqsa Mosque, (Najjar, 2007c)
It is shown that urban planning in Jerusalem consists of two contradictory approaches: ‘progressive planning’ in West Jerusalem which serves the current and future needs of the Jewish Israeli residents there. On the other hand, ‘regressive planning’ in East Jerusalem, which hinders the current and the future development of the Palestinian residents. As such, deliberate and discriminatory actions against the Palestinian population continue. Planning in Jerusalem, therefore, is inequitable, implicitly biased and reflects not what it promises to be. It is used as a tool of control over the native Palestinian residents, rather than a tool of positive change. However, Yousef (2008) argues that both divided communities, the Israelis and Palestinians, are matching at one line, the commercial activities between the Israelis and the Jerusalemites, stating:

“Although East and West Jerusalem remained ethnically segregated in terms of separate Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods, commerce was a major magnet that brought both people to common place of encounter and interaction. .... the moments of tolerance and acceptance take place through business”. (Yousef, 2008:21)

The existing paradox in the Israeli planning context in Jerusalem shaped two contradictory physical spaces. A Palestinian unsecured society; and an Israeli advanced and secured one. Control in this research means increasing the Jewish demography in Jerusalem over Palestinians and making them a majority in order to Israelize Jerusalem, neglecting its original Arabic roots, as well as, restraining the Palestinians future development. Israel succeeded to impose new geographical, demographical and physical facts on the ground. The Israeli planning laws and regulations have been designed to facilitate the process of expropriating Palestinian lands to be used for Israeli settlements, obstruct the growth and development of Palestinian neighborhoods. The significant influence of the political decision-making upon the creation of ethnic related regions and settlements in Jerusalem has been also shown. The effects of power and politics upon social and economic dimensions were evident; the extent to which superimposing the former has shaped and influenced the latter is outstanding. This reveals the dark side of planning in Israel and proves the regressive impact of Israel's planning policies, which in total have profoundly shifted land along with economic resources from indigenous Palestinians to Israeli settlers and Jewish immigrants. Palestinians suffer in consequence. The Palestinian feeling of living in ‘unsecured spaces’ in East Jerusalem is, therefore, overwhelmingly growing in the Palestinians’ daily life and existence.
5.4 **Green Architecture – Gray Planning**\(^{37}\)

The urbanization process in East Jerusalem has been described as a still process, in other words, a frozen or even rarely-developed process. This section of this chapter explores the green and open landscape concept as one of the dominant factors described in the Jerusalem Master Plan. This factor is one that restrains urbanization and hinders expansion of the Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. Both descriptive and comparative approaches were adopted to analyze and evaluate the historical development of green spaces and open landscape concepts in East Jerusalem. This section examines the current status of these spaces and policies with objectives for misusing these spaces to implement and achieve Israeli policies. The overall objective of the Israeli policies appears to be to hinder the Palestinian development and expansion process in East Jerusalem while speeding-up the expansion and building process of more Israeli settlements.

5.4.1 **Urban Morphology**

Open landscapes besides greenbelts have long been considered an effective tool for containing and shaping urban growth. Greenbelt concepts were developed in London and diffused to many cities, including Jerusalem. Israel has created planning policies using open landscapes to restrict the future development of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem by making them disintegrate socially (ethnically), and thus reducing their traditional Palestinian character. In theory, a landscape comprises the visible features of an area of land, including physical elements such as landforms, living elements of flora and fauna, abstract elements such as lighting and weather conditions, and human elements (Najjar, 2008); in other words, landscape "is of all kinds of painting the most innocent, and which the Devil himself could not accuse of Idolatry" (Gombrich, 1966:107). The Palestinian Landscape has always been distinguished for its diversity and uniqueness within a limited area of land. Each of the Palestinian cities has its own remarkable landscape, which is considered a part of the Palestinian cultural heritage.

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\(^{37}\) This section of the PhD research has recently been published by the researcher and co-authored and acknowledged by the supervisors, the publication is referenced as: Najjar, R. and Amro, J. 2011, Future development of the Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem: Misuse of environmental concepts in land management. *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 68(4):531-542. London: Routledge.
Palestine’s landscape is the best historian, narrating the story of Palestine and its people throughout their history. The Palestinian landscape is a major element that must be observed and analyzed, especially. The Palestinian lands have suffered from successive invasions and occupation. The history of ancient Palestine and its cultural landscape have been gradually replaced by an image of ancient Israel and Jewish landscape.

A living image of the Palestinian historical and cultural landscape lies in Jerusalem. Jerusalem's heart and soul undeniably lies in its Old City, an area reflecting 5000 years of human history condensed in barely one square kilometer. Covering more or less the original area of the age-old settlement in the Judean mountains, the Old City's maze of narrow, and sometimes confusing, alleys and stairways hide a treasure of historical, cultural and spiritual heritage. The Old City's four quarters are home to an amazingly diverse mix of people, and the extent of ethnic and spiritual coexistence displayed here every day greatly adds to this unique area's allure. The quarters are grouped around the Temple Mount, a spiritual focal point for multiculturalism, especially for Muslims since the Seventh century CE, when the Dome of the of the Rock and Al Aqsa Mosque were built atop the Mount. All this wealth is protected by a thick, imposing stone wall, 3 meters thick and between 5 and 15 meters high. Erected by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the 16th century CE to protect the city's residents and its Islamic holy places - not the least against a possible resurgence of the Crusades - it is one of the world's best preserved walls in that period. Extending over approximately 4.5 kilometers, the wall roughly follows the line of earlier foundations built by Roman Emperor Hadrian and fortified in Byzantine times, and it is surrounded by a beautifully landscaped green belt, which sets off its splendor.

Urban morphology is the study of the physical form of a city, which consists of street patterns, building sizes and shapes, architecture, population density and patterns of residential, commercial, industrial and other uses, amongst other things. Special attention is given to how the physical form of a city changes over time and to how different cities compare to each other. Another significant part of urban morphology deals with the study of the social forms which are expressed in the physical layout of a city and conversely, how physical form produces or reproduces various social forms (Whitehand, 1987a). Urban morphology is also considered as the study of urban fabric, as a means of
discerning the underlying structure of the built landscape. This approach challenges the common perception of unplanned environments as chaotic or vaguely organic through understanding the structures and processes embedded in urbanization (Whitehand, 1981; Whitehand, 1987b; Slater, 1990a). Within industrial countries, urban landscape is a major research topic. Much of the recent work attaches considerable importance to the historical forms created by previous generations (Slater, 1990b). Jerusalem by its texture combines the historical and the modern landscape perspectives; this makes planners give it special value.

Researches dealing with the physical form of urban areas became more evident during the 1980s. Nevertheless, related publications formed only 12% of geographical papers on the internal structure of cities in the middle of the decade (Whitehand, 1986). By 1990, there was sufficient international interest in the urban landscape amongst academics and professionals in a range of disciplines for the international Conference of Urban Landscape to be convened (Whitehand and Larkham, 1992; Moudon, 1997). Jerusalem has acquired special attention in the related planning literature, since it includes monuments of the main monolithic religions on the globe. Within Europe, the influence of studies of urban form has created a pool of knowledge and experience upon which town planning has drawn, at least indirectly. Within the Third World, the contribution of urban morphology has hitherto been relatively small. Here urban morphologists are particularly needed to contribute to master plans with a historical view, before the cities of the twenty-first century are severed irreparably from their roots. When Ebenezer Howard put forth the idea of the garden city in 1898, he was looking for an antidote to the ills of the urban life. His solution was a town set against a background of the country. Various sources contributed to the thinking of Howard and his contemporaries. Part of the inspiration appears to have been the Bible (Osborn, 1969). Another element was the nineteenth century experience of the Industrial Revolution and the reaction against it (Howard, 1966).

5.4.2 Historical Development of the Green and Open Spaces in EJ

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Palestine, like many other Ottoman provinces, had undergone a slow process of modernization. It was increasingly exposed to Western
technology and culture. The European consulates and missionary-philanthropic organizations that had begun operating in Jerusalem around mid-century served as vehicles for the introduction of Western influence. The Germans, Russian, French, and English presence was reflected in their architectural compositions; e.g., the Anglican cathedral of St. George, the churches under the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission. Political life in Palestine under the British Mandate (1917-1948) was turbulent. The Arab population of Palestine, Muslim as well as Christian, more than doubled during the first half of the twentieth century, and Jerusalem's Arab population grew from 28,000 in 1922 to 65,000 in 1946. Rapid demographic development went hand in hand with accelerated economic progress. The British brought with them new standards of physical infrastructure and public services. Electricity was first introduced in private homes in the large cities in the mid-1920s. Development in the country slowed down with the outbreak of the First World War. The years following the First World War brought rapid growth. In 1917, when General Sir Edmund Allenby entered the Old City of Jerusalem, British rule over Palestine began. The British set up their administrative centre for the country in Jerusalem, transforming it from a relatively neglected Ottoman provincial town to a modern administrative, political, religious and cultural centre. Jerusalem expanded to the north, south and west. Many eminent architects and planners were brought to Jerusalem to draw master plans, develop guidelines, and design buildings. Since the civil administration of the British Mandate Authority was headquartered in Jerusalem, the city acquired a new position of political importance adding to its position of religious significance, and became the capital of the country. This in itself was a major source of urban growth.

The origins of the concept of greenbelts long predate the initial use of the term (Thomas, 1970). Definition of the greenbelts causes much confusion in Jerusalem and, indeed, there is no hard-and-fast definition. In Jerusalem no statutory status distinguishes the land included in the belt or its use. Instead, the term greenbelt is applied by the quasi-governmental agency responsible for afforesting and maintaining a portion of the public land in and around the city. The Jerusalem greenbelt ranges from several kilometers at its broadest to as few as twenty meters at its narrowest and covers an area of approximately thirteen square kilometers (Cohen, 1994). The benefits of greenbelts are to improve the
city’s aesthetics and health; but in East Jerusalem those green spaces are not noticeable and rare. On the other hand, open landscapes are widely allocated, since these spaces damage the Palestinian neighborhoods and devastate their landscape integrity as well as restrict their future development.

Greenbelts were imported to Jerusalem by the British. British plans for Jerusalem predated official commencement of the mandate; they had been initiated in 1917 before the end of the Ottoman regime in Palestine. With Turkish troops still in the town of Nablus, slightly more than eighty kilometers from the gates of Jerusalem, the British commander General Allenby summoned the city engineer of Alexandria, William McLean, to Jerusalem to advise the army on urban development (Kendall, 1948). A proclamation in 1918 limited construction within two and-a-half kilometers of Damascus Gate, and special effort was made to direct construction away from these areas to the east and south of the Old City. The reason for imposing these restrictions was the British desire to preserve the special character of Jerusalem, which was best expressed in concern of the Old City and its immediate surroundings, the areas of scenic vistas to the east and, to lesser extent, the south, and the approaches to the city from the four points of the compass (Cohen, 1994). This was in line with British respect for Jerusalem’s role in the Bible and the widespread Evangelical understanding of religion (e.g., Lloyd George was a Welsh Protestant) which operated in decision-making circles; although Sir Mark Sykes was a Roman Catholic.

In 1919, the Pro-Jerusalem Society commissioned Patrick Geddes to prepare a plan for the city. It, like the 1918 scheme, proposed severe restrictions on building immediately adjacent to the external side of the Old City wall. That land was occupied in many places by ramshackle structures, and the British authorities sought to convert it into strip of green parkland that would beautify and set the Old City apart from the surrounding built-up area (Fig. 5.42). In 1921 the Town Planning Commission was established, and initial ordinances on development were issued. A 1922 scheme proposed by the commission had four zones, one of which was a “park system composed of public and private open spaces”. A 1929 scheme contained a map labelled “Showing Green Belt Around the City Walls” (Kendall, 1948). The concept of a greenbelt was also evident in the work of the Jewish Agency, which was engaged in planning new Jewish
neighborhoods and communities in Palestine, an activity that was officially sanctioned by the Mandate authorities (Kauffman, 1926).

The impetus for the British planning of Jerusalem in the interwar years was aesthetic and historical – including the matter of open spaces. The efforts were primarily for preservation or, perhaps more accurately, restoration rather than as guides for the evolution of the city. This position was indicated in Kendall’s comment about the lack of trees in Jerusalem:

“There can be little doubt that by 1919 the Central Commission and all the persons interested in the appearance of Jerusalem were impressed by the inadequacy of tree planting generally” (Najjar and Amro, 2011:537)
The 1944 plan for Jerusalem was intended to meet the needs of the city as a whole, and discussion of open space indicated a shortage for the entire area. The plan gave details only for the areas of traditional concern to the British planners and for a small number of prominent locations. In addition to the continued focus on the Old City and the Mount of Olives, the section on open space described provision to save the greenery areas where future roads will be opened through, so that when a proposed road crossed open spaces, provision would be made to transplant existing trees from the road way to adjacent plots, achieving amenity in the development of future neighborhoods (Kendall, 1948). Kendall continued to serve as a planning adviser to the government of Jordan after 1948 (Efrat, 1984).

After the Arab-Israel war (1948), Israel located some of the forests and the newly established agricultural communities on the sites of the depopulated Arab Villages. In 1950 planting began near Givat Shaul, a new neighborhood occupying the site of a former Arab village. Major purposes of the greenbelts are to prevent urban sprawl, provide escape from noise, congestion and strain of the city life, and to seek recreation in the countryside. In East Jerusalem, there has been a seemingly contradictory function; Israel has used the forest block as a key tool in separating Jerusalem from the surrounding landscape (Cohen, 1994) i.e. the West Bank, to devastate the contiguity between them, and to impede access by the Palestinians to Jerusalem. Although some deforestation soon took place after the reunification of Jerusalem after the 1967 war, it was piecemeal and not guided by greenbelt planning. Instead, it was noticeably intended to beautify specific areas, especially along the approaches to the city and in the pre-1967 No Man’s Land. An additional function of tree planting was to prevent alternative land use, mainly by the Palestinians (Cohen, 1993).

5.4.3 Discussing the Urban Green Spaces' Status Quo in Jerusalem

The urbanization process according to Yokohari et al (2000) is a global phenomenon that requires an increasing amount of land and other resources. Unpolluted environments, as well as, possibilities for recreation in open green spaces, are among the top expectations of urban citizens (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Urban sustainability requires adopting development choices which consider the integration between actions
and consequences in the environment, economy and society. The overlapped connectivity of that interrelationship is illustrated using a three dimensional diagram shown in Figure 5.43, in which sustainable development is represented schematically using three circles for the target dimensions of environment, economy and society, to which are added the time, north, and east-south dimensions (Abuleil, 2008).

![Diagram](image)

Figure 5.43: Environment, economy and society interrelationship in sustainable perspective, (Abuleil, 2008, edited)

Despite the large debate over sustainability, that sustainable development goes beyond environmental conservation, to economic and social objectives, Haughton, and Hunter, (1996) argue that the development of cities, generally, generate more pollution. Areas classified as green spaces in the master plan of Jerusalem (B3000-1991) are about 13 percent of total land area of East Jerusalem (Fig. 5.44). The master plan of East Jerusalem shows that all the Arab neighborhoods are surrounded by lands that are regarded as green zone except for Beit Safafa and Kafr Aqab, which means that these lands are to remain open zones or ‘vacant’ lands (Fig. 5.45). On the contrary, lands surrounding Israeli settlements are classified as development zones, where future possible expansion is permitted. In practice, lands that were classified as green area in the planning schemes would eventually be confiscated for Israeli use in building new Israeli settlements (Figs. 5.46, 5.47). This policy is used to block the Palestinian development in one hand and expand the Israeli settlements growth on the other.
It is shown that the green lands in East Jerusalem do not reflect "green belt, or green buffer zone" around the historical Old City of Jerusalem, which was initially proposed by the British planners and was reflected in their Master Plans discussed earlier in chapter four of this doctorate research.
Figure 5.45: The Master Plan of East Jerusalem, shows how Green Spaces surround the Palestinian neighborhoods, and thus, restrict their future possibilities for expansion and development. (Amon, 1998, edited)
Figure 5.46: Aerial image shows how the ‘green spaces’ around the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (above picture/top for Abu-Ghneim green mountain) are expropriated by Israel and used eventually to construct Jewish-only settlements (above picture/below-for Har Homa settlement during construction works), (Halawani, 2006, edited)
According to the Israeli planning policies, green spaces and open landscape zoning in the master plan of Jerusalem can be classified into two main categories: the first category lies in East Jerusalem, the researcher conceptualizes as “green spaces of risks” which formulate a “static sphere” surrounding the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, where Palestinians are prevented to do any kind of development, creating therefore, an “unsecured feeling” of future threat in terms of the “transformation” of that
natural landscape which presents in the Palestinians’ minds a rigid tie to the space’s history and identity; as well as, “psychological threat” of the danger for changing the Arabic names of that green spaces into Jewish names imposed by the Israeli central government, namely, "Israelization" of the Palestinian natural landscapes. This ‘transformation process’ of East Jerusalem’s original green spaces is subjected into further Israeli detailed plans, for each expropriated green area, the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality along with other governmental planning bodies prepare town schemes that only consider the Israeli needs, even the proposed green area in these town schemes are not preserving the original natural landscapes, but rather, depend upon new proposed zones to be designed within the colonial layout of the Jewish settlements, and thus, changing the original identify of the space, see Figure 5.48 for the approved master plan of Har Homa settlement which is established on Palestinian expropriated lands.

Figure 5.48: Master plan of Har Homa settlement, the plan proposed new green areas without considering the original forest exited prior construction works, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)
The municipality of Jerusalem began preparing the master plan (#5053) of Har Homa directly after the order of expropriating Abu Ghnaim Palestinian lands in 1992 and approved it in 1995. Har Homa was planned as a high-density urban settlement of 2056 dunums (Figs. 5.49, 5.50). The residential area constitutes approximately 38% of the plan area with high construction density of 175%, allowing building height with eight floors for each building; the plan allocates land for public use including hotels, institutions, and public services, as well as, lands for commercial and industrial purposes as detailed in Table 5.6 and reflected in percentages in Figure 5.51.

Figure 5.49: Architectural sections of 8-10 floors buildings in Har Homa, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)

Figure 5.50: High rise tower under construction in Har Homa settlement, (Halawani, 2006, edited)
Table 5.6: Land use categories in Har Homa master plan according to (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Planned Area (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential Zone</td>
<td>777.4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Institutions</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>377.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Commercial Zone</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Zone</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Zone</td>
<td>332.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardens</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The plan introduces 7 land use categories unlike the plans given for the Palestinian neighborhoods in EJ which introduce 4-5 categories as will be shown in this chapter. The plan allocates high percent for residential use (high density) unlike the percent given for the Palestinian neighborhoods in EJ as will be shown later in this chapter.

Figure 5.51: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Har Homa settlement, (researcher\(^{38}\))

\(^{38}\) The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.6).
The second category lies in West Jerusalem, the researcher conceptualizes as “green spaces of life” where natural forestry and open landscapes are integrated with town planning and connected to serve the local Israeli population without preventing future development of the Israeli neighborhoods or Jewish settlements (Fig. 5.52, 5.53).

Figure 5.52: Natural green profile of Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)

Figure 5.53: National parks and natural reserves in Jerusalem, the figure shows how are the natural green recreational facilities concentrated in West Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)
The process of misusing green concepts to achieve specific ethnic goals of the regime is conceptualized by the researcher as gray planning through artificial green architecture. Green spaces in Jerusalem were planned within an Israeli perspective to serve and support the Jewish population in Jerusalem. These green spaces can only be used by Israelis in the future to prevent the amalgamation of Israeli and Arab neighbourhoods in the city and to merge with surrounding settlements. The Israel Lands Authority aims at control over unused Arab tracts that, instead of being considered for deforestation (a process which would challenge governmental tenure or lead to premature sale and less revenue for the state), are being earmarked by the Israeli government for an Israeli future use, preventing Arabic residents from making use of the free spaces for their constructional needs. In addition, the Israeli Ministry of Housing prepared plans to restrict the Palestinian community (owners of the land) to use undeveloped tracts so that they are available instead for future Israeli settlements. This is also to ensure that Palestinian communities are geographically separated (Cohen, 1994). Tree planting in Jerusalem has an explicit function of ethnic separation between the Arab Palestinians and Israeli populations, an example of which can be found between the Israeli neighbourhood of East Talpiot and the Palestinian village of Sur Baher.

5.5 Study Cases

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Israeli urban planning policies in Jerusalem are creating two separate societies within the same district of Jerusalem, Palestinian or Arabic Society, and Israeli or Jewish Community. However, the earlier society still suffers from fragmentation of its social and geographical contexts in contrast to the later community, which is well connected and integrated by spatial continuity and physical infrastructure. The Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem has intensified the complexity between the Palestinian urbanized neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, via complex set of measures and tools. The Israeli government created mechanisms to expropriate Palestinian lands. One of the main methods is the “green land” method by which the needs of the Palestinian Arab residents in East Jerusalem could not be satisfied due to the fact that, the available free lands have been earmarked as green and open landscape, see Figure 5.54 which presents the land cut-off in the Israeli planning system.
It is noteworthy mentioning that the approved planning areas consist only 40 percent of the total area of East Jerusalem, however, Palestinians in East Jerusalem are neither able to utilize all the planned areas for their organic development needs nor the other unplanned areas. Approximately 34 percent of East Jerusalem is expropriated for Jewish settlements, while 26 percent is still unplanned areas, therefore, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are facing serious challenge to find enough room for their future development and expansion, see Figure 5.55. The researcher argues that more than 75 percent of the total area of East Jerusalem is part of what he conceptualizes as the “static sphere” where vacant Palestinians’ lands are frozen by the Israeli planning policies of
any kind of development, and transferred in the future for the purpose of establishing Jewish settlements, see Table 5.7.

Table 5.7: Urban Management in East Jerusalem and the respective land management categories, (researcher39)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Planning and Urban Management</th>
<th>Percentage of EJ Total Area (%</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Area (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Jerusalem</td>
<td>Expropriated Lands</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unplanned Areas</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roads and public buildings</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Green Areas</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

* This area of land is deducted from Palestinian East Jerusalem Lands and annexed, illegally, into the Israeli lands for the advantage of the Jewish population.

** This area of land is undeveloped zones where Palestinians in East Jerusalem are unable to utilize; it is also subjected into future Israeli planning policies for the advantage of the Jewish population.

*** This area of land is undeveloped zones where Palestinians in East Jerusalem are prevented to utilize; many of these zones are subjected into Israeli expropriation for the purpose of construction Jewish settlements illegally.

Thus, according to the Israeli Planning Policies, approximately 74% of the total area of East Jerusalem are zones where Palestinians are not allowed to utilize for their future development.

39 The researcher produced this figure/table based on analyzing the data presented in (Fig. 5.54).
Eventually, the planned areas which amount up to 40 percent of the total area of East Jerusalem are categorized mainly under three major folds: housing areas, roads and public building areas, and green and open landscapes areas, the respective percentage of each category is presented in Figure 5.56. However, more than 70% of the total area of East Jerusalem is zones where Palestinians are not allowed to utilize for their future development (34% expropriated areas, 26% unplanned areas, and 14% green areas).

In fact, most of the East Jerusalem plans prepared by the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem have allocated extensive areas for open landscape spaces. As shown in the previous figure, approximately 35% of the total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. As such, construction is completely forbidden in open landscape areas, where the permitted usage only includes forestry, groves, agriculture, and the use of pre-existing roads. Unlike open public land, open green spaces are not expropriated from their owners and remain private property unless the Israeli government decides to confiscate such green lands for the purpose of constructing new Jewish settlements, or even for expanding the boundaries of existing settlements.

Figure 5.56: Approved planning categories in East Jerusalem each in percent to total approved areas, (researcher 40)

40 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Fig. 5.54).
5.5.1 The Case of the Northern Areas

5.5.1.1 Beit Hanina and Shu'fat

An outstanding example of the gray planning policies is the Israeli urban planning in Beit Hanina and Shu'fat (Fig. 5.49). When the planning process began, extensive areas in these neighbourhoods were earmarked for residential construction on the scale of some 12,500 housing units. On the basis of governmental policy, the Israeli District Committee decided to restrict construction to 7,500 housing units and earmarked large areas for open landscapes (Figs 5.50, 5.51). Numerous objections to these decisions were submitted by private landowners whose lands were allocated for open landscape. The Committee decided to remove these areas from the scope of the plan, as it could not really counter the objectors' arguments in terms of planning considerations. The removal of the open landscape area from the planning process in no way alters their legal status, since these areas are earmarked for open landscape in the general outline plan for Northern Jerusalem Plan 3000B (Najjar, 2007c).

Figure 5.49: Location of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat relative to the Old City (researcher 41)

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41 The researcher extracted this figure from (Fig. 5.13).
Figure 5.50: Beit Hanina Plan #3457A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Beit Hanina to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the east, north, west and south as Green Open Landscapes, while the other vacant lands are expropriated for the purpose of constructing of two Jewish-only settlements, one on east of Beit Hanina while the other is on south-east part of Beit Hanina.
Figure 5.51: Shu'fat Plan #3456A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policy restricts the borders of Shu'fat to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the east and west as Green Open Landscapes, while the other vacant lands are expropriated for the purpose of constructing two Jewish-only settlements, one on west of Shu'fat while the others are on northeast and south of Shu'fat.
According to Jerusalem Municipality planning perspectives, both of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat neighborhoods were planned as urban clusters with Ramallah-Jerusalem Road serving as a commercial urban axis with high-density construction. The construction density declines as moving away from the center toward the margins of the neighborhoods. Table 5.8 shows the detailed planning categories of these neighborhoods. Of the total area of the plans, less than 30 percent is allocated for residential construction purposes with relatively low density and obviously low rise buildings. Residential land use is categorized into two classes, ‘Class 1’ where all the built-up areas close to Ramallah Jerusalem Road are earmarked as a residential area with a construction density of 75% on three floors. And ‘Class 5’ covers the remaining areas located on the margins of the neighborhoods in vacant areas intended for low-density residential construction of 50% on two floors. Figure 5.52 shows the percentages of each planning category in Beit Hanina and Shu'fat (Najjar, 2007c; Arnon, 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Category</th>
<th>Beit Hanina and Shu'fat</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Village Core</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 5’ – (50% density)</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 1’ – (75% density)</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Dwelling Area</strong></td>
<td><strong>2109</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paths for Pedestrians</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Roads</strong></td>
<td><strong>985</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open Public Areas (Parks)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineering Facilities</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Public Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>642</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td>Commercial Plus Residential Areas</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Commercial Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>398</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Open Landscape Area</td>
<td>2965</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Unutilized Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>3037</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As detected from the previous figure, the plan allocates very marginal area dedicated for the purpose of ‘public spaces’, especially those designated for recreational purposes which people need for social interaction with healthy and natural entertainment facilities, namely, the ‘public parks’ which consists only 2 percent of the total planned area. On the other hand, the plan allocates excessively large area accounts for 43 percent of the total planned area earmarked as open landscapes, particularly on spaces over vacant tracts. From a landscape and planning viewpoint, large sections of these areas are suitable for construction (Fig. 5.53). However, they were earmarked as open green spaces for political reasons. As explained earlier, the areas under open landscape land use title prevent Palestinians to make use of the land of any kind of development to serve their future expansion needs, on the contrary, these spaces surround the Palestinian built-up areas to construct hidden border of their development, then confiscated for Jewish settlements (Fig. 5.54). Figure 5.55 shows comparatively the percentage of what the researcher conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area of both Beit Hanina and Shu'fat.

The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.8).
Areas zoned as open landscapes in Beit Hanina establish “hidden borders” to the residential development of the Palestinians there.

Figure 5.53: Open landscapes prevent future development of the residential areas in Beit Hanina, (researcher)

Figure 5.54: Jewish-only settlement established upon confiscated Palestinian lands in Beit Hanina and other areas in East Jerusalem, (researcher)
The percentage of green spaces of risks in this case is shocking. These spaces continue producing the “unsecured” feeling to the local Palestinian residents who are also the landlords of these spaces. For example, Hodgkins (1996) argues that 2000 dunums from Shufat village were designated as a green area in 1968 and was planted with cypress trees and remained untouched until 1994 when a new Jewish-only settlement (Reches Shufat) was approved to be built consisting of 2,500 units (Figs. 5.56, 5.58).

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Figure 5.55: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Beit Hanina and Shufat; the figure shows the percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas of the plan. (researcher43)

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43 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.8).
Figure 5.57: Reches Shu'fat Jewish-only settlement which was established over expropriated Palestinian lands that was planted by cypress trees, (Halawani, 2006, edited)

Figure 5.58: The main street leading to Reches Shu'fat Jewish-only settlement, (researcher)
5.5.2 The Case of the Middle Areas

This section deals with four Palestinian localities in the middle of East Jerusalem, namely Wadi Al-Jawz, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud and Jabal Al-Mukabir. These neighborhoods are vital Palestinian economical and residential nodes in central East Jerusalem and lie within the visual basin of the Old City. Although these neighborhoods are among the most important Arabic clusters in central East Jerusalem, their urban fabric and the residential areas are fragmented and not integrated. Figure 5.59 identifies the geographical location of Wadi Al-Jawz, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud and Jabal Al-Mukabir relative to the Old City.

Figure 5.59: Location of study cases in middle areas relative to the Old City, (researcher, extracted from Fig. 5.31)
5.5.2.1 Wadi Al-Jawz

The neighborhood of Wadi Al-Jawz, because of its logistic location and proximity to the Old City (Fig. 5.60), has attracted many Jerusalemites since long time ago to live and reside inside it (Fig. 5.61). However, the municipality of Jerusalem imposed restrictive planning policies to marginalize the potential of the neighborhood and to limit its capacity to absorb more Palestinian residents. The ‘politics of demography’ to make certain that the Jewish population in Jerusalem will remain a majority, and thus, Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem should not exceed a certain limit to remain a group of minority have driven the political objectives in the Israeli governmental bodies to impose one-sided planning policies in Jerusalem for the advantage of the Israeli people and on the expense of the Palestinian residents there. As such, the Israeli spatial planning regime imposed upon the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem was not serving the Arab population with the basic social and infrastructure needs.

Figure 5.60: One of Jerusalem Old City’s northern gates that leads directly into Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher)
Wadi Al-Jawz is a Palestinian long-standing residential neighborhood in East Jerusalem, situated to the north of the Old City and close to the East Central Business District. However, the neighborhood suffers from severe deterioration of the physical infrastructure along with scattered pattern of development enforced by the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem. The neighborhood urban fabric is no more coherent, the buildings are in general of bad structures and reflect in total a slum oriented pattern of development. The growth could be described as piecemeal; it reflects its expansion in incremental additions into the existing structures in the city. All of this is, strictly, imposed by Jerusalem Municipality which in most cases prevents the residents from adding new extensions into their homes either vertically or horizontally or building new houses in the vacant lands. Therefore, to match their basic needs, Palestinians are obligated to react to this Israeli policy by adding “illegally” some fast-erected attachments to their homes as will be shown in the following figures, (Figs. 5.62 – 5.70).
Figure 5.62: Attachments added into one Palestinian residential building in Wadi Al-Jawz, the figure shows the incremental fast-erected attachments added to the building mainly by hollow blocks or light steel structures, additions are made almost in all the building façades, which in total damages the building style and urban fabric, and thus producing low-quality social and physical landscape – an output of the political architecture, (researcher)
Figure 5.63: Additions made to serve households’ basic needs in residential building in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher)

Figure 5.64: Incremental growth, sanitary rest rooms attached into residential building in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher)
Figure 5.65: Heterogeneous building façades in Wadi Al-Jawz – an output of the political architecture, (researcher)

Figure 5.66: Scattered urban fabric in Wadi Al-Jawz – an output of the political architecture, (researcher)
Piecemeal development and incremental growth produced distorted skyline and urban sprawl in Wadi Al-Jawz.

Figure 5.67: Urban sprawl and scattered skyline in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher)

Slum-oriented development pattern

Israeli Hotel constructed on Palestinian confiscated lands of Wadi Al-Jawz

High density repetitive building units for Jewish-only settlement constructed on Palestinian confiscated lands of Wadi Al-Jawz

Wadi Al-Jawz neighborhood

Figure 5.68: Spatial urban Paradox between Wadi Al-Jawz and the adjacent Jewish settlement, (researcher)
Figure 5.69: Poor infrastructure at the commercial area in Wadi Al-Jawz, no room for proper parking, (researcher)

Figure 5.70: Poor infrastructure at the industrial area in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher)
The visual outlook of Wadi Al-Jawz is deemed by the Israeli planning policies to continue fragmentally. The plan for this neighborhood was the first prepared by the Municipality of Jerusalem which addressed more restrictions upon the Palestinian future development and vacant lands are kept under open landscape zones (Figs. 5.71-5.73)

Figure 5.71: To the right, Wadi al-Jawz and American Colony Plan #2639 in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policy restricts the borders of Wadi al-Jawz to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands as Green Open Landscapes.
Eastern “open landscapes” are confiscated for constructing the Hebrew University in Wadi Al-Jawz.

According to the Israeli planning policies imposed by Jerusalem Municipality “open landscapes” remained undeveloped in Wadi Al-Jawz.

Figure 5.72: Large zones earmarked as open landscapes in Wadi Al-Jawz are confiscated for constructing the Hebrew University, while others remained undeveloped despite the urgent need for urban expansion, (researcher)

Figure 5.73: Open landscapes in Wadi Al-Jawz remained undeveloped despite the vital need for expansion, (researcher)
5.5.2.2 Silwan

The village of Silwan is considered one of the most important Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Silwan commands interesting views to the old city. It has narrow and relatively contour oriented structure which is characterized by dense construction benefiting the varied slopes of the mountain edges, and therefore, it interacts uniquely with the topography and presents beautiful architectural landscape. However, the difficult topographical conditions have created serious problems of overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure in the village (Fig. 5.74). It is located adjacent to the southern wall of the Old City of Jerusalem, and thus, gets more interest in the Palestinians history and local Jerusalemite’s concern (Fig. 5.75).

Figure 5.74: General view of Silwan village in East Jerusalem, (researcher)
The proximity of Silwan to the Old City has attracted the Jerusalemites to live in the village since long time. Arnon (1998) argues that according to the planning scheme of Jerusalem Municipality, the maximum residential capacity of Silwan is approximately 1,200 housing units, however, and according to the Municipality of Jerusalem more than 1,300 housing units already exist in the village. Thus there is no potential for additional housing neither for the exiting Palestinian population there nor for new comers. The village includes a very large proportion of small apartments, so that building additions are intended mainly for the extension of existing housing units rather than for the construction of new units. Table 5.9 shows the detail plan land use categories in Silwan, and Figure 5.76 shows the percentages of each planning category and the respective land area according to the approved land use plan prepared by Jerusalem Municipality which also restricts the future development of Silwan by not expanding the village boundaries or increasing the construction densities or zones.
Table 5.9: Silwan land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Category</th>
<th>Silwan</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 6’</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Dwelling Area ‘detailed planning’</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Total Dwelling Area</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Paths for Pedestrians</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Total Roads</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Open Public Areas (Parks)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Total Public Areas</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td>Hotel and Recreation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td>Total Commercial Areas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Open Landscape Area [nature reserve]</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Total Unutilized Areas</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although 51% is residential area, Silwan has no room for any residential new building, which means that the plan boundaries must be expanded to include new vacant lands, a matter that Jerusalem Municipality did not account for.

Figure 5.76: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Silwan, (researcher⁴⁴)

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⁴⁴ The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.9).
The approved master plan of Silwan is shown in Figure 5.77, while Fig. 5.78 and Fig. 5.79 reflect the Israeli determination for preventing any opportunity of future development of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

Figure 5.77: Silwan Plan #2783A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Silwan to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands as Green Open Landscapes.
Figure 5.78: Over saturated space in Silwan where no room for new or additional buildings for the local Palestinian residents, (researcher)

Figure 5.79: Vacant lands in Silwan earmarked as open landscapes restrain the Palestinian development, (researcher)
5.5.2.3 Ras Al-Amud

The preparation of Ras Al-Amud plan took many years of delay before approving the plan. The plan received final authorization from the Minister of the Interior in the late years of 1990s. Residential areas constitute 39% of the total area of the plan. The plan proposes low construction density of 50% and 25%. Approximately 65% of the residential areas are earmarked for 50% construction density while 35% of the areas are planned at a construction density of 25% (Arnon, 1998). On the other hand, Halawani (2006) argues that this designation of low-rise buildings and low construction density is part of the Israeli planning policies adopted only for the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, unlike the Jewish settlements there, for instance a Jewish neighborhood in Ras Al-Amud neighborhood allows for construction density of 112 percent and four stories. Table 5.10 shows the detail plan categories of Ras Al-Amud.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Category</th>
<th>Ras Al-Amud</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area Special’</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 4’ – (70% density)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 6’</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Dwelling Area</strong></td>
<td><strong>548</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paths for Pedestrians</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Roads</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open Public Areas (Parks)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Public Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>148</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td>Hotel and Recreation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gas Station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Commercial Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Open Landscape Area [including 16 dunums not included in the plan]</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Unutilized Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>470</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.80 – 5.81 show the percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in Ras Al-Amud respectively.

![Diagram showing planning categories in percent of total planned area for Ras Al-Amud.](image)

**Figure 5.80**: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Ras Al-Amud, (researcher\(^45\))

![Diagram showing distribution between green spaces of life vs. green spaces of risks.](image)

**Figure 5.81**: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Ras Al-Amud; the figure shows the percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher\(^45\))

\(^{45}\) The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.10).
The maximum residential capacity of Ras Al-Amud plan is approximately 2,000 housing units (Arnon, 1998). According to the Municipality of Jerusalem the area already includes approximately 1,750 units. Thus the potential for additional housing is 250 units. However, the plan has extensive areas earmarked as Open landscape space amounting to approximately 34% of the total planned area (Fig. 5.82).

Figure 5.82: Ras Al-Amud Plan #2668A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Ras Al-Amud to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre and south as Green Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities (if any).
5.5.2.4 Jabal Al-Mukabir

The approved plan of Jabal Al-Mukabir shows four main land use categories, namely residential, roads, public areas and open landscapes. No commercial lands are entitled in the plan as shown in Table 5.11. The table shows strong restrictions imposed on the residential areas. Construction percentages are 25% on two floors only, therefore, the construction density in the village is extremely low. The areas earmarked for construction are very limited, amounting to approximately 20% of the total planned area including the already built up spaces. The maximum capacity is 230 housing units. According to the Municipality of Jerusalem some 120 housing units exist in the village. Thus the potential for additional housing is 110 units. The borders of the areas for construction were established by the plan according to the borders of the existing built-up area, without any possibility for expansion. In terms of the public areas, the plan includes only a single site of one dunum designated for a kindergarten. On the other hand, the plan provides for a minimal network of roads that will not allow access to each home. Despite all these solid restrictions imposed upon the Palestinians in Jabal Al-Mukabir, the plan allocates very huge areas as open landscapes which constitute more than 70% of the total planned area, and thus, imposing more challenges over the future needs of the Jerusalemites (Arnon, 1998).

Table 5.11: Jabal Al-Mukabir land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Category</th>
<th>Jabal Al-Mukabir</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 6’ - (25% density)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Dwelling Area</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Roads</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Public Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Open Landscape Area [including 22 dunums not included in the planned]</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Unutilized Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>361</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.83 – 5.84 show the percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in Jabal Al-Mukabir respectively.

![Figure 5.83: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Jabal Al-Mukabir, (researcher 46)](image)

![Figure 5.84: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Jabal Al-Mukabir; the figure shows the percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher 46)](image)

46 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.11).
The distribution of the open landscapes is designed to damage any possibility of geographical continuum in Jabal Al-Mukabir and to prevent the future Palestinian expansion opportunities in the vacant lands (Fig. 5.85).

Figure 5.85: Jabal Al-Mukabir Plan #2691 in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Jabal Al-Mukabir to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre, east, west and south as Green Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities (if any).
5.5.3 The Case of the Southern Areas

This section sheds light upon the southern parts in East Jerusalem; the southern Palestinian localities discussed in this section are Arab A-Sawahra, Sur Baher and Um-Tuba, shown in Figure 5.86. These localities were located in Jerusalem District, and then were included within the municipal boundaries after the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the respective expansion of the municipality political borders.

Figure 5.86: Location of Arab A-Sawahra and Sur Baher relative to the Old City, (researcher\textsuperscript{47})

\textsuperscript{47} The researcher extracted this figure from (Fig. 5.31).
5.5.3.1 Arab A-Sawahra

Arab A-Sawahra is located in the south-east of the city; it is the largest neighborhood of East Jerusalem and is inhabited mainly by indigenous Arabs. The master plan of Arab A-Sawahra classifies zones into main four categories; namely, residential, roads, public areas and open landscapes. The total planned area is approximately 4,682 dunams; Table 5.12 shows the respective area of each land use category. The plan is very conservative regarding the residential land use, it is of very low density, i.e. it allocates construction density of 25%, or in other words, only two floor buildings. On the other hand, it allocates no less than 60% of the total area of the plan for open landscape. The areas earmarked for open landscape include several clusters of existing buildings as well as isolated buildings. Zoning as open green spaces means that households cannot extend their homes or connect to infrastructure services. The instructions attached to the plans include a clause stating that in ‘lawful’ existing buildings within open green spaces, no additional building will be permitted, with the exception of extensions required for the purpose of sanitary improvements to an existing building. In practice, the use of the word lawful prevents any building extension, since it is difficult to prove that long-standing buildings were constructed legally, while the new buildings were built unlawfully (Najjar, 2007c).

Table 5.12: Arab A-Sawahra land use plan categories according to (Najjar, 2007c, edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Category</th>
<th>Arab A-Sawahra</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 6’ - (25% density)</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Total Dwelling Area</em></td>
<td>1109</td>
<td><strong>23.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Total Roads</em></td>
<td>662</td>
<td><strong>13.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Total Public Areas</em></td>
<td>59</td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Open Landscape Area [including 82 dunums not included in the planned]</td>
<td>2852</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Total Unutilized Areas</em></td>
<td>2852</td>
<td><strong>61.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.87 – 5.88 show the percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in Arab A-Sawahra respectively.

![Figure 5.87: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Arab A-Sawahra, (researcher48)](image)

![Figure 5.88: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Arab A-Sawahra; the figure shows the percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher48)](image)

---

48 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.12).
The excessive distribution of the open landscapes is, deliberately, designed to damage any possibility of geographical continuum in Arab A-Sawahra and to prevent the future Palestinian expansion opportunities in the vacant lands (Fig. 5.89).

Figure 5.89: Arab A-Sawahra Plan #2683A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Arab A-Sawahra to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre, east, west and south as Green Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities (if any).
5.5.3.2 Sur Baher

The other Palestinian neighborhoods if this section are Sur Baher and Um Tuba which are located in the south of Jerusalem, to the south of East Talpiot. Sur Baher and Um Tuba have had no master plan until 1999, when the municipality of Jerusalem prepared the master plan of these neighborhoods as shown in Figure 5.90. The plan portrays the zoning policy adopted for Sur Baher and Um Tuba to earmark the zones around the built up areas for residential purposes, but with low construction densities. These spaces are connected by relatively limited road network that does not extend towards new vacant areas, meanwhile open spaces surround residential areas. Table 5.13 shows the respective area of each land use category for the planned areas of these neighborhoods.

Figure 5.90: Sur Baher and Um Tuba master plan according to (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)
Table 5.13: Sur Baher and Um Tuba land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Category</th>
<th>Sur Bahir and Um Tuba</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Village core</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 5’ - (50% density)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dwelling ‘Area 6’ - (25% density)</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Dwelling Area</strong></td>
<td><strong>1333</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landscape area</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Path for pedestrian</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Roads</strong></td>
<td><strong>502</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open public areas (Parks, etc.)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other areas of public use</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Public Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>198</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused Areas</td>
<td>Open Landscape Area</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Unutilized Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>1465</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the planned area for residential areas amounts for 38 percent, the construction densities are very low, allowing in most cases for two floors buildings for 77 percent of the residential areas as shown in Figure 5.91.

![Figure 5.91: Percentage of construction density in the residential areas in Sur Baher and Um Tuba, (researcher)](image)

49 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.13).
Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.92 – 5.93 show the percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in Sur Baher and Um Taba respectively.

![Figure 5.92: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Sur Baher and Um Taba, (researcher)](image)

That means 97% of the total open spaces Sur Baher and Um Taba generate “unsecured” feelings for the local Palestinian residents.

![Figure 5.93: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Sur Baher and Um Taba; the figure shows the percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher)](image)

The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.13).
The excessive distribution of the open landscapes is, thoroughly, designed to damage any possibility of geographical continuum in Sur Baher and Um Taba and to prevent the future Palestinian expansion opportunities in the vacant lands (Fig. 5.94).

Figure 5.94: Sur Baher and Um Taba Plan #2320 in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Arab A-Sawahra to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre, east, west and south as Green Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities, as well as, in the south western edge there is a Jewish settlement which hinders the Palestinian development and movement.
In spite of all the aforementioned shortcomings in terms of the future development of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem, as most of the vacant lands are allocated for open landscapes where development is not allowed, it is quite sophisticated and costly to obtain a building permit from Jerusalem Municipality in the vacant lands in residential areas. Figure 5.95 demonstrates the bureaucratic steps the local residents should pass through before obtaining a building permit. These steps are identical for any Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem; however, the example is taken for the case study in Sur Baher and Um Taba.

Figure 5.95: Steps needed to obtain a building permit in East Jerusalem, the procedure is very complex and takes many years before issuing a building permit by the municipality. (researcher: according to data by Halawani, 2006)
The previous schematic outline of the complicated routine and procedural steps needed to obtain a building permit from the Israeli Municipality in Jerusalem is aggravated by considering the huge amount of money which should be deposited as a permit fee. Applying a request to the municipality to ask for approval to initiate engineering design process costs about 1155 NIS\(^{51}\) (312 $). The fees of water and sanitation depend mainly on the land and the building floor areas respectively. In terms of water fees, the municipality earns 10 NIS (2.7 $) for each one square meter of the land area, and 70 NIS (18.9 $) per one meter square of the building area, in addition, 15% of the total water fee is to be paid for the price of connecting water pipes to the building. In terms of sewage fees, the municipality earns 30 NIS (8.1 $) for each one square meter of the land area, and 40 NIS (10.8 $) per one meter square of the building area. The municipality earns 36 NIS (9.72) per one meter square of the building area as building license fees. Table 5.14 illustrates the exact permit cost of one building that obtained municipal building permit in Sur Baher and Um Tuba. The building area in this case study is 966 square meters distributed into three floors.

Table 5.14: Municipal fees' categories with the respective cost for obtaining a building permit of one building in Sur Baher and um Tuba according to (Halawani, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permit Item</th>
<th>Cost NIS (₪)</th>
<th>Equivalent Cost US ($)</th>
<th>Percent of total cost (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening file in the municipality</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire department fee</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archeology fee</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dump site fee</td>
<td>5120</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final payment to the municipality</td>
<td>62000</td>
<td>16740</td>
<td>7.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage and water fee</td>
<td>344419</td>
<td>92993</td>
<td>44.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betterment levy fee</td>
<td>365395</td>
<td>98657</td>
<td>46.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>780744</strong></td>
<td><strong>210801</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Betterment levy is a tax taken upon preparing master plan and improving the environment of the city.
** The cost does not include the payments for the lawyer, land surveyor, design and supervision of consultant engineering office, as well as construction.

\(^{51}\) NIS (Israeli New Shekel), sign (₪): is the local currency used in Israel and the oPt. 1 NIS ₪ = 0.27 US$.
Thus, the total cost to get municipal building permit of 966 square meters in Sur Baher and Um Tuba is 780,744 NIS (210,801 $). In other words, the permit cost per square meter is 808 NIS (218 $). This number does not include the engineering design and supervision or lawyer and surveyor costs, still it is extremely high and unaffordable for most of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem; it is almost equivalent to construction costs of building skeleton works. Figures 5.96 and 5.97 show the municipal receipts of the most costly building permit items, i.e. sewage and water and betterment levy fees respectively.

Figure 5.96: Municipal receipt for the sewage and water fees of the discussed example (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)

Figure 5.97: Municipal receipt for the betterment levy fees of the discussed example (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)
5.6 Discussion

Examining of the overall planning map of East Jerusalem and analyzing the tables of land usages reveal a number of planning problems, the absence of overall integrated urban planning for East Jerusalem floats to the surface in this sense. This is the fundamental planning problem in East Jerusalem. The overall planning map shows that each neighborhood has been planned separately with the objective of dealing with local scale level. These plans were prepared at different periods and do not relate to the regional scale or the area as a whole, as well as, do not present a perspective which integrates the Palestinian neighborhoods into a single urban fabric. The result of this approach is that there is no integration of infrastructure, facilities and other services on the urban level, beyond individual neighborhoods. Figure 5.98 shows schematic outline of the spatial context in East Jerusalem.

![Figure 5.98: Schematic outline of the spatial context in East Jerusalem highlighting the fragmentation of the Palestinian neighborhoods because of the Jewish settlements and the wall, (researcher)
The past, present, and future of - a testy but necessary relationship - float to the surface when discussing planning status in East Jerusalem, more specifically, when dealing with the Palestinian neighborhoods and challenges Jerusalemites should face from the unilateral Israeli planning policies adopted by Jerusalem Municipality. The research presented in this study relates to the planning situation in East Jerusalem after forty five years of Israeli rule. The Municipality of Jerusalem has prepared town planning schemes for almost all the existing Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, as such planning has been completed for the entire built-up areas and valid town plans exist. It is noteworthy reminding that only 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem zoned for residential purposes. Nonetheless, in many areas of these zones additional planning is needed before building permits may be received. For example, the land net area is a matter of concern in East Jerusalem, since the municipal building regulations vary according the land total area as shown in Figure 5.99. Thus, statutory planning has far-reaching ramifications for the possibilities open to individual residents regarding building opportunities, whether or not they may build, and according to what conditions.

The Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem in most of the plans prepared for the Palestinian neighborhoods establish **special conditions** for obtaining building permits on plots of more than one dunum, for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area &gt; 1 dunum</th>
<th>Area &gt; 3 dunums</th>
<th>Area &gt; 6 dunums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plans for Arab A-Sawahara, Isawiyah and Abu Tor state that the granting of building permits for <em>plots larger than one dunum</em> will require the approval of the local committee of a building and development plan for the plot or the submission of a plan for the parceling of the plot.</td>
<td>Plan 3085A for A-Sheikh determines that for <em>plots larger than 3 dunums</em> a detailed plan will be submitted to the committee including allocations for public uses.</td>
<td>Plan for Arab A-Sawahara determines that for <em>plots larger than 6 dunums</em>, a condition for the granting of a building permit will be the depositing and approval of a detailed plan according to the legal provisions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.99: Special conditions imposed upon the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem in terms of obtaining building permits on plots of more than one dunum, (Najjar, 2007c, edited)
The geography and demography in East Jerusalem have been severely impacted by the Israeli planning regime. In order to outline these impacts and as part of the research work, selected urban town plans for specific Palestinian neighborhoods distributed geographically in the north, centre and south were analyzed to reflect the overall Palestinian situation in East Jerusalem from spatial planning point of view. It has been shown that, yet, these town plans do neither meet the needs of the local Palestinian population nor allow for sustainable development. However, statutory planning evidently determines the character of the public domain. According to Najjar (2007c) the detailed plans for Beit Hanina and Shu'fat all include extensive areas earmarked for unification and re-parcelation. Indeed, most of the available areas that offer potential for new construction are either defined as compounds for unification and re-parcelation, a process that usually takes several years, or earmarked as open landscapes. Consequently, building in these areas has been completely frozen and pending approval of the plans. For example, the town plans of Bayt Hanina and Shu'fat allocates more than forty compounds for re-parcelation, Arnon (1998) argues that this is equivalent to more than sixty percent of the total planned area of the two neighborhoods. These conditions delay development since the bureaucratic procedures are extremely time-consuming. The following text discusses the two-sided planning perspective of Jerusalem Municipality in East Jerusalem. Table 5.15 shows selected three Palestinian neighbourhoods and one Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem for comparative analysis.

Table 5.15: Land use categories for approved plans in Palestinian neighborhoods and Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher, based on Tables: 5.6, 5.8, 5.11 and 5.12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Palestinian Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Israeli Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North EJ: (Shu'fat &amp; Beit Hanina)</td>
<td>Middle EJ: (Jabl Al-Mukabir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Area</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Areas</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Landscape Areas</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The previous table shows the urban discrepancies in East Jerusalem between the Arab and the Jewish neighborhoods. The average of residential areas in that comparison of the Palestinian neighborhoods is less than 25% of the total planned area, while it reaches to 38% of the Jewish settlement. On the other hand, the construction building density in the Palestinian neighborhoods is very low; it reaches 25% in Jabal Al-Mukabir and Arab A-Sawahra, and ranges between 50%-70% in Beit Hanina and Shu'fat. While for Har Homa settlement it reaches 175% which is seven times higher than that designated in Jabal Al-Mukabir and Arab A-Sawahra, see (Figs. 5.100 - 5.102).

![Image 1](image1.png)

**Figure 5.100**: Palestinian scattered housing units with low construction densities in EJ, (researcher)

![Image 2](image2.png)

**Figure 5.101**: High-rise buildings & high construction densities in Har Homa settlement (Jerusalem Unit, 2010, edited)
Indeed, after 1967 when Jerusalem Municipality began preparing town planning schemes for the Palestinian localities in East Jerusalem, areas were defined where building permits could be received subject to various complicated conditions. These conditions established a number of permitted low construction densities in most cases which allow for one or two floors only. Building permits were issued subject to these conditions and in accordance with the provisions of ‘Section 78’ of the Planning and Building Law, which is designed to enable the authorities to issue building permits during the period of announcing the preparation of a town planning scheme and its approval. The use of ‘Section 78’ was intended to solve urgent problems pending the preparation of general outline plans for the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. However, since the preparation of the general outline plan which began only in the 1980s, the provisions of ‘Section 78’ became a dominant tool in the Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem. Moreover, in many cases the licensing process in East Jerusalem is infinitely more complex than in the west of the city, due to problems relating to existing infrastructures and bureaucracy. In order to solve problems, Jerusalemites are in many cases obliged to submit detailed planning scheme for their plot, a process that creates additional delay of several years before a building permit may be obtained. Thus the path for obtaining a building permit is paved with endless obstacles.

The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15).
Most of the urban plans of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem allocate extensive areas for open landscape area. Approximately 40% of the total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. Construction is completely forbidden in open landscape zones, where the permitted usages include forestry, groves, agriculture, and existing roads. It has been shown that all the Palestinian neighborhoods discussed in this chapter suffer from severe restrictions upon the residential capacity which is restrained by the planning regulations imposed by the municipality of Jerusalem. It could be argued that the Israeli planning paradigm in East Jerusalem enforces Palestinian development towards ‘rural pattern’ through limiting the construction densities into low values and the building heights into low levels. In spite of the urgent need for residential areas in the Palestinian neighborhoods and the fact that the exiting residential zones are in many neighborhoods already got saturated, the Israeli planning policies allocates very vast areas for ‘open landscape zones’ where development is not allowed. For example, the plan of Jabal Al-Kukabir allocates only 20.5% of the planned area for residential purposes, however it allocates 73.6% for open landscape zones, see Figure 5.103 which presents comparison between some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in terms of the amount of areas earmarked as open landscapes.

![Open Landscape Areas](image.png)

**Figure 5.103:** Percentage of the open landscape areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, it shows the excessive allocation for this land use while it could redistributed in lower percentages for the benefit of residential land use category, (researcher53)

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53 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15).
By limiting the Palestinian future expansion opportunities in East Jerusalem, the Israeli planning system attempts to enhance ‘slum-style’ character of many Palestinian urban areas from urban design perspective, and therefore, reflecting that the Jerusalemites are not accommodating urbanization. However, Palestinians perceive this as no more than a pretext for the application of political considerations limiting the development of Palestinian East Jerusalem. The planning of Jerusalem is influenced by government policy dictating that a proportion of 78% Jews and 22% Arabs should be maintained in the demography of Jerusalem. To this end, it has been necessary to restrict the development of the neighborhoods in the east of the city. One consequence of this policy has been the zoning of areas for open landscape on a basis that relates not to professional planning or design considerations, but rather to arbitrary decisions establishing the limits of construction. These open landscape zones are conceptualized by the researcher as green spaces of risks, since they generate feelings of insecurity to the local Palestinian residents who do observe these remain undeveloped spaces until eventually being expropriated for the establishment of Jewish settlements, Figures 5.104 - 5.105. On the other hand, the allocation of open landscapes in the Israeli settlements is providing the settlement with healthy environment and do not affect the development opportunities of the Israeli population, on the contrary, these spaces are integrated in the town planning schemes to provide well-integrated and environmental living conditions, as such the research conceptualizes these open landscapes located in the Jewish settlements as green spaces of live, Figures 5.106 – 5.108.

Figure 5.104: The borders of the built-up areas of the Palestinian neighborhoods are earmarked as open landscape zones, and thus freezing the future expansion opportunities of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem, (researcher)
A Jewish settlement constructed over Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem, the open landscape zones in the Jewish settlement do not hinder the Jewish residential expansion, and are integrated within the urban design to create healthy environment.

Figure 5.105: Green spaces of risks construct hidden borders to the Palestinian development in EJ, (researcher)

Figure 5.106: Green spaces of life in Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher)
Figure 5.107: Green spaces of life produce social interaction in the Jewish settlements in EJ, (researcher)

Figure 5.108: Open landscapes do not hinder residential development inside the Jewish settlements in EJ, (researcher)
Although zoning for open landscapes is presented heavily in the urban plans of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, areas allocated for public use are inadequate and do not respond to the needs of the local residents, and therefore, Palestinians suffer from severe shortage of the public institutions (educational, cultural, health, youth clubs, parks, gardens etc.), recreational and welfare spaces, as well as infrastructure. Hence, all the plans for East Jerusalem show a profound shortage of open public land. The limited allocation of land for gardens and parks is based on the fact that considerable areas are allocated for open landscape in East Jerusalem. But, the open spaces are actually undeveloped spaces that cannot serve as a substitute for public gardens, including playgrounds for children and space for leisure activities. On the other hand, in the Jewish settlements huge areas are designated for these purposes, Fig 5.109.

Figure 5.109: Comparison of open public spaces between the Palestinian neighborhoods and Israeli settlements in Jerusalem, (Najjar and Amro, 2011, edited)
The previous figure shows the level of urban discrepancies between the Arabic and the Israeli communities in Jerusalem. Where the first suffer from profound shortage of institutional and community services as well as proper and adequate infrastructure, while the latter experiences well established level of these services and advanced infrastructure. Figures 5.110 – 5.111 show these discrepancies for the discussed localities.

Figure 5.110: Percentage of the public areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher\textsuperscript{54})

Figure 5.111: Percentage of the roads’ areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher\textsuperscript{54})

\textsuperscript{54} The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15).
Eventually, the analysis of the land use categories for the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem has shown that these plans reflect unsustainable pattern of development, the plans do include severe shortage of vital land use categories that are needed to guarantee sustainable social and economic life, see Figures 5.112 – 5.113. However, the Israeli planning policies showed special concern for the Jewish settlements in east Jerusalem and prepared well integrated urban plans for them.

Figure 5.112: Percentage of the commercial areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher 55)

Figure 5.113: Percentage of the industrial areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher 55)

55 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15).
5.7 Conclusion

Since the first Israeli occupation of West Jerusalem in 1948, and the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli planning policies and actions have targeted the Palestinian presence in the city. The determination to assert political sovereignty and demographic dominance over the eastern parts of the city have key impact upon the rational development of Jerusalem over and above the problems associated with rapid growth and modernization. In this concern, Israel continued imposing radical spatial facts over Jerusalem and changed the total area of Jerusalem extending its sovereignty over the city. According to the Israeli planning policies, Palestinians living in Jerusalem must be a minority, Israel assumed the right to evict and deport them out of the city in order to restrict Palestinian presence. At the same time, Israel confiscated and seized land and properties and built Jewish settlements that surround the Palestinian neighborhoods and prevent their future expansion. Moreover, Israel constructed the Separation Wall around East Jerusalem which severed the city from its demographic, geographic, and economic support base. Therefore, profound evidences of the influence of the Israeli political decision-making upon the creation of ethnic related regions and settlements in Jerusalem were demonstrated, and the rule of power and politics in shaping the city space and producing what the researcher conceptualizes as “political architecture” was outstandingly proven.

It has been shown that urban planning in Jerusalem consists of two contradictory approaches: progressive planning in West Jerusalem which serves the current and future needs of the Jewish Israeli residents; and regressive planning in East Jerusalem which hinders the current and the future development of the Palestinian residents. As such, deliberate and discriminatory actions against the Palestinian population continue. Planning in Jerusalem, therefore, is inequitable, implicitly biased and reflects not what it promises to be. It is used as a tool of control over the native Palestinian residents, rather than a tool of positive change. Control in this research paper means increasing the Jewish demography in Jerusalem over Palestinians making them a majority in order to Israelize Jerusalem, neglecting its original Arabic roots, as well as, restraining the Palestinians future development. Israel succeeded to impose new geographical, demographical and physical facts on the ground. The planning laws and regulations, imposed by the Israelis,
have been designed to facilitate the process of expropriating Palestinian lands to be used for Israeli settlements, obstruct the growth and development of the Palestinian neighborhoods. Most of the vacant spaces in the Palestinian neighborhoods are frozen through the current Israeli zoning laws, since most of these lands are designated as open landscapes where development is prevented and no construction is allowed. These zones are conceptualized by the researcher as ‘green spaces of risk’; a risk that generates unsecured feelings to the Palestinians who see their vacant lands available but they cannot make use of them. Instead, Israel expropriates these open landscapes for the benefit of establishing or expanding more Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, and therefore, Palestinians suffer in consequence. On the other hand, there is no counteractive practical strategic program performed to create reversed results turn to the benefit of the Palestinians.
Chapter Six

Epilogue
Chapter Six

Epilogue

"Life: It is better not to wrap philosophy around such an inconceivable evolving beautiful mystery. If based on perception, alone; whatever the conclusion - it is still guessing."
T.F. Hodge

The epilogue is a concluding part of this doctoral research, it is formulated to provide a closing review of what has been discussed, conceptualized and tackled in this dissertation. This chapter is presented with an analytical elaboration given by the researcher; it is divided into two main parts: the first is a ‘general summary’ of the research’s findings and arguments; while the other part provides ‘an outlook and future spatial scenarios’ for the geopolitical spatial context of Jerusalem. Therefore, the epilogue is an instructive chapter which highlights and envisions the overall situation of the case study from spatial planning perspective.

6.1 Concluding Summary

East Jerusalem hardly is a standing city yet, but the future will examine its existence to the extreme limits. Political turbulences and urban instability were not the only provident challenges that have faced the researcher to conduct this doctoral research; but also words and phrases set up sophisticated battle that obliged the researcher to seek deeply catching the best terminologies and the most convenient expressions describing the complex spatial situation of the case study (Jerusalem) which this doctorate dissertation presents objectively. The research presents comprehensive set of relations namely (space, politics, power and planning) based upon theoretical framework; these are interestingly elaborated and conceptualized within referenced spatial contexts in Jerusalem (East and West). The direct and implicit role and impacts of these relations were examined. It has been shown that power and politics are the major planning drivers which set out the development pattern and objectives. Consequently, the spatial and
social profiles of Jerusalem were changing very fast producing new norms of urban fabrics and geographical extents which all together constitute manifold challenges to the indigenous Palestinian residents (the Jerusalemites). Figure 6.1 shows schematically the impacts of the major parameters (politics, power, and planning) and the respective major four phases in which Jerusalem (space) passed through under different ruling powers discussed in this dissertation.

Figure 6.1: The influence of ‘politics’, ‘power’, and ‘planning’ upon the spatial development in Jerusalem, (researcher)
The previous figure shows that the relation between power, politics and time (in the case of Jerusalem) is proportional; as time passes through, the spatial status of Jerusalem becomes more complex. Jerusalem experienced five administrative systems with less than five decades; this by itself was a major factor to enrich the planning history of Jerusalem. Consequently, Jerusalem went through various socio physical transformations, namely, historical old city, urbanized city, divided city, and finally it becomes polarized city which is implicitly divided and explicitly fragmented ethnically. A polarized contested city is a city in which groups from multiethnic origins live under the regime of one dominant ethnic group. This kind of cities usually enhances the willingness of unjust development and instability, as well as consist a host of urban conflict and tension. In Jerusalem, urban policies play an important role in achieving political goals, and thus altering the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, and also re-shaping the distribution of socio-economic benefits. Therefore, planning functions in this case (East Jerusalem) as a regressive tool utilized by the dominant group (Israelis) over weaker group (Palestinians). Hence, the Israeli ‘power’ and ‘politics’ enhance using what the researcher conceptualizes as ‘imperfect planning’ against the native Palestinians, in which planning becomes as a “control tool” instead of “reforming tool” principally upon weaker ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the ideology of the regime intensifies urban instability in Jerusalem; the sacred spatial context of the historical centre in Jerusalem for both the Israelis (Jews) and the Palestinians (Muslims and Christians) aggravates the problem, standing upon religious viewpoints.

Eventually, Jerusalem (East and West) is politically unified by one municipal boundary; however, the planning system is not serving that (proposed) spatial unity of Jerusalem, it rather supports a divergent mode of amalgamation between the western and eastern parts of the city. Meanwhile, the Israeli planning paradigm is not characterizing both identities of these two spatial entities (EJ and WJ) allowing the experience of both individually, it rather enhances the characteristics (socio-physical) of the dominant group (Jews in WJ and in EJ settlements), but neglects and even eliminates these for the weaker groups (Palestinians in EJ). Consequently, spatial planning in Jerusalem does reflect two paradoxical approaches: the first is a ‘progressive planning paradigm’ that serves the dominant group in Jerusalem (Israeli Jews living in WJ and in EJ settlements), and
applies under the normative planning principles which aim at improve the living conditions and reduce the ills of urbanization. The second is a ‘regressive planning paradigm’ that restrains the development of the native but weaker group in Jerusalem (Palestinian living in EJ), as well as threatens their future existence and cultural identity.

The paradoxical planning regime in Jerusalem has strongly affected the spatial layouts (built up areas) in both sectors of the city (eastern and western), in each split case, the layouts reflect contradiction of what a unified city space is supposed to mean. In the case of the dominant groups’ areas, the space is undertaking fast modernization steps with large scale infrastructure and housing projects introducing in the same time high technologies and state of the art urban design elements. On the other hand, in the case of the weaker groups’ areas, the space is almost frozen (i.e. growth and expansion is very limited), the infrastructure is extremely deteriorated and the overall urban fabric is shifted towards rural and even slum-style contexts. Indeed, this doctoral research has shown that these restrained and un-modernized spatial layouts of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem are imposed and preserved by the Israeli planning policies. Therefore, the researcher named the physical layouts being produced under the Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem as contextual fabric of ‘political architecture’; furthermore, the researcher conceptualized the contradictory status between the areas of the dominant and weaker groups as: ‘secured spaces, or spaces of life’ and ‘spaces of risks’ for each group respectively which produce collectively unbalanced space in Jerusalem, see (Figure 6.2).

![Figure 6.2: Unbalanced space in Jerusalem - conceptualizing of the research hypothesis, (researcher)]
Social reform and spatial sustainability are amongst the prominent challenging criteria considered during the process of spatial planning in the conflict areas where cities suffer from ‘deeply divided’ socio-spatial characteristics. Jerusalem is a metropolis that represents high intensive case in which urban conflicts are outlined through cultural, social, religious, ideological, ethnic, political and geopolitical ‘one-sided’ urban policies. The future definition of East Jerusalem has met profound interest after the recent political turbulences between the Palestinians and the Israelis; and new arguments about the Israeli colonialism against occupied Jerusalem arise. For instance, pertinent concepts of ethnocracy, de-palestiniazation, targeting the social fabric, all together underline and expose the hegemonic effects of Israeli colonialism on ethnographic, demographic, social, and spatial dimensions of Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem, respectively. Therefore, visioning Jerusalem is a crucial issue in which the Palestine people can propose their aspects of hope for their future capital.

The Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem have paved the road of success for the governing regime to achieve deeply designed objectives which (in total) left deep-rooted facts on the ground. These include physical changes and socioeconomic features which led into new demographic engineering (battle) and cultural struggle inside the city. As such, deliberate and prejudiced actions against the Palestinian people continue. Planning in Jerusalem, is therefore, inequitable, implicitly biased and reflects not what it promises to be; Palestinians suffer in consequence. On the other hand, there is no counter strategic plan to generate reversed (balanced) results turn to the benefit of the Palestinians. Indeed, dealing with all the spatial contexts and planning parameters in Jerusalem highlight the endless assumptions that may arise during exploring the future status of Jerusalem. However, the more difficulties shall arise when dealing with the future scenarios of East Jerusalem, especially when considering it as a Palestinian capital city. With all the challenges driven into Jerusalem, the city still occupies very central geopolitical status (Fig. 6.3) which attracts more attention from planners, politicians, historians and geographers. Future is thus best simulated by scenarios as Mackinnon states:

"Thinking through [scenario] stories, and talking in depth about their implications, brings each person’s unspoken assumptions about the future to the surface. Scenarios are
thus the most powerful vehicles I know for challenging our “mental models” about the world and lifting the “blinders” that limit our creativity and resourcefulness” (Lauchlan Mackinnon’s Quotation)

Figure 6.3: Geopolitical centrality of Jerusalem on the local, district, regional, national and territorial scales, (researcher)
Recently, specifically in the last year of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) through the Palestinian President’s Office and the specialized unit for Jerusalem identified after deep study the vision statement for East Jerusalem as a future Palestinian capital, stating:

“Jerusalem is an Arab and international city with a Palestinian identity. Palestinians take pride in Jerusalem’s central historical, cultural, religious, and spiritual significance for the three monotheistic religions. Jerusalem is a vibrant city that contributes to human development and local, Arab, and international civil and cultural diversity. Jerusalem is an ideal city to live in, work in, and invest in because of its possession of unique and sustainable economic, social, health, cultural, touristic, and recreational attributes that befit its status as the capital of the future State of Palestine.” (Jerusalem Unit, 2010:32)

This “vision” identifies Jerusalem in different regional contexts within different social, political and economic settings. Standing upon the theoretical and scientific definition of the vision, makes it clear that, a 'vision' is an outlook for a 'desired future' status. Utterly, a vision is therefore an optimistic, coherent, emotionally appealing and convincing statement about a desired “future-oriented” outcome; and in this case, it is an articulation of the way to live peacefully and equitably in Jerusalem. Indeed, this vision requires combining elements of various ideas and practices together, drawing connections that cross boundaries, linking concepts from one regime or culture with those from another. Albert Einstein called this process a “combinatorial play” and conceived it as foundational for creative thinking (Dyer et. al, 2011). A comprehensive and ideal vision should therefore be composed of two vital parts: the visible part, that can be observed and felt (such as: places, objects, etc.); and the invisible part (such as: political, cultural and social aspects) which make the visible part possible and applicable.

The researcher envisions the future of Jerusalem as a livable, equitable and a free standing capital for two states, the State of the Israel, and the “future” State of Palestine. Jerusalem will be a smoothly accessible city for both nations, i.e. the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well as, it will be an attractive global city for all visitors throughout the world. It will be a city of peace, diversity, equality, prosperity and economic sustainability, tourism and cultural centres, a linking city on the territorial and international levels. The following text in the next section of this doctoral research draws interestingly some future scenarios for the question of Jerusalem as a capital city of the two aforementioned states.
6.3 Spatial Scenarios for Jerusalem

Standing upon the very unique historical, religious, and political backgrounds in Jerusalem, the future of this changing city becomes more attractive in terms of scenario planning viewpoints. But definitely, with very complex set of assumptions and premises. Considering the manifold dimensions currently conceived within Jerusalem spaces, makes it very difficult to answer questions about the future status of the city and its residents. For instance, if peace agreement settles between the Palestinians and the Israelis, what will happen to Jerusalem spatial and social contexts? What could happen if peace continues to fade away? Is there any possibility to have a just administration for Jerusalem with the coexistence of both: the Israelis and Palestinians? Indeed, such questions among many others could not have clear answers, but instead, could have more likely assumptions when answered, jointly, by shared understanding and outlook between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Although discussing officially the final status and the future of Jerusalem have been postponed ever since the beginning of the peace process in 1993, some Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals shared common ideas regarding the future of this sacred city.

Among the first Israelis who introduced scenarios for the future of Jerusalem is Meron Benvenisti\textsuperscript{56}; these scenarios could be concluded as: Jerusalem undivided capital of a single geopolitical unit; Jerusalem a divided capital to two separate geopolitical units; and Jerusalem as a distinct geopolitical enclave. Other interesting scenarios were addressed by Naomi Chazan\textsuperscript{57} included: Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty with full autonomy to Palestinians; Jerusalem with split sovereignty; and Jerusalem under shared sovereignty. Moshe Ma'oz\textsuperscript{58} on the other hand, believed that Jerusalem should remain undivided and should serve as a capital of two states: the State of Israel in West Jerusalem and the State of Palestine in East Jerusalem. Differently, Manuel Hassassian\textsuperscript{59} suggested that the only solution for the question of Jerusalem is to integrate communities that hold Jerusalem sacred for one reason or another by a joint sovereignty approach, which fosters integration, as well as separation (Najjar, 2007 c).

\textsuperscript{56} Former deputy mayor of Jerusalem 1971 to 1978.
\textsuperscript{57} A former member of the Israeli Knesset from the Meretz Party between 1969 and 1974.
\textsuperscript{58} An Israeli professor in history in the Middle East.
\textsuperscript{59} Executive Vice President of Bethlehem University.
Another remarkable scenarios that were developed jointly by an Israeli and Palestinian research group during the last decade, were published in two different books, the first was published in 2005, entitled as: “Jerusalem in the Future: Scenarios and a Shared Vision”\textsuperscript{60}; and the other was published in 2007, entitled as: “Successful Jerusalem: Vision, Scenarios and Strategies”\textsuperscript{61}. The second book is an advanced version of the first one; it is more comprehensive and provides five different scenarios for the future of Jerusalem, while the first book provides only four. However, both of these books did not illustrate the scenarios by plans or maps, even schematically, but used flowcharts which were rather generic, more vision oriented and narrative. The five scenarios introduced by the research group are: the besieged city; the scorched earth; the bi-national city; the hybrid city; and the city of bridges. The first scenario presents the continuation of the status quo, while the second is considered the worst case scenario which represents more complex situation of the conflict between Palestinians and the Israelis. The other two scenarios are considered as translational scenarios into peace situation, while the last scenario is the best case scenario for full peace agreement and final settlement for all the struggles between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Given that scenarios and visions, in general, do not characterize absolute truths or generate determined outputs solely; it becomes essential to understand and even to outline some of the scenarios for “what is best” to Jerusalem in terms of both national affiliation to its inhabitants, i.e. the Israeli Jewish population, and the Palestinian Arab population. Hence, the scenarios shall simulate the basic factors which will affect the city and represent the respective spatial dynamics of the city. The researcher identifies four different possible city spatial scenarios’ dynamics for Jerusalem geopolitical context as shown in Figure 6.4. Basically, the city dynamics is correlated into four major spatial axes; namely: the urban stability (depending upon the peace process and political negotiations); the urban instability (conflict); the physical fragmentation; and finally the sustainability. Based upon the relational combination between these spatial axes, another four spatial scenarios are generated; specifically: social degradation (the worst case),

\textsuperscript{60} International Peace and Cooperation Centre (IPCC), 2005, Jerusalem in the Future: Scenarios and a Shared Vision. Jerusalem.
conflict management and conflict transformations (intermediate stages), and eventually social integration (best case) under shared vision.
Moving into urban stability and enhancing the socio-physical spatial contexts in Jerusalem shall depend ultimately on, conceiving, and integrating, the following spatial units (places) which are parts of Jerusalem (the space), namely: the Israeli neighborhoods in West Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the Old City, the vacant lands in West Jerusalem, and the vacant lands in East Jerusalem. Integrating these spatial units “the conceived places in Jerusalem” will make it more possible to generate ideal spatial unit “the Jerusalem space”; and therefore, Jerusalem space (the total) shall get its spatial definition via the sum of places (the parts). As such the dialectical spatial understanding between, 'places' and 'space', applies ideally. Understanding the very changing nature of relations, and the complexity of predicting “probable future interactions” between these relations, for the case of Jerusalem, does outstandingly touch the dialectical ‘philosophy’, and even its foundational base - the ‘contradiction’, e.g. (stability vs. instability), which addresses interestingly the question of change. Consequently, proposing future spatial scenarios for Jerusalem shall, utterly, comply with the dialectical mode of argumentation. Figure 6.5 illustrates the dialectical property in Jerusalem space.

![Diagram showing the dialectical characteristic of Jerusalem spatial definition](image)
Recalling the major invisible parts in Jerusalem, i.e. planning, power, and politics, as well as the influential effects of these elements upon the visible parts in Jerusalem, reveals the very ‘contradictory’ and even the “conflictual” nature of the existing spatial contexts in Jerusalem as shown in Figure 6.6. This case does generate an ‘unbalanced space’, and therefore, it does again clearly emphasize the cornerstone in dialectics, which is, contradiction. Accordingly, taking into account the political, social, economic, urban, cultural, religious and psycho-social constraints and opportunities in analyzing the existing situation in Jerusalem, or even understanding or forecasting the final status of this complex space, is not as easy as, in other non-contradictory spaces. Therefore, the researcher in the following text shall not merely focus on the 'end situations' in Jerusalem; but rather shall concentrate on developing viable scenarios for living towards a better future in Jerusalem, as well as, discussing the perpetuation of the status quo.

6.3.1 Scenario One: Jerusalem Segregated City

Given the uncertainties presently characterizing any future political development, this scenario has been elaborated assuming two cases regarding the political situation, i.e. a “status quo” scenario implying continuation of the present political situation which has been bad, and the assumption of even “worse political status” scenario with more instability and urban conflicts – these cases are shown in Figure 6.7. For either of these cases, records of violence between Palestinians and Israelis will continue to increase. Israel shall intensify its unilateral policies of high security and shall continue isolating...
Jerusalem from the West Bank via the separation wall. The illegal Israeli occupation to East Jerusalem continues unchanged; the features of political architecture in the city will be magnificently increased, and more security features will be imposed over the eastern part of the city. The only Israeli municipality will continue to exist and the planning policies will not allow any kind of social or physical integration between the Israeli and Palestinian communities, but strictly will deepen the fragmentation of the Palestinians urban and social fabric. East Jerusalem will not be able to cope with the needs of the Palestinian population, and thus, many Jerusalemites will be obliged to search for other living spaces outside the city. On the contrary, Jewish settlements in the eastern part will continue to expand, while the Arabic neighborhood shall continue to shrink. Hence, the Israeli (Jewish) population shall present the overwhelming majority. Accordingly, the Palestinian community and identity will be very vulnerable and minimal respectively.

Figure 6.7: Scenario one: Segregated Jerusalem (presenting both the status quo and the worst case), (researcher)
6.3.2 Scenario Two: Jerusalem Twin City

The “twin city” scenario presents the best case scenario where ultimate and permanent peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians will be reached. Jerusalem will be divided into three major parts; namely: West Jerusalem, Central Jerusalem, and East Jerusalem. Consequently, fixed and determined political borders for each part of the city become internationally recognized. West Jerusalem shall be the Israeli self-standing capital, it shall be under complete Israeli sovereignty and control, an independent Israeli municipality will be responsible for the municipal boundaries of this capital and shall have the complete power and authority to manage the planning system and all other ordinary municipal services there; in addition, the residents of this capital shall be Israelis, while the Jewish identity will be spatially provident throughout the city space. Equivalently, East Jerusalem shall be the Palestinian independent capital, it shall be under complete Palestinian sovereignty and control, and all the Israeli settlements there will be evacuated and re-inhabited by Palestinians. An independent Palestinian municipality will be established and shall be responsible for the municipal boundaries of this capital and shall have the complete power and authority to manage the planning system and the other ordinary municipal services there. In addition, the residents of this capital shall be Palestinians, while the Arabic identity will be spatially provident throughout the city space.

On the other hand, Central Jerusalem which contains the Old City of Jerusalem and extends similarly from east to west and from north to south, shall be equally shared between Israel and Palestine, and will be shared between the Palestinian community and the Israeli society. This major part of Jerusalem shall be considered as a cross-border development zone where major cultural, commercial, educational utilities will be jointly shared. This zone will be a corridor of prosperity that will be administrated evenly by a joint council composed of official and popular representatives of each nation. This zone will be integrated with the shared-sphere which surrounds both of the external boundaries of the two capitals, and thus forming a total area under shared vision which consists outline of the twin capitals and enhancing therefore a shared vision of Grand Jerusalem. The schematic outline plan of this scenario is shown in Figure 6.8
Figure 6.8: Scenario two: Jerusalem The Twin City – schematic outline plan, (researcher)
Under this scenario, the one-sided control and occupation are justly replaced with political separation and functional integration of the city in the same time. Different two political systems with distinct political citizenships, i.e. Israeli and Palestinian, are uniquely shared under the umbrella of one urban affiliation, Grand Jerusalem. To achieve sustainable mode of development, harmony and cooperation, both of East and West Jerusalem municipalities shall coordinate to select representatives to be part of the district “Grand Jerusalem” planning council which will work on the general guidelines and visions to control growth under mutual benefits. Accordingly, both municipalities shall continue to work on and upgrade a joint general outline plan for Grand Jerusalem and integrate it under comprehensive master plans of the two cities. The plans shall introduce integrated land uses, utilize common infrastructure facilities, and avoid duplication of resources, utilities or services as much as possible. As such, Jerusalem will be an attractive and prosperous world capital, serving as a successful model for cross-border cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians.

6.3.3 Scenario Three: Jerusalem Open City

This scenario represents the ‘conflict transformation’ stage (shown previously in Fig. 6.4). In this scenario, according to interim peace agreement62, Jerusalem will be divided into three major parts; namely: West Jerusalem, Central Jerusalem, and East Jerusalem. However, the final political borders of West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem are not fixed, and still subject for negotiations, meanwhile peace process is being supported by both, the Palestinians and the Israelis, and each of the contested groups has positive understanding for the mutual need of the final peace agreement. Therefore, the international community will take major role in facilitating the final status agreement, and will also be involved in administrating the central part of Jerusalem until reaching fixed political borders, and the two capitals become internationally recognized. Under this ‘translational’ stage, the city of Jerusalem will work as an open city; smooth, safe and efficient accessibility from both sides of the eastern and western directions into the central part of Jerusalem and the Old City is always available for both nations, the Israelis and the Palestinians without restrictions as shown in Figure 6.9.

62 This ‘interim’ agreement is not limited to specific validity date, it is unlimited in timeframe but quarterly meetings are usually held between the two official representative negotiations committees
Figure 6.9: Scenario three: Jerusalem The Open City – schematic outline plan, (researcher)
Since the final border lines are not fixed yet, the international community will take the responsibility of administrating the “buffer zone, and the sacred area” between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem, i.e. Central Jerusalem which will be entitled as an ‘international enclave’. This administration will make it possible for equitable and safe living, as well as, just sharing of the city most holy places and vital economic centres. However, each community will make sure to watch and supervise the adjacent boundaries between the international enclave and the respective inner area, i.e. the “outer” eastern border of the international enclave will be supervised by the Palestinians; and equivalently, the “outer” western border of the international enclave will be supervised by the Israelis. Still, the security issues and administrative tasks will be totally conducted by the international community for both sides of the borders.

Two split and independent municipalities will be established; the first is an Israeli municipality in West Jerusalem and the other is a Palestinian municipality in East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, a special service council will be established for Central Jerusalem which will act on behalf of ‘municipality’. West Jerusalem will be the Israeli self-standing capital, it shall be under complete Israeli sovereignty and control, the Israeli municipality will be responsible for the municipal services there and shall coordinate with the international community (through the special service council) pertaining to the final boundaries of this capital, however it shall have complete power and authority to manage the planning system there. Likewise, East Jerusalem will be the Palestinian capital, it shall be under complete Palestinian sovereignty and control, the Palestinian municipality will be responsible for the municipal services there and shall coordinate with the international community (through the special service council) pertaining to the final boundaries of this capital, however it shall have complete power and authority to manage the planning system there.

All the Israeli settlers living in Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem will be redistributed into West Jerusalem, and the separation wall between the Palestinian neighborhoods will be removed. The international enclave in Central Jerusalem with its heterogeneous population will make Jerusalem more competitive internationally, and even, more globally appealing city. On the one hand, in West Jerusalem, the Jewish identity will be spatially provident; however, negative migration from West Jerusalem to
other Israeli coastal cities is expected due to the “unusual” feeling some Israelis will have as a result of the coexistence of two ethnically and culturally different communities, the Palestinians and the Israelis, as well as, as of the easy accessibility between the two capitals. On the other hand, in East Jerusalem the Arabic features will be spatially provident and high rates of internal immigration from other Palestinian cities into East Jerusalem are expected due to spiritual ties with the city.

6.3.4 Scenario Four: Jerusalem Bi-National City

This scenario represents the ‘conflict management’ stage (shown previously in Fig. 6.4). In this scenario, according to provisional peace agreement\(^{63}\), Jerusalem will be a united city, but implicitly divided into three various peripheries; that is West Jerusalem, East Jerusalem, and the Old City will be dissolved within ‘heterogeneous’ and demarked shared space. Specifically, Jerusalem will be outlined by three outstanding zones; namely: the inner periphery, the internal periphery, and the external periphery as shown in Figure 6.10. However, each of these peripheries’ national affiliation is highly correlated with the radial distance from the city centre and with the east and west directions. The provisional peace agreement for this scenario proposes areas with “pure” national affiliation for each community, and other areas with “mixed” national affiliation, i.e. coexistence of Palestinians and Israelis. Therefore, and according to the historical and religious significance of the Old City for both communities, the inner periphery (which includes the historical centre and its suburbs) is divided into two parts, eastern and western. The western part extends from north to west and south, it will include ‘Israeli-only’ neighborhoods, and the Jewish character will be provident spatially inside this part, and therefore this part will represent a Jewish-only community; however, Palestinians from the other parts of the city will be able to visit this Jewish part, but will not have the right to reside or run business there. Similarly, the eastern part extends from north to east and south, it will include ‘Palestinian-only’ neighborhoods, and the Arabic character will be provident spatially inside this part. Consequently this part will represent a Palestinian-only community; however, Israelis from the other parts of the city will be able to visit this Palestinian part, but will not have the right to reside or run business there.

\(^{63}\) This ‘provisional’ agreement is not limited to specific validity date, it is unlimited in timeframe but scheduled two-annual meetings are usually held between the two official representative negotiations committees.
Figure 6.10: Scenario four: Jerusalem The Bi-National City – schematic outline plan, (researcher)
The next zone is the internal periphery, this zone will include both communities distributed almost evenly all around this periphery, i.e. Israelis and Palestinians will share this space openly, Israelis living in settlements in East Jerusalem will be redistributed, some will remain in their settlements, while the others, will be transferred into Jewish neighborhoods in the western parts and Palestinians will re-inhabit their evacuated places. Inside this periphery of the city, spaces will be re-identified to get more normalization and balance between the Israeli and the Palestinian communities, so colonial and random development will be guided to match smoothly midway. Both Israelis and Palestinians will have right to reside and invest freely. Finally, the external periphery is the ‘outer’ part of the city, and therefore, each community will be more provident with the organic direction of its existence, i.e. Israeli neighborhoods will be majority in the western side of this zone and Palestinians will be minority. Whereas, Palestinian neighborhoods will be majority in the eastern side of this zone and Israelis will be minority. Access and movement will be freely provided for both nations, and the rights to reside and invest are equally shared too. Eventually, to administer the ‘municipal’ boundaries of the city, a City Hall will be established instead of the municipality, and will be shared by official staff of both communities, as well as the city councilors will be composed from Palestinians and Israelis, and will be elected democratically by both communities; while the mayor will be periodically changed to represent both national affiliations evenly. Under this ‘translational’ stage, the city of Jerusalem will work as equitable shared space; where smooth, safe and efficient accessibility throughout the eastern and western directions into the central part of Jerusalem and the Old City is always available for both nations, the Israelis and the Palestinians without restrictions.

6.4 Conclusion

The case in which a city is ‘politically united’, but ‘physically divided’, and even, ‘socially fragmented’, is outstandingly presented in Jerusalem. It might be needless to merely explore literature in order to reveal what “challenges” the city of Jerusalem

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The elections will normally take place each four years, therefore, the mayor will be for the first two years one of the Israeli councilors, and then for the other remaining two years, the mayor will be one of the Palestinian councilors, and vice versa for the next city hall election round, i.e. starting with Palestinian mayor and shifting into Israeli mayor.
imposes over its ‘eastern’ part, more particularly, over its ‘Palestinian’ residents. Instead, a single tour in the city shall astonishingly demonstrate that. Therefore, it could be argued that Jerusalem urban landscape is the “best historian” that not only portrays the challenges and difficulties which the city indigenous residents face, but also outlines changes and socio-physical transformations chronologically. The landscape will also highlight spatially the two contradictory spheres in Jerusalem; that is, places where Jewish communities live in, and places where Arabic communities live in respectively. This contradiction in the physical structures, urban fabrics and social textures in Jerusalem was shown to be, deliberately guided, by the Israeli planning policies. Planning in this context, is conceived as a ‘regressive’ tool of change instead of being a ‘reformative’ tool of change; that is, planning has been used as a control tool over the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem. In spite of the very complex geopolitical situation on the ground of Jerusalem, the researcher explores and develops various spatial scenarios questioning therefore the ‘future’ of Jerusalem. Accordingly, four different scenarios have been elaborated, standing upon the status quo and moving forward into more stable and desired future status in Jerusalem. As such, the power of ‘reformative’ planning (planning as a mean of positive change) to achieve more urban justice and stability for the manifold and heterogeneous cultural, ethnic, social, and spatial backgrounds in Jerusalem has been highlighted. However, these scenarios (other than the worst case) are still considered “evolutionary initiatives” for prospective ‘positive change’ and presented schematically in the form of ideas and outlines; consequently, comprehensive multicriteria analysis and strategies are required before applying the respective scenario planning model on a real situation on the ground.

The End
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