

**Spatial Planning Strategies Towards Sustainability in the
Geo-Political Context of Present Palestine**

The Case of Bethlehem

Dissertation Submitted

By:

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*To the Faculty of Spatial Planning at the Technical University of Dortmund in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Engineering (Dr.-Ing.)*

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Declaration

I, hereby declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this doctoral dissertation.

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Ahmad El-Atrash

Dedication

To my dear parents; Jihad and Amin

Acknowledgments

I owe a special debt of gratitude to my doctoral research supervisors. First, Prof. Christa Reicher, who curated my research from the very beginning, help shaping the research idea, guide writing the research proposal, carefully watching my research progress, and taking care of whatever needed to enable the perfect working environment. I wholeheartedly thank her for the continuous support and advice; without her this research would never has been accomplished. Second, Prof. Michael Wegener, who provided the cogent advice needed to better anchor and ground my research through his critical reviews of my earlier manuscript, and through the living discussion that we had together during the many held consultation meetings. His astute and prudent way of thinking has positively impacted me in so many ways, and this will definitely stay forever with me. Also, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Lubna Shaheen, who first nominated and supported me to pursue my doctoral research at the Faculty of Spatial Planning in TU-Dortmund University, and as well she has co-supervised my research and provided valuable insights.

I have had the pleasure to work with engaged and enthusiastic fellow researchers and colleagues, who have helped me so ably to hone my research interest to better plan for the future of Palestine within the prevailing geo-political context. Among whom several need to be acknowledged. Dr. Jad Isaac, Director General of the Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ), where he provided all the support needed to spend fruitful three-months of a research internship within the ambit of my doctoral research. In this undertaking, a special acknowledgment is due to the experts at the GIS Department of ARIJ, especially its Director, Mr. Isaa Zboun and one of its cartographers, Mr. Elia Khalilieh, for their technical contribution and assistance in producing the maps and checking many of the secondary calculations provided in this dissertation. It bears mentioning that the bulk of the maps used in this dissertation have been prepared at the bequest of ARIJ and designed by its cartographers based on the author's specific request, nevertheless the maps do not necessarily reflect ARIJ's views.

Likewise, I would like to acknowledge the planning experts and decision-makers from the policy community of Bethlehem who have cooperated with me during my field work visits.

I would like to thank all the colleagues at the Department of Urban Design and Land Use Planning for making my PhD journey such a memorable and pleasant one.

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Abstract

Planning for sustainable spatial development is challenging due to the many pertained uncertainties and the multi-disciplinary nature of the affecting causes. This is more problematic in the inextricably volatile geo-political context of Bethlehem in the West Bank that circumscribes Palestinian spatial planning policy in many ways since it is afflicted by a prolonged military occupation, as well as a weakened planning capacity to manage the limited natural resources. Tellingly, the Western definition to sustainability in terms of spatial development is indeed problematic to such an evolved context, especially under the ongoing Palestinian flagship project of ending the occupation and building the statehood.

This doctoral research aims at identifying the suitable Spatial Planning Strategies towards Sustainability (“SPSSs”) to the context of Bethlehem. “Smart Growth” that is a term in vogue as a progeny of sustainability in the Palestinian planning vocabulary is assessed and debunked to show that such ready-made recipes would only pay a lip service to sustainable spatial development at the local level. In more concrete terms, the empirical-oriented objectives of this doctoral research include assessing the present-day situation and the future impact of the *status quo* of spatial development and planning on the limited Palestinian natural resources; and developing scenarios for sustainable spatial development and planning, in order to adapt (not subject) to the prevailing geo-political context. As per the theoretical-oriented objectives they include additions to the palette of theoretical discourses that advocates to realizing sustainability as a right-based approach, along to the hitherto articulated need-based approach especially in the turmoil geo-political context that spawns present Palestine; and proposing an expert-consulting model for decision support that is theoretically informed, and practice relevant within a context unequivocally perceived with complexity. All of all, this would contribute in the improvement of the state of spatial order in present Palestine, by devising strategies and designated policies towards sustainability in such a geo-political context.

Methodologically, this doctoral research deploys a mixed research methods of quantitative and qualitative approaches, and musters data from two sets: primary and secondary. The primary data are extracted mainly from direct field observations from the case study environment of Bethlehem and its environs and from a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with Palestinian planning experts, academia, and decision-makers from the policy community of Bethlehem. Accordingly, the acquired data are triangulated, and all filtered to feed the discussion organized in focus group format with key informants and decision makers to draw more data of primary importance to the theme of research. Concurrently, the secondary data are built through deliberations on the available data sources in the forms of archived research, published documents by state and non-state actors, including municipal and civil society, along with mapping interpretations using Geographic Information System.

The expected outcome of this doctoral research promises to address interlinked knowledge gaps. In the context of complex geo-politics and an emergent statehood: how to plan for sustainability in terms of spatial development; what is the definition of sustainability in terms of spatial development; wherefore the prevailing spatial order conditions are associated with a stance of deterioration and malfunctioning; and what are their implications in terms of the triple bottom lines of sustainability: social, economic, and environment.

It bears repeating that geo-politics basically prevents Palestinian cities from wittingly adopting “SPSSs” that satisfy the needs of the present without compromising the future aspirations and rights. As such, the intellectual merit of this doctoral research is manifested in placing the critical issue of the geo-political role of the city and its spatial planning policies in the forefront of research in contemporary cities of imbalanced power relations, where planning process must stay abreast of wrenching changes on the ground that loom large. It is envisaged that the findings of this doctoral research will have a far-reaching impact on the planning policies of the Palestinian government towards conceiving the Palestinian statehood and realizing it as a fact on the ground.

Keywords: Spatial Planning Strategies towards Sustainability “SPSSs”; Geo-politics; and Bethlehem.

Kurzfassung

Planung für eine nachhaltige Raumentwicklung bedeutet eine Herausforderung für die Stadt, vor allem wegen der vielen Ungewissheiten und der multidisziplinären Natur der Einflussfaktoren. Dies wird besonders problematisch, wenn man den unentwirrbaren und instabilen geopolitischen Kontext in Betracht zieht, in dem die Stadt und Region Bethlehem in der Westbank zu verorten ist. Palästinensische Raumplanungspolitik ist in diesem Zusammenhang in vielerlei Hinsicht eingeengt; einmal wegen der langandauernden militärischen Besatzung und zum anderen wegen der dadurch geschwächten Planungskapazität, die nicht ausreicht, um die begrenzten natürlichen Ressourcen zu verwalten. Offensichtlich ist deshalb die westliche Definition von Nachhaltigkeit für eine räumliche Entwicklung unter diesen gewachsenen Umständen problematisch, und erst recht, wenn es um das noch immer verfolgte zentrale Projekt palästinensischer Politik geht: die Beendigung der Besatzung und der Aufbau eines Staates.

Die vorliegende Dissertation hat zum Ziel, adäquate Raumplanungsstrategien für Nachhaltigkeit („SPSSs“) im Zusammenhang und am Beispiel der Stadt und der Region Bethlehem zu identifizieren. Im palästinensischen Planungsvokabular ist ‚Smart Growth‘ zur Zeit ein gängiger Begriff für die Weiterentwicklung von Nachhaltigkeit. Es scheint den Versuch wert zu zeigen, dass solche fertigen Rezepte für die lokalen Verhältnisse wertlos sind und nur Lippenbekenntnisse bleiben können. Konkreter ausgedrückt, umfasst eine durch Empirie unterstützte Zielsetzung dieser Forschungsarbeit die Bewertung der aktuellen Situation und untersucht die zukünftigen Auswirkungen des *Status Quo* auf die räumliche Entwicklung und Planung - dies in Bezug auf die begrenzten natürlichen palästinensischen Ressourcen. Eine andere auf Empirie gestützte Zielsetzung der Arbeit betrifft den Entwurf von Zukunftsbildern (Szenarios) für nachhaltige Entwicklung und Planung, die zwar an den vorhandenen, gegebenen geopolitischen Bedingungen ausgerichtet sind, diese aber nicht als gegeben hinnehmen. Was die theoretisch orientierten Zielsetzungen betrifft, geht es zunächst um Ergänzungen zur Palette theoretischer Diskurse über den bisher formulierten bedürfnis-orientierten Zugang hinaus und begründet Nachhaltigkeit als ein Recht, vor allem für das aktuelle, im geopolitischen Kontext durch Aufruhr geschüttelte Palästina. Darüber hinaus wird ein theoretisch fundiertes Modell der Experten-Beratung vorgeschlagen, das Entscheidungsfindungen unterstützen soll und insofern praxisrelevant ist, als es den komplexen geopolitischen Bedingungen Rechnung trägt. All dies zusammengenommen soll die Arbeit einen Beitrag zur Verbesserung des staatlich-räumlichen Handelns im gegenwärtigen Palästina leisten und darüber hinaus Strategien sowie ausgearbeitete Richtlinien zur Nachhaltigkeit in diesem geopolitischen Kontext vorschlagen.

Was die Methodologie angeht, wurden in dieser Dissertation ein Mix aus quantitativen und qualitativen Forschungsmethoden sowie Datensätze primärer und sekundärer Daten genutzt. Die primären Daten wurden einerseits mit Hilfe von Feldforschung in Bethlehem, dem Ort der Feldstudie, ermittelt, und andererseits wurde eine Anzahl halb-strukturierter Interviews mit Planungsexperten, Wissenschaftlern und Entscheidungsträgern aus dem Politikumfeld der Kommune Bethlehem durchgeführt. Auf diese Weise wurden die benötigten Daten von verschiedenen Blickwinkeln aus gewonnen und in Beziehung gesetzt. In einem dritten Schritt wurden die Ergebnisse in organisierter Form in Fokusgruppen mit entsprechenden Schlüsselpersonen und Entscheidungsträgern diskutiert und dadurch der Satz an Primärdaten noch einmal erweitert. Sekundärdaten wurden sorgfältig aus den verfügbaren Datenquellen

ausgewählt, wie Forschungsstudien, veröffentlichte staatliche und nicht-staatliche Dokumente, solche von der Stadtverwaltung und von zivilen Stellen. Zusätzlich wurde GIS- Kartenmaterial ausgewertet.

Die vorliegende Dissertation möchte mit dem gewählten Kontext eine Forschungslücke schließen. Unter den Bedingungen des geopolitischen Komplexes und eines sich entwickelnden Staates werden folgende Forschungsfragen aufgeworfen: Wie kann unter diesen Rahmenbedingungen eine nachhaltige Planung für die räumliche Entwicklung aussehen? Was bedeutet Nachhaltigkeit in Bezug auf räumliche Planung unter diesen Bedingungen? Was sind die Gründe dafür, dass die herrschenden Bedingungen der räumlichen Organisation so schlecht sind und kaum funktionieren? Und welche Auswirkungen haben diese Bedingungen auf Nachhaltigkeit in Bezug auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Umwelt?

Klar ist, dass die geopolitischen Verhältnisse die palästinensischen Städte daran hindern, „SPSSs“ in einer umfassenden Weise zu übernehmen. „SPSSs“ meint hier, im Sinne dieser Dissertation, dass Bedürfnisse befriedigt werden, ohne dass Rechte aufgegeben werden. Der intellektuelle Wert dieser Arbeit liegt in der Herausforderung, die geopolitische Rolle der Stadt ins Zentrum der Überlegungen zu setzen, für Städte unter ungleichen Machtverhältnissen, in denen der Planungsprozess schmerzlichen und bedrohlichen Veränderungen ausgesetzt ist.

Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit werden, so die Hoffnung des Autors, tiefgreifenden Einfluss auf die allgegenwärtige Planungspolitik der palästinensischen Regierung haben, die alles tut, um einen palästinensischen Staat zu erhalten, ihn endlich auf dem Boden der Tatsachen zu realisieren.

Schlüsselbegriffe: Raumplanungsstrategien für Nachhaltigkeit „SPSSs“; Geopolitik; Bethlehem.

Preface

“... *in close engagement to the context.*”

Patsy Healey at the Silver Jubilee of AESOP (Association of European Schools of Planning) celebrated at the Technical University of Dortmund on January 27, 2012.

During the celebration of the 25th birth of AESOP at TU-Dortmund University, a group of prominent European planners attended the event that was sophisticatedly coordinated by Prof. Christa Reicher. Among the attendances was Prof. Patsy Healey, to whom I am enamored of her writings. In a side talk with her, she cautiously advised me to keep my doctoral research “*in close engagement to the context.*”

To position myself within the context of research it is quite important to refer to the fact that Palestinian spatial planners, at the outset would confront with two extreme standpoints about the geo-political settings in the context of Palestine. The first is seen as a geo-political credulousness or gullibility that is touted as geo-political realism, where no resolution to the conflict could ever eventuate. This standpoint by and large is part of a political philosophy harkening back to old colonial history, and thus would ultimately squander opportunities. The second standpoint is seen as a geo-political idealism that is touted as less-than prudent practice where genuine discussion and deliberation is likely to ensure a resolution to the conflict. The putative views of planners, or facile practice, if I may say from this standpoint would simply lead to false hopes. Charting a middle ground or course of planning between these two extreme standpoints would help in unfolding a set of real and feasible possibilities from what loomed to be before as impossible, and thus reflecting the most evocative and compelling definition of spatial planning that I would ever embrace as a Palestinian spatial planner: the organization of hope for the people of Palestine. Actually, this might be an apt sub-title to this doctoral research.

Tellingly, research after research with pithy versions has been concluded with the not-quite-breath-taking rediscovery that within the Palestinian context, it's all about geo-politics! So, why then, doing fresh and probing research about such a context? What could one do in a practical and more mundane way? This doctoral research addresses this challenge squarely and substantially with these questions lurking in the background.

This doctoral research is not a revisited anecdote to be shared with the audience of this dissertation, which include amongst others the Palestinian spatial planners. Rather, it is to be seen as a living history of colonial engineering that justifies the occupation of native land and indigenous population under the tutelage of a “modernization” project. The provided incisive analysis of the wanton changes wrought to the Palestinian built environment, especially in the context of Bethlehem show how embittered Palestinian's life has been and how most likely it would persist as such. Nevertheless, most of the proposed policy recommendations within this study should not be received as a panacea rather only to cause a desirable placebo effect to the wicked challenges in the context of research.

By and large, the irreducible uncertainties of planning in the geo-political context of present Palestine have provided rich fodder for this doctoral research, nevertheless they have challenged me in so many ways. Examples on these challenges are legion, ranging from outlining the boundary of planning

jurisdiction to simply defining the key stakeholders to work with to make sure that the devised action plan would be congruent with the realities on the ground.

This dissertation is disclosed with the hope to contribute in the planning towards a more sustainable Palestine.

Dortmund, Germany

April 10, 2014

Ahmad El-Atrash

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

APLA	Association of Palestinian Local Authorities
ARIJ	The Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CBD	Central Business District
CBOs	Community-Based Organizations
CCHP	Center for Cultural Heritage Preservation
DoP	Declaration of Principles
DPC	District Planning Committee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographic Information System
GIZ	Society for International Cooperation (German: Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
HDI	Human Development Index
HPC	High Planning Council
HTRI	Harry S. Truman Research Institute
IDI	Israel Democracy Institute
IMG	International Management Group
LEED	Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
LGUs	Local Government Units
LPC	Local Planning Committee
LU/LC	Land Use and Land Cover
MCM	Million Cubic Meters
MDLF	Municipal Development and Lending Fund
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MoPAD	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development
MoPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MSL	Mean Sea Level
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSP	National Spatial Plan
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PBA	Planning and Building Act
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCPSR	Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

PLA	Palestinian Land Authority
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
SG	Smart Growth
S-M-DIP	Strategic (Municipal) Development and Investment Plan
SPR	Spatial Planning Rights
SPSSs	Spatial Planning Strategies towards Sustainability
SWOT	Strengths–Weaknesses–Opportunities–Threats
TPO	Town Planning Order
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nation General Assembly
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development

Chapter 1: Introduction

*“To go forward in the march toward Palestinian self-determination—which has a meaning only if freedom, sovereignty, and equality, and **not** perpetual subservience to Israel, are its goal—we need an honest acknowledgment of where we are.”*

(Said, 1996: 8)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1.Prelude

The HOW and WHAT of spatial planning practices in present Palestine (the Gaza Strip, and West Bank, including East Jerusalem) beset with the charged geo-political context and the overall weak Palestinian spatial planning capacity and limited resources at hand that leave the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability for future spatial development towards sustainability stretched to the limit, taking into consideration the prospective high population and urbanization growth rates and the artificial phenomenon of land shrinkage due to the *de facto* Israeli confiscation policy on the ground.

Generally speaking, the mandate of spatial planning practices is to guide and orient the location of development and physical infrastructure through designated frameworks, which consists of a set of governance principles for mediating visions, strategies, policies, and certain activities. These spatial planning practices are contingent responses to the dynamics of the prevailing social, economic, and environment change, from one side, and active forces by themselves to such changes, from another side. Institutionalizing such spatial planning practices with a strategic orientation towards sustainability has been of great interest to many scholars (e.g. Healey, 2007; Albrechts, *et al.*, 2003; Albrechts, 2012), but with little attention to complex geo-political contexts, such as in the Palestinian case.

Spatial planning in present Palestine is not rudimentary from the outset, because of the rich legacy of planning experience. Nevertheless, this planning legacy is fragmented and demands for a planning practice that reflects and reciprocates with the geo-political facts on the ground. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has planning jurisdiction only over 42% of the West Bank territory (ARIJ, 2013), which is totally besieged and controlled by the manifested Israeli occupation practices, in terms of land razing and confiscation, illegal Israeli settlements and outposts, construction of Israeli by-pass roads, Segregation Wall, to name a few. Such a case results in the lack of sovereign control by the Palestinian people over their lands and natural resources (UNOCHA, 2011). Notwithstanding, the political dimension, relating as it does to resources, accountability and strategic choices, it is a pivotal aspect of city planning and development, along with the triple bottom lines of sustainability: social, economic, and environment. In this context, the politics of urban mutations within the Palestinian cities is directly related to the Israeli separation and segregation doctrine that affects the spatial structure and order of the Palestinian cities (See Weizman, 2007; Graham, 2011).

In the same token, the PNA manages an inefficient and non-transparent land administration system in the West Bank territory of jurisdiction, with different layers of laws, legislative frameworks, and plans from different times (Ottoman Turks, British Mandate, Jordanian Administration, and Israeli Occupation) still working in practice. These are considered among the paramount factors that convey how conditions are inimical to sustainable planning of the Palestinian cities (World Bank, 2005). Nevertheless, the overall weakened capacity of Palestinian professionals, technocrats, and those of scientific bent (spatial planners, architects, geographers, etc.) is another factor within this context (Rammal & Hammad, 2008), keeping in mind that knowledge *in* and *on* spatial planning in present Palestine has been for a long period arcane: the domain of Israeli military forces, planners, and decision-makers, and thus procuring any professional information have been restricted, if not tabooed for a long period of time.

Importantly to highlight here is that the stagnant peace process that started between the Palestinians and Israelis with the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 1993, made the prevailing planning practices in many cases ambivalent at best, and dismissive at worst about concrete spatial development towards sustainability. Between 1993 and 2011, three thousands of Palestinian houses have been demolished, more than half a million trees have been uprooted, and more than three-quarter of a million of dunums have been confiscated and appropriated by the Israeli authorities in the West Bank (Khalilieh, 2011: 23). Bethlehem provides a representative case study and a venue for analyzing and strategically planning for a Palestinian city/city-region in the geo-political context that spawns it.

Bethlehem city-region is among the largest West Bank eleven city-regions. It occupies 607.8 km² of land area and is inhabited by 199,466 capita (PCBS, 2012). Throughout the modern history, the three twin cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour (hereinafter, Bethlehem City-area) have organically developed together constituting the urban hub and the service center of Bethlehem city-region. Due to the prevailing geo-political designations of Oslo accords for the year 1995, more than 94% of Bethlehem people live in less than 14% (classified as area A & B) of the total area of the city-region that falls under the Palestinian planning jurisdiction (ARIJ, 2013), whereas the remaining area (classified as area C) is totally controlled by the Israeli occupation, through a matrix of control of antagonistic geo-political artifacts, including: Israeli settlements, outposts, by-pass roads, Segregation Wall, to name a few.

As such, this doctoral research aims at conceptualizing and elaborating the suitable framework of “Spatial Planning Strategies towards Sustainability” (“SPSSs”) to the Palestinian context. At the beginnings, the concept of sustainability was mainly acknowledging the environmental dimension, and then it was later on in the UN Earth Summit of 1992, when the social and economic dimensions have been compounded to the concept of sustainability. Since after, the conventional understanding of sustainability has been manifesting itself in defining and meeting the needs of the present generations without undermining the ability of the coming generations to meet their needs in a balanced way: socially, economically, and environmentally. Nevertheless, a new turn to realizing sustainability in the every-day life practices of planners pays attention to the associated rights and advocates for their fulfillment from a humanitarian perspective. This doctoral dissertation finds it equally important to come about away to address the *needs* and *rights* in conceiving sustainability within the stateless present of the Palestinian context. It is quite important to realize a right-based approach to sustainability in the heart of the hitherto acknowledged need-based approach, especially in the prevailing Palestinian context. It bears mentioning that while this scholarly work would contribute in the intellectual decolonization of Palestine by envisioning the geo-political fate of the conflict, nevertheless the research will not ultimately result in the decolonization of Palestine (See Al-Hardan, 2013: 69-70) (Sections 1.5 & 1.6.2, below).

“Smart Growth” (“SG”) that is a term in vogue as a progeny of sustainability in the Palestinian planning vocabulary is assessed, as an operational concept to “SPSSs” in order to show that such Western ready-made recipes would only pay a lip service to sustainable spatial development at the local level, and to accordingly identify the suitable solutions (strategies and policies) to the wicked problems (geo-politics) that would satisfy the local needs without compromising the right of self-determination through the contemplation of the geo-political fate of the case study by means of a set of scenarios, keeping in mind that “wicked” is used here to emphasis on the problem’s fierce resistance to resolution. In the same token, the role of Palestinian planners within this context is addressed, and an expert-consulting model is accordingly proposed, as a result of an extensive theoretical analysis and

stakeholder's consultation. The expected outcome of this doctoral research promises to address interlinked knowledge gaps. In the context of complex geo-politics and an emergent statehood: how to plan for sustainability; what is the definition of sustainability in terms of spatial development; and what are their implications in terms of the conventional triple bottom lines of sustainability: socio-politics, economic, and environment.

1.2.Basic Area Definitions

This section presents the basic area definitions that are extensively used within this doctoral dissertation, mainly: Bethlehem City-area; Bethlehem City-region; Present Palestine; and Historic Palestine, bearing in mind that they are interrelated and interconnected (Figure 1.1). The smallest spatial dimensions are Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, and they stand as the two units of analysis for the case study used within the framework of this doctoral research, whereas present and historic Palestine have larger spatial dimensions, and are seemingly used within the different course of analysis too. Importantly to mention here that the prevailing metric units of mass area measurements are used within the course of this doctoral research, where $1 \text{ km}^2 = 1,000 \text{ dunums} = 1,000,000 \text{ m}^2$. Following is a scant overview of the basic area definitions:

1.2.1.Bethlehem City-area

Bethlehem city-area is the first unit of analysis for the case study of this doctoral research, and it includes the three twin cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour. The term "Bethlehem city-area" is used in the sense to accentuate on the integration between the three twin cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour that stand as the micro-scale of spatial analysis within this doctoral research. One should wary that this micro-scale is not qualified to be called Bethlehem metropolitan area or Bethlehem urban area, as the first would exhibit higher urban population numbers and larger mass areas than that in our case. In the same token, the three cities under investigation do not stand alone as the urban area for the Bethlehem governorate, though they stand as the urban hub and the epicenter for main urban services. Therefore, the micro-scale of spatial analysis is referred to as Bethlehem city-area and consists mainly from the three cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour.

1.2.2.Bethlehem City-region

Bethlehem city-region is the second unit of analysis for the case study of this doctoral research, and it stands for Bethlehem governorate or district that is one of the eleven governorates of the West Bank territory. The term "Bethlehem city-region" has been used after Frey (1999) to emphasis on the relation between the city as the epicenter and the governorate as the spatial extension to the city. Bethlehem city-region stands as the meso-scale of spatial analysis within this doctoral research.

It is important to mention that the relationship between Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region is organic and indispensable, as Bethlehem city-area is considered the urban hub for Bethlehem city-region, where most of the main urban services are provided. Both Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region stand as the two units of analysis for the deployed case study within this doctoral research.

1.2.3. Present Palestine

Present Palestine stands for the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) that consists of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This is the macro-scale of spatial analysis for this doctoral research. The term “present Palestine” is used to accentuate on the spatio-temporal status for the context of research, since the spatial boundary of the OPT has been subjected to an ever changing dynamics due to the Israeli occupation practices. This denotes that the planning boundary in the OPT is indeed dynamic, keeping in mind that the political boundary is nevertheless constant, as stipulated by the signed Armistice agreements in the year 1949 between Egypt and Jordan on one hand, and Israel, on the other hand, following the war of 1948, where the Armistice Line (AKA, the Green Line) became to be the internationally recognized border between the OPT and Israel (Khamaisi, 2008).

1.2.4. Historic Palestine

Historic Palestine stands for the area of jurisdiction during the British Mandate that was relinquished to Israel in 1948. The three levels of spatial analysis, micro, meso, and macro (i.e. Bethlehem City-area, Bethlehem City-region, and Present Palestine, respectively) are diffused within “Historic Palestine” to highlight the spatial convergence between Israel proper and present Palestine that was planned to be dissolved between Israel and Palestine by the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA), which approved the Partition Plan for Historic Palestine with resolution No. 181 in the year 1947.




Figure (1.1): The Spatial Relation between Bethlehem City-area, Bethlehem City-region, Present Palestine, and Historic Palestine

1.3. General Background

1.3.1. Physical Background and Characteristics

Present Palestine is split into two geographically separate masses of the Gaza Strip at 362 km² and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem at 5,661 km². The West Bank is an artificial entity that has the shape of a kidney bean, stretching about 130 km north-south at its longest and almost 30 km east-west wide at its narrowest (Suisman, 2005). The West Bank has significant natural features including underground water aquifers, and a mountain chain at the center dressed in some parts with green farmlands and tree crops (World Bank, 2008). Generally, the West Bank is endowed with a Mediterranean climate characterized by relatively long-hot summer and short-cold winter. The West Bank is mainly divided into four climatic regions: the Central Highlands; the Western Slopes; the Eastern Slopes; and the Jordan Valley that includes the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth and a worldwide attraction, along with many outstanding archeological and religious sites (ARIJ, 2011: 10; MoTA, 2004).

The West Bank is severely fragmented into a set of detached enclaves, with a *de facto* regime of movement restrictions controlling the entire territory. This situation is chiefly the result of the complex administrative arrangements imposed by the Oslo accords (1995), which created different designations of Areas, namely: A, B, and C, with different security, administrative, and planning arrangements (UNOCHA, 2012) (Section 1.3.2, below). The case study of Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region is also seemingly characterized by these arrangements (Figure 1.2).

Bethlehem city-region is located in a strategic location at the south of the West Bank, as it is the only city-region that has a physical extension between the east and west wards of the West Bank, connecting Jerusalem at the West with the Dead Sea at the East (Figure 1.2). Bethlehem city-region covers an area of approximately 607.8 km² (i.e. calculating about 11% of the West Bank area). Bethlehem city-region is characterized by its topographic variability where the altitude ranges from the mountainous hills of Beit Jala standing at 930 m above Mean Sea Level (MSL) to as low as 412 m below MSL along the shores of the Dead Sea (ARIJ, 2013). At the heart of Bethlehem city-region lays Bethlehem city-area that represents the urban hub of the city-region that accommodates many religious and archeological sites, most importantly is the Church of Nativity, the traditional birthplace of Christ that was the first site registered at the List of World Heritage in Danger since PNA was granted full membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in late 2011. Bethlehem city-area has a relatively small mass area of 14.6 km² (i.e. about 2.4% of the Bethlehem city-region total area). The remaining parts of the city-region are divided into the western and eastern rural zones. The fertile western rural zone is the traditional breadbasket for the city-region, whereas the eastern rural zone comprises an extensive area of semi-desert that is used extensively for herding and the off-limit Dead Sea that is of a high touristic attraction.



Figure (1.2): The Prevailing Geo-political Designations of the West Bank Territory
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

1.3.2. Administrative and Governance Overview

The case study of Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, likewise the rest of the Palestinian communities in present Palestine have been subjected to many administrative regimes throughout the modern history, starting from the Ottoman rule, ending with the PNA. Below is an overview of the different administrative epochs that ruled over present Palestine with a perspective to the case study area. This overview is presented to shed lights on the complexity of the prevailing administrative regimes in the context of research. More elaborations on the evolution of the “statutory” planning policy processes in the context of Bethlehem is presented and analyzed in Section (3.2), Chapter (3).

The onset of the modern administrative and governance system that ruled over present Palestine was the **Ottoman Turks (1516-1917)** period. Since the beginnings of the 16th Century, the Ottoman *de jure* legal system applied on Palestine, and few laws are still in force. The first level of administrative subdivisions of Greater Syria was during the time of the Ottoman Empire rule, where the land of Palestine was divided into 3 districts (AKA, Sanjaq in Turkish and Liwa’ in Arabic), namely: Nablus, Acre, and Jerusalem. Following this subdivision, Bethlehem city-area was administratively part of Jerusalem district (Figure 1.3).

During the **British Mandate (1918-1948)** period many laws and by-laws have been devised. It is important to mention that the British military administration has imposed a legal system of laws, by-laws, and orders in 1918, even before assuming the mandate over Palestine from the League of Nations in 1922. In the same token, many of the laws issued during that period are still in force till today. Nevertheless, administrative wise, Palestine was divided into 16 districts each under a military govern. Bethlehem city-area remained part of the Jerusalem district (Figure 1.4). It is important to mention that before the end of the British Mandate era in 1947, UNGA’s Partition Plan envisaged Bethlehem and Jerusalem as belonging to neither the proposed Arab nor Jewish state, but a *corpus separatum* (i.e., separated body) under international trusteeship to confer upon the organic relation between Jerusalem and Bethlehem due to its shared religious importance. Importantly to mention here that during the British mandate, *village boundaries* based on land ownerships were delineated to divide villages in the middle and northern parts of Palestine, keeping in mind that the term village was seemingly used also for cities. This division was applicable to Bethlehem city-area (Figure 1.5).

In the aftermath of the war of 1948, the **Jordanian Administration (1948-1967)** period started. Actually, the war of 1948 had many political and administrative repercussions. Political wise, Bethlehem city-area lost part of its land, and as a result of the exodus of more than 726,000 Palestinians from today-Israel (UNCC, 1949: 22), 3 refugee camps were established in Bethlehem city-area to accommodate some of the Palestinian refugees, namely: Ad Duheisha, Ayda, and Beit Jibrin (Al-Aza). Administrative wise, the Gaza Strip became under the Egyptian rule. The West Bank became part of Jordan, and since the unification between the West Bank and East Bank in 1950 the common parliament passed many legislations, most of which is still in force. At the time of the Jordanian administration of the West Bank new administrative boundaries for the Palestinian districts came into effect, as the West Bank was divided into 11 sub-governorate (3 governorates), and for the first time Bethlehem city-area was cut from the administrative milieu of Jerusalem, and a separate administrative region has been introduced that is still in effect to present (Figure 1.6).



Figure (1.3): Bethlehem as Part of Jerusalem District during the Ottoman Epoch (1516-1917)
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (1.4): Bethlehem as Part of Jerusalem District during the British Epoch (1918-1948)
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (1.5): Bethlehem as Part of the United Nation’s Proposed *Corpus Separatum* (1947)
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (1.6): Bethlehem as a Sub-governorate within Jerusalem Governorate during the Jordanian Epoch (1948-1967)

Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

The **Israeli Military Occupation (1967-1993)** period was the result of the war of 1967. Following the war of 1967, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, along with East Jerusalem that was illegally annexed to Israel. In 1968, the Israeli authorities redrew the administrative boundaries of the Palestinian city-regions and expanded the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, and consequently Israel started to construct Israeli settlements on the annexed lands. As a corollary to this expansion, Bethlehem city-region lost 18,048 dunums of its land out of which 6,844 dunums (38%) belonged to the village boundary of Bethlehem city-area. In total, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour have roughly lost 8%, 22%, and 17%, respectively of their land (Isaac, *et al.*, 2007: 5) (Figure 1.7). Until the 1988 disengagement with Jordan, Bethlehem remained partly under Jordanian administration.




Figure (1.7): De facto Changes in Bethlehem City-area's Village Boundary at the Advent of the Israeli Occupation (1968)
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

With the signing of the DoP in 1993, the PNA assumed partial responsibility on present Palestine, and adopted the same administrative arrangements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, where 16 city-regions are demarcated; 5 of which in the Gaza Strip and 11 more in West Bank. At that time, Israel imposed general closure on West Bank, where the West Bank's ID holders, including residents of Bethlehem, needed special permits to enter East Jerusalem and Israel. According to Oslo agreements, Bethlehem city-region, like the rest of the West Bank was divided into three zones, namely: Area A, B and C (Figure 1.2). Following is a definition to the three zones, as stipulated in Oslo II Interim Agreement of September 1995:

- **Area A:** The Israeli army has pulled out fully and Palestinians hold all responsibilities for internal security and public order, including planning-related jurisdiction. This area represents 17.7% of the West Bank total area. In Bethlehem city-region, area A calculates 8% of Bethlehem city-region total area.
- **Area B:** Palestinians have full control over civil administration, including planning-related jurisdiction and Israel continues to have overriding responsibility for security. This entails that the Israeli authorities have the privilege to intervene in any related Palestinian spatial planning activities, where they can stop or restrict any needed local spatial development as purported for security reasons, as have been the case in many instances. This practically makes area B an area C (See below). Nevertheless, area B represents 18.3% of the West Bank total area, and 5% of Bethlehem city-region total area.
- **Area C:** Palestinians have responsibility for civil life, including socio-economic aspects of education and health, while, the Israeli authorities assume full control over security and administration related to this area, including planning-related jurisdiction. This area represents 61% of the West Bank total area and 70% of Bethlehem city-region total area.

The remaining 3% of the West Bank was designated in Sharm Al-Sheik Agreement (2000) as Nature Reserve. The Nature Reserve area is mainly located in Bethlehem and Hebron city-regions. This area has been handed over to the PNA only on papers, but in reality it remains under the effective control of the Israeli authorities. The Nature Reserve area calculates about 17% of Bethlehem city-region (ARIJ, 2013).

In 2002, Israel started unilaterally building a Segregation Wall to further separate the West Bank from East Jerusalem and annex Israeli block settlements (chiefly: Ma'ale Adumim, Giv'at Ze'ev, and Gush Etzion) to Israel. The Segregation Wall started first at Rachel's Tomb north of Bethlehem city, and the planned trajectory of the Segregation Wall entails that it would intrude approximately 10 km into the Bethlehem city-region, with a total length of 78 km isolating approximately 161 Km² (i.e. 26% of Bethlehem city-region) of land, including scarce water resources (Figure 1.8).

To this end, the prevailing administrative legacy in present Palestine has a complex pedigree, as resulted from the successive military and administrative regimes that ruled over Palestine. The case study area is an exemplary on this regard (Figure 1.9).




Figure (1.8): The Prevailing Geo-political Designations of the Bethlehem City-region
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (1.9): Timeline for the Evolution of Spatial Settings of Bethlehem City-area (Since 1516)

1.4. Goals and Objectives

The overarching goal and specific objectives of this doctoral research could be outlined, as follows:

1.4.1. Overarching Goal

- To contribute in the improvement of the state of spatial order in present Palestine, by devising strategies and designated policies towards sustainability in such a geo-political context.

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

- *Empirical-oriented Objectives*

- To *assess* the present-day situation (potentials and weaknesses) and the future impacts (threats and opportunities) of the *status quo* of spatial development and planning on the limited Palestinian natural resources.
- To *develop* scenarios for sustainable spatial development, in order to adapt (not subject) to the prevailing geo-political context.

- *Theoretical-oriented Objectives*

- To *provide* a fuller account for sustainability as a right-based approach in terms of theoretical discourses, especially in such a geo-political context. This entails the promotion for novel academic right-related notions and terminologies.
- To *propose* an expert-consulting model for decision support within a context unequivocally perceived with complexity.

1.5. Scientific Relevance of Research

The innovative character of this doctoral research is reflected in the research envisaged outputs; laying-out the foundations for an institutional framework, in terms of spatial planning strategies and policies. Such a framework would be useful for scholarly and policy analysis capable of informing new agendas in the context of the Palestinian state-building. It is important to outline here that the audience for this doctoral research is chiefly, but not exclusively the Palestinian spatial planners: policy planners, social planners, strategic planners, transportation planners, etc.

This doctoral research contributes to knowledge by providing a fuller account in literature to the virtue of sustainability in today's cities as a right-based approach, in tandem to the hitherto accepted and recognized need-based approach, aiming at broadening the definition of sustainability, and thus enhancing the actualization of the concept in the daily practices of planners in such a geo-political context. Experiences from all around the world have proven that sustainability if to be achieved should encompass the *rights* not only the *needs* of the inhabitants. Arguably this is more needed in the evolved geo-political context of present Palestine. The adoption of such an approach to spatial development is useful at both the theoretical and practical levels (See Alexander, 2007). This doctoral research pays

attention to the conceptualization of these notions. Nevertheless, this doctoral research is balanced also in terms of practicality; or in other words bridging the gap between academics and practitioners, as Allmendinger (2002: 96) for instance believes that there is a reciprocal lack of benefit from this perspective. Therefore, a detailed account of analysis to the proposed “SPSSs” has been presented in the form of concept plans to provide a practical dimension to this scholarly work.

Needless to say, discussing the sustainability of the Palestinian cities, in terms of spatial planning strategies and policies, within the prevailing geo-political context is a challenging task for the Palestinian spatial planners, especially in light of the adopted (flagship) national plan, namely: “Palestine: Ending the Occupation and Building the State” (PNA, 2009 a: 20-21). Arguably, this truism rarely finds expression in Palestinian academic and professional research. More specifically, the state-of-the-art discussion within this doctoral research is embedded in translating the fuzzy notion of sustainability into tangible and concrete spatial planning strategies and policies, and to provide hard data about sustainability measures at the local level, and exploring the prospectus for adopting Western ready-made recipes, namely: “SG”, as an operational definition to “SPSSs”. Likewise, a set of scenarios that envisions the geo-political fate of the case study is provided to mainstream thinking-out-of-the-box in exploring new ideas to the geo-political conflict that spawns present Palestine, at large.

To this end, the intellectual merit of this doctoral research manifests itself in placing the critical issue of the geo-political role of the city and its spatial planning policies in the forefront of research in contemporary cities of imbalanced power relations.

1.6. Statement of Limitations

Following is the statement of limitations that contributed to bounding and scaling-down the scope of this doctoral research. The statement of limitations could be scantily outlined, as follows:

1.6.1. Personal Limitations

As the author is affiliated to the case study on the personal, as well as the professional level, it is unavoidably that an element of subjectivity is experienced. Shields (1996: 245) bluntly points out that spatial planners use what he describes as “*treacherous selective vision*,” when they analyze the city and propose their plans. This means that such personal inclination would have implications on the production of the urban (Graham & Healey, 1999). Nevertheless, it is indeed difficult to reconcile the role of a spatial planner as a prescribed (and well internalized) “moral actor” in the public, where s/he works with her/his actual practice, or for her/his to enact the role of “social change agent” in deliberating on a development proposal (Alexander, 2013). As such, the author follows Siemiatycki’s (2012: 157) recommendation to spatial planning scholars with nascent experience to: “*focus on traditional types of relationships with their research subjects, and defer more complex researcher–subject interfaces and involvement in public dis-course until they have been awarded tenure*.” To this end, the author to some extent defines his role within this doctoral research as an “independent outsider,” to address what Healey (1991: 448) refers to as research *on* planning. This is translated in terms of methodology by working not only from a *positivist epistemological* foundation, but also from an *interpretive/critical epistemological foundation* (Bazeley 2004: 141), to squarely investigate what affect is beget from a given cause, and to arrive at generalizable propositions about the foreseen policy outcomes. Said differently, the author is therefore deploying a mixed of research methodologies (Section 4.3, Chapter 4).

1.6.2. Theoretical Limitations

Through the thorough conducted literature review, it is quite clear that spatial planning theories generally lack the credentials to address spatial planning *rights* as a complimentary factor, in tandem to the spatial planning *needs* in achieving sustainability in today's cities. Nevertheless, as being touted by international developmental agencies, such as: UNESCO and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT), the premise for such a new approach towards sustainability is deeply rooted in the concept of the "right to the city" (Lefebvre, 1996), which remains highly dismissive when it comes to concrete spatial development towards sustainability at the local level.

In the same token, theory of "critical geo-politics" challenge the hegemonic perspective that takes power relations with space for granted, and advocates perceiving geo-politics as a way of seeing the world and the future of territory by justifying the territorial competition (Tuathail, 1996: 44-57). It is important to be clear that neither the research nor the researcher will directly decolonize the associated coloniality of power/knowledge in the context of Palestine, nevertheless as reminded by Al-Hardan (2013: 69-70), the academic realm is the principle site where the researcher can contribute in a research about the decolonization of Palestine. This would be realized within this doctoral research through envisioning different scenarios in the discussion of the geo-political fate of Bethlehem. Arguably, in such a geo-political context, building scenarios would be the suitable tool for planners to think about and influence the future towards more effective planning practices.

1.6.3. Practical Limitations

Due to the lack of overall official documentation and archiving at the national level to the related spatial planning practices, and due to the lack of accessibility and fieldwork difficulties as resulted from the prevailing geo-political context, compounded with relatively big geographic area of the West Bank territory, all have contributed to the limitation of geographic investigation mainly to Bethlehem city-area: Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour cities, and Bethlehem city-region, as well. Furthermore, the three refugee camps in Bethlehem city-area were excluded since they do not fall under the Local Government Units (LGUs), i.e. municipalities planning jurisdiction, rather they are being administrated in spatial planning terms by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Also, this doctoral research includes other practical limitations. For instance, soliciting the views of Palestinian lay persons was extremely limited due to the time constraints. Likewise, it was unfortunately difficult to encounter with Israeli scholars and spatial planning experts to solicit their views and reflect upon their feedback about the discussed future scenarios to the resolution of the festering geo-political conflict in Palestine/Israel, at large. From another perspective, given the time constraints it was difficult to perform a sensitivity analysis for the computer-based models used in the multi-criteria evaluation for the proposed scenarios in the discussion of the geo-political fate of Bethlehem.

1.7. Dissertation's Structure and Organization

This section briefly presents the dissertation's structure and organization of its chapters with a brief introduction to the content of each chapter (Figure 1.10).

PART ONE: THE CHALLENGE – SETTING-OUT THE CONTEXT

CHAPTER (1): Introduction

This chapter is designed to set-out the research context by identifying the scope and level of intervention, and systematically elaborates on the research theme with a general background on the physical characteristics, along with a governance overview for the different planning epochs that ruled over Bethlehem. Within the same framework, the scientific relevance of research and the statement of limitations are also stated, along with the research goals and envisaged outputs. Finally, this chapter provides a brief presentation to the structure and organization of dissertation.

PART TWO: THE CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER (2): Analyzing the Systemness – Socio-economic, Geo-political, Physical, and Environmental Aspects of Bethlehem

This chapter analyzes the context of research of Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region. Bethlehem city-area is perceived as a multiplex city that is invoked by an ever changing and perennially in movement systemness in terms of socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental aspects. This analysis is invoked by a set of auxiliary research questions, mainly: what is the state of the bottom-line of sustainability (socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental aspects) in the context of Bethlehem? At what stage is the deterioration in the spatial structure in the context of research? What is the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability for future spatial development in the context of research? What are the developmental-related priorities at the local level of Bethlehem? This approach of analysis gains astute position by troubleshooting the minutia of decision-making by the epistemic dimensions in the policy community, more specifically (and said differently) the knowledge capacity of planners and other actors is acknowledged in the articulation of “SPSSs”. This is squarely discussed and analyzed in Chapter (3) that follows.

CHAPTER (3): Analyzing the Policy Processes – “Statutory” & “Development” Planning in Bethlehem

This chapter substantially analyzes the prevailing compulsory-“statutory”-physical and voluntary-“development”-strategic policy processes and practices, and highlights the embedded challenges within this practice. The auxiliary research questions that invoke this analysis are chiefly: What are the key transitions and their underlined motives that accompanied spatial development in the context of research? How do the Palestinian planning experts evaluate the current local decision making processes? This analysis is done with a perspective to the spatial planning hierarchy in present Palestine with a focus to the question of (fiscal) decentralization in the context of Bethlehem city-area. Furthermore, the entrusted role of planners as outlined by law is addressed.

PART THREE: THE WAYS OF BEING AND DOING

CHAPTER (4): Methodological Framework

This chapter sets-out the methodological framework that invokes the course of this doctoral research. This chapter defines the related research questions under investigation, along with the associated research hypothesis based on the detailed factual analysis and perusal of secondary data provided in Chapter 2 & 3 that led to the definition of the research problem and knowledge gap in a more nuanced manner. Accordingly, the conceptual analytical scheme and the research strategy were designed and justified to guide the conducted research. Furthermore, this chapter presents the deployed research techniques and data sources, along with the adopted (internal) validity instrument used within the framework of this doctoral research.

CHAPTER (5): Theoretical Framework – Conceptualizing “SPSSs”

This chapter sets-out the theoretical framework that guides this doctoral research, and concludes the conceptual framework that provides a comprehensive understanding of the theme of research (“SPSSs”) within the prevailing geo-political context of Bethlehem and present Palestine, at large. The conceptual framework is normatively presented by three-layer perspective of space (area of overlap between the three-bottom lines of sustainability: socio-politics, economic, and environment aspects of spatial development), namely: outer space, medium space, and inner space, and is concurrently perceived from three spatial strategy-making perspectives, namely: object/passive-subject/conscious orientation; government-governance tendency; and public participation. This conceptualization is bounded by a double-tiered approach of need & right-based approaches. Importantly, this is challenged by the question of what are the “Spatial Planning Rights” resulted from mediating the urban geo-politics with the fuzzy doctrine of sustainability with a focus to the strategic orientation of spatial planning? Furthermore, this chapter discusses the principles of new urban approaches, mainly: “SG” in terms of prospectus and challenges, and as an operational concept to “SPSSs”.

PART FOUR (A): THE WAY FORWARD – OPTIONS AND PROPOSALS

CHAPTER (6): An Expert-Consulting Model

This chapter tailors an expert-consulting model that is theoretically informed and practice related as a continuation of the discussion started in the previous chapter of theoretical framework that concluded the doctrine of sustainability in the context of Bethlehem as a double-tiered approach of need & right-based approaches, where the rubric of public participation is in the heart of this theoretical deduction. The proposed model defines the responsibility of planners and the degree of public participation that would be afforded in terms of efficiency, and tellingly legitimate in terms of venues of articulation. As such, the auxiliary questions that rounded the theoretical discussion to deduct the expert-consulting model are mainly: How to consider the volatile geo-political context in the daily spatial planning practices? What are the related planning models that define the role of planners? Ultimately, the proposed model is envisaged to scaling-up and institutional anchoring of strategic “development” planning to the prevailing physical “statutory” planning at higher (regional/national) planning levels, since the ongoing practice is only perceived at the local level. All of all, this is translated into a balanced approach in terms of its focus on object vs. subject and government vs. governance to suit the spatio-temporal case of present Palestine, at large.

CHAPTER (7): Evaluating “Smart Growth” Policies – Implications for Bethlehem

This chapter presents a contextualized analysis to the “SG” principles, and their associated policies based on extensive semi-structured interviews with planning experts from the policy community of Bethlehem. This analysis was invoked by mainly the following auxiliary questions: What are the strategies and policies used and considered efficient and worth adoption? To what extent the agenda-settings of “SG” are inclusive and efficient? The analysis was based on a designated evaluation sheet (opinion survey) that filters the entire set of “SG” policies, and pinpoints the relevant policies to the context of Bethlehem city-area and city-region, as well. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of the applicability of “SG” in relatively small communities that are in turmoil geo-political context. It bears accentuating that “SG” as an operational concept to “SPSSs” is touted in the context of present Palestine at large as a framework for assisting Palestinian communities to achieve more sustainable natural and built environment.

PART FOUR (B): THE WAY FORWARD – RECOMMENDATIONS AND VISION

CHAPTER (8): Main Policy Recommendations – “SPSSs” – and Concept Plans

This last but one chapter presents the main policy recommendations or “SPSSs” that have been devised in close consultation with planning experts from the policy community of Bethlehem. The proposed “SPSSs” within the framework of this doctoral research stand as the suitable solutions to the wicked problems that face and challenge Bethlehem in the planning for a sustainable spatial development that satisfy the current needs and help achieving the local aspirations and rights. Said differently, the proposed “SPSSs” as presented in the geo-political context of Bethlehem serve as a blueprint for a future comprehensive spatial plan towards sustainability. The proposed “SPSSs” are translated into a detailed action plan that defines the key stakeholders and the indicative time frame needed for the implementation of these “SPSSs” in the *status quo*.

CHAPTER (9): Envisioning the Geo-political Future of Bethlehem – Scenarios for Spatial Development towards Sustainability

This closing scene chapter presents a set of scenarios for the spatial planning of the geo-political fate of Bethlehem, as resulted from extensive consultation and discussion with key stakeholders (planning experts and decision makers) from the policy community of Bethlehem, based on pre-defined parameters or criteria, including: Palestinian-to-Israeli population distribution; right to movement, especially access to worship places; economic prosperity, especially in the tourism sector; social cohesion and willingness; along with land availability and suitability for future spatial development. Basically, by using these criteria, the different scenarios within which Bethlehem would spatially grow and develop have been evaluated, namely: no-state/mini-state solution scenario or *status quo*; two-state solution scenario; three-state solution scenario; and one-state solution scenario. From another perspective, this chapter responds to the question of where the future spatial development in Bethlehem should be accommodated, i.e., this chapter identifies the suitable scenario within which the proposed “SPSSs” would be spatially realized at the long run. This entails that the proposed “SPSSs” in Chapter 8 that fits the *status quo* conditions and arguably also fits the suitable solution of the two-state scenario, should be strategically revisited and amended accordingly to suit the long-term vision, which foresees the one-state scenario as the best solution to the geo-political conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.




Figure (1.10): Schematic Description of Chapter’s Relations

Chapter 2: Analyzing the Systemness – Socio-economics, Geo-political, Physical, and Environmental Aspects of Bethlehem

*“We come full circle—political mobilization requires a goal to mobilize about. Planning theory ought to describe that goal, along with the means of attaining it and the context in which it rests. It calls for sensitivity toward process and discourse as well, but never divorced from **recognition of the political-economic structure and spatial form** in which we find ourselves and those to which we wish to move.”*

(Fainstein, 2005: 128)

Chapter 2: Analyzing the Systemness – Socio-economics, Geo-political, Physical, and Environmental Aspects of Bethlehem

2.1. Abstract

This chapter introduces and analyzes the context of the case study of Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well. Bethlehem at large is conceived as a multiplex city relating to multiple parts that are in a perennially dynamic and complex **systemness** in terms of socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental aspects. This analysis shed lights on the associated urban reverberations and their repercussions that all of all have led to meager results in sustaining the natural and built environment in the context of Bethlehem. This perspective of analysis would provide an overview on the trends and aspects that affected the spatiality of Bethlehem case study. Nevertheless, this should not be read alone, since an insight perspective to the covert, but profound and commonplace role of **policy processes** throughout the modern history of present Palestine at large is still needed to understand the context in which the current urban reverberations are realized. This will be addressed separately in Chapter 3 that follows. This approach of analysis gains astute position by troubleshooting the minutia of decision-making by the epistemic dimensions in the policy community, more specifically (and said differently) the knowledge capacity of planners and other actors is acknowledged in the articulation of “SPSSs”.

2.2. Prelude

The urban system as early conceptualized by McLoughlin (1969: 76) conceive the city as a set of interconnected compartments that stands by its own as a sub-system, and in the same token, the city, or the whole system may be regarded as but one of a larger system. This fundamental conceptualization of the city acknowledges the inherent incongruence and complexity of the city elements, where the city is seen as a mental construct, organizing devices to find a way through the complexities of urban and regional relations and dynamics of today’s cities (Healey, 2007: 31). The way these devises are constructed would prioritize the selection of critical nodes and relations within the city structure, needless to say this goes beyond seeing the city as a physical artifact, but rather a richer emphasis on the dynamic socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental relations - through which places are continuously evolving - is acknowledged.

This chapter is dedicated to parsing the urban reverberations as resulted from the many exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal) driving forces afflicting the case study of Bethlehem in terms of socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental aspects. These urban reverberations are indeed “stubborn realities” as referred by Yiftachel (2006 a: 213) that continue to shape cities of the global south-east. Building on Yiftachel’s (2006 a) conceptualization of “stubborn realities”, Watson (2012: 2) argues that the extant literature on the spatial conditions - socio-economic and geo-political in urban areas in these south-east regions is patchy, contradictory and sometimes prone to generalization rather being locally contextualized. Though, Watson’s (2012) argument might be partially valid in the case of Bethlehem, nevertheless, the author by providing the analysis presented in this chapter, intends to argue that the contemporary dynamics in the context of Bethlehem case study indicates that the “stubborn realities” coined by Yiftachel (2006 a) seem set to continue. Nevertheless, the durability or resilience of these “stubborn realities” is characterized by some significant new interpretations, as

resulted from the conspicuous Israeli *de facto* practices as an exogenous driving force shaping the built environment of Bethlehem city-area and the West Bank, at large, along with the weakened Palestinian planning capacity, as an endogenous driving force that could not so far cope or counter act the Israeli colonial project on the ground.

2.3.Socio-economic Aspects

The land resources and numerous archeological and religious sites based in the West Bank offer much scope to support Palestinians to flourish in terms of economic development in different sectors, including agriculture and tourism. Nevertheless, statistics and figures signify sober realities, and entails that the carrying capacity of the West Bank, including Bethlehem is relatively weak and remarkably finite, due to the duality of land shrinkage, along the ever growing urbanization trends. This section addresses the socio-economic aspects of this truism (land shrinkage-urbanization expansion).

2.3.1. Demography Spurs High Urbanization Trends

The Palestinian population across the world was estimated at the end of 2011 to total about 11.22 million, distributed over present Palestine (4.2 million; 1.87 of which are refugees), Israel (1.37 million), Arab countries (4.99 million) and abroad (0.64 million) (PCBS, 2011 a; UNRWA, 2012). It is expected that by 2015 the Arab Palestinian and Jewish Israeli populations will be equated at 6.3 million inside Historic Palestine (PCBS, 2011 a) (Figure 2.1).




Figure (2.1): Palestinian Distribution across the World in 2011
Source: PCBS, 2011 a; UNRWA, 2012

As such, present Palestine is inhabited by 4,293,313 capita; 1,644,293 capita in the Gaza Strip and 2,649,020 capita in the West Bank (plus 628,000 Israeli settlers), which makes the average gross population density of present Palestine at 713 capita/km² and of the West Bank at 468 capita/km² appears favorable, when compared to that of the Gaza Strip at 4,542 capita/km² that is unequivocally striking; standing as one of the highest in the world (ARIJ, 2013). Nevertheless, it is important to accentuate on the fact that due to the prevailing geo-political conditions in the West Bank, there is a phenomenon of artificial land scarcity as Palestinians are denied physical access to large tracks of their land and resources, known as area C.

Taking into consideration the natural growth rate of 2.6% for Palestinians in the West Bank in 2011, when planning to accommodate the return of 1,200,000 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank in a relax trend during 2019-2024, it is expected that the gross population density would be increased to reach 743 capita/km² in 2030 (Table 2.1). The figure of 1,200,000 Palestinian returnees is a conservative one if compared with the highest forecasted scenarios of the MoPIC (1998: 15) at 780,000 or other expert's forecasting scenarios such as the American RAND corporation at 750,000 (Suisman, 2005: 8). The figure of 1,200,000 returnees satisfactorily covers and outnumbers the natural growth rates of the official estimated figure of 780,000 returnees. Overall, this anticipated increase in gross population density by almost 159% (from 468-to-743 capita/km²) in a period of 18 years (2012-2030) would further increase the high urbanization rates, and thus increase the demand and pressure on the limited natural resources, as will be systematically demonstrated from the analysis provided in this chapter in respect to the different aspects of sustainability.

Table (2.1): Extrapolation of Palestinian Population in the West Bank (2012-2030)

Year	Population (Thousand)	Returnees (Thousand)	Total Population (Thousand)	Population Density (Capita/Km ²)
2012	2,649		2,649	468
2013	2,719		2,719	480
2014	2,790		2,790	493
2015	2,862		2,862	506
2016	2,935		2,935	519
2017	3,006		3,006	531
2018	3,078		3,078	544
2019	3,150	200	3,350	592
2020	3,222	200	3,422	605
2021	3,293	200	3,493	617
2022	3,366	200	3,566	630
2023	3,437	200	3,637	643
2024	3,509	200	3,709	655
2025	3,581		3,581	633
2026	3,653		3,857	681
2027	3,725		3,948	698
2028	3,797		4,037	713
2029	3,869		4,124	729
2030	3,941		4,208	743

The first Palestinian census of 1997 done by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) found a population of 2,896,000 capita in present Palestine, compared to a population of 1,035,300 capita that the Israelis found at the end of 1967 following their occupation of present Palestine. Pedersen *et al.* (2001) indicated that during the thirty years following the Israeli occupation of present Palestine the average growth rate was 3.4%, which may appear surprisingly small, mainly because of the large Palestinian's out-flux during most of that period. To analyze the phenomenon of Palestinian's out-flux from the West Bank, the urbanization trends for Palestinians during the period of 1967 (start of Israeli occupation) to 2007 (second Palestinian census) are collected, as per population ranges, number of communities, and total population, as depicted in Table (2.2).

Population Range	Number of Communities		Total Population of Communities (Thousand)			Increase (Thousand) (1967-1987)	% Increase (1967-1987)	Increase (Thousand) (1987-2007)	% Increase/Decrease (1987-2007)
	1967 ¹	2007 ²	1967 ¹	1987 ¹	2007 ²				
More than 38,000	2	6	99	186	461	87	88	275	148
12,000-16,000	5	5	69	138	69	69	100	-69	-50
2,500-9,000	24	124	113	227	571	114	100	344	152
Less than 2,500	361	301	302	517	287	215	71	-231	-45
West Bank (Exc. East Jerusalem)	392	436	583	1,068	1,387	485	83	319	30

Source: ¹(Coon, 1992: 28); ²(PCBS, 2007)

Overall, the urbanization trends have witnessed an unprecedented increase of 138% during 1967 and 2007, but more surprisingly to notice is that the first half of this period (1967-1987) has witnessed more than 2.7 times the increase during the second half of the same period (1987-2007) (Table 2.2). Said differently, the period after the eruption of the first *Intifada* have had witnessed more restrictions on the overall urbanization process in the West Bank. This is attributed to the Israeli practices that led to relatively high out-fluxes outside of the West Bank. More important to notice is that this overall increase in urbanization trends for Palestinians in the West Bank resulted in an increase of almost 150% for the communities of population of more than 38,000 capita and for the communities of population ranging between 2,500 and 9,000 capita. Nevertheless, this overall increase in urbanization trends have caused also a decrease of almost 50% for the communities of population less than 2,500 and for communities of population ranging between 12,000 and 16,000 capita (Figure 2.2). This entails that the high out-flux (immigration) rates outside of the West Bank have been coupled with a silent in-flux (migration) from the small rural communities to the big urban communities (Figure 2.2).




Figure (2.2): Change in the Typology of Palestinian Communities in the West Bank (1967-2007)

It is worthy to highlight that the depicted overall change in the typology of Palestinian communities of the West Bank had a special character in the context of Bethlehem city-area. The Moslem-Christian evenly balanced population distribution that existed before the outbreak of the second *Intifada* in September 2000 has changed, as 9.3% of total Christian population of Bethlehem city-area (calculating 357 families: 150 families from Bethlehem city; 107 families from Beit Jala city; and 100 families from Beit Sahour city) have left the country opting to start new lives away from the intensifying occupation practices (UNOCHA & UNSCO, 2004: 2 & 18).

At large the Palestinian community has been rapidly urbanized due to the geo-political constructs and developments on the ground, as the population of present Palestine is 74% urban (69% in the West Bank and 81% in Gaza Strip) and is almost equally divided between men and women both at the West Bank and Gaza Strip levels (PCBS, 2010: 205). The urban population of present Palestine is higher than the average value for the Arab States and the World that stands at 56.7% and 50.8%, respectively. Nevertheless, the urban population of present Palestine remains less than the Israeli urban population that stands at 91.9% (UNDP, 2011: 160-165). This might be because most of the Israeli communities inside Israel have been established in the periphery of main cities after the declaration of the State of Israel in 1950 (See Alfasi & Fenster, 2014: 11-14).

When compared with the Israeli figures in the West Bank, it is quite clear that the illegal Israeli settlers that calculated 628,000 in 2011 are one portentous threat to the Palestinian harmonious urbanization. El-Atrash (2011: 94) noted that the Israeli plans reveal that they exceed those of the Palestinian communities in 8 out of the eleven West Bank city-regions, including Bethlehem city-region. Though, the maximum expected expansion would be inside Jerusalem city-region, Bethlehem city-region exhibits the highest Israeli net population density (total population per built-up area) at 7,140 capita/km² in comparison to the other West Bank city-regions that have an average of 3,325 capita/km² (ARIJ, 2013) (Figure 2.3).




Figure (2.3): Comparison of Net Population Density between Palestinian Population and Israeli Settlers in the West Bank's City-regions (2011/2012)

Source: (PCBS, 2012; ARIJ, 2013)

Within this context, Bethlehem city-region is ranked in the middle amongst the eleven West Bank city-regions, in terms of population and area. The mass area of Bethlehem city-region is 607.8 km² (ARIJ, 2013) and is inhabited by 199,466 capita (PCBS, 2012). Bethlehem city-area occupies 14,600 dunums of Bethlehem city-region (ARIJ, 2013), and is inhabited by 55,901 capita (Bethlehem, 28,596; Beit Jala, 13,308; and Beit Sahour, 13,997). This represents 40% of the total urban inhabitants of Bethlehem city-region that calculates 139,935 capita (PCBS, 2012), bearing in mind that Bethlehem city-area exclusively constituted the urban inhabitants of Bethlehem city-region in the first Palestinian census of 1997 calculating at that time 45,471 capita (Bethlehem, 21,947; Beit Jala, 12,239; and Beit Sahour, 11,285) (PCBS, 1997). Actually, the population growth rate in Bethlehem city-area has decreased from 4.1% to 3.1% during the period 1997 and 2007 following the West Bank trends. This has led to the decrease in the average family size in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, alike from 4.9 to 4.6, and from 5.8 to 5.4 capita per family, respectively during the same period, mainly due to the increase in immigration rates and the overall decrease in the fertility rates – births per woman – in the West Bank from 5.6 to 3.8 during the same period (more specifically, the crude birth rates and crude death rates – births/1000 capita – have sharply dropped during the same period of 1997-2007 from 41.2 to 25.5 and from 5.1 to 2.2, respectively) (PCBS, 2010). Importantly, to notice is that though the overall average family size during 1997 and 2007 has decreased in Bethlehem city-region, but it was increased in the urban communities by 6%, unlike the rural and refugee camps that exhibited a decrease in the average family size by 12.3% and 5.8%, respectively (PCBS, 2009: 41).

The urban area of Bethlehem is spatially clustered at the heart of Bethlehem city-region. Ayda and Al-Aza refugee camps are situated within the municipal boundary of Bethlehem city while Ad Duheisha refugee camp is situated at the southwestern fringes of Bethlehem city within the municipal boundary of Ad Doha that was a neighborhood within the municipal boundary of Beit Jala city till it was separated

into a new municipality in 1997 to accommodate the natural expansion of Ad Duheisha camp. The population in the three refugee camps calculated 10,563 capita in 1997, and increased to 22,656 capita in 2007. Nevertheless, the total number of registered refugees in Bethlehem city-region in 2007 calculated 46,539 capita (52.3% living in urban areas; 22.5% living in rural areas; and 25.2% living in refugee camps) (UNRWA, 2011: 14). As per the rural area, it is spatially dispersed in the mid-eastern, western, and southern parts of Bethlehem city-region. The rural population makes up now less than 19% (36,875 capita) of Bethlehem city-region, in comparison to the year 1997, when they were about 58% of the total population of the city-region (PCBS, 1997 & 2012) (Figure 2.4).

Due to the geo-political classifications, more than 94% of Bethlehem population live in less than 14% (classified as area A & B under Oslo accords) of the total area of Bethlehem city-region that falls under the Palestinian planning jurisdiction, whereas the remaining 6% of Bethlehem population is sparsely distributed in the remaining bulk of 86% of the Bethlehem city-region area (classified as area C), which is totally perpetuated and controlled by the Israeli authorities (Figure 2.4) (Section 1.3.2, Chapter 1).




Figure (2.4): Population Distribution in Bethlehem City-region, according to the Geo-political Classifications
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

2.3.2. Economic Dependency and Social Service Underdevelopment

Despite the relatively overall dismal socio-economic conditions in present Palestine, the Human Development Index (HDI) for the year 2011 was estimated to reach 0.641, which represents the average value for the Arab countries for the same year. This value categorizes present Palestine to be in the group of the medium HDI countries that has an average value of 0.631 – reflecting strong advances in health, education, and incomes (UNDP, 2011: 128, 130). For the sake of comparison, the neighbouring countries to present Palestine at the regional scale: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Israel have significantly different HDI values: 0.739, 0.632, 0.698, 0.644, and 0.888, respectively. All are ranked as medium HDI, except Lebanon and Israel that are considered as of high HDI and very high HDI values, respectively (UNDP, 2011: 127-130).

Officially, the West Bank is considered an economically independent unit. However, the prolonged Israeli occupation of the territory has created the basis for increased and sustained dependence and subservience on the Israeli economy and on the dwindling foreign donor funds, which are all of all influenced by the pressures of economic restrictions imposed by Israel and the prevailing political instability. For instance, in 2007, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dipped to 60% of its peak level in 1999, and investment reached precariously low levels mainly because of the political impasse resulted from Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) winning the 2006 legislative elections and forming a new government at that time (World Bank, 2008: 1). As one important indicator that reflects the performance of the economy, the rampant poverty rates in the West Bank at 17.8% (7.8% of which are in deep poverty) in 2011 and in Bethlehem city-region at 17.5% in 2007 (representing an increase of 3.5% compared to the year 1997), show the weakened economic capacity of the people of Bethlehem and West Bank, at large (PCBS, 2009: 92 & PCBS, 2013: 26). This is translated at Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region levels in terms of striking unemployment status. In 2007, 60.5% and 65.7% of the population in the working age in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, respectively were regarded not economically active (PCBS, 2008).

At present, the Palestinian economy at large is dominated by the service sector that has the lion share in terms of contribution to the GDP with 20.1% in 2012. The structure of economic activities differed between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2012. Although the service sector represented the largest share of GDP in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it contributed 26.9% of Gaza Strip GDP compared to 17.7% of West Bank GDP (PCBS 2013: 55). Nevertheless, such related services are predominantly realized in the major cities and urban areas, just like in the case of Bethlehem. Both the economy of Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region is also dominated by the service sector at 40.7% and 51.7%, respectively. Likewise, the manufacturing sector is considered economically active and employs about 17% of the labour force in Bethlehem (CCC, 2012) (Figure 2.5).




Figure (2.5): Distribution of Economic Establishments by Economic Activities in Bethlehem (2007)
Source: Raw data from PCBS (2007 & 2008)

As depicted in Figure (2.5), the community service activities, and the network of basic infrastructure in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well are relatively underdeveloped and stand at 7.4% and 8.6% of the total number of economic establishments in 2007. Likewise, the contribution of both the tourism sector and the agriculture sector to the economy of Bethlehem are strict to a trickle, as they employ only 4.3% and 1% of the labour force of Bethlehem, respectively (CCC, 2012). Nevertheless, it is worthy to mention that before the outbreak of second *Intifada* in 2000 approximately 18% of the waged workers in Bethlehem city-area were employed in the tourism sector (UNOCHA & UNSCO, 2004: 14). In the same token, health and educational facilities and activities from an economic perspective are also relatively weak. In 2007, the economic activities for education and health in Bethlehem city-area were 6.6% and 10.1%, respectively, whereas the figures for Bethlehem city-region were 2.6% and 5.5%, respectively for the same year (PCBS, 2008: 44) (Figure 2.5).

In terms of basic infrastructure networks, only 46.7% of the Bethlehem city-region's total number of households is collectively connected to the water, electricity, and sewage network. Nevertheless, 98% of the households in Bethlehem city-region are connected to the public local electricity network; 87% of the households in Bethlehem city-region are connected to the public local water network; and 47.3% of the households in Bethlehem city-region are connected to the public local sewage network, whereas another 40.7% use cesspool to get rid of the wastewater.

Tables (2.3 & 2.4) present the changes in selected indicators per education, health, and basic infrastructure networks and facilities in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well.

In terms of education developments, Table (2.3) summarizes the changes in the basic indicators for the related educational services and facilities in Bethlehem city-area during the period 1997 and 2011/2012.

Table (2.3): Basic Education-related Indicators in Bethlehem (1997-2011/2012)			
Indicator	Geographical Level	1997	2011/2012
Rate of literacy for the population (10 ⁺ years) (%)	Bethlehem	92	97
	Beit Jala	95	97
	Beit Sahour	95	97
	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	94.0	97.0
Schools by type of school and the supervisory body (No.)	Bethlehem	19 schools :	20 schools :
		5 male schools	7 public schools (3 males; 3 females; & 1 mixed)
		6 female schools	13 private schools (9 males; 2 females; & 2 mixed)
		8 mixed schools	
	Beit Jala	9 schools :	12 schools :
		4 male schools	4 public schools (3 males & 1 females)
		2 female schools	7 private schools (1 males, 1 females and 5 mixed)
		3 mixed schools	1 male school belonging to UNRWA
	Beit Sahour	8 schools :	10 schools :
		1 male schools	5 public schools (2 males, 2 females & 1 mixed)
		1 female schools	5 private schools (5 mixed)
		6 mixed schools	
		Bethlehem City-area	36.0
The average number of students per teacher	Bethlehem	23	17
	Beit Jala	21	18
	Beit Sahour	26	19
	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	23.3	18.0
Classroom density (the average number of students per class)	Bethlehem	32	30
	Beit Jala	29	28
	Beit Sahour	30	29
	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	30.3	29.0

Source: compiled by author from (MoEHE - Directorate of Bethlehem, 2012)

As evidenced, the literacy rates in Bethlehem city-area has increased from 94% to 97% of the population 10 years and over during the period 1997 and 2011/2012. This has been accompanied by an increase in the total number of educational schools from 36 to 42 during the same period. The quantitative improvement in the total number of educational schools and facilities was accompanied by a qualitative improvement, as well, since the average number of students per teacher in Bethlehem city-area decreased from 23.3 to 18 during the same period of 1997 and 2011/2012. In the same token, the average number of students per class (i.e., class density) also slightly decreased from 30.3 to 29 during the comparison period of 1997 and 2011/2012.

Nevertheless, when comparing the qualitative improvements in educational schools, for instance in terms of average number of students per class room between the private and governmental schools, one could easily notice that there is a clear deviation, since in 2006/2007 the average number of students per class room in the private and governmental schools in Bethlehem city-area was 27 and 35, respectively (ARIJ, 2008). Important to notice that these figures are higher than the national figures, as the national class density in 2011/2012 in the private and governmental schools were 22.9 and 30.4, respectively (MoEHE, 2012 a: 42). Indeed, this increases the pressure on the public educational facilities, mainly schools, thus undermining the quality of basic and secondary education in Bethlehem city-area, and Bethlehem city-region, at large. The higher classroom densities in the governmental schools compared to the private schools in Bethlehem city-area could be contributed to the increase in demand, especially after the Segregation Wall was built in 2002, when the neighbouring communities started sending their pupils to the public schools in Bethlehem city-area mainly because it is more economically affordable compared to the private schools. This is considered an indirect negative impact of the Segregation Wall that has been hindering the access of pupils to the schools in the affected communities, keeping in mind that the direct negative impact on the schools of Bethlehem city-region reached 21% of the total affected schools across the West Bank in 2012 (MoEHE, 2012 b: 36-38). The affected schools are mainly in Al-Khas and Al-Ma'srah east of Bethlehem city-area, along with Nahlin, Battir and Al-Khader (See B'Tselem, 2013: 82) west of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 2.4). Overall, this impedes the right to education for Palestinians in Bethlehem and the West Bank, at large.

In terms of health developments, Table (2.4) summarizes the changes in the basic indicators for the related health services and facilities in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well during the period 2002 and 2010.

As per the developments in the related health services and facilities in Bethlehem city-area, during the period of 1997 and 2010, one could notice that there have been no crucial improvements; the proportion of the population of Bethlehem city-area connected to primary health care services remained high at 100% and the 5 working hospitals remained as they are, but the average number of beds in these hospitals have decreased from 456.0 in 2002 to 445.3 in 2010, chiefly in the non-governmental hospitals of Bethlehem city. This decrease in the number of beds in hospitals, attributed to the increase in the overall occupancy rate of beds from 39.0 in 2002 to 50.5 in 2010, thus increasing the pressure on the working hospitals. Nevertheless, it is importantly to notice that the average number of beds in the hospitals of Bethlehem city-area at 445.3 in 2010 (i.e. 8.4 beds per 1000 capita) is by far much better than the West Bank figure of 1.2 beds per 1000 capita for the same year. In the same token, the occupancy rate of hospitals beds in Bethlehem city-area at 50.5 remains less than the national figure at 62.1 for the same year (PCBS, 2011 b: 77).

Table (2.4): Basic Health-related Indicators in Bethlehem (2002-2010)

Indicator	Geographical Level	2002	2010
Number of hospitals (No.)	Bethlehem	3 Hospitals (1 Governmental & 2 Non-governmental) (2002)	3 Hospitals (1 Governmental & 2 Non-governmental)
	Beit Jala	1 Non-governmental hospital	1 Non-governmental hospital
	Beit Sahour	1 Non-governmental hospital	1 Non-governmental hospital
	Bethlehem City-area	5	5
Number of beds (No.)	Bethlehem	Governmental hospitals: 280 beds	Governmental hospitals: 280 beds
		Non-governmental hospitals: 140 beds	Non-governmental hospitals: 129 beds
	Beit Jala	Governmental hospitals: 18 beds	Governmental hospitals: 18 beds
	Beit Sahour	Governmental hospitals: 18 beds	Governmental hospitals: 18 beds
	Bethlehem City-area	456.0	445.3
Occupancy rate of beds - Hospitalization days for admitted patients divided by number of beds multiplied by days of year	Bethlehem	Governmental hospitals: 59.7	Governmental hospitals: 52.5
		Non-governmental hospitals: 36.8	Non-governmental hospitals: 60.9
	Beit Jala	10.3	19
	Beit Sahour	10.3	19
	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	39.0	50.5
Number of physicians per 1000 capita	Bethlehem City-region	1997: 1.1 physician per 1000 capita	1.2 physician per 1000 capita
Number of nurses per 1000 capita	Bethlehem City-region	1997: 1.6 nurses per 1000 capita	1.7 nurses per 1000 capita
Source: compiled by author from PCBS (1997 & 2010) & ARIJ (2008)			

At Bethlehem city-region scale, the number of physicians per 1000 capita of population remained relatively low despite that it has exhibited a slight improvement from 1.1 physicians per 1000 capita in 1997 to 1.2 physicians per 1000 capita in 2010. The number of physicians per capita at 1.2 in Bethlehem city-region (i.e. 1 physician per 227 capita) remains considerably better than the West Bank figure of 1.3 physicians per 1000 capita (i.e. 1 physician per 777 capita) in 2010. Likewise, the number of nurses per 1000 capita of population increased from 1.6 nurses per 1000 capita in 1997 to 1.7 nurses per 1000 capita in 2010 (i.e. 1 nurse per 321 capita), which is better than the West Bank figure of 1.8 nurses per 1000 capita (i.e. 1 nurse per 545) (PCBS, 2011 b: 78).

2.4. Geo-political Aspects

A bird-eye review to the geo-politics of spatial planning in Bethlehem could be conceived as typical of the fate of many other Palestinian cities across the West Bank territory. Nevertheless, a deep investigation would further demonstrate that Bethlehem exhibits a particular aspect of extreme *de facto* apartheid planning, where the imprints of the every-day life under the prolonged Israeli occupation is a living story. Actually, one could argue that Bethlehem is a *microscopic* West Bank. In Bethlehem one could pinpoint the emblematic instances of disenfranchisement and segregation since 1967: starting from the illegal annexation of land in favor to the expansion of Jerusalem municipal boundary by the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality, ending by the recent attempts to isolate and alienate Bethlehem and by the encroachment of its land by building the Segregation Wall. Needless to say, in between Bethlehem has been experiencing countless violations: restricted access to work, health, religious, educational facilities and establishments, forced immigration, house demolitions, property confiscations, natural resource depletions, to name a few. This section is presented in the form of a set of urban reverberations as resulted from the many geo-political aspects that Bethlehem has been experiencing after the Israeli occupation to the West Bank, at large. Following is a factual analysis to these urban reverberations that could be callously dubbed in terms of the “stubborn realities” touted by the Israeli anthropologist Jeff Halper as a “matrix of control” (Halper, 2008: 150-174). This “matrix of control” is compartmentalized and analyzed in this section in terms of two main urban reverberations, namely: **demography shaping geography** through the construction of the Israeli settlements and the Segregation Wall, which are all of all controlled by a complex system of mobility with the aim to introduce **transportation rather territorial contiguity** to the promised Palestinian statehood.

2.4.1. Demography Shaping Geography: Israeli Settlements and Segregation Wall

Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Bethlehem city-area has been witnessing an ever changing and perennially in movement flexible frontier. The Israeli planning apparatus has been dealing with the Palestinian land and people based on the thesis of “a land without a people for a people without a land,” therefore the Israelis have been confiscating as much as possible of land containing as less as possible of indigenous Palestinians, or in spatial planning terms: “**demography shapes geography**”.

The long established socio-cultural, economic, and above all spiritual lifeline between Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem city has been undermined due to the many Israeli geo-political artifacts, such as the Israeli settlements and Segregation Wall that infiltrate and dissect the urban fabric of Bethlehem city-area from Jerusalem city. In 1968, the Israeli government unilaterally expanded the Jerusalem municipal boundary by almost 11 times of its original size of 6.5 km² by the annexation of lands from 28 surrounding towns and villages including Bethlehem city-region, thus, losing 18,048 dunums of its land; 38% of which belongs to the village boundary of Bethlehem city-area (Isaac, *et al.*, 2007: 5). The access of the owners of these “annexed land” was restricted to a trickle till it was totally severed, when the Segregation Wall came to existence in 2002.

To coerce facts on the ground, in the early 1970's the Israeli settlements of Gilo and Har Gilo to the north and north-west of Bethlehem city-area were built on this “annexed land”, thus cutting the natural urban fabric between Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Later on in 1997, the Har Homa (Abu-Gonim) settlement was built also on this “annexed land”. Nevertheless, the Kfar Etzion settlement (south-east of Bethlehem city-area) was the first Israeli settlement established after the June 1967 war on the lands of

Bethlehem, followed by the 1970's propagation wave of Israeli settlements in the Bethlehem city-region, including: Gilo and Har Gilo settlements. The different Israeli governments have effectively violated and flaunted International Law by illegally establishing 19 Israeli settlements accommodating more than 132,000 Israeli settlers infringed on the Palestinians' lands in Bethlehem city-region. These settlements are built on a total area of 18,042 dunums, which constitutes around 3% of the Bethlehem city-region's total area (POICA, 2009) (Figure 2.6).

After signing the peace agreements in 1995, a new colonization tool has been devised, known as the settlements' outposts. This tool was improvised in 1996 by the Israeli officials in covert coordination with the Israeli settlers. While the Israeli consecutive governments categorized these outposts as unauthorized and did not provide direct financial support to them, nevertheless the consecutive Israeli governments have been providing security and infrastructural support to sustain these outposts (Sason, 2005). The aim of the outposts was best described in 1998 by the –then– Israeli agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon (Prime Minister of Israel, later during 2003-2006), while addressing a meeting of Israeli militants: *“Everybody has to move, run and grab as many [Palestinian] hilltops as they can to enlarge the [Jewish] settlements because everything we take now will stay ourseverything we don't grab will go to them”* (AFP, 1998). The number of Israeli outposts in Bethlehem city-region calculated 13 (including around 300 structures) in the year 2009 (POICA, 2009). From a wider perspective, after signing the peace agreements in 1995, Israel intensified the construction of settlements and doubled the area they occupy in the West Bank; Bethlehem city-region is in the first rank in terms of expansion, as it witnessed an increase of 104% in the period 1996 and 2000 (Khalilieh, 2011: 36 & 37). FEMP (2013: 7) reported that 3 out of the top 10 Israeli settlements that exhibited the highest population growth rate in the West Bank during 1995 and 2011 are located in Bethlehem city-region, namely: Betar Illit (646%), Nokdim/El David (426%), and El'azar (399%) (Figure 2.6).

As such, the spatial layout of the Israeli settlements, including outposts in Bethlehem city-region works as a belt that encircle Bethlehem city-area and puts it completely in a limbo from the northern and western parts (Figure 2.6). The Segregation Wall coerces these facts on the ground by perpetuating the Israeli settlements, and by cutting the Palestinian urban fabric into separate cantons. While, the western zone of Bethlehem is indeed a representative example on this regard at the city-region level, Walaja village to the north-west of Bethlehem city-area is a representative example on the local level (Saleh, 2012), which will be enclosed from all of its sides by the Segregation Wall with a single, but patrolled and censored entrance/exit to access the bulk of social services located in Bethlehem city-area. In Bethlehem city-region, the Segregation Wall runs at 74.8 km (only 3.2 km of which runs over the Green Line) and segregates 159,793 dunums of its land (POICA, 2009) (Figure 2.6).

As depicted in Figure (2.6), the spatial layout of Bethlehem city-region in geo-political terms could be presented into three main zones, namely: eastern, urban center, and western zones. The **urban center zone** of Bethlehem city-area is densely populated with about 94% of the total population of Bethlehem city-region is located, and is mainly designated as area A and B, i.e. falling under the Palestinian planning jurisdiction. The **eastern zone** is sparsely populated with rural communities and is designated as area C, i.e. falls under the full Israeli control, and is dominated by the Israeli declared closed military area and Nature Reserve (See Section 2.5.1, Chapter 2), thus cutting Bethlehem city-area from the Dead Sea to the east. The **western zone** is demarcated by the Segregation Wall. The Segregation Wall severs the rural agricultural communities in the western zone from their kith and kin in neighboring communities, and from main services primarily located in the urban center zone of Bethlehem city-area.

Thus, about 25,000 capita in 9 Palestinian rural communities will become hostages to Israeli settlers' insatiable aspirations in the land located in the western zone (PCBS, 2012). As such, geo-politically speaking, Bethlehem city-region could be conceived as a shrinking space of urban contraction and rural fragmentation (UNOCHA, 2009).




Figure (2.6): Geo-political Classifications of Bethlehem City-region, into Western-Urban Center-Eastern Zones

Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

To this end, the Israeli imposed facts on the ground by means of the Israeli settlements and Segregation Wall have been affecting every aspect of life for Palestinians, including right to worship, along other associated rights, including the right of freedom to movement, amongst others. The next section is dedicated to address the undermined right of freedom to movement for Palestinians. The complex system of mobility deployed by the Israelis, works in conformity with other tools of annexation and segregation, as evidenced in the next section.

2.4.2. Transportation rather Territorial Contiguity

Since its occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Israel built a complex system of roads to strengthen its control over land and to perpetuate the Israeli settlements. Most of the times, this road network has been used as a collective punishment to the Palestinians, who have been denied access to large tracks of the road network. Most of the Israeli controlled roads, AKA, By-pass roads – as they by-pass Palestinian communities – were built on privately-owned Palestinian land under the pretext of two as-though legal means, namely: “requisition for military needs” and “expropriation for public use.” At the beginning, Israel used both means – requisition and expropriation – arbitrarily, but after signing the Oslo accords in 1995 the way they used these particular means became more systematic (B’Tselem, 2004: 42).

The “military needs” contention was used first during the 1970s and 1980s by the Israelis, as they have been arguing that the settlements play an important military role, so they found the excuse to seize privately-owned Palestinian land to establish the settlements and construct designated roads to serve them. The roads construction accelerated in tandem with the progress in the peace process following the redeployment (designations of Area A, B, and C) in the West Bank in the mid-1990s (Etkes & Friedman, 2005). Overall, the “military needs” was the only available tool for the Israelis to dodge the International Law, which prohibits seizing land for any purpose other than “military needs”. Nevertheless, this remains violating the right to freedom of movement for Palestinians – who were denied access to most of these roads – as codified in Point 1 of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1967 to which Israel is a signatory since the year 1991. *“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence”* (UNGA, 1976).

The second as-though legal mean that Israel employs, is “expropriation for a public purpose.” Unlike, the “requisition for military needs” contention that allows for temporary requisition of privately-owned lands in an occupied territory, the “expropriation for a public purpose” contention gave the Israelis the privilege of permanency, as they have used the local Jordanian expropriation law for the year 1956 that is intended to benefit the local population (See Section 3.2.3, Chapter 3), arguing that local Palestinian population needs were taken into account during the planning of the new roads (Halabi, 1997).

Bethlehem city-area has lost parts of its land for the by-pass road network as purported for the two as-though legal means of requisition and expropriation. An example on the land seizure for “security reasons” to build a by-pass road is Military Order no. (01/02/T) for the year 2002, which confiscated 149 dunums of privately-owned land from Bethlehem and Beit Sahour cities to build a by-pass road east of Bethlehem city-area. Likewise, Military Order no. (02/04/H) for the year 2004 was issued to expropriate 380 dunums of privately-owned land from Bethlehem and Beit Sahour cities for “public reasons” to build a by-pass road east of Bethlehem city-area. Importantly to mention is that the trajectory of the Segregation Wall came in conformity with the by-pass road layout, as in the example of Military Order no. (24/06/T) for the year 2006 that was issued to build part of the Segregation Wall and Har Gilo Passage/Terminal along by-pass road no. 60 on the land of Beit Jala (ARIJ’s Military Orders Database, 2006) (Figure 2.7 & Figure 2.8).



Figure (2.7): Section of the Segregation Wall West of Bethlehem City-area along Bypass Road no. 60



Figure (2.8): Har Gilo Israeli Terminal West of Bethlehem City-area Controlling Trips to Jerusalem

Source: (ARIJ, 2007: 28 & 31)

Today, about 114 km of by-pass roads runs in Bethlehem city-region to connect the Israeli settlements and by-pass the Palestinian communities and leave them in apartheid-like cantons (B'Tselem, 2004: 3; Khalilieh, 2011: 76) (Figure 2.6).

2.5. Physical Aspects

The carrying capacity of present Palestine in terms of **land availability** and **land suitability** for future spatial development has been increasingly yet unsustainably consumed. This section discusses and analyzes this aspect by means of micro-examination to the current Land Use/Land Cover (LU/LC) of present Palestine, in general, and the West Bank, including Bethlehem city-region, in specific. It is to be acknowledged that the maps and calculations depicted in this section are the result of close consultation and discussion with the Geographic Information System (GIS) Department at the Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ) in Bethlehem city.

2.5.1. Available Land for Future Spatial Development

An autopsy of the *status quo* carrying capacity by analyzing the LU/LC of present Palestine using GIS shows that the available area for spatial development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip stands at 2,190 km² (39%), and 63 km² (17.4%), respectively (Table 2.5). The available area is simply defined as the open space, pastures, and shrubs that are the remaining of the land mass of present Palestine after deducting the agricultural area, already developed area, inaccessible area, and protected area, keeping in mind that this definition contains area of overlap between the designated inaccessible and protected areas from one side and the open space from another side. More details in this section is provided to the West Bank territory, since it presents a more complex model of colonialism - with and without colonies, where Bethlehem stands as a representative case.

The **agricultural area** consists from arable and cultivated areas that calculate in total (2,152 km² in the West Bank, and 198 km² in the Gaza Strip). The cultivated area includes the heterogeneous agricultural areas, plastic houses, and permanent crops and it represents 23% of the West Bank mass area, whereas the arable area represents 15% of the West Bank mass area, which is basically an area suitable for

agriculture, but might not include agricultural products at the time of analysis for the land use/land cover of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The **already developed area** (378 km² in the West Bank and 84 km² in the Gaza Strip) stands for the Palestinian built-up areas, technically including: cemeteries, roads (average width 6 m), artificial non-agricultural vegetated areas, industrial, commercial and transport units, mine, dump and construction sites.

The **inaccessible area** (564 km² in the West Bank, and 17.4 km² –300 m buffer × 58 km parameter– in the Gaza Strip (UNOCHA, 2013)) consists of the Israeli geo-political artifacts on the ground, namely: the Israeli settlements, outposts, Segregation Wall (with 65 m of buffer zone), Israeli controlled roads (with an average width of 150 m), along with mine areas along the Jordan river. Arguably, these artifacts are the one, which Palestinians might consider decolonizing or subverting once the statehood is established, since these are the physical colonial architecture on the ground, or said differently, these artifacts are the elements which are physically inaccessible at present. Therefore, the inaccessible area within this definition does not include, for instance area C of the Oslo accords designations (61% of the West Bank total area and 70% of Bethlehem city-region total area), though this area is not accessible at present for spatial development to Palestinians.

The **protected area** of forests and nature reserves calculates 781 km² in the West Bank. This area is based on the same adopted definition in the ongoing project of developing the Palestinian National Spatial Plan (NSP) (Section 3.3.2, Chapter 3). Nevertheless, this definition of protected area is questionable and raises many problematic issues since it is based on the Israeli definition, where the experience has shown that such areas are used as a reserve for the expansion of the Israeli settlements and does not follow pure ecological parameters (Section 2.6.1, Chapter 2). Since this is an academic exercise, the same definition was used, acknowledging the reservations on this definition of protected area.

Table (2.5): Land Use/Land Cover Analysis of Present Palestine

Land Use/Land Cover Items	West Bank		Gaza Strip	
	Area (Km ²)	Percentage	Area (Km ²)	Percentage
Agricultural Area	2,152	38	198	55
<i>Arable Area</i>	820	15	120	33
<i>Cultivated Area</i>	1,332	23	78	22
Already Developed Area	378	7	84	23
Inaccessible Area	564	10	17.4	5
Protected Area	781	14	--	--

Source: Raw Data from (ARIJ, 2013)

Note: These numbers do not sum to the total area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as presented, neither to the remaining available area.

Tellingly, the available area (basically the open space, pastures, and shrubs) is in principle controlled by the Israeli controlled roads and mine area (part of the inaccessible area), and nature reserves, respectively that stands at more than 90% of the protected area in the West Bank. In numerical terms this entails that only 2,190 km² out of the 2,784 km² available area (open space, pastures, and shrubs) is physically available for future spatial development (Figure 2.9 – Available Area is in White Color).

Overlaying the layer of available area in the West Bank with the *de facto* Israeli classifications of Oslo accords (1995) reveals that 70% of the available area is designated as area C that falls under the full Israeli sovereignty. It is worthy to mention that almost 40% of the available area is located in Hebron (21.7%) and Bethlehem (18%) city-regions, along the eastern slopes of the Dead Sea (Table 2.6).

City-region (Governorate)	Available Area	
	Area (Dunum)	Percentage (%)
Qalqilya	37,224	1.7
Salfit	48,172	2.2
Jenin	72,258	3.3
Tulkarm	74,448	3.4
Tubas	133,568	6.1
Jerusalem	170,792	7.8
Nablus	188,310	8.6
Jericho	264,947	12.1
Ramallah	328,447	15.0
Bethlehem	394,136	18.0
Hebron	475,153	21.7
West Bank (Total)	2,187,457	100.0

Source: Raw Data from (ARIJ, 2013)

Note: Rounding of figures may produce minor anomalies




Figure (2.9): Analysis of Land Use/Land Cover in Present Palestine (2013)
Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

To this end, Bethlehem city-region upholds 18% of the total available area for future spatial development at the West Bank level. This stands at almost 64% of the total area of the Bethlehem city-region. Nevertheless, the question remains how much of this area is suitable for spatial development in ecological terms? Also, would this area satisfactorily accommodate the expected growth in population at the medium and long run, if the current paradigm of urbanization persisted? In the same token, where the future spatial development should be accommodated within these available areas? And under which directions and scenarios this spatial development should be realized? These questions amongst others would be addressed in details in the last chapter of this dissertation as part of the future visioning for Bethlehem, after analyzing and identifying the current needs, priorities, and aspirations (rights) for spatial development. Nevertheless, the next sub-section, identify the suitable areas in ecological terms for future spatial development in the context of present Palestine, with more focus to Bethlehem city-region.

2.5.2. Suitable Land for Future Spatial Development

Considering the ecological suitability that is a function of water sensitivity, soil type, slope degree, and climatology would further stretch the area of available land to a limit of 450 Km² (i.e., 8% of the West Bank area and 21% of the Available area). The ecological suitability of present Palestine has been defined based on a GIS-based model using a matrix of choice-possibilities that is the premise of a multi-criteria evaluation method, where all the criteria have been given equal weights (See Section 4.4.4, Chapter 4) (Figure 2.10-E).


Annex (1) distillates the assigned factors for each of the used suitability factors, i.e. water sensitivity, soil type, slope degree, and climatology. The assigned factors ranged from 1 to 5 based on the characteristics of each class (Figure 2.11).

In the **water sensitivity** map of present Palestine, the extreme water sensitive area was designated with a value of 1, indicating that this area is the least suitable (or not suitable) for future spatial development. In the same token, the least sensitive water area was designated with a value of 5, indicating that this area is the most suitable for spatial development, in comparison to the extreme water sensitive area (See NSP, 2012) (Figure 2.10-A).


Likewise, the Brown Lithosols and Loessial Serozems in the **soil** map of present Palestine was designated a value of 5, whereas the Solonchaks and Terra Rossas Brown Rendzinas were designated a value of 1, since they are the most suitable for agricultural uses (See ARIJ, 2007: 4-6), entailing that they are the least suitable for future spatial development (Figure 2.10-B).

In terms of the contour or **slope** map of present Palestine, the area with a slope less than 5% was designated with a value of 5, and the area with a slope of more than 20% was designated a value of 1, since spatial development on steeper areas might sabotage the skyline and landscape of Bethlehem city-area, keeping in mind that spatial development here would also cost more than on flatter areas (See ARIJ, 2000: 74) (Figure 2.10-C).


Finally, in the **climatology** mapping of present Palestine, the warm sub-humid summer and cold winter area was designated a value of 5, whereas the hot dry summer and mild winter/arid zones were designated a value of 1 (See ARIJ, 2000: 103) (Figure 2.10-D).




(2.10-A) Water Suitability




(2.10-B) Soil Suitability



(2.10-C) Slope Suitability



(2.10-D) Climate Suitability



(2.10-E) Suitability Index (Result)
Figure (2.10): Ecological Suitability's Criteria and Results
 Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

Tellingly, the assigned factors in each of the suitability criteria might contain unavoidable subjectivity judgments by the author (Figure 2.11). Nevertheless, to control this subjectivity a thorough discussion of the author's interpretations and judgments to the assigned factors were conducted with GIS technicians, environmentalists, and planning experts in the field of interest (See Section 4.4.3, Chapter 4).




Figure (2.11): Suitability Scheme of the Assigned Factors

As a result, the suitable land within the available land for future spatial development in Bethlehem city-region is less than 20%. This represents less than 15% (88,623/607,850 dunums) of the total area of Bethlehem city-region (Table 2.7).

Table (2.7): More/Most Suitable Area within Available Area for Future Spatial Development

City-region (Governorate)	Area (Dunums)	Percentage (%)
Qalqilya	1,502	0.3
Salfit	2,798	0.6
Tulkarem	8,485	1.9
Tubas	15,610	3.5
Jenin	29,396	6.5
Jerusalem	36,770	8.2
Jericho	43,000	9.6
Nablus	48,800	10.8
Ramallah	79,500	17.7
Bethlehem	88,623	19.7
Hebron	95,716	21.3
West Bank (Total)	450,200	100.0

Source: Raw Data from (ARIJ, 2013)

2.6.Environmental Aspects

The environmental aspects of spatial development in Bethlehem city-area in general have been largely affected by the geo-political conditions, which has negatively impacted the natural and built environment through the fragmentation of landscape and depletion of natural resources. In this section, only two aspects of these negative impacts are presented and analyzed. The first touches upon the fragmentation in the landscape caused by the Israeli geo-political artifacts, attributing to the “stubborn reality” of a “**vanishing**” landscape. The second aspect pays attention to the **depletion of water resources** and the resulted discrepancies in water consumption between Palestinian inhabitants and Israeli settlers in Bethlehem and the West Bank, at large.

2.6.1.“Vanishing” Landscape: A “Spacio-cidal” Colonial Project

As the Palestinian landscape shrinks that of the Israeli expands, with more big Israeli settlements being built, and small Israeli settlements called outposts persisted to crop up. Thus, destroying forever the valleys (*Wadis*) and cliffs, as well as the mountains (*Jables*), and transforming the virgin landscape, which the coming Palestinian generations will never see again. This has been coined on a grander scale by Shehadeh (2008) as a “vanishing landscape”. In the words of Hanafi (2004) the Israeli colonial project is “spacio-cidal” in the sense that it targets the landscape; it might not be a genocidal project in terms of innocent people killing, nevertheless it is indeed a “spacio-cidal” project in an age of literal agoraphobia, the fear of green space, seeking not only the fragmentation of landscape, but by far its abolition (Salmon, 2002).

A flagrant example on this “spacio-cidal” project is Har Homa Israeli settlement that was built on Abu-Gonim Mountain (Jable) in Bethlehem city-area (Figure 2.12). When, Jable Abu-Gonim in Bethlehem city-area was annexed to the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality in 1968, it was designated as a green area, where spatial development has been restricted, till the designation of the area was suddenly changed in 1997 to declare the building of Har Homa Israeli settlement on Jable Abu-Gonim that was the largest forestland in Bethlehem city-region. As such, uprooting trees in Bethlehem city-region at large

calculated about 66,000 trees during 1994 and 2010 (POICA, 2009), thus contributing to the overall loss of natural forest area by 55.5% compared to the year 1974, the time of the Israeli settlement program's inception in Bethlehem city-region (Abu A'yash, *et.al.*, 2007: 153).



Figure (2.12): Spacio-side of Jable Abu-Gonim in Bethlehem City-area
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

The western zone of Bethlehem city-region is most likely to suffer from the potential negative impacts of the Segregation Wall that would cause formidable challenges in conserving the landscape and habitat linkages, especially between protected green areas and forestlands. The Segregation Wall is considered a serious threat to the biodiversity of Bethlehem city-region, as it physically disconnects and impedes the movement of terrestrial fauna; isolates significant parts of the agro-ecosystems including their valuable water resources; and thus cuts the natural ecological corridors (Figure 2.13) (Ghattas, 2011: 337; Hazineh & El-Atrash, 2011: 120). On a larger level, the fragmentation in the Palestinian landscape due to the Segregation Wall is really evident since 348 km² (48%) out of the inaccessible western segregation zone – the area trapped between the Segregation Wall and the Green Line (calculating an area of 733 km²) – is designated as agricultural areas. This means that more than 16% of the total agricultural lands of the West Bank became inaccessible (Khalilieh, 2011: 45; El-Atrash, 2011: 98).




Figure (2.13): Fragmentation of Natural Landscape in Bethlehem City-region
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

As depicted in Figure (2.13), the Segregation Wall isolated Krimzan and Al-Makhroun natural landscapes from Bethlehem city-area, especially from Beit Jala city to which they belong. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities have been repeatedly demolishing the agricultural structures in these sites, especially in Al-Makhroun since 2011 to complicate the work of Palestinian farmers (B'Tselem, 2013: 83). Wadi Al-Makhroun starts in Cremisan Monastery, and extends to Battir village, which is replete with ancient terraces with outstanding universal value to the extent that made the UNESCO to register this cultural landscape in the tentative list of world heritage sites (UNESCO, 2012).

Overall, this “spacio-cidal” colonial project against the Palestinian landscape has been realized by the manipulation of the land use designations through changing the green areas into gray concrete Israeli settlements. Sometimes, these green areas have not been designated as such based on scientific reasons,

such as in the case of the Nature Reserve area in the eastern zone of Bethlehem city-region (Figure 2.6). Ghattas (2011: 338) argues that the selection and designation of the Nature Reserve area in Bethlehem city-region in Sharm Al-Sheik Agreement in 2000 was based on political rather scientific reasons: First, a large percentage of the Nature Reserve area overlap with the Israeli declared closed military area, which is used as a military training ground that is considered a serious threat for the fragile ecosystem (biodiversity) of the eastern slopes along the Dead Sea; and Second, the Nature Reserve area, as such is not representative of the agro-ecological zones of Bethlehem city-region.

2.6.2. Water Resources Depletion and Shortage

The H₂O factor has been a key Israeli geo-strategic tool since its occupation of present Palestine (Hilal & Ashhab, 2006). In 1998, the –then– Israeli Minister Sharon was quoted saying: *“My view of Judea and Samaria [West Bank] is well known, the absolute necessity of protecting our water in this region is central to our security. It is a non-negotiable item”* (Charles, 1998). Haddad (2007: 50) quotes the former Israeli water commissioner Ben-Meir in one of his meetings with the Palestinian negotiators, declaring: *“I recognize needs, not rights.” We are prepared to connect Arab villages to Israel as well, but I want to retain sovereignty on hand”*. Such statements, amongst others led the Palestinians to anticipate a dry peace with the Israelis.

The renewable water resources in the West Bank are mainly fed from the Jordan River systems and the West Bank Aquifer that constitute the surface and ground water resources, respectively. More specifically, surface and ground water resources have been controlled by the Israelis, and formidable restrictions on water utilization by Palestinians have been imposed by the Israeli authorities. For instance, in 1967 Israel declared the lands located alongside the Jordan River as closed military areas, and thus access to Palestinians was denied (B’Tselem, 2011: 19). In the same token, Israel is exploiting about 82% of the annual safe yield of the groundwater basins in the West Bank to meet 25% of its water needs, whereas the water quantity consumed by Palestinians constitutes around 17% of the annual safe yield (Hilal & Ashhab, 2006: 185). These Israeli practices have undermined the right of Palestinians to access water resources (COHRE, 2008). This has been translated into huge discrepancies in water consumption between the Israelis and Palestinian, as depicted in Figure (2.14), where in average every Israeli settler in the West Bank had almost the same share of water consumption allocated for 5 West Bankers in 2008/2009. The discrepancy in water consumption between the Israeli settlers and Palestinian inhabitants in the West Bank has been a repeatedly noticed phenomenon. For instance, Benvenisti & Khayat (1988: 26) reported that in 1982, the average annual consumption per capita in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank was more than 3.6 times that in the Palestinian communities of the West Bank.




Figure (2.14): Discrepancies in Water Consumption between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (2008/2009)

Source: (PWA, 2009); (Khair, 2011: 398)

Table (2.8) summarizes the changes in the basic indicators for the water and wastewater infrastructure networks in Bethlehem during the period 1997 and 2010.

Table (2.8): Basic Indicators for the Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Network in Bethlehem (1997-2010)			
Indicator	Geographical Level	1997	2010
Proportion of the population connected to sewage network (%)	Bethlehem	68	90
	Beit Jala	15	90
	Beit Sahour	15	90
	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	32.7	90.0
Proportion of people connected to safe drinking water source (%)	Bethlehem	98	100
	Beit Jala	99	100
	Beit Sahour	99	100
	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	98.7	100
Water loss from Network (%)	Bethlehem City-area (Average)	2003: 29 %	2006: 31 %
Water Deficiency (Needed Water – Available Water) (%)	Bethlehem City-region	2003: 20 % (1.544 MCM)	2006: 17 % (1.635 MCM)

Source: compiled by author from PCBS (1997 & 2010); ARIJ (2008)

The developments in the water and wastewater networks in Bethlehem city-area documents a noticeable increase in the proportion of the population connected to the sewage network from 32.7% in 1997 to 90% in 2010. Nevertheless, only a negligible amount (0.38%) of the collected domestic wastewater is treated using on-site small treatment plants (Abu-Mohor, 2011: 422), while the remaining collected domestic and industrial wastewater from Bethlehem city-area is pumped through Beit Sahour sewage network in Wadi Al-Nar (Qidron Valley), which is a narrow, circuitous route on the northern-eastern slopes of Bethlehem city-region, eventually ending in the Dead Sea (Figure 2.15). Despite the crucial need and high feasibility to construct a wastewater treatment plant in Wadi Al-Nar (Tal-Spiro, 2011: 13), the Israeli authorities precondition that the intended plant should treat the generated wastewater from (illegal) Israeli settlements located in the vicinity of Jerusalem including Ma'ale Adumim settlement bloc, since the location is designated as area C (POICA, 2008). This denial of the Palestinian right to sanitation resulted in many environmental and health problems in Bethlehem city-region, as Khair (2011: 388) reported that about 950 inhabitants from Bethlehem city-region (0.5% of total population) have been infected with waterborne diseases in 2007/2008.



Figure (2.15): The Pumped Wastewater in Wadi Al-Nar, North-East of Bethlehem City-area
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

As per the proportion of the people of Bethlehem city-area connected to safe water sources, also has increased from 98.7% in 1997 to cover the entire population in 2010. Nevertheless, Bethlehem city-area, and Bethlehem city-region, at large suffer from huge amount of water deficiency that calculated 1.635 Million Cubic Meters (MCM) in 2006 representing a 17% deficiency compared to the water deficiency rate of 20% in 2003. This problem of water deficiency is further exacerbated due to the high rate of water losses in the water network of Bethlehem city-area that calculated 31% in 2006 compared to the rate of 29% for the year 2003. This vindicates the erroneous use of water resources in Bethlehem city-area, and Bethlehem city-region, at large. According to PWA (2012: 17), **the supply rate** in Bethlehem city-region in 2010 was 155 l/c/d; 63% of which is purchased and the remaining 37% is provided by local resources, mainly from the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) wells at 70% and from Artas water spring (south-west of Bethlehem city) at 30% (PWA, 2012: 29) (Figure 2.16). It is worthy to mention that the bulk of supplied water is provided by the the West Bank Water Department, and the water supply management in the Bethlehem city-area is carried out by the Bethlehem Water and Sewage Authority in close cooperation with the local municipalities. From another perspective, **the consumption rate** in Bethlehem city-region in 2010 was 102 l/c/d, which is 40% higher than the West Bank consumption rate for the same year. Nevertheless, the percentage of water losses in the network

was 34.4% in 2010, which is higher than the average water losses at the West Bank that reached 29.4% during the same year (PWA, 2012: 39), which makes the actual deficit accrue to 3.331 MCM in Bethlehem city-region in 2010 (PWA, 2012: 36).



Figure (2.16): Collection of Water from Artas Spring for Agricultural Purposes

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter provided factual evidences to the “stubborn realities” of the prolonged Israeli occupation and the weakened Palestinian planning capacity, as exogenous and endogenous driving forces, respectively that had many negative urban reverberations in terms of the socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental aspects of spatial development in Bethlehem city-area, Bethlehem city-region, and the West Bank, at large. Against this dismal background of sober realities, there is a need to enhance and upgrade the different aspects of spatial development, especially since the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability for future spatial development is stretched to a limit. In socio-economic terms, there is a need to enhance economic development and employment, and increase the contribution of the tourism and agriculture sectors to the local economy. Importantly to highlight is the need to improve the tourist experience by preserving and improving natural and cultural heritage sites. Likewise, the quantity and most importantly the quality of the educational and health-related establishments need to be enhanced. As per the geo-political aspects, connectivity between city centers and vital social service sites, including touristic areas need to be enhanced and the road network, including the pedestrian routes should be readdressed accordingly to be hospitable as such. As per the environmental aspects, there is a need to enhance the efficiency of the water and wastewater networks, reduce losses, and secure the water sources. In the same token, there is a need for the reduction and recovery of domestic and industrial waste materials and the collection methods should be enhanced accordingly. The public realm needs to be upgraded by improving the accessibility and quality of public green spaces, natural environment, cultural heritage landscape, and local biodiversity, including flora and fauna. Nevertheless, the question remains what are the suitable “SPSSs” needed to conceive these needs in the context of Bethlehem? Before touching base with such a question there is a necessity to understand the prevailing policy processes that shapes the course of spatial development in the context of Bethlehem. The following Chapter (3) addresses this aspect, and tries to investigate the role of Palestinian planners within the prevailing policy processes.

Chapter 3: Analyzing the Policy Processes in Bethlehem

“Process should not be understood merely as a means to a substantive end. Processes have process outcomes. Engagement in governance processes shapes participants’ sense of themselves. It generates ways of thinking and acting that may be carried forward into subsequent episodes of governance.”

(Healey, 2003: 111)

Chapter 3: Analyzing the Policy Processes in Bethlehem

3.1. Abstract

This chapter elaborates on the ongoing spatial planning and development processes and practices, in order to demonstrate the imbedded challenges that provoke Palestinian spatial planners to devise apposite “SPSSs” to cope with the urban challenges and development priorities. Importantly, a perspective to the spatial planning hierarchy in present Palestine, along with the entrusted role for planners as outlined by law are also investigated and presented to show that the practice of spatial planning in present Palestine is a mixture between compulsory-“statutory”-physical and voluntary-“development”-strategic approaches. Finally, in order to realize the hierarchy of spatial planning system, the question of (fiscal) decentralization is investigated in Bethlehem city-area.

3.2. The Practice of “Statutory” Planning in the Context of Bethlehem: A Legacy of the Colonial Eras

This section focuses on the colonial planning practices that culminated in present Palestine and their role in shaping the prevailing “statutory” planning practices in the context of Bethlehem that are characterized by high degree of centralization.

3.2.1 Ottoman Turks (1516-1917)

The onset of the prevailing “statutory” planning that still valid till now was the Ottoman period (1516-1917). Before any exposition of the Ottoman’s intervention, one should pay attention to the perception of *tradition* and its legacy as a concept. According to Suraiya & Halil (2004), *tradition* as a concept implies a relation between the past and the present. As such, *tradition* is a dynamic concept; the accumulation of decisions that are constantly amended and reformed upon experience. Conceptually, “*tradition implies immutability, yet it is relentlessly under revision*” (Suraiya & Halil, 2004: 25). In the Ottoman society, the ruling group negotiated an ever changing relationship with the past of the Ottoman polity, as well as the “acquired” past of conquered territories. Then as now, material remains from the past “buildings or objects” were crucial sites for the articulation of such relationships.

Within this framework, Fattah (1999) articulates that at the advent of the Ottoman ruling to Palestine, the traditional perception was that neither the local population to be harmed nor the historic sites to be damaged. On the contrary, the early Ottoman administration in collaboration with local entrepreneurs and merchants propelled the renovation and repair of the Palestinian cities, especially Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Actually, law and order was reinforced, and consequently, an increase in population became a trend and an economic boom was achieved.

During that period, *ad hoc* planning practices were made to meet local needs and manage the urban/rural physical development. The planning system at that time was not yet structured (Khamaisi, 1997: 324), but that period differed from the ones that followed that it was based on Islamic Law (*Shari’ah*), and hence the development of urban/rural land-use was managed in a different way (Eisenman, 1978). To elaborate more, most of planning practices during that period were physical oriented, as most of the

towns were reengineered to be concentrated outside their historic centers, bearing in mind that planning practices in the Ottoman Empire was largely influenced by the European interference (Bozdoğan, 2001). Nevertheless, the socio-economic aspects were implicitly tackled, since the *Shari'ah* determines some related aspects, but unfortunately these were not a constituent of planning regulations.

An important intervention made during that period that has its repercussions till now is the Ottoman Land Code (*Tanzimat*) for the year 1858 that tackled the issue of land ownership that was categorized into 4 public categories, and another 1 private category. This categorization of land is due to the fact that the majority of the land was a public ownership and, in practice inhabited and tilled by tenants holding long or short leases (Fruchtman, 1986; Abdelhamid, 2006). The privately owned land was termed "*Mulk*", and the 4 public categories were termed, as follows: "*Miri*", which is the cultivated land; "*Mewat*", which is the uncultivated land; "*Metruka*", which is the land used for public purposes, like roads; and "*Waqf*", which is the Islamic charitable trust (Abdelhamid, 2006). Nevertheless, the bulk of the public lands under the four categories were informally designated as *Masha'* that was the prevailing land-equalizing and collective ownership system managed directly by the peasants and villagers (Quiquix, 2013: 3). In 1914, during the final years of the Ottoman rule, the *Masha'* had made up 70% of the land of Palestine. Nevertheless, the *Masha'* designations have been facing a "spatial amputation", with atrophy seems to be its probable destiny, since in 1947 during the British Mandate it made up only 25% (El-Eini, 2006: 292).

Another intervention was the promulgation of the Provincial Municipalities Law for the year 1877 that relegated the establishment of municipalities in new communities that were endowed with the right to confiscate land for public purposes in order to control development by the issuance of building permits for houses and roads, and then collect taxes from land's owners who benefited from building the new roads that ultimately caused an increase in land value (Khamaisi, 1997: 324). Under this law 22 municipal councils were established, exclusively in the major towns and large villages. Bethlehem and Beit Jala were among the emergent municipal councils (Abdelhamid, 2005: 4).

To this end, the prevailing and conventional wisdom has been that the Ottomans had founded the basis of "statutory" planning scheme in present Palestine and in the context of Bethlehem, but with a little impact in terms of implementation, which was more evident later during the British Mandate (Kark, 1991: 58-59). Said differently, the Ottoman regulations were the legacy for the Mandate period that adopted them, but on different scales. For instance, the building permits for houses and roads were mainly issued for developments in the towns, and were mostly absent in the villages, which accommodated the bulk population at that time. In the same token, the Ottoman Empire enacted the laws of organizing the land ownership laws and formed the development of tenure, this period was known for advocating to the peasants' rights for the lands they gained, regardless of the manner of this possession. The Ottoman Empire tried to encourage Palestinian farmers to register their lands, but they refused due to fears of paying taxes and to being forced to join the army.

3.2.2 British Mandate (1918-1948)

The subsequent era of the British Mandate (1918-1948) had colossal impacts and wide and effective interventions. Tamari (2006) pinpoints an exhaustive list of the main achievements done during the Mandate era, most important to the context of this research is: the amendment and modernization of the land code and the taxation system; the creation of the population registry and the conduct of national

censuses in 1922 and 1931; land survey of 1947; and finally the establishment of an infrastructure of roads and communication system. Those all are considered the basic tools for a nascent spatial planning apparatus. Nevertheless, the British administration is assumed responsible by Palestinians for stirring-up the conflict in historic Palestine by the promulgation of Balfour Declaration of 1917 that facilitated the accommodation of Jewish immigrants from across the world in historic Palestine.

Halabi (1997) documents a plethora of decreed legislations during the British Mandate. The most important among these were the issuance of Town Planning Order (TPO) for the year 1921 and for the year 1936. TPO for the year 1921 is considered the corner stone in structuring the prevailing “statutory” physical planning in present Palestine. This order created centralized and restrictive planning practices, as it comprised mainly of two tiers: the central planning commission and the local planning commissions in the towns, where the central planning commission had the overriding responsibility and absolute power to enforce or overturn the local decisions issued by the local planning commissions. TPO for the year 1936 amended TPO for the year 1921 by adding the regional-district level for the “statutory” planning apparatus. This TPO remained valid during the Jordanian and Israeli eras. Following this TPO, the West Bank was mostly covered using two district plans, namely: District Plan for Jerusalem (RJ-5) for the year 1942 and District Plan for Samaria (Nablus) (S-15) for the year 1948. The latter exhibited higher density developments, bearing in mind that the building activities were only permissible due to the zoning scheme in the *agricultural* zones (outside the municipal boundary) and *development* zones (that included the built-up areas and small fringe areas of villages), and it was prevented in the *nature reserve* and *state domain* zones (Khamaisi, 1997: 326) (Figure 3.1).

Bethlehem city-region was part of RJ-5 plan and was basically designated into *state domain* and *development* areas (Figure 3.1). The *state domain* designation covered the eastern zone of Bethlehem city-region along the shores of the Dead Sea. Most of the *state domain* designation was declared later in 2000 as Nature Reserve based on political rather scientific reasoning (See Section 2.6.1, Chapter 2), bearing in mind that this designation of Nature Reserve differs than the British Mandate designation that was only located in S-15 plan (Figure 3.1). As per the *development* areas they only depicts the location of existing development, and lack directions or guidelines on the location of future development, except in the case of Bethlehem city-area (more specifically, between Bethlehem and Beit Jala) inside Bethlehem city-region (Figure 3.1).

When comparing the designations of RJ-5 plan for the year 1942 with the current reality on the ground in and around Bethlehem city-area (Figure 3.2) one could easily witness the emblematic instances of disenfranchisement and segregation as resulted from the Israeli *de facto* designations (See Section 2.4, Chapter 2). In general, Coon (1992: 206) concludes based on a thorough study of the town planning under the Israeli military occupation that these Mandate plans are irrelevant to Palestinian needs, and they provide virtually no opportunity for development.




Figure (3.1): Mandate Regional Plans in the West Bank
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (3.2): Bethlehem City-area Developments Since the Mandate Regional Plan RJ5
Source: Base Map Retrieved from (Coon, 1992: 75)

Though, TPO for the year 1936 seems more decentralized on paper than TPO for the year 1921, but it remained in practice centralized, since the planning order for preparing local plans for the villages was not practiced at local level, particularly during the period, when the political conflict between the Arabs and the Jews led to less attention to the planning efforts. Also, the weakened capacity at the municipal level increased the onus, and undermined the local planning initiatives. Said differently, the lack of town planning knowledge compounded with the organizational and political deficiencies have disrupted the

smooth functioning of town planning commissions' overall powers. The TPO for the year 1936 allowed District Commissions only to limit building heights, but not to control the rate of vertical construction (i.e. densification), because they wanted to prevent the construction of tall buildings adjacent to empty plots or plots with one-to-two floor's buildings. The mandatory, also tried to implement its policy of maintaining the same character and to make it an "obligatory for building," which is a trend that lasted till now, at least in terms of impact. Another fact that has attributed to delays in town planning is the lack of comprehensive land surveys, especially in hilly areas in the south, including Bethlehem city-region, where there was poor contour and topographical information, along with the disputes on municipal boundaries, such as in the case of Bethlehem and Beit Jala (See Bannourah, 1982).

During 1936-1939, the Arab revolt occurred as a reaction against mass Jewish immigration, causing the Palestine's building and construction boom of 1929-1936 to slow down (El-Eini, 2006). While keeping in mind that this period was also the period of the industrial revolution of the 18th-19th Century that started in England, British officials – more specifically, Henri Kendall (1936), who remained Palestine's town planning adviser to the end of the British Mandate, aimed at avoiding that kind of re-planning and re-building that resulted from Europe's rapid industrialization. During this period, fast urban changes occurred in the country such as: the overcrowding in housing flats and lack of public spaces, amongst others. He continued with planning conceptions such as, the "grouping of neighborhood units," and produced the 1944 scheme, which emphasized on developing the suburbs and the new areas outside the walls of the old cities.

Through his analysis of the memories of both Wasif Jawhariyyeh (1897–1972) (native narrative) and the military governor Ronald Storrs (1881-1955) (colonial narrative), Tamari (2006) concludes that the British Mandate intervention identified two counterparts for urban development in Mandate Palestine. Those who settled in the old cores of the Palestinian cities, like in Bethlehem city-area, and the others who lived in the newness planned neighborhoods. The ones who lived in the new modern part of the Palestinian cities were the elites and the local aristocracy (*a'yan*), where the ones who settled in the old traditional old cores were described as parasitic (dependent) population including: priests, caretakers, clerks, and lawyers, amongst others who all had an unequivocal interest to maintain the *status quo*.

The British architect Charles Robert Ashbee (1863-1942), who was first appointed as a "civic advisor" to governor Storrs in 1918, was the one who introduced this conceptual paradigm for *old traditional* versus *new modern* future urban fabric in Mandate Palestine. Generally speaking, from a technical point of view, the British planners' related provisions were efficient, but essentially oriented some kind of a reactive development; with their immediate concern was a response to the past and present. Khamaisi (1997: 321) brings the argument wider by stating that these interventions probably achieved the same goal of controlling development for the native people, while granting the colonial central regime the upper hand to implement policies and achieve aims that are likely to be in contradiction with the interests of the native people.

The British Mandate left Mandate Palestine with 24 municipal councils (adding two to the Ottoman's legacy, mainly in Israel), along with 38 local councils (11 for Arabs and 27 for Jews). Beit Sahour was among the established local (village) councils in 1925, before being upgraded later during the Jordanian administration in 1952 as a municipal council (Shtayyeh & Habbas, 2004).

To this end and based on Yacobi & Shechter (2005) thesis on the Ottoman and British Mandate spatial planning within the Palestinian context, it is more appropriate to read the evolved city spaces as a *mélange* (i.e. mixture of disparate components) of global and local tastes and a hybrid of old and new. This is true as the emerging modern/Westernized urban environments seemingly tended to create a split city, where different urban spaces represented binary oppositions (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005: 184-185). From one side, the old city “AKA: *Madina*” stood for “local traditional” life, and from another side, the new public buildings, commercial centers and residential neighborhoods stood as an urban iconography of imported “foreign modernity.” However, this split has never materialized; the “new” has never replaced the “old,” as visualized by European planners or orientalists (See Said, 1994), since the city physique and geography became more integrated by the development of transport and commerce, more specifically residents in both sides, the “new” and “old” found spaces for commuting, leisure, and work, amongst others. This conclusion is current in the case of Bethlehem city-area (See Salman, 2000: 145-146).

3.2.3 Jordanian Administration (1948-1967)

Following the War of 1948, the West Bank became under the Jordanian administration and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian rule. In the West Bank, only the laws that were in harmony with the Jordanian Defense Law remained in effect. Nevertheless, after the unification between the West Bank and East Bank in 1950, particular laws were applied only on one side. From 1950-1967 the common parliament passed much legislations, most of which is still in force. In the Gaza Strip, most Ottoman and British laws remained in force with only few reforms introduced (PASSIA, 2012).

During the Jordanian administration, the West Bank was a peripheral region, as Amman was the capital. The “statutory” physical planning interventions during that period were mainly based on the Mandate planning legacy. More specifically, the Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Buildings (AKA, Municipalities Ordinance) No. 31 for the year 1955 and the amended version (No. 79 for the year 1966) were based on the TPO for the year 1936. Nevertheless, the first version of the Law (No. 31) gave the authority to the Minister of Interior to establish a Central Planning Commission in tandem to the High Planning Council (HPC). The second version of the Law (No. 79) cancelled the Central Planning Commission and excluded the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister from the “statutory” planning system. Furthermore, the Law (No.79) decreed the duties entrusted for planners to prepare outline plans (regional), along with master-plans, detailed, and parcellation schemes (local) (Section 3.4.1, Chapter 3). Despite the fact that the law laid down what could be seemed as a decentralized planning system, with four tiers of planning commissions and four tiers of statutory schemes, it empowered a higher tier to supplant the lower tier in responsibility and authority; entailing that it was actually a centralized planning system per excellence (Khamaisi, 1997: 329).

Overall, this situation has negatively affected the official planning activity in the West Bank, including Bethlehem city-area. The planning authorities did not develop any regional plans, or structural provincial plans, thus the British established plans remained operational; a fact which was exploited later by the Israeli occupation, when considering any building permits decisions.

During the Jordanian administration, there were 25 operational municipal councils, including the newly emerged (at that time) municipal council of Beit Sahour (Section 3.2.2, Chapter 3).

3.2.4 Israeli Military Occupation (1967-1993)

Since the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank started only after less than a year of the approval of the Jordanian Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Buildings No. 79 for the year 1966, and based on the fact that the majority of villages and towns at that time lacked approved structural plans, the Israeli authorities managed a *de jure* planning system (i.e. not institutionalized) by amending the relevant laws and by-laws to serve their interests, by means of the vantage point that they have inherited from the Jordanians a centralized planning system, and thus gained a free hand in controlling land-use and granting building permits to Palestinians (Abdulhadi, 1990; Coon, 1992; and Abdelhamid, 2006). In spatial terms, this has meant that the future urban expansion of Palestinian communities has been controlled by means of technical and bureaucratic procedures as deployed by the Israeli planning and military authorities.

The West Bank is an occupied territory, thus the Israeli interventions were predominantly in the form of military orders. The first enacted military order was No. 291 for the year 1968 that gave directions about ceasing the registration of lands in the West Bank. This has been considered the foremost dilemma for any future physical developmental initiative in the West Bank. Consequent to that in 1969, the Israeli Civil Administration issued Military Order No. 321, which facilitated the confiscation of land for public services (roads being the most common), keeping in mind that the term “public” actually meant the “Israelis/Jews” (Khalilieh, 2011: 76; B’Tselem, 2004). The decree concerning the Organization of Towns, Villages, and Buildings in the West Bank, as stipulated in military order No. 418 for the year 1971, cancelled the district commission and the local planning commissions, and transferred the authority of the district commission to the HPC and established alternatively to the local commission, the Regional Rural Planning Committee. Khamaisi (1997: 330) assures that military order No. 418 returned the “statutory” planning situation in the West Bank to what it was before the 1936 British TPO. More specifically, military order No. 418 has changed the “statutory” planning structure, as the central and district planning tiers were merged together, but increasingly dominated by the Israeli authorities. Nevertheless, the 1966 Jordanian Planning Law No. 79 and the archaic plans dating back to the British Mandate remained officially valid.

Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the Israeli authorities perceived the Mandate plans as an obstacle towards controlling the Palestinian land and resources. For instance, the need to get a permit to build in the agricultural zone remained problematic, especially when considering the construction of new Israeli settlements (See Coon, 1992 and Khamaisi, 1997). Therefore, there was a necessity to amend the Mandate plans to suit the Israeli increasing colonial interests.

The second half of the direct Israeli military occupation (i.e. after the eruption of the first *Intifida* in 1987) that started in 1967 and ended by signing the DoP in 1993 witnessed structural changes in the Israeli planning policy that began to be more adamant with the implementation of the Mandate plans that were set to be amended by the Israeli authorities. For instance, the HPC amended the intervention at the regional level by means of issuance of two regional plans. The first was the Partial Regional Plan No. 1/82 for the year 1982 that came as an amendment to the British District Plan for Jerusalem (RJ-5) for the year 1942. Though, this Plan is not approved till now, it was used as a guiding strategy to steer the Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank territory, including Bethlehem city-region (Halabi, 1997: 45) (Figure 3.3). The second regional plan was the Regional Partial Outline Plan for Roads - Order No.50 for the year 1984, which created two separate road systems, one for the Palestinians, and the other

for the Israeli settlers. Though, this Plan (No.50) has not been yet approved like in the case of Plan (No.1/82), it has been used by the Israeli authorities as part of the Israeli National Road Plan (T-M-A-3), which was approved by the Israeli government in 1973, thus ultimately linking the Israeli settlements together and with Israel, and stifling Palestinian spatial development by by-passing the Palestinian communities (Khamaisi, 1997: 334) (Section 2.4.2, Chapter 2).




Figure (3.3): Israeli Partial Regional Plan No. 1/82 for the Year 1982
Source: (Coon, 1995: 221)

The Partial Regional Plan No. 1/82 for the year 1982 had disastrous impacts on the Palestinian spatial development in Jerusalem and its environs. To focus on Bethlehem city-area, the *reserved area* and *future development area* were mainly used for building the Israeli settlements, such as: Betar 'Illit in 1985, whereas the *built-up area* was used to restrict Palestinian development in the villages only inside these already compacted areas, and to prevent the obtaining of building permits in agricultural zones outlined in the Mandate RJ-5 Plan (Khamaisi, 1997: 333).

As a subsequent occupying power, the prolonged Israeli colonial project has deployed the spatial planning tools developed during the Ottoman and the British Mandate to colonize the Palestinian lands.

This could be interestingly linked with the *status quo* political representation in the context of Bethlehem, more specifically, the Oslo geo-political classifications. Mitchell (2000) argues that because these modern modes of classifications are about political representation, they are in fact inseparable from the epistemological representations underlying colonial modernity, translated in terms of the global free-market version. This is a crucial insight, because in fact the Oslo peace process was based on just this kind of modernization neo-liberal economic vision, which had disastrous effects on the Palestinian population (Yiftachel, 2006 b). This situation made it impossible for Palestinians to harvest the fruits of modern spatial development promised to them as Oslo's product (Nakhleh, 2012). Thus, generally speaking the whole "statutory" planning apparatus that bred with the inception of the PNA in Bethlehem, as part of the West Bank entailed a truncated and distorted understanding, as well be elaborated in Section 3.3, below.

3.2.5 Palestinian National Authority (1993-To Present)

With the inception of the PNA, a new planning legal reality has emerged with the presidential decree that stipulated that "*all authorities and powers mentioned in legislation, laws, decrees, orders in force in the West Bank and Gaza before 5 May 1994 shall be transferred to the PNA*" (Palestinian Gazette, 1995), bearing in mind that "*the laws and regulations in force before 5 June 1967 shall continue to be in force in Palestinian lands (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) until they are united*" (Palestinian Gazette, 1994). This entails that all Mandate and Jordanian laws continue to be in force in the PNA areas unless they have been replaced by new Palestinian laws, since the Transfer of Authorities Law for the year 1994 authorized the President of the PNA to enact new legislations with the consent of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) (See UNDP, 2003: 31). Nevertheless, since the establishment of the PNA, no further legislations on planning have been fully approved.

Though, some progress has been made towards drafting a unified planning law (AKA, Planning and Building Act (PBA)), the current planning practice is still based on new by-laws that were passed in 1996. The related 1996 by-laws functioning in the West Bank are based on two sets of documents. The first set is being applied to the areas with approved plans, while the second set is applicable to the areas without plans. Both documents are not cleared yet by the PLC, and both cover (and conflict with) many provisions of the approved pre-1967 planning legislations (UNDP, 2010: 112 & 113).

The planning process within the capacity of the PNA is largely an administrative exercise that is based on standard customs, procedures, and regulations. The actual policies and objectives are often not explicit and are rarely discussed (UNDP, 2010: 112). The highest decision making body is the HPC, which is chaired by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). In contrast to other aspects of the local government, the planning system cannot be described as extremely centralized mainly due to the prevailing geo-politics that make no options for the PNA else relinquishing some of the planning responsibilities, especially in area C of the West Bank.

To this end, a non-startling realization from the modern history of "statutory" planning practices in present Palestine that these practices (translated into regulations) have been characterized with high degrees of centralization of power and decision making away from the Palestinian indigenous

population that have been by far ineffective, yet a desirable placebo to begin a “modernization” project ushered by the colonial powers. Therefore, any local self-organizing system was considered a challenge to the “modernization” project, such as the *Masha*. Since the bulk of the Palestinian lands were used for agriculture purposes, the prevailing land-equalizing and collective ownership system known as the *Masha* that is managed directly by the peasants and villagers stood as the main obstacle in the face of the “modernization” project. This rhetoric of spatio-social arrangements under the tutelage of “modernization” is indeed covering ulterior motives, which is part of a colonial philosophy harkening back to the capitalist school of thought that sees the land as a mere commodity or a resource, thus undervaluing the associated social relations that goes into the collective ownership and management of land uses as promulgated in the *Masha* designations that was characterized by the periodic, but temporary redistribution of agricultural plots among peasant cultivators who held claims to parts of the land in the form of shares that changed as needed to preserve the cultivator’s right to subsist (Quiquix, 2013: 8). Said differently, these colonial regimes especially during the Mandate epoch did not accept the idea that Palestinians could manage for themselves how to collectively manage the “common” without the need for their colonial mediation. This has been considered by Palestinians as a challenge to the realization of the right to self-determination.

Nowadays, the official figures of the Palestinian Land Authority (PLA) show that the *Masha* makes up less than 2% of the West Bank. In a future outlook and meditation, it is argued that there is a professed need to readdress the *Masha* land in the West Bank within the geo-political context that spawns it. Bethlehem city-region provides a venue for contextualizing this truism. According to PLA (2013), the *Masha* makes up a negligible part of the total area of Bethlehem city-region calculating 2,302 dunums (0.38% of Bethlehem city-regions’ area) (Figure 3.4). Nevertheless, 60% of the *Masha* in Bethlehem is designated as available area for future spatial development (Section 2.5.1, Chapter 2), keeping in mind that almost 19% of the *Masha* in Bethlehem falls under the Israeli administered area C, and less than 9% of the *Masha* is already used as Palestinian built-up area. As such, understanding the *Masha* as a socio-economic resource in the prevailing geo-political context remains a prerequisite to realize the sustainability of future spatial development in Bethlehem and beyond.




Figure (3.4): The Masha' (Common/Collective) Land in Bethlehem City-region
 Source: (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (3.5): Timeline for “Statutory” Planning Practices in the Context of Bethlehem

3.3. The Practice of “Development” Planning in the Context of Bethlehem: From De-development to Over-development and in between

The notion of “development” in present Palestine entails a truncated and distorted understanding that questions the very essence of “development” theory itself. The notion of “development” has been always struck into a murky environment that is a legacy of years of neglect and despotism as resulted from the many colonial powers that ruled over the country, especially the on-going Israeli occupation. This section is an attempt to shed lights on the main changes in the notion of “development” and their associated reverberations on the planning for the spatiality of Bethlehem and present Palestine, at large during the prolonged Israeli occupation epoch.

The conventional “development” theory states that “development” denotes betterment. In the Palestinian case, this was not exemplary. Nakhleh (2012) as an anthropologists provides a micro-analytic approach to the notion of “development” and concludes how truncated, distorted, and mythological the official claim of Palestinian “development” is and has become. Below is a scant re-reading to this conclusion from a spatial planner perspective.

At the very beginning of the Israeli occupation, and before the start of the peace negotiations in 1993, “development” to the Palestinians denoted resistance. The many Israeli military actions in that era thwarted Palestinian “development” efforts, and the primordial task became among Palestinians to spur resistance; or in different words to spur steadfastness (*Summud*). This has been translated in spatial planning terms in the spread of urban sprawl that was politically accepted and encouraged (See El-Atrash, 2009: 136-137). The environmental repercussions to the spread of urban sprawl at that period to Palestinian planners were unbeknown and minimal against the value of keeping the land by building constructions that were mostly used for residential and agricultural purposes. The idea was the more you build the more land you would preserve against the *de facto* Israeli appropriation and confiscation policy. Nevertheless, this strategy that was adopted by Palestinians for a protracted period proved inefficient and the consequences on the urban environment could be described as negative, at best and disastrous, at worst (See Musallam, 2012). By means of micro-examining the human settlement patterns in Bethlehem city-area, and by conducting a designated quantification model, El-Atrash (2009: 89-94) proved how fragmented and dispersed the urban fabric of Bethlehem city-area is with a galaxy of sprawled neighbourhoods becoming increasingly prominent resulting in a kind of peripheral conditions with little regard for spatial coherence. For instance, the built-up of Bethlehem city-area increased 2.5 times the rate of population growth between 1997 and 2007, indicating to the leapfrog development in Bethlehem city-area, which is one of the characteristics of urban sprawl (El-Atrash, 2009: 92).

Roy (1987: 56) argues that not only economic “development” was quite impossible to be achieved at that time, but may in fact be precluded by “de-development” that is “*a process which undermines or weakens the ability of an economy to grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical inputs needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural level.*” This means that the Palestinian economy transformed into an auxiliary and dependent of Israel. Needless to say, when talking about economy, this includes the spatial and infrastructure industry that remained in the custody of the Israeli occupation till the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993.

Nevertheless, with years passing, and despite the tenuous socio-politics of the Palestinian society as resulted from the volatile geo-political conditions associated with the peace process, an orientation in the

perspective to “development” into a notion of ownership to ensure sustainability was adopted, but, this was coloured with different meanings, keeping in mind that this transit period was flanked with high uncertainties as reflected by the time factor. Junne & Verkoren (2005) point out that time is not neutral in any case of peace building; certain challenges must be met promptly or the developmental and political costs can be high. Brynen (2005) thoroughly studied the Palestinian case since the beginning of the peace negotiations in 1993 to present, and argued that the notion of “development” was coloured with many meanings throughout that period (Figure 3.6). The most conspicuous result during that period is that the Palestinian “development” has been highly dependent on the donor community, along with the long-lasting dependence on the Israeli economy.




Figure (3.6): The Changing Meaning of Spatial “Development” in the Context of Bethlehem (1993–Present)
Source: Compiled from Brynen (2005: 225-234)

At first the “development” efforts were concentrated at the establishment of the PNA institutions. At that period the architecture of the donor assistance to Palestine began to take shape, and since the Palestinian planning capacities were quite modest at that time, the World Bank prepared an overall needs assessment in 1993 that gave some orientation to the donor community to determine aid priorities. During that period the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) was established with the mandate to coordinate aid assistance to the PNA.

After signing the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement (Oslo II) in 1995, and holding the first Palestinian presidential and legislative elections in 1996, a shift in donor and Palestinian priorities from transitional and start-up assistance to longer-term “development” investment was perceived, but unfortunately this had never been realized due to the Israeli’s increasing imposition of closure and other mobility restrictions (World Bank & Government of Japan, 1999).

By 1998, an ease in the Israeli policy of restrictions was experienced, and this has allowed the PNA and donors at last to make a transition from emergency stabilization into investment in sustainable “development”. At that time the Palestinian planning capacities became better, and in conjunction with the donors, a series of public investment programs were produced and then formulated into a “shopping list” as touted in the first Palestinian Development Plan for the years 1998-2000.

After the failure of the permanent end negotiations in Camp David (2000) and Taba (2001), the second *Intifada*, or Palestinian people uprising took place and Israel re-occupied the West Bank in 2002, and this has resulted in wanton destructions to the Palestinian infrastructure (Figure 3.7), and consequently “development” has become impossible; only focused on attempting to blunt a growing humanitarian

emergency. The International Management Group (IMG), which is an EU-affiliated legal international organization enjoying all privileges and immunities under International Law has estimated in 2006 the losses incurred due to the Israeli invasion to Bethlehem city-region to reach 12,500,000 US\$; about 65% of which was in the housing sector; 35% in the water sector, and the remaining 5% in the roads sector (IMG, 2006).

At that period, in 2003 a new Palestinian government re-named the MoPIC to simply Ministry of Planning (MoP) following the reform strategy adopted by the PNA.



Figure (3.7): Bombing of the Palestinian President Headquarter in Bethlehem City (2002)
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

It is worthy to notice that at certain periods, and mainly due to the state of chaos that spread when the PNA has been at the verge of collapse after the second *Intifada*, some aspects of the Palestinian spatial planning and “development,” especially related to project planning and management were characterized by a state of “over-development”. This happened when beneficiaries, most importantly LGUs received the same support from different donors, reflecting the lack of cooperation among the donors and with the PNA’s competent authorities. For instance, the three municipalities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour have repeatedly received a number of “development” projects that all contained a phase of a need assessment study for the area, each of which has been done separately despite the overlap between projects in terms of implementation. An example on this regard is the community development visioning strategy developed for Beit Sahour municipality separately by ARIJ and the CHF International (now Global Communities) in 2006 within the framework of the projects Bethlehem 21 (Section 7.4, Chapter 7) and the Local Democratic Reform Program, respectively.

After 2005, the Palestinian political structure started to re-shape and this climaxed when Hamas won the 2006 elections. Afterwards, in 2007 the Gaza Strip and West Bank became, also in Palestinian administration terms apart, and since after the PLC has been in freeze. The steer of “development” in the West Bank outpaced that in the Gaza Strip with the launch of the 13th Palestinian Government flagship program: “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State” in 2009 (PNA, 2009 a). At that year, MoP has been re-named into Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MoPAD). This re-naming appears to have changed the strategy and to abstain from mixing in local level planning, which is now fully in the hands of the MoLG. It now appears relevant to re-define what remains of spatial planning at

the central level, but this has not been concluded yet, due to the prevailing West Bank geo-political designations of Oslo into A, B, and C zones. Presumably, MoPIC/MoP/MoPAD has gone through a commendable learning process, from “control of all planning processes” (by the MoPIC), to “coordinating planning at all levels” and further “to consolidate physical planning efforts, and to create linkages with others”, and finally, as an outcome in terms of the new MoPAD mandate “to leading and coordinating the development of national spatial plans.” Obviously, the latter is more modest and realistic than earlier charted mandates, and most probably would result in collaboration of different entities at more equal terms. For example, MoLG was endowed with the mandate to developing policies and guidance for land-use; developing strategic and developmental planning capacity at the local level; and finalizing the modernization of spatial planning, at large (Scanteam & ARIJ, 2009: 25&43).

Nevertheless, the UNDP (2010: 8) assures that the international engagement has been negatively affected by the ever changing internal dynamics within present Palestine, especially between the Palestinian factions, and by the almost complete collapse of the peace process with Israel. And it recommends that the related governance programming in present Palestine needs to be addressed within the ambit of this unpredictable and perilous context.

The remaining of this section briefly presents two prominent “development” spatial plans for the period after 2005. The first is an international initiative called the Arc Plan (2005), and the second is the national initiative of the National Spatial Plan (NSP) (2009). Both Plans could be framed under the umbrella of the Palestinian flagship project: “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”.

3.3.1 The Arc Plan (2005)

In 2005, the American Rand corporation introduced “The Arc Plan: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State”. The Arc consists of a high-speed train and energy network linking the eleven main Palestinian cities in the West Bank together, along with the five main Palestinian cities in Gaza Strip. The Arc is a 225 km corridor; 137 km out of which stretches over the West Bank (Figure 3.8), with almost half of this trajectory runs over areas A & B that fall under Palestinian planning jurisdiction, whereas the remaining half runs over area C that falls under the full Israeli jurisdiction in the West Bank territory (ARIJ, 2013).

El-Atrash & Zboun (2009) have concluded based on a critical analyzes of the Arc Plan that the underlining assumptions of the Plan are nebulous and ambiguous, since the Plan did not address, in details the issues of Israeli settlements, Jerusalem, right of return and state borders, which are among the major issues in the final peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. As per the Israeli settlements, the Plan ignored them, since the trajectory of the Arc overlapped with Israeli settlements, as in the case of Tekoa Settlement (including, Tekoa C & D), east-west of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 3.8). As per the state borders, the Arc could be conceived as a consolidation to the *de facto* geo-political artifacts, especially the Segregation Wall, since it predominantly calls for building new cities to accommodate the return of Palestinian refugees (estimated at 750,000 returnees) (Suisman, 2005: 2008) to the eastern part of the West Bank, i.e., away from the unilateral Israeli demarcated border by the Segregation Wall in the western part (Figure 3.8). Importantly, to highlight here is that the proposed new city core for Bethlehem, for instance will be in the eastern rural zone, thus consequently affecting the business-as-usual land market industry, especially that the Plan didn’t define the criteria upon which the new core will be developed, or what would be the character of this new core: residential only or

including new industrial facilities. This socio-economic aspect of the Plan was not clear, since the Plan did not bluntly define what would be the intrinsic relationship between the old and new cores in the context of Bethlehem, for instance.

Ecologically speaking, the Arc Plan did not acknowledge the Nature Reserve area. Though, this area was defined based on political rather than scientific motivations (Section 2.6.1, Chapter 2), part of which remains the host of important flora and fauna, especially for Bethlehem city-region, therefore, the repercussion of the proposed trajectory of the Arc Plan should be further analyzed in relation to the ecological resources and the biblical landscape that it passes by, especially in the context of Bethlehem city-region.

Overall, the Arc Plan was highly welcomed by Palestinians, as an impetuous “development” spatial plan that would be a good base to create a durable imprint for the coming Palestinian statehood, but only when the Israeli occupation comes to an end on the ground.




Figure (3.8): The Arc Plan as Per the Geo-political Status in Present Palestine (2005)

Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

Note: At the time the Arc Plan was published in 2005, the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip were not yet dismantled; therefore they have been captioned in this map.

3.3.2 The National Spatial Plan (2009)

Indications are that the importance of spatial planning in relation to “development” is currently on the rise, especially since a NSP for the Palestinian territory has been finally commenced in February, 2011 by the 13th Palestinian cabinet. The technical team of the NSP consists of 7 line ministries and is headed by MoPAD. The first phase of the NSP was concluded by means of approval of the “Protection Plan for Natural Resources and Archeological Sites”, along with its legislations in February, 2012.

The Protection Plan is outlined as a preparatory phase for the production of the NSP and the leitmotif of the Protection Plan chiefly aims at balancing between development priorities from one side and preservation of endangered resources from another side towards achieving sustainable development, by protecting high-to-medium valued agricultural lands (green and light green in Figure 3.9), nature reserve, cultural heritage, forests (olive green in Figure 3.9), and unique landscapes (hatched in Figure 3.9) from uncontrolled development (NSP, 2012). Nevertheless, the Protection Plan has caused a furor and strong opposition among many LGUs, including those in Bethlehem who are asking to reconsider the Protection Plan since it is incongruent with the realities on the ground, as it restricts spatial development in areas which are not agricultural sensitive as designated in the Protection Plan, bearing in mind that these particular areas (mostly designated as area C) are of high interest to the Israeli settlers, especially in the western zone of Bethlehem city-region (Figure 3.9). The LGUs of Bethlehem are yearning that the Protection Plan would not add layers of complexity to the Palestinian spatial development in less sensitive ecological areas located in area C, since spatial development there is already restricted by the Israeli authorities.

A detailed exposition to the repercussions of proposed designations in the Protection Plan on Bethlehem is difficult now, since the Protection Plan is still under consideration and revision. Actually the new appointed 15th Palestinian cabinet in June, 2013 discussed the Protection Plan during its second meeting, which entails how the Protection Plan is being perceived with a high profile at the national level. Nevertheless, there is a professed need to reconsider the current designations in the Protection Plan in the eastern zone of Bethlehem city-region, as well, since ecologists believe that the designations of landscape of high-to-medium value, biodiversity, and nature reserve is not consistent and complete, keeping in mind that the related legislations to the Protection Plan is based on already archaic and outdated building laws and by-laws that do not cope with the current Palestinian priorities and aspirations (Section 3.2, Chapter 3).




Figure (3.9): Protection Plan for Natural Resources and Archeological Sites in Bethlehem City-region
Source: (NSP, 2012)

To conclude this section, it is obvious that the planning for sustainability in terms of spatial “development” is more concrete than before, nevertheless the ultimate sustainability depends on a firm, law-based mandate (i.e., endorsement of the new PBA, or at least updating the old version for the year 1966 (Law No. 79)). More concluding notes on the changing meaning of “development” in the context of Bethlehem in a relatively short period of time are many, but the main points related to donor aid to the Palestinians, which is a political aid per excellence (Nakhleh, 2012) include: relief supplants “development”; mobility and security considerations lead to an increase reliance on international staff, thus key decisions are increasingly shifted out of local hands, which impedes the ability of the competent authorities to monitor needs, develop and implement policies, deliver services, and provide leadership; and finally reformers, unable to make progress, and thus would lose credibility at the long run (Brynen, 2005: 233).

3.4. Institutional Anchoring

In the context of the West Bank, including Bethlehem city-area the practice of “development” planning supplemented the practice of “statutory” planning. It has never been used as a substitute. Actually, it is acknowledged that the practice of “development” or strategic planning would never completely replace the traditional “statutory” physical planning in present Palestine with its focus on providing a legal basis for guiding private and public building activities, and its different speed and time horizon (Table 3.2). Nevertheless, particularly in such a dynamic environment with rapid urban growth and transformation, such a “development” practice is useful in identifying priority action needs with spatial relevance that cannot usually be addressed adequately by traditional physical planning with its more tedious and time consuming procedural requirements (GTZ, 2008: 19-20).

Before delving into the details of spatial planning hierarchy, it is quite important to scrutinize the role of planners as codified by the relevant laws and at the different spatial level to understand the scope and level of intervention needed by the planners before considering scaling-up and institutional anchoring of strategic “development” planning practices at the appropriate spatial level.

3.4.1 Role of Planners in the Current Practice of “Statutory” Planning in Present Palestine

This section provides an overview of the main responsibilities of planners in each of the respective competent authorities, along with the associated planning schemes.

According to the prevailing practices there are 4 types of planning schemes; 1 at the regional level, and the remaining 3 at the local level. Nevertheless, there is an un-regulated plan at the national level that has never been realized mainly due to the geo-political implications on the ground, which is the NSP (Section 3.3.2, Chapter 3). Annex (2) pinpoints the contents of the different “statutory” plans as codified by the Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Building No. 79 for the year 1966 – Articles 14, 15, 19, 23, and 28 (See Palestinian Gazette, 1966).

At the national level, the planners at MoPAD are entitled to curate the development of the **NSP** that is not yet regulated by law. The importance of such a plan stems from the geo-political context that pays attention to the physical conditions. The first related plan of its kind within this context was developed in 1998, and at present the most comprehensive version of a national plan is being developed by MoPAD in close cooperation with the line ministries. The issues to be addressed by planners in such a plan are many, but are mainly based on a base map, AKA a basic topographic plan (See Article 14, Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Building No. 79 for the year 1966), and the main items to be included in this plan are pinpointed in Annex (2).

As per the regional level, the planners at MoLG are entitled to coordinate with MoPAD through the mechanisms of HPC and District Planning Council (DPC) in the formulation of **Regional Plans** that though have been once regulated in 2005 for the Gaza Strip; they had never been realized due to the geo-political implications. The regional plan should be based on the base map, and includes many items, as shown in Annex (2) (See Article 15, Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Building No. 79 for the year 1966). The long list of the pinpointed responsibilities of planners in Annex (2) that should be realized within the regional plan is far and by large has not been achieved in present Palestine since the

establishment of the PNA. This adds layers of complexities at the local level planning that are dependent on this level as outlined by the Law.

The local level includes 3 different planning schemes as codified by Law. The 3 plans are not only regulated, but also action-oriented in the context of Bethlehem city-area. **The first type of locally-based plans is the Master-plan.** The main issues to be tackled by planners are similar to those at the regional level, and based on the regional plan, but more accentuation is given to more locally-based items, as shown in Annex (2) (See Article 19, Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Building No. 79 for the year 1966). According to the PCBS (2011 c: 56) almost 32% of the LGUs in present Palestine do not have master-plans; the percentage in the West Bank is the same, but in Bethlehem city-region it is a slight higher at 37%. As per Bethlehem city-area, the municipalities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour have outdated master-plans (Table 3.1).

City	Prepared	Last Updated
Bethlehem	1956	1973
Beit Jala	1987	Not updated
Beit Sahour	1954	1974 and now in process 2012
Source: Interviews with City-Engineers (2012)		

The three municipalities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour have recently prepared and established zoning designations for each city by itself, which are predominantly zoned as Area A or B of residential designations (these designations differ than the geo-political classifications, Section 1.3.2, Chapter 1) (Figure 3.10). These documents are unofficial and lack an overall vision for the three cities together (CCC, 2012). The three cities could not update the old master-plans due to many reasons including lack of funds and local human resources, but more importantly because none of the municipalities could re-draw the new municipal boundaries since the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality expanded its borders in 1967 by annexing land from the three twin cities, which could be considered as an acknowledgement to the *de facto* political boundaries (Section 2.4.1, Chapter 2). This “stubborn reality” had resulted in many negative repercussions as characterized by urban sprawl, inefficiency of land consumption, and incoherent urban fabric, amongst others.




Figure (3.10): Current Zoning Designations (Land Use Types) in Bethlehem City-area
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

The second type of locally-based plans is the Detailed Plan. Based on the outlined master-plan, a detailed plan for the different sections of the master-plan should be prepared. The items that should be tackled by planners are identical to those specified for the master-plans, but with more details to specific items, as shown in Annex (2) (See Article 23, Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Building No. 79 for the year 1966).

The third type of locally-based plans is the Land Parcellation Plan. Based on Article 28, Law of Planning for Cities, Villages, and Building No. 79 for the year 1966, planners could approve a parcellation plan for piece of lands not less 10 m² in area, which are submitted by land owners in accordance to the outlined detailed plans (See Annex 2). Land parcellation plans are diminished to a trickle in Bethlehem city-area, especially in case of inherited and common lands (Section 3.2.5, above). Halabi (1997: 50) bluntly assures that the practice of land parcellation as outlined by the Law makes restrictions on the right of usufruct for land owners, and therefore it should be revisited.

3.4.2 Spatial Planning Hierarchy in Present Palestine

The planning system in present Palestine, which is applicable to the case study of Bethlehem, follows a top-down hierarchical approach. There are three levels of spatial planning, namely: national, regional, and local. The national level is mandated to MoPAD, while the regional and local levels are mandated to MoLG, and they are represented by the HPC, DPC, and Local Planning Committee (LPC). It is worthy to mention, that MoLG closely coordinates with MoPAD in planning at the regional level, but only for elements of the plans that of national relevance and importance. In other words, and according to the division of labour and the mandates that were proposed for the two ministries in the draft PBA, MoPAD eventually have to focus more on the national and regional level of physical planning, while MoLG have to focus on governorate (city-region) and local level physical planning (Tesli, 2008: 43). Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether an intermediate form of spatial planning at governorate (city-region) level is suitable in a relatively small country like present Palestine, and whether it would not be also apposite and resource saving to work with only two spatial planning levels, i.e. national and local (GTZ, 2008: 9; BUS & HOPE, 2009), keeping in mind that regional planning and development in present Palestine is limited chiefly due to the geo-political conditions (Bäumer & Shaheen, 2010: 134-135). This issue is revisited later on at the end of this dissertation, based on the attained findings (Section 9.7, Chapter 9). From a different perspective, there is a considerable overlap especially at the national level between the different Palestinian ministries, such as: ministry of education, health, environment, transportation, finance, and tourism, amongst others in terms of spatial planning mandates, functions, and responsibilities. Table (3.2) presents the forms and levels of spatial planning in the West Bank.

Table (3.2): Forms and Levels of Spatial Planning in the West Bank

	Spatial Planning Paradigm	
	Statutory (Physical)	Development (Strategic)
Status in Law	Regulated, except at the national level (compulsory, but not action-oriented, except at the local level)	Not-regulated (indicative, but action-oriented, especially at the local level)
Scope	Basis for granting private/public building permits, and ushering infrastructure development	Basis for an action program identifying priority needs, and accessing finance for priority investment projects
Time Horizon	Preparation: 2-3 years; Validity: 5-10 years	Preparation: <1 year; Validity: 2-5 years
Spatial Level / Leading Actor	Type	
National	National Spatial Plan (MoPAD)	Reform and Development Plan (MoPAD)
Regional	Regional Scheme (MoLG-HPC & RPC)	Regional Development Planning (MoLG-HPC & RPC)
Local	Master-Plans (MoLG-LPC)	Local Development Planning (MoLG-LPC)
	Strategic (Municipal) Development and Investment Plan (S-M-DIP) (MoLG-LPC)	
Source: Compiled from (GTZ, 2008: 9 & 20); (Daoud, 2009: 49); (MoLG, 2009: 6); and (MoLG, 2010: 9)		

As depicted in Table (3.2), the practice of both “statutory” and “development” planning in Bethlehem city-area, like in the rest of the West Bank is more realized at the local level, and presented in the S-M-DIP, as a voluntary strategic planning tool that is highly encouraged and recommended by national government (MoLG, 2009: 5). This is actually the result of reform initiatives to help achieve balanced development through a more decentralized planning system, but on a gradual basis, where the operational planning tasks for planners at the local level will be realized as the LGUs-LPCs becomes more developed and competent (See GTZ, 2008; Daoud, 2009; and MoLG, 2010). This entails that the planners at the level of central government entities, mainly: MoPAD and MoLG should remain active at the meantime in issues of strategy and policy formulation. The GTZ (2008: 27) and upon the commission of MoLG recommends that the S-M-DIP should follow a modular approach for the different stages, steps, and outputs of the planning process, as shown below in Figure (3.11).




Figure (3.11): Modular Approach for S-M-DIP Preparation and Implementation

Source: Compiled from GTZ (2008: 27-29)

As outlined in Figure (3.11), a distinct output from the S-M-DIP is a detailed investment plan that enfold elaborations on the associated costs and investments needed to implement the priority projects. This entails a fiscal dimension that is under-researched in the discussion of spatial planning practices in Bethlehem city-area just as in the rest of present Palestine. The next section addresses this truism in terms of the ongoing governance reform initiatives through the decentralization of spatial planning onus politically, administratively, but more importantly here fiscally.

3.4.3 The Question of (Fiscal) Decentralization in Spatial Planning Practices

The truism of “decentralization” in present Palestine in terms of spatial planning is considered a key spatial-making perspective underlying the policy analyses and recommendations of Palestinian planners. Nevertheless, the precise meaning of “decentralization” needs to be clarified and explicitly understood by the relevant planning competent authorities. The significance of realizing this truism stems from the important role of strategic “development” plans that seek accessing finance for priority investment projects (Table 3.3).

Decentralization could take three forms, namely: political, administrative, and financial decentralization, keeping in mind that the three are inter-related and inter-connected. The **political decentralization** entails devolving the spatial planning decision making to lower tiers of government, i.e. to the elected LGUs. In order to be fully effective, political decentralization should be accompanied with **administrative decentralization**, where the central government delegates administrative responsibilities and planning functions, including service delivery commensurate with the decision making powers. In present Palestine, and according to the related planning reform initiatives, it is envisaged that at the medium-to-long run that more administrative decentralization be realized without political decentralization, taking into consideration that present Palestine is a relatively small country (See ARIJ, 2009: 59-62). This paradigm of governance is referred to as “de-concentration”. Nevertheless, there remains a professed need to perform **fiscal decentralization** that is, devolving fiscal powers and authorities to lower level so that the LGUs could perform the planning functions entrusted to them by the administrative decentralization. Experience in the context of present Palestine have shown that the central government is willing to decentralize the administrative authorities without the fiscal authorities, needless to say, this have been and would remain very challenging towards achieving more sustainable spatial development (PNA, 2009 b: 14-15).

To knock on effects of such a planning practice, an analysis to Bethlehem city-area in terms of fiscal revenues is presented. The analysis is focusing only on the revenue responsibilities and not on the expenditure responsibilities (though both revenues and expenditures are two sides of the same coin, that is fiscal decentralization), simply because expenditure responsibilities boil down to administrative functions, decentralization (or de-concentration) of which will be necessary in the medium-to-long run, but is currently not on the immediate Palestinian policy agenda.

Decentralization of revenue responsibilities can take different forms. Figure (3.12) summarizes the revenues resources in Bethlehem city-area, according to the relevant laws and regulations.




Figure (3.12): Schematic Description of the Current Revenues Resources for the LGUs of Bethlehem City-area

Source: Compiled from (PNA, 2009 b: 9-11)

List of Abbreviations in Figure (3.12) (Alphabetically)

APLA: Association of Palestinian Local Authorities; **LGUs:** Local Government Units; **MDLF:** Municipal Development and Lending Fund; **MoF:** Ministry of Finance; **MoLG:** Ministry of Local Government; **MoPAD:** Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development

Having examined the current mechanism of revenues resources for the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area, three important features could be highlighted, as follows:

- The absence of privately financed infrastructure projects
- The absence of debt finance resources
- The absence of surtaxes that is tax levied by LGUs upon a national tax, such as individual income tax

The municipalities of Bethlehem city-area have been tapping into all of the revenues sources outlined in Figure (3.12), but on different scales, as shown in Table (3.3).

Revenue Source		2010		2011		2012	
		Bethlehem City-area	%	Bethlehem City-area	%	Bethlehem City-area	%
Revenues Collected by MoF	Property Tax	7,800,000	34.6	7,750,000	34.0	7,850,000	33.2
	Profession & Industry Fees	1,265,000	5.6	590,000	2.6	585,000	2.5
Fiscal Transfer	Transfer from PNA	2,507,500	11.1	1,310,000	5.7	1,310,000	5.5
	Fines	165,000	0.7	175,000	0.8	185,000	0.8
LGUs Fees	Other Local Fees	5,106,500	22.7	6,677,500	29.3	6,896,450	29.2
	Property Revenues	1,268,000	5.6	2,637,640	11.6	1,610,000	6.8
	Other Revenues	1,940,810	8.6	1,169,810	5.1	2,519,000	10.7
Utility Fees	Utility Revenues	2,465,000	10.9	2,481,000	10.9	2,663,000	11.3
Total Revenues (Israeli New Shekel-ILS)		22,517,810	100	22,790,950	100	23,618,450	100

Source: Raw Data from (MoLG, 2012)

The analysis of the revenues resources for the municipalities of Bethlehem city-area during the years 2010-2012, exhibits distinctive insights and reflections. The lion share goes to the user fees and charges, such as craft fees at 43.4% in average for the years 2010-2012. A distinct feature is the declining percentage of the revenues collected by the central government, mainly the property tax at 37.5% in average during 2010-2012. This item is under-utilized as a source of local public finance, since it is being collected directly by MoF, and then returned after a 10% management fees deduction. Surprisingly, the municipalities of Bethlehem city-area rely on utility fees, as a source of income. This is an anomaly, as basically utility services should be provided on commercial principles, and not on a profit base that generates extra revenues for LGUs (See PNA, 2009 b: 12; and Daoud, 2009: 32-33). Despite the recent establishment and enlargement of corporatized entities for water and electricity respectively, the generated income from this item is still stable at 11% in average during the last three years. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that this item will demonstrate a decreasing trend at the short run. An important aspect within this vein is the hidden debts associated with utility services, as the refugee camps inhabitants within Bethlehem city-area usually do not pay their dues, and this makes the financial management in the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area more complicated. Unsurprisingly, the fiscal transfer from the central government is demonstrating a sharp decreasing trend as it has decreased by half in the year 2010/2011. This might be interpreted due to the political impasse, and the decrease in the financial assistance from donors to the PNA. Furthermore, the fiscal transfer mechanism for the LGUs in general lacks clear allocation criteria.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter presented the “statutory” planning practices in present Palestine that are applicable to the case study as a *mélange* or a *bricolage* of different laws and by-laws inherited from the many powers that ruled over present Palestine, namely: Ottoman Turks (1516-1917); British Mandate (1918-1948); Jordanian Administration (1948-1967); Israeli Military Occupation (1967-1993); and PNA (1993-To present). This presentation shed lights on the inefficient formal planning system that resulted from many layers of constraints, most importantly the incapability of the PNA to legalize the amendments in the planning laws and by-laws since its establishment, especially since the stoppage of the PLC in 2007. This has rendered the “statutory” planning paradigm to be characterized with high degrees of centralization. Generally speaking, though “statutory” planning that steers the related spatial planning practices is a must and an indispensable aspect of state nationalism, but in the modern history of Palestine at large, “statutory” planning has ushered the colonial project that expropriated lands and disordered the social Palestinian fabric, ultimately deploying spatial planning as a tool. Prospective national spatial planning towards a modern statehood should acknowledge such capacities in the sustainable development of present Palestine, arguably based on the newly emerged intellectual strand of thought that vouches sustainability as an amalgam between need- and right-based approaches; said differently based on the local needs and rights.

Within the same framework, a presentation to the voluntary paradigm of “development” planning that is in vogue nowadays in the practice of spatial planning in present Palestine was also provided. This type of planning practices have provided the Palestinian planners with the flexibility to strategically tackle the priority of spatial development, especially at the local level, since a designated amalgamation with the “statutory” planning paradigm was realized in the form of S-M-DIP. The S-M-DIP is still nascent and it remains very early to evaluate its validity as a reform initiative towards a more decentralized planning system. This is more concrete, when studying and analyzing the question of (fiscal) decentralization at the local level. Therefore, there remains a professed need to try realizing the amalgamation between the “statutory” physical and “development” strategic paradigms at a higher level: regional (city-region) or national level, keeping into consideration that present Palestine is a relatively small country, and the bulk of the Palestinian land is not yet under the Palestinian planning jurisdiction. This will be elaborated in terms of theoretical discussions in Chapter 6, An Expert-Consulting Model. It was decided to study the anticipated role of planners as evidenced in the different planning models theoretically, since basically the Palestinian planning experience lacks enough empirical physical plans at the regional and national levels that could substantiate the proposal for such a planning model.

Chapter 4: Methodological Frameworks

“Methods should be equal to the task of helping answer the questions asked.”

(Bryson, *et.al*, 2009: 177)

Chapter 4: Methodological Frameworks

4.1. Abstract

This chapter is designed to set-out the methodological frameworks that invoke the course of this doctoral research. The organization of this chapter follows a main thread starting from the defined research questions, along with the associated research hypothesis for this doctoral research based on the statement of problems resulted from the detailed analysis provided in Chapter 2 & 3. Afterwards, the research strategy and the conceptual analytical scheme of this doctoral research are presented, as a guiding frame for the analysis provided within the framework of this doctoral research. The rationale for choosing a case study approach of Bethlehem city, and city-region, as well in the investigation of “SPSSs” in such an evolved geo-political context is, also substantially elaborated. This chapter, furthermore, provides an overview of the deployed techniques within this doctoral research. The undertaken field observations and the selection of data (primary and secondary) that have been analyzed, along with the adopted (internal) validity instrument are all discussed, as part of the adopted methodological frameworks.

4.2. Research Questions

The key questions that invoke the course of this doctoral research are narrowed within the framework of research scope, and could be readily divided into main and secondary questions. The main research question is *solution-oriented* that tends to bring about solutions to the associated wicked problems of the *status quo* spatial planning and development in the case study in specific, and present Palestine, in general. However, to fully understand and enable the environment that enfold the main question, a set of operational, or more specifically *process oriented* and *analytical oriented* secondary questions were developed based on the definition of the conceptual and methodological problems, as narrated from the generic research problem of tenuous and fragmented institutional landscapes of spatial planning practices in present Palestine, which are resulted from the precarious geo-political context. These questions are systematically summarized in Table (4.1).

To advance the research context into a clear research design that enables the development of practical and explicit descriptions within the research context, designated research propositions in the form of research hypothesis have been identified. According to Gerring (2002), the viability of a case study (Bethlehem city and city-region, in our case) is always proposition-centric. It depends on what the researcher is interested to research, or argues. Propositions help identifying the relevant information about studied causes and represent the reference point against which the collected data is collated and the results are generalized. Said differently, each identified proposition help focusing on certain issues that need to be addressed within the scope of research, and the more a research contains specific propositions, the most likely it remains within feasible limits (Yin, 2003). This doctoral research is based on three major research propositions as related to the three operational research questions, which helped in narrowing down the main theme of this doctoral research into three specific sub-themes (Table 4.1).

Table (4.1): Compartmentalization of Research Problem

Generic Research Problem (Theme)		
<p>Endorsed by the Palestinian cabinet, and in coherence with the 13th Palestinian government program, a National Spatial Plan for the Palestinian territory has commenced in February, 2011. The Plan has its dimensions embodied in determining the relation on the regional and sub-regional levels in the Gaza Strip and West Bank governorates (city-regions). The notoriously complex and wicked prevailing problems that the Palestinian cities face are conceived at different levels and scales, which are needless to say interrelated and interconnected. The epicenter of urban problems in the case study of Bethlehem city and city-region as well, are not unique rather representative to other Palestinian cities. To put it brief, the adoption of “SPSSs” within the context of present Palestine needs to be investigated.</p>		
Main Research Question		
<p>How to plan for sustainability in terms of spatial development, under such an evolved geo-political context?</p>		
Conceptual Problem		
<p>The Western definition of sustainability, in terms of spatial development is indeed problematic and not suitable to the context of present Palestine.</p>		
Secondary Question I	Secondary Question II	Secondary Question III
<p>Wherefore the prevailing spatial order conditions are associated with a stance of deterioration and malfunctioning?</p>	<p>What are the planner’s responsibilities to plan for and achieve better sustainability outcomes?</p>	<p>What are the policy recommendations for efficient institutional settings for local planning processes? And at what spatial dimension they should be realized? (i.e., which Bethlehem?)</p>
Hypothesis I:	Hypothesis II:	Hypothesis III:
<p>For a more sound articulation of sustainability in spatial development practices, a holistic analysis for the driving forces is necessary.</p>	<p>There is an afforded degree of public participation in terms of efficiency, and tellingly legitimacy in terms of venues of articulation with other interest groups that planning experts should take into consideration.</p>	<p>To establish a functional spatial structure, a minimum of development guidelines is needed in the implementation (management & maintenance) dimensions. And in order to improve the articulation of the proposed interventions (“SPSSs”) the spatial dimension should be realized as such.</p>
Sub-Theme I	Sub-Theme II	Sub-Theme III
<p>Addressing the endogenous and exogenous driving forces afflicting the process of spatial development (Systemness – Socio-politics, economic, and environment).</p>	<p>Addressing the potential changes in terms of scale and forms of Policy Processes/ government-governance (An-Expert Consulting Model).</p>	<p>Addressing the potentials for a new paradigm of planning (Smart Growth, including envision future alternatives and scenarios for Bethlehem).</p>

4.3. Research Strategy and Scheme

This doctoral research adopts a mixed research method of quantitative and qualitative approaches (q-squared method). Thompson (2004: 237) expresses it like this: "... research using one eye rather than two" typifies much conventional social science. But, in recent times, more and more researchers are attempting to use "both eyes." Bazeley (2004: 2) assures that researchers should be wary of *what* is being mixed, and *how* it is being mixed? Table (4.2) distinguishes (and thereby defines) the adopted q-squared method in this doctoral research on the basis of certain variables, namely: type of data; employed logic; type of investigation; method of analysis; and presumed underlying paradigm.

Table (4.2): Variables of the Q-squared Method	
Variable	Explanation
Type of data	The research uses both textual and numeric data in the form of structured and unstructured formats
Employed logic	The research employs both an inductive and deductive reasoning
Type of investigation	The research adopts both an exploratory and confirmatory investigation approaches
Method of analysis	The research uses both interpretative and statistical methods of analysis
Underlying paradigm	The presumed underlying paradigm is an amalgam between positivist and interpretative/critical ones
Source: Edited by the author from Bazeley (2004: 141)	


To elaborate more about the adopted q-squared method, this doctoral research follows a mix between inductive (AKA: exploratory analysis) and deductive (AKA: confirmatory analysis) approaches. The inductive (qualitative method) is similar to deductive (quantitative method) approaches in the sense that both are used in research to establish hypothesis, but differs in the sense that it takes events and makes generalizations in comparison to deductive approaches that arrives at a specific conclusion based on generalizations (Jones, 2006). The inductive research method is apposite to this doctoral research because of its characteristics that promises to provide the flexibility to examine data without preconceptions; the possibility of thorough understanding of processes; and the learning from the own descriptive statistical data (Mosteller & Tukey, 1977). Bulmer & Warwick (1993) argue that these characteristics are suitable for achieving the goals of certain social enquiry research in third world countries, like in present Palestine. Nevertheless, inductive reasoning usually betrays shortcomings in terms of its inability to provide definitive answers in most cases, as it is based on judgments (Jones, 2006). Therefore, deductive research method based on quantitative data, in particular on the analysis of variables is also used. This means that this doctoral research uses a balanced approach in order to have complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses of the resulting combination of approaches and methods. Nevertheless, in order to tame the associated shortcomings in each of the inductive and deductive approaches, this doctoral research uses an internal validity instrument, namely: triangulation to troubleshoot and test convergence/divergence of the acquired data/information (Section 4.4, below).

Knocking effects on the qualitative research underway, the author uses a conceptual analysis technique in the investigation of the related research questions to this doctoral research on two inter-related and hierarchical levels of analysis, namely: theoretical and contextual (Figure 4.1). The theoretical analysis rallies around revisiting sustainability in a holistic way; the analysis of the case study as a multiplex city that investigates the systemness of the case study based on the triple-bottom lines of sustainability, along with the prevailing policy processes and the truncated knowledge in the policy community are all presented and addressed (See Chapters 2 & 3).

“SPSSs”

HOW TO PLAN FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN TERMS OF SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT, UNDER SUCH AN EVOLVED GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT?

Theoretical Background and Analysis
(Conceptualizing “SPSSs”)



What is the definition of sustainability in terms of spatial development in such a context?




Figure (4.1): Conceptual Analytical Scheme

Research design, in its general sense is considered a blueprint of research, confronting with at least four problems: what questions to address; what data are relevant so to speak; what data to collect; and how to analyze the findings and results (Philliber, *et al.*, 1980). Having already discussed the research questions, what remains important here is to shed lights on the remaining three questions that focus on the relevant data to this doctoral research and how to analyze them. The following sections cover this inquiry, but before that the case study approach and the rationale for the selection of the case study are presented.

4.3.1. Case Study Approach

Among the different types of social science inquiry, such as: phenomenology (experiencing a phenomenon), ethnography (describing the associated culture), grounded theory (generating a theory from data), historical research (studying events in the past), or doing surveys, a research strategy that employs a case study as an analytical approach has been defined as the suitable tool to carry out this doctoral research. Lauria & Wagner (2006: 367) assured through a detailed analysis of the extant literature that the case study research design solidified its hold as the research strategy of choice in empirical spatial planning studies, while other qualitative methods unattached to a case study design declined.

Gerring (2002: 2) defines a case study as “*an in-depth study of an individual unit where that unit is approached as an example of some larger phenomenon*”. Case study is a comprehensive research strategy that includes different methods covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis (Yin, 2002: 14). Gerring (2002) rightly prizes case studies as a form of exploratory research that focuses on a subject that is not well-understood, like in the case of the theme of this doctoral research (i.e., “SPSSs”).

According to Yin (2002: 6), case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being raised (See Section 4.2, above), when the “*investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context*”, i.e. when the subject and context are ambiguously defined. Furthermore, the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as: policy processes and neighborhood change (Yin, 2003) that are of great relevance to the scope of this doctoral research. In the same token, case study research method is appropriate when it is inevitable to define research topics broadly; to cover contextual or multivariate conditions; and to rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence, all of which are applicable to the case of this doctoral research (Yin, 2002: xi). Finally, since the empirically-oriented objective of this doctoral research is to *assess* (i.e., *explore and explain*) the present-day situation (potentials and weaknesses) and the future impact (threats and opportunities) of the *status quo* spatial development in such a poor-resource Palestinian environment (See Section 1.4.2, Chapter 1), the case study approach is adopted as proposed by Yin (2002 & 2003), Flyvbjerg (2001), and Gerring (2002).

4.3.2. Case Study Selection and Bounding (Validity Instrument)

At this stage of research it is important to select the case study. Yin (2003: 9) argues that the selection of the cases to be studied is one of the most difficult steps in case study research, therefore he accentuates on the importance of identifying an array of candidate cases, but without delving into so much details that the screening begins to emulate the conduct of the actual case study. As a first step within this vein, it is important to make sure that the case is bounded. Miles & Huberman (1986) highlight three boundaries of high importance to bounding the case, namely: conceptive boundary (i.e., focus); temporal boundary (i.e., time); and spatial boundary (i.e., location). Since the conceptive boundary for the case study has been already established (Figure 4.1), only the temporal and spatial boundaries are briefly discussed below.

The temporal boundary covers the period since the start of the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian territory in 1967 to present, with an outlook and an action plan for the future of spatial development at the short-to-medium run and to the long run, as well. It is argued that the period after which the Israeli occupation started in 1967 has been shaping the spatiality of present Palestine (See Section 3.2.4, Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the period during which the peace process negotiations have started in 1993 is further analyzed, since this period has resulted in new administrative and planning jurisdictions that still prevails till today and affect the daily practices of Palestinian spatial planners and decision makers, as well (Section 3.2.5, Chapter 3). In the same token, the period between 1948 and 1967 is only covered where necessary to shed lights on the reams of laws and by-laws that still shape and influence the related spatial planning policy processes in present Palestine. Likewise, the Ottoman and British epochs influence on the spatial planning policy processes are examined too.

The spatial boundary is translated in practical terms by establishing the unit of analysis and sampling frame. Since the basic concept in choosing the case study is to be a representative one, an abstract spatial analysis of the main Palestinian cities of the West Bank territory has been done in terms of gross population density (i.e., population size and planning jurisdiction area). Bethlehem city-area (Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour cities) and Bethlehem city-region, as well were ranked in the middle among the remaining Palestinian cities of the West Bank (Table 4.3). Furthermore, Bethlehem city-area and city-region, as well were ranked in the middle in comparison to other Palestinian cities and city-regions in terms of city-region population, urban population, city population, and area of master-plan. Evidently, this abstract statistical analysis is indicative and is only used here to highlight the representativeness of the chosen case study.


Table (4.3): Gross Population Density for the Main Cities of the West Bank Territory

City	Population ¹ – City-region (2012)	Population ¹ – Urban (2012)	Population ¹ – City (2012)	Master-plan Area ² (Dunum)	Gross Population Density (Capita/km ²)
Al & Jericho Aghwar	48,041	25,503	20,826	25,000	833
& Ramallah Al-Bireh	319,418	165,703	31,356	19,000	1,650
Jenin	288,511	169,968	43,851	22,000	1,993
Salfit	66,119	23,990	9,763	4,000	2,441
Tubas	58,586	39,045	18,830	7,270	2,590
Bethlehem City-area	199,466	139,935	55,901	14,600	3,829
Tulkarm	172,224	115,753	55,922	13,790	4,055
Jerusalem (J1) ³	396,710	342,856	246,412	54,871	4,491
Nablus	356,129	196,577	140,009	28,500	4,913
Hebron	641,170	547,110	189,444	27,000	7,016
Qalqiliya	102,649	62,541	46,970	4,250	11,052

Sources: ¹ PCBS (2012); ² Interviews with City-Engineers (2012), except for Jerusalem PCBS (2011 d: 107);

³ Based on prevailing geographical and political situations in Jerusalem city-region, the Palestinian communities have been divided into two parts (J1 and J2), mainly for statistical purposes. The first part (J1) includes those sections of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israel in 1967. The second part (J2) includes Jerusalem city-region except that section of Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel in 1967 (PCBS, 2011 d: 43).

The research utilizes the use of an embedded single case study as an analytical approach. Two units of analysis are deployed, one for the cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour and the other for Bethlehem city-region (Figure 4.2). The rationale for using an embedded single-case design is only to focus the case study inquiry (Yin, 2002: 45). The two sub-units of analysis promises to facilitate for extensive analysis, which would ultimately enhance the insights into the single case of research at hand.

**Figure (4.2): Units of Analysis and Sampling Frame**

The case study of Bethlehem city-area and city-region, as well is used as the model that gave the opportunity for in-depth scrutiny at the micro and meso (sub-regional) levels. Bethlehem is a heterogenous unit, in terms of gender, population composition, religious backgrounds, and spatial functions within the Palestinian context. The study at the micro-level has given more insight to the cause-and-effect relationship that spawns the “SPSSs” in the Palestinian cities. Furthermore, the spatial proximity of Bethlehem to Jerusalem city enriched the research and coloured the analysis with important urban reverberations (See Section 9.2, Chapter 9). Having said this, the chosen case study doesn’t provide a unique or exceptional case within the context of the Palestinian cities, rather a representative model that would facilitate the replication and adaption of the research methodology on different Palestinian cities or other developing cities with different regional context. Flick (2007: 29) assures that the representative nature of the case and not the statistical representation is important in the generalization in the case method. Needless to say, the generalization here is only intended at the conceptual level, due to the uniqueness of each context.

Babbie (2004) clearly describes how the case study approach has the privilege of embracing the combination of multiple methods and approaches of data collection and analysis within a robust research design. This is indeed suitable since the study follow a triangulation research method: exploratory, descriptive, and causal, keeping in mind that the various methods are not mutually exclusive (Yin, 2003: 97-101).

To elaborate more, in order to ensure the authenticity of data used, especially those qualitatively extracted, this doctoral research adopts a triangulation methodology, as an internal validity instrument (Babbie, 2004). As explained earlier, this doctoral research is partly *exploratory* (AKA: *inductive*) in nature, as it takes events and try to makes generalizations afterwards (of course only at the conceptual level), in order to reconcile the many perennial challenges in terms of spatial developments in the Palestinian cities. In parallel, the research adopts *descriptive* analysis and *causal* illustration of the research context, in the sense of what affect is beget from a given cause. The descriptive-related research focuses on collecting data and information about existing conditions while the causal-related research is more concerned with determination of cause-effect relationship, or which variable might be causing a particular behavior. Needless to say, the use of multiple methods (or *triangulation* in our case) enables the research environment; allowing for an opportunity of an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under question. Denzin (1978) used the term triangulation to argue for the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon, where any bias inherent in particular data sources, investigators or methods would be neutralized. Nevertheless, the triangulation of different sources and tools, as expected did not end up with converging conclusions. Some aspects remained ambiguous, which questions the validity of some of the used data, bearing in mind the obvious factor that the triangulated data were collected from different sources that used different crude data and methodologies. For instance, while the conducted field observation by the researcher (investigator) noticed that the urban form of Bethlehem city-area is characterized by high levels of compactness, nevertheless the analysis attained from the conducted semi-structured interviews with planning experts from the policy community of Bethlehem indicated that it remains a priority to increase level of compactness in the spatial development of Bethlehem city-area (Section 7.4, Chapter 7).

4.4. Data Collection and Analysis

The doctoral research musters data from two sets, namely: **primary** and **secondary**. This renders the case study a stronger one as pointed by Yin (2003: 83).

The **primary** data are extracted mainly from the direct field observations made by the author from the case study environment, and from the semi-structured interviews conducted with local and national planning experts to assess the bundle of “SG” strategies and policies and then envision and project future scenarios for Bethlehem using a spatial GIS-based model to identify possible scenarios and projections for the most desirable scenario for future urban growth in Bethlehem city-area. Accordingly, the acquired data are triangulated, and all filtered to feed the discussion organized in focus group format with key informants and decision makers to draw more data of primary importance to the theme of research (Figure 4.3).

Concurrently, the **secondary** data corpus is derived from multiple sources including: archived research, (un)-published non-state actors (e.g. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), UN bodies, etc.) and state actors (e.g. LGUs, PCBS, etc.) documents, and mapping interpretations using the state-of-the-art technology of GIS. The GIS has only two types of data, namely: *spatial* and *attribute* data. The former is related to the digitized and drawn geographical data, while the latter is related to the descriptive tabular data, which is entered in the database tables in order to be used in querying and spatial reasoning (Figure 4.3).

To this end, the used primary data in this sense are conceptual in the pursuit of “SPSSs”. Nevertheless, the used secondary data sources could be conceived as auxiliary means to analyze the context of research in statistical and spatial terms then devise the relevant “SPSSs”.

Having defined the specific research enquiry and the needed data/information, a detailed matrix of research techniques was designed to identify the appropriate tools for data collection (Table 4.4).

Following is a brief presentation to the data collection tools used within the course of this doctoral research. The different deployed research tools were used to triangulate (then validate) data and neutralize any inherent bias from any single research tool stands alone (Figure 4.3).




Figure (4.3): Hierarchy of Data Processing and Analysis

Table (4.4): Matrix of Research Techniques for Data/Information Collection

Specific Research Enquiry	Needed Data/Information	Used Tools for Data/Information Collection
What is the definition of sustainability in terms of spatial development in such an evolved context?		
- How to consider the volatile geo-political context in the daily spatial planning practices (rights)?	Suitable paradigms for spatial development	- Literature review & theoretical analysis
- What are the developmental-related priorities at the local level (needs)?	Priority of development interventions and worthiness	- Observation - Literature review - Semi-structured interviews with key informants - Focus group discussion with decision makers
Wherefore the prevailing spatial order conditions are associated with a stance of deterioration and malfunctioning?		
- What is the state of the triple bottom-line of sustainability: i.e. socio-politics, economic, and environmental aspects?	Diagnostic desk-top analysis	- Observation - Analysis of related census data - Literature review of (un)official related reports
- At what stage is the deterioration in the spatial structure?	Trends of urbanization & trends of economic productivity	- Observation - Literature review of official sector-specific reports - Analysis of statistical data
- What is the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability at the local level?	Analysis of Land Use and Land Cover (LU/LC)	- Analysis of Aerial imageries and modeling using designated Geographic Information System (GIS) layers
- What are the key transitions and their underlined motives that accompanied spatial development (in other words, what are the major changes in local planning management system)?	<i>De jure</i> and <i>De facto</i> authorizations	- Literature review of related laws, by-laws, and directives - Semi-structured interviews with planning experts

What are the planner's responsibilities to plan for and achieve better sustainability outcomes?		
- What are the related planning models that define the role of planners?	Highlight the main drives that lead to the advancement in planning within different planning models	- Literature review and theoretical analysis of planning models
- How do the planning experts evaluate the current local decision making processes?	Define the main deficiencies and the main needed improvements in the planning process	- Semi-structured interviews with planning experts
What are the policy recommendations for efficient institutional settings of local planning processes?		
- What are the strategies and policies used and considered efficient and worth adoption? And to what extent the agenda-settings of "Smart Growth" are inclusive and efficient?	Identification of potential specific strategies and policies impacting the case study positively. And exploring and evaluating the relevance of "Smart Growth" policies	- Observation - Semi-structured interviews with key informant interviews using a designated questionnaire (evaluation sheet)
- Where the future spatial development should be accommodated?	The location for future spatial development (Scenarios)	- GIS analysis and modeling for different scenarios - Focus group discussion with the decision makers, along with a Delphi survey with planning experts (weighting scheme) - Observation

4.4.1.Literature Review

As a start-up, literature review was defined as an instrumental method to collect, summarize, and narrow-down and understand the relevant data. More specifically, three different roles of literature review could be identified within the course of this doctoral research, as indicated by Yin (2011: 64). First, an initial step was to collect and build a **data bank** of previously related studies that tackles the theme of this research, i.e., “SPSSs”, along with other needed data in the form of statistics, reports, and maps, amongst others. Second, a **comprehensive** review was conducted out of the desire to summarize what is known on the theme of research. This has helped in defining the knowledge gap within the context of research. Third, a **selective** review for specific studies that cover a similar ground was done to help in defining the doctoral research in a more nuanced manner, and establishing a niche with other studies. As a corollary, the doctoral research commenced with a substantial amount of data, information, and knowledge on the theme of research that enabled and facilitated the role of other data collection tools, including: semi-structured interviews and GIS (Figure 4.3). Importantly, the literature review has been a work in progress throughout the entire period of this doctoral research.

4.4.2.Field Observation

Observation is an invaluable method to collect primary data; it enriches the research with an insight perception that is not captured or reported in other documents. Not surprisingly, strictly observational studies have been a long-standing part of the research methods in spatial planning. There, the researcher is partially passive (Yin, 2011: 143). Nevertheless, the researcher is advised to strengthen the inferences done from the observation by collecting other data, like interview data in our case, to corroborate or challenge the obtained inferences. Doing so would be an example of triangulating (Figure 4.3) that is an essential part of data collection (Yin, 2011: 147). Within the course of this doctoral research, field observation concentrated mainly on understanding the spatial arrangements and functions in the study area, as well as verifying a sample from the results of the factual-based analysis done using GIS (See Section 4.4.4).

The field observation has been done on two stages, namely:

- **Preliminary Field Work Trip** (August, 20 – September, 17, 2012): The first period was intended as a first preliminary phase to observe, analyze, and understand the context of Bethlehem, and to conduct the first round of semi-structured interviews with the identified key informants (See Section 4.4.3).
- **Research Internship** (January 14 – April 4, 2013): The second period was done at the bequest of a local think-tank in Bethlehem city, called ARIJ. The research internship at ARIJ was designed for more in-depth observation and investigation, as well as to conduct a second round of interviews with key informants (See Section 4.4.3), and to test the results of the factual-based analysis done using GIS (See Section 4.4.4).

4.4.3. Semi-structured Interviews

One of the key data collection methods was the conducted semi-structured interviews with local and national experts from the policy community of the case study. These interviews are indeed qualitative in the sense that they have delved into an intensive and in-depth investigation (Yin, 2011: 133) with experts on the relevant “SG” policies to the context of the case study. A designated evaluation sheet for the “SG” policies was first designed and tested before being used in the interviews. This has been done in the format of a first round of interviews with key informants from the context of Bethlehem city-area, Bethlehem city-region, and the West Bank during the preliminary field work trip (August 20 – September 17, 2012) (Annex 3).

In tandem, a second round of interviews with key informants during the conducted research internship at ARIJ (January 14 – April 4, 2013) was organized to discuss the results of the evaluation of the “SG” during the preliminary field work trip (August, 20 – September, 17, 2012), and to prioritize the proposed suitable “SPSSs” in terms of timing in the format of an action plan. Furthermore, the second round of interviews intended to develop a weighting scheme for the different future scenarios to trade-off among them in respect to certain sustainability criteria, and thus to make further analysis and projections to the most suitable scenario. The weighting scheme was established using Delphi technique, which is a series of expert rounds in which “*information is collected from panelists, analyzed and feedback to them as the basis for subsequent rounds; an opportunity for individuals to revise their judgments on the basis of this feedback; and some degree of anonymity for their individual contributions*” (Underhill, 2004: 1). In brief, the Delphi technique was used to achieve a consensus view among the respondents about the weighting scheme to be adopted in the multi-criteria evaluation of the discussed scenarios. It was based on asking the respondents (planning experts) in their various fields of interventions to estimate individually the probability that certain scenarios will occur in the future, and ultimately to get the respondents to converge on future views by comparing their weights and answers with those of the other respondents (See Ringland, 2006: 19 & 33). The first round for proposing and discussing the weighting scheme was done on an individual base with the key informants during the second round of interviews, but the second round of discussing the average results was done on a group basis with the key informants, and decision makers, as well during the conducted focus group discussion (See Section 4.4.5, below). It is worthy to mention that the proposed weighting scheme by each of the key informants and the results for the proposed scenarios was visually presented during the interviews using simple excel histograms to provide a sense for the interviewees about their suggestions and to give them the chance to amend the weighting scheme on spot accordingly, if needed.

The semi-structured interviews with experts were organized based on an *expert sampling* technique, which is a type of purposive (non-probability) sampling techniques. The purpose behind selecting this specific study unit is to have those that will provide the most plentiful, but relevant data, given the technical aspect of this study (Yin, 2011: 88; Patton, 2002: 230). The list of interviewees could be found in Annex (3).

Last but not least, part of the second round of interviews were conducted with key informants to discuss and amend the proposed expert consulting model (Chapter 6). The list of the interviewed key informants for this purpose is also provided in Annex (3).

4.4.4. Geographic Information System (GIS)

Increasingly, contemporary spatial planning practices tend to regard GIS as one of the most efficient tools in collating and analyzing spatial data. Nevertheless, one should wary that visualization tools, especially maps and computer images as produced by GIS although could bring actors closer to the planning process, also they might not make actors more engaged in the planning process, actually they might distance them from their local knowledge base (Herzele & Woerkum, 2008: 444). Furthermore, map-based visualization in spatial planning betrays many practical difficulties, including: accessibility to information; ability to handle what Kingston *et al.* (2000: 124) call “*the fuzzy information which is in people’s minds but is difficult to represent on a map.*” Leuenberger (2013: 54) argues that map-making in terms of cartographic representations for Palestinian state-making is much more complicated and problematic, but still remains important to encourage commitment to a nation-state and also to inform scientific knowledge and practices that are crucial for state-building.

In the context of the case study, using the GIS as an analytical and spatial planning tool to inform futuristic practices enabled the research and provided a great deal of flexibility to delve into details, by means of considering different geographic layers to lay-out the base for analyzing and reflecting factual information on the perceived pejorative experiences of the complex spatial planning practices on the ground. Within this framework, it is worthy to mention that acknowledging overlaps and discrepancies is quite important when planning in an evolved geo-political context like in present Palestine (Zboinska, 2007).

In our case, the methodological approach adopted here involves the use of the GIS in the preparation of relevant layers that can be overlaid according to the collected and stored information. As mentioned earlier, GIS has only two types of data, namely: spatial and attribute data, and both types have been intertwined and used throughout the course of research (Figure 4.3). It is important to mention that the bulk of shape-files used in developing the GIS are owned, operated, and updated at the bequest of ARIJ. The meta-data on ARIJ’s GIS-database reads the coverage of the case study in terms of road networks, land parcels, main features, administrative boundaries, land-use and land-cover classifications, contour lines and slopes, water sensitivity, soil types, climatology, houses, and basic infrastructural networks, amongst other (ARIJ, 2013). However, the attribute data in terms of statistical figures and socio-politics, economic, and environmental conditions has been gathered by the author from other multi-secondary data sources, including the PCBS.

In GIS applications, there are mainly three elements for the use of spatial data. First, input (encoding); after the collection of the information and preparing it for input into the GIS database. Second, data management; storing and retrieval, manipulation, analysis, as well as modeling and third, output including maps and displays according to pre-defined specifications. More specifically, to detect the dynamics involved in the context of research, analysis is done of the demographic, mobility and natural resources aspects, and then evaluation is performed of the influence of such changes on the socio-economic, environmental, and geo-political settings. In the same token, using a multi-criteria evaluation application based on the proposed weighting scheme by the key informants, a detailed account of analysis and mapping has been done with the assistance of the GIS experts at ARIJ.

4.4.5. Focus Group Discussion

This tool is used to produce data through the interaction between a group of participants selected and assembled “to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that is the subject of the research” (Powell, *et al.*, 1996: 499). Gibbs (1997: 1) argues that features like “organized discussion,” “collective activity,” “social events,” and most importantly “interaction” identify the contribution that focus groups make to social research, in general.

Focus group discussion has many potentials and limitations, as well. On one hand, in group discussion the onus is upon participants to explain their reasoning and this could embolden participants to bring about new solutions to the wicked challenges they are facing (Kitzinger, 1994: 107). On the other hand, this approach is peculiar in the sense that it tends to be less controllable and less representative in comparison to other data collection tools like semi-structured interviews. Likewise, compared to observational methods focus groups are organized events, and thus not natural. Nevertheless, focus groups are particularly useful when there are power differences between the participants; decision-makers, professionals, or lay-persons (Gibbs, 1997: 3). Arguably, this is highly relevant in the context of the case study.

Gibbs (1997: 2) points out that the role of focus group discussions can be conceived as either a stand-alone method or as a complement or supplement to other methods, especially for triangulation (Figure 4.3) and validity checking (Morgan & Spanish, 1984: 267). And this is exactly, why the focus group discussion was used within the course of this doctoral research.

Merton & Kendall’s (1946) classical and influential writing on the focused interview clearly chart the parameters for a robust focus group discussion, namely: ensuring that participants have acquainted knowledge and specific experience of (or opinion about) the topic under investigation; that an explicit interview guide is designed and used; and that the subjective experiences of participants are explored in relation to predetermined research questions. Following these parameters, and based on the detailed research sub-questions (Table 4.4), the major themes addressed during the discussion were narrowed down mainly to the following:

- The developmental-related needs and priorities at the local level.
- The possible future scenarios for spatial development and projection results and implications for the suitable scenario.

The related literature (Merton and Kendall, 1946; Morgan and Spanish, 1984; Kitzinger, 1994; and Gibbs, 1997) provides insights on the organization of focus group discussion. It is recommended that the number of participants should not exceed 15 and the duration for the discussion be less than 2 hours, and most importantly that the venue where the discussion take place be neutral. In our case, the discussion was organized and conducted with 12 participants for 1.5 hours at ARIJ (See Annex 3), which is a neutral place since it is a non-governmental organization, which is also engaged in many spatial development projects in the case study area.

Chapter 5: Theoretical Frameworks – Conceptualizing “SPSSs”

“Our theories determine what we measure.”

Albert Einstein, cited in (Senge, 1990: 175)

Chapter 5: Theoretical Frameworks – Conceptualizing “SPSSs”

5.1. Abstract

This chapter tries to interpret the relevant discourses in terms of theoretical perspective related to the theme of interest (i.e. “Spatial Planning Strategies towards Sustainability: SPSSs”), which is adapted to the prevailing geo-political context in Bethlehem and present Palestine, at large. The evolution of “Spatial Planning Strategies” within the contemporary planning theory discourses is scantily introduced with a focus on their recent amalgamation to the concept of “Sustainability”. The conceptuality for this evolution is normatively presented by three-layer perspective of space, namely: outer space, medium space, and inner space, and is concurrently conceived from three spatial strategy-making perspectives, namely: object/passive-subject/conscious orientation; government-governance tendency; and public participation. Nevertheless, this conceptualization is bounded by a duality process for sustainable spatial development as a right-based approach in tandem to the hitherto accepted and recognized need-based approach, aiming at broadening the definition of sustainability, and thus enhancing the actualization of the concept in the every-day life practices of spatial planners in present Palestine. Nonetheless, this is challenged by the elaboration of a contingent definition to sustainability in the present and in future, alike. In other words, what are the “Spatial Planning Rights” (hereinafter “SPR”) resulted from mediating the urban geo-politics with the fuzzy concept of sustainability? Tellingly, this is the contribution to the knowledge gap at the conceptual level. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the principles of new urban approaches, mainly: “SG” in terms of prospectus and challenges, and as the contemporary face of sustainable spatial development. Overall, this is tailored by the rationalization of a designated conceptual framework that concludes the many notions presented within this chapter. This theoretical analysis is entirely based on analyzing the related archived research in the form of scientific books, refereed journals, relevant reports and plans, with a focus on those related to the Palestinian spatial planning context.

5.2. The Evolution of Spatial Planning Strategies towards Sustainability (“SPSSs”)

5.2.1. Introduction

In response to the wrenching changes and many complexities facing modern societies, a strategic orientation to spatial planning practices have emerged. This strategic orientation is based on identifying the priorities of spatial development and addressing them through synthesizing short-term activities with long-term visions of place making of common assets. This was more contingent to the growing interest to environmental concerns. Salet & Faludi (2000: 1) trace back the use of strategic thinking to military activities, where the role of “strategy” was to never lose sight of the “final” military objective within the changing tableaux of battle. Though, this doctoral research is not about the military sense of strategy, it remains relevant to the context of research, as Weizman (2004) outlines that the Palestinian urbanity provided the theater of war, weapons, and ammunition of Israeli occupation. The spatial legacy of the Israeli colonial project is manifested in the re-definition of engineering metrics. The points, lines, surfaces, and volumes have been re-conceptualized to define a colonial engineering that mainly coerce facts on the ground (See Hazineh & El-Atrash, 2011: 124-129).

Nevertheless, in generic terms, “SPSSs” could be dubbed as pluralistic and public-sector-led approach, as Kunzmann (2000: 259) sees the field of strategic spatial planning, at large. Being public-sector-led does not entail that, where needed, other non-state actors like NGOs could not take the initiative, but the

state-actors or public sector, for obvious reasons, has always to be considered as a protagonist or key actors (Albrechts, 2012: 7). “SPSSs” focuses on the spatial manifestations of socio-economic and environmental objectives in a balanced manner through which a vision, actions, and means for implementation are employed to shape and frame what a place is and may become in the future (Albrechts, 2004: 747). Said differently, “SPSSs” is not a single concept, procedure, or tool. Instead, it is “*a set of concepts, procedures and tools that must be tailored carefully to whatever situation is at hand if desirable outcomes are to be achieved*” (Bryson, 2003: 38).

Albrechts (2004: 747) through a detailed analysis of the related literature pinpoints an exhaustive list of characteristics for “SPSSs” that could be abbreviated in the initials of S-P-S-S, as follows:

- **Strategic:** focusing on key issues;
- **Perspective-oriented** in terms of *assessing* the internal and external conditions and *developing* a realistic long-term vision, i.e. all in all it tackles decisions, actions, results, implementation, monitoring, feedback, and revision;
- **Selective:** identifying and gathering major stakeholders (public and private); and
- **Synergic:** allowing for a broad (multi-level) and diverse (public, economic, civil society) involvement during the planning process.

It is worthy to mention that the term “SPSSs” is used here in its capacity to refer to the proposed conceptualization for spatial strategy-making at different levels, as it seems to be the most commonly used term in the related literature (e.g. Olesen, 2010; Healey, 2009; Roo & Geoff, 2007; Sartorio, 2005; Albrechts, *et al.*, 2003). Nevertheless, the term is put in *inverted commas* to stress that this conceptualization should not necessarily be understood as attempts to theorize something new, maybe merely an attempt to re-read previous conceptualizations. Furthermore, “SPSSs” is not touted as a new ontology (ways of being) aiming at preaching a new society order, but as a methodology (ways of doing) for managing better future of a place based on shared vision and values (See Newman, 2008). Or in other words, the real test for “SPSSs” is not whether the conceived vision has been fully achieved, but rather whether a change in approach has been realized to achieve a better future (See Albrechts, 2006).

5.2.2. Conceptualizing “SPSSs”: Three-layer Perspective of Spatial Strategy-making

- *Prelude*

Strategic spatial planning is not only concerned in developing substantive theories, but it is as much about process, institutional design, mobilization, and above all about the content related to the key issues selected in the process (Albrechts, 2004: 748). Equally important as in the developed countries, developing countries alike acknowledge the environmental agenda to be of a high priority to future spatial developments, thus sustainable development has become an umbrella concept for promoting a wide range of economic, social, and environmental public policies (Jabareen, 2004: 623), also in present Palestine. Jepson (2001: 505) believes that sustainability and the field of spatial planning are inextricably linked and mutually relevant since the constituent concepts of sustainability are conceived by many of its proponents to be most applicable at the same level at which most spatial planning occurs and on which it is most focused, that is, the local or regional level. This argument coincides with the well-known adage: “*think globally, act locally.*” The interest in the local knowledge and prevailing policy processes that characterize the context, where planning take place always have been identified as of high influence (Healey, 2007). The remaining of this section is dedicated to the articulation of these notions through a 3-layer perspective of spatial strategy-making of space, namely: outer space, medium space, and inner space (Figure 5.1).

Outer space dimension is the crust sphere within which the proposed conceptualization is conceived. It investigates the three bottom-line of sustainability, namely: the *social*, *economic*, and *environmental* interventions. The **inner space** dimension is the core of the proposed conceptualization and is always conceived to be of a dynamic status. It is a flexible frontier, where the *local knowledge* and prevailing *policy processes* that characterize the context of research take place. Nevertheless, within the proposed conceptualization a **medium space** dimension that outpaces the outer and inner dimensions apart is conceived. Planning literature criticizes the practice of spatial planning strategies for not being efficient (Newman, 2008) and for being (mis-)used as smokescreens for neo-liberal transformations of strategic spatial planning (Olesen, 2010). Therefore, the medium space dimension is introduced with the intention of accentuating on how “SPSSs” should be carried out in practice, *i.e. what is actually done*, as opposed to the thesis of communicative planning theorists, who are merely concerned with prescribing how “SPSSs” should be done, *i.e. what should be done* (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002).

The arsenal of classification and compartmentalization within this conceptualization is not definite, but presented to chart some conceptual grids over dynamic fields of three key variables, fully acknowledging that no clear cut edge or boundary exists between the three outlined spaces. Within the framework of this conceptualization, spatial strategy-making is investigated and analyzed through three perspectives (*i.e.*, key variables), namely: object/passive-subject/conscious orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation. The three perspectives are considered to be interdependent and interrelated. More specifically, it is assumed that the truism of public participation (*z*-axis in Figure 5.1) implicitly stands as the projection of both the object-subject orientation (*x*-axis in Figure 5.1) and government-governance tendency (*y*-axis in Figure 5.1).

Following is a brief discussion on each of the three proposed space dimensions (outer, inner, and medium) against the three key variables for spatial strategy-making (object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation).




Figure (5.1): Conceptualizing “SPSSs”: 3-layer Perspective of Spatial Strategy-making

- *1st-layer: Outer Space Dimension*

This dimension is the exterior frontier of the current conceptualization for “SPSSs”. It is a rigid dimension in the sense that it is deeply content-related and object-oriented. Hence, the outer space dimension focuses on the overall sustainability goals, namely: social, economic, and environment. This conceptualization is ubiquitous and concurs that improving life conditions requires a scientific interpretation to the (built and nature) environment as articulated by the school of thought of urban rationalists who follow a positivistic perspective to the prevailing urban conditions (Section 6.2.2, Chapter 6). Notwithstanding that the outer space dimension within this conceptualization stands for a highly centralized system that is nationally controlled by central governments, there is an extreme presentation for government control over resources, where citizens are manipulated (Arnstein, 1969).

Since the onset of environmental consciousness in the 1970’s, notion of sustainable development (AKA: environmental sustainability and sustainable communities) became more noticeable in spatial planning literature, when the United Nations’ affiliated Brundtland Commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), published its report “Our Common Future” in 1987 that advocated for a promising future for our cities. The report brought sustainability into the mainstream of scholarly work, with the often cited definition: “*sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*” (WCED, 1987: 43).

The prevailing conventional concept of sustainable development nowadays contains three bottom lines, namely: *economic line*, where an economically sustainable system must be able to produce goods and services on a continuing basis; *environmental line*, where (both natural and built) environmental sustainable system must maintain a stable resource base, avoiding over-exploitation of renewable resources, avoiding depletion of non-renewable resources, maintenance of ecosystem functions (e.g. biodiversity) not commonly classified as economic resources; and *socio-political line*, where a socially sustainable system must work to achieve adequate provision of social services including health and education, gender equity, and political accountability and participation (Holmberg, 1992). The nexus of these three bottom lines yield in the articulation of other sub-notions for the envisioned system of our cities, namely: a bearable, equitable, and viable system (Figure 5.2).




Figure (5.2): Conventional Nexus of Sustainability
 Source: Edited by the author from Adams (2006)

Literature about spatial planning as a public policy arena provides evidence on the complex pedigree of the notion of sustainable development. Holmberg (1992: 20) sees the notion of sustainable development “.... has become devalued to the point where, to some, it is now just a cliché,” and this is indeed problematic as a cliché is conceived as a danger to streamline thinking in today’s societies (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). This brings on the table the question *is sustainability a fuzzy notion, a concept, or a doctrine?* This question is presented here to grasp the dogmatic narrative associated with the evolution of sustainability within the discipline of spatial planning.

Simply and without much exposition, when a notion is associated with high uncertainty, which is inevitable to the profession of spatial planning and decision-making (Shackle, 1969) the notion becomes associated with fuzziness. Actually, for Roo & Geoff (2007: 8) “....sustainability is cursed with fuzziness.” Uncertainty is best conceived in this context as the “....lack of knowledge, by an individual or group that is relevant to the purpose or action being undertaken” (Abbott, 2005: 238). The more the fuzzy notions are used they become part of structure of our belief systems or terms of reference, and this is what a concept is all about. A concept could be said to have become a doctrine when its underlying assumptions are accepted to such an extent that they are considered as implicit beliefs that are more or less fixed in terms of the planning process (Roo, 2003). In this sense it is reasonable to say that the fuzzy notion of sustainability can be considered as a doctrine on the basis that it is widely understood by the society. Nevertheless, acknowledging sustainability as a belief system does not mean that it reflects reality. Actually, Roo & Geoff (2007: 8) argues that though sustainability is politically accepted, still its translation into practice is cumbersome, chiefly because it has a wide range of interpretations, therefore it is usually included in the policy-making process as a secondary objective. Arguably, this is a valid conclusion in the context of research.

To this end, there remains a lack of comprehensive theoretical approach for understanding the complexity of sustainability, as most of the current research on the topic is monothematic, while the issues are multi-disciplinary (Leitmann, 1999: 49). This has challenged Jabareen (2004) to draw “*A Knowledge Map for Describing Variegated and Conflict Domains of Sustainable Development*”, by which he could inductively identify seven metaphors; each representing a certain domain in the designated cognitive map. The identified seven metaphors are of a “generative” nature (Rein & Schön, 1977) and they best serve here as a conceptual bridge between familiar and unfamiliar phenomena to understand a problem and also to guide future actions (Myers & Kitsuse, 2000). Jabareen (2004) believes that the metaphor of **ethical** paradox signifies the ethical domain; the **material** domain is represented through the metaphor of natural capital; the **social** domain through the metaphor of fairness; the **political** domain through the global discourse metaphor; the **management** domain through the integrative management metaphor; the **visionary** domain through the utopian metaphor; and the **spatial** domain through the eco-form metaphor. The latter, in spatial planning terms, suggests “*compactness, high density of the built environment, intensification of its activities, efficient land planning, diverse and mixed land-uses and efficient transportation systems*” (Jabareen, 2004: 632). The spatial domain and the associated metaphor of eco-form is partly the focus of this doctoral research and are further discussed through introducing “Smart Growth” as a promising planning approach in present Palestine” (See Section 5.3, Chapter 5).

While Jabareen (2004) has employed metaphor-like signifiers to chart the associated domains of conflict between the main goals of sustainability, namely: socio-politics, economic, and environment, other spatial planners used more representative and simple geometrical images to provide rhetorically

powerful organizing representations, of which a particularly evocative and compelling example is the “planner’s triangle” of Campbell (1996) (Figure 5.3). Campbell (1996) identifies mainly three conflicts at the edges or axes between the three-bottom lines of sustainability, namely: property conflict, resource conflict, and development conflict, where sustainable development is placed in the center as the potential, elusive reconciliation towards which planners can strive (Connelly, 2007: 263).

As depicted in Figure (5.3), there are three conflicts occurring as a result of the contention between the three goals at the different corners of the planner’s triangle, namely: development, resource, and property conflict. The *property conflict* is the result of the contention between socio-cultural (including economic) growth and equitable allocation of physical space in the form of the usage of property as a private resource and public good. This is more problematic in the context of research, where the Israeli geo-political artifacts impede the local Palestinian spatial growth goals (Section 2.4, Chapter 2). In the same token, the *resource conflict* between physical-led spatial growth and ecological utility is the result from the contention as formulated in the consumption claims of natural resources and physical space arises from competing needs to improve the living standards of local people, while protecting the environment through designated growth management concepts. Nevertheless, when the geo-political goals have a high profile like in the context of research and the local planning capacities are relatively weak, the depletion of natural resources becomes a pejorative aspect of spatial growth (Section 2.6, Chapter 2). Tellingly, the *development conflict* stands as the legacy of long-standing contentions among the three goals of sustainability as resulted in the form of spatial development practices, and it remains the most elusive conflict, simply because it stems from the difficulty of dealing both with the *property conflict* and *resource conflict* together. This may be the quite standing conundrum of sustainable development in spatial planning practices: how to increase social equity and protect environment simultaneously? (Campbell, 1996: 298) In the context of research, the *development conflict* has been coloured with many meanings to represent the changing priorities with time (Section 3.3, Chapter 3).




Figure (5.3): The Planner’s Triangle towards Achieving Sustainable Development
Source: Adapted from (Campbell, 1996)

As such, sustainability exhibits both time and spatial dimensions, since it is not only based on the idea that we do not inherit our environment, but we borrow it from our children’s (time dimension), also it takes into consideration the geographical scale at which environmental issues are emerged (spatial dimension). This entails that the local level is perceived as a crucial contributor to sustainability at the larger level, hence the exhortation to “*think globally, act locally.*”

Healey (2007) points out that sustainability in practice at the local level is challenged by the prevailing institutional settings. She asserts that the key dimensions in situ are the nature of **local knowledge** and **policy processes**. This is what she most probably refers to in her *magnum opus* “*Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies,*” as soft infrastructure (Healey, 1997). Gaffikin, *et al.* (2005) assure that Healey did not define soft infrastructure, but they think that she meant by using it to refer to the inventory of habits, styles, and arenas, amongst others that typify a mode of communication and governance. The next section conceptualizes these notions within the inner space dimension.

- ***2nd-layer: Inner Space Dimension***

This dimension is the core of the current conceptualization for “SPSSs”. It is a flexible dimension in the sense that it is trapped in the contextualization of the phenomenon at hand (i.e. sustainability). More specifically, the inner space is concerned with the epistemic dimension of sustainability, i.e. local knowledge and policy processes. Tellingly, the malleability of the inner space within this conceptualization renders it to stand for a highly decentralized system that is locally managed by citizens, who are in role of principle (Arnstein, 1969). Therefore, the inner space dimension focuses on interaction as it is deeply actor-related and subject-oriented, unlike the outer space dimension, which is deeply content-related and object-oriented. This conceptualization goes along with the communicative/interpretative turn in planning theory and policy analysis that emphasizes on adopting a social constructivist approach to knowledge production under the rubric of consensus building (Innes & Booher, 1999), thus challenging the rationalist/positivist approach of objectively-grounded understanding of, say, urban and regional dynamics. Needless to say, this conceptualization captures the normative case, which “SPSSs” strives to achieve.

Owing to the influence exhorted in the stifling duality between macro and micro, as articulated in “*think globally, act locally,*” this level of conceptualization concur on the importance of acknowledging context-specific methods of exploring local knowledge and policy processes, thus allowing the holism of this conceptualization to cut rightly across and overlap with different levels and layers and thus including things and entities as active autonomous (f)actors of importance (Boelens, 2010: 38).

In other words, and at the risk of sounding tautological, in spatial planning terms it is important to indicate that since predicting a trajectory for the evolving city system and steering it to maintain a given course are quintessentially difficult tasks, due to the inordinate relevant variables and the way they interrelate, the current mainstream of sustainability should be maintained by sidestepping the risk of replacing a planning model with another, and by investigating in the nature of knowledge needed and the ways knowledge is mobilized in current policy processes, and needless to say this, promises to add substantial implications for the enterprise of “SPSSs”, at hand.

Local knowledge or firsthand experience within a knowledge community is best described by Geertz (1983: 167) as “*to know a city is to know its streets.*” It is a “*practical, collective and strongly rooted in*

a particular place.... [that forms an] organized body of thought based on immediacy of experience” (Geertz, 1983: 75). The mechanisms that the prevailing models of community knowledge unravel provide insights of synthesis, as the knowledge community is foreseen as of having a complimentary role by offering values, raising questions of fairness and providing political insights for the professional role, which retain autonomy over technical issues. Corburn (2003: 420) proposed a model for community knowledge, called “co-production,” to tap the local knowledge, by adding to the knowledge base of policy-making (epistemology); including silenced voices (democracy); providing low-cost policy solutions (efficacy); and highlighting inequitable distributions of environmental burdens (justice). The “co-production” concept has connection with the concept of “knowledge co-construction” (Alexander, 2013). The “co-production” model argues that all publics are potential contributors to all aspects of spatial planning decisions, because it is hard to make a distinction between expert and lay, scientific and political, or facts and values (Corburn 2003: 423). Nevertheless, Herzele (2004: 197) concludes based on empirical evidences that the value of local knowledge in the creative phase of planning practice is at best considered to be an input used to steer planning solutions devised by professionals to ameliorate urban conditions rather than to formulate new interpretations of the planning situation itself as argued by the “co-production” model of Corburn (2003). To this end, Herzele & Woerkum (2008: 445) make it clear that local knowledge should not be thought of as *“a resource, which can simply be tapped into, but as a (situated) process i.e., something to be produced in the circumstances of a specific situation.”*

Re-thinking the nature of policy processes by acknowledging local knowledge as a situated process suggests that “SPSSs” should be understood as an enterprise in generating policy ideas with the capacity to frame ways of thinking and ways of acting over the long-term. Healey (2007: 35) thinks that the current calls for empowerment and public participation should be voiced in paying more attention to the dimensions of policy processes in terms of the articulation of the notions of accessibility, dissemination, legitimacy, and accountability. However, Voogd & Woltjer (1999) make it clear that there is no one model of communicative policy process. Lauria & Wagner (2006: 378) have gone further by concluding by means of meta-analysis of empirical studies in communicative planning theory that the use of multiple sources and methods does not guarantee that contentious theoretical issues will be resolved. Therefore, Voogd & Woltjer (1999) echoed the ideas of Kaiser, *et al.* (1995) and others that the communicative ideology stand-alone does not necessarily meet conventional ethical planning principles any better, but when compounded with “adaptive” rational planning more concrete results and fruitions are anticipated. This could be done by adopting a planning approach, which consists of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data and information to stakeholders in the use and development of land.

In this way, the inner space dimension and particularly the agenda-setting and narrative-building process as articulated from the local knowledge seem to put an increasing pressure on statutory planning to somehow incorporate trade-offs made in the formal planning apparatus (See Olesen a, 2011: 194). Evidences from the European experience (e.g., for the Danish experience (See Olesen, 2011 a); for the British experience (See Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009); and for the Irish experience (See Walsh, 2009)), where most of theorizing and practice of “SPSSs” is being materialized, suggest that for “SPSSs” to be successful and effective such inner spaces should be closely linked with formal institutional arrangements, and not outcompete with them. However, in general there seems to be little evidence of inner spaces acting as important vehicles for policy integration, policy delivery or promoting more effective forms of “SPSSs”, alone. Olesen (2011 b) concludes that while the empirical observation of the prevalence of inner spaces in spatial planning remains a significant contribution to the

planning literature, the normative theorization on inner spaces’ significance in spatial planning seems to be overstated and perhaps even unfounded. This suggests that there is indeed what Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2002) call a “dark side” of “SPSSs”, in which related practices are misinterpreted, misused, or showcased to fulfill certain agendas. In the conceptualization for “SPSSs” at hand, this “dark side” is referred to as medium space dimension.

- *3rd-layer: Medium Space Dimension*

This dimension is presented as the medium, where the current “SPSSs” are devised in practice. It is a medium space since its characteristics are lend from both the outer space and inner space dimensions, therefore it should not be acknowledged in a pejorative or sinister manner. Such an approach of exploring this “black box/dark side” within spatial planning theorization in general has recently gained concurrency (See Yiftachel, 1998; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Yiftachel, 2009; and Olesen, 2011 a). It is indeed the result of meshing between the two dimensions of outer and inner space dimensions in the sense of being content/actor related, object/subject oriented, and thus focusing both on achieving goals, and mobilizing the interaction networks within the policy community.

Nevertheless, it is quite important to assure that the contribution of the outer space dimension is much more anticipated than that of the inner space dimension within this conceptualization, simply because at the end of the day the ultimate goal of “SPSSs” is to enhance the quality of life in every-day life practices. So it is a question of *what is actually done*, not *what should be done*? In this way, one could gain a better understanding, which is less idealistic, and more mundane of what “SPSSs” is and more specifically, what are the strategies and policies that may help steer a change for the better (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). In other words, there is a need to understand “Realrationalität” or real-life rationality than normative rationality that unequivocally does provide an ideal to strive for, but remains a poor guide to the strategies and policies needed for moving toward to the ideal, and arguably this is the quandary of normative idealists, including the majority of planning theorists, especially the communicative planning theorists, who know where they would like to go, but not how to get there (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002: 22-23). As such, the question remains *what is the instrumental rationality that concentrates on devising the best way to solve problems*? And this is one of the secondary questions (Section 4.2, Chapter 4) that this doctoral research strives to answer at the conceptual level, through introducing an expert-consulting model for “SPSSs” (Chapter 6).

The conceptualization of the medium space dimension tends to promote more effective forms of “SPSSs” by filling the gaps in contemporary planning systems, by providing the glue that binds the planning processes with the prevailing planning systems (See Haughton, *et al.*, 2010). In contemporary planning systems the notion of state spatiality is not anymore trapped in nested hierarchies, rather it delineates a more complex picture in which different scales and spaces coexist (See Olesen, 2011 a: 28-29) (Chapter 3). This emergent paradigm of coexistence in state spatiality, or “spatial fix,” in the terms of Harvey (2001) is the result of the insatiable drive of globalization that tends to resolve its own crisis by means of geographical expansion and restructuring. A recent example of great relevance to the context of this doctoral research that contributes to this discussion is Yiftachel’s (2009) “*Theoretical Notes on Gray Cities.*” Liggett (2009: 107) highly commends and echoes Yiftachel’s (2009) work since he examines the effects of globalization on city level, arguing that this is the level where the daily spatial practices are played out. Needless to say, this challenges the mainstream of theorizing about globalization that examines larger geographic levels for the examination and analysis of globalization

effects (Section 3.2.4, Chapter 3). Yiftachel (2009: 97) calls for a “planning citizenship” to confront what he calls “creeping urban apartheid” that characterizes the “contemporary urban colonialism” in Palestine/Israel. The march towards “planning citizenship” amid the geo-political context that spawns Palestine/Israel should mainly focus on policy participation and communal identity of the citizens of what he calls “gray” spaces, in which citizens live in *de facto* “permanent temporalities” under the pretexts of “necessary enhancement” and “security”.

The conceptual scheme outlined here provides many answers, but raises many questions, as well especially if approached from a poly-rational planning standpoint that focuses on the value of fragmentation, and could provide arenas for different voices and rationalities (Davy, 2008). Nevertheless, what remains of high relevance is that “SPSSs” could emerge as a mix of top-down functional spaces for national and regional planning promoted by the state and more *ad hoc* bottom-up arrangements (See Olesen, 2011 b).

To conclude, contemporary planning systems, especially those situated in volatile geo-political conditions face many vexing problems, thus rendering these systems to devise responsive paradigms of planning in a more assertive form that could command appropriate political legitimacy and support to the needed spatial development schemes. The conceptualization for “SPSSs” at hand provide a promising paradigm by presenting “SPSSs” as a spectrum of overlap (sidestepping potential inherited schism) between outer space, medium space, and inner space dimensions against three key variables of spatial strategy-making, namely: object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation that are in seemingly endless fluidity and interdependence (Figure 5.4).




Figure (5.4): Spectrum of Overlap for “SPSSs” Space Dimensions against Spatial Strategy-making Perspectives

Nowadays, “SG” stands as a term of spatial planning that is in vogue. It stands as the new urban approach of “SPSSs” and could even act as a synonym for many of the explicit contemporary values and tools of wider spatial planning (Gunder & Hillier, 2009: 83). The term has been catapulted to the forefront of public discourse, and has gained rapid concurrency to the level that makes it the state-of-the-art discussion within the field of contemporary spatial planning, at large. For instance, at the time this manuscript was first written (12.03.2012), a search (as depicted by the search engine, Google) on the phrase “Smart Growth” produced nearly a 150,000,000 more results than “New Urbanism,” a phrase that is closely related and is such a fundamental part of the planning lexicon that made advocates of New Urbanism to argue that both agendas are convergent, if not, fully synonymous (See Gunder, 2011: 188). In 2010, and based on a national survey of practicing planners in the USA, Jepson & Edwards (2010) find that it is to the conviction of planners that “SG” matched most frequently with the sustainable development principles and is also the most understood in comparison with other sustainable development oriented sister approaches, namely: New Urbanism and the Ecological City. Nevertheless, many critics still question “SG” and consider it to be a vision or a smokescreen for neo-liberal schemes

(Gunder & Hillier, 2009: 77-94). Needless to say, this makes it trapped in the medium zone dimension (Figure 5.5). Based on the proposed conceptualization for “SPSSs”, the articulation of “SG” will be always the encumbrance of context; therefore, the next section is dedicated to the discussion of “SG” as a promising planning approach in the context of research. At the outset, “SG” is defined in terms of principles and the associated policies, and then the doctrine of sustainability is revisited and rationalized in terms of approach to be apposite for the context of Bethlehem and present Palestine, at large. It is important to highlight that discussing “SG” here stems from the interest of making sure that such a movement does not become “.... bogged down in outdated notions, or unsubstantiated claims about causes and effects, [as] there will never be completely right or completely wrong answers, but there should always be a continuing need to question assumptions, challenge the status quo, and push for new ways of dealing with an endemic problem” (Knaap & Talen, 2005: 117), such as urban sprawl that characterizes the course of urban development in present Palestine, in general, and in the case study of Bethlehem city-area, in specific (See El-Atrash, 2009)




Figure (5.5): Situating “Smart Growth” within the Conceptualizing of “SPSSs” (Red Dot)

5.3. “Smart Growth”: A promising Planning Approach in Present Palestine?

5.3.1. Prelude

Since the introduction of sustainable development, the challenging task for the field of spatial planning has been its conversion into actual principles of development practice (Jepson & Edwards, 2010); that is, its translation on the ground, so to speak, about new urban approaches to spatial development. Grant (2006) highlights “SG” to be one of the foremost urban approaches (i.e., “SPSSs”) that differs from its sister approaches, namely: Traditional Neighbourhood Design, Transit-oriented Design, and Urban Villages in its emphasis to add government policies and incentives to promote change (Table 5.1).

Table (5.1): Comparing the Principles of New Urban Approaches

Traditional Neighbourhood Design	Transit-oriented Design	Urban Villages	“Smart Growth”
Focus on vernacular or classical architecture	Centred on public transportation hubs linked to regional system	More emphasis on self-sufficiency (with mix of housing and jobs) and brownfield re-development	Adds government policies and incentives to promote change
Source: (Grant, 2006: 57)			

The new urban approaches, especially “SG” gained momentum from a renewed focus on the importance of urban design, known as New Urbanism and the promotion of a Compact City model for urban growth rather than the conventional urban sprawl. Notwithstanding that “SG” and New Urbanism share the same lexicon, a closer view on the genesis and nature of both reveals significant difference. Knaap & Talen (2005: 109-110) highlight two significant differences between “SG” and New Urbanism. First, in terms of origin, “SG” was advocated mainly by environmentalists and policy planners, who were appalled by the problem of sprawl, whereas New Urbanism was highly influenced by architects and physical planners. Second, in terms of focus, both share the same principles, but New Urbanism give a high profile for physical form, arguing that changes in physical form are a necessary precondition for urban economic, social, and ecological change. Furthermore, New Urbanists have more confidence than advocates of “SG” in the potential of market forces and they call for removing regulatory obstacles to urban development. Nevertheless, Garde (2004: 166) stresses on the interrelatedness between “SG” and New Urbanism, as he argues that there is concrete evidences that the planning and design concepts of New Urbanism have actually influenced public policy, as policy initiatives like “SG” have already incorporated several principles of New Urbanism. Ultimately, what makes “SG” more popular is that it focuses on a more pragmatic question: *How and where should we grow?* (Smart Growth Network, 2003) Needless to say, this is a question that of a quintessential concern for this doctoral research (Chapter 9).

German to this point, “SG” is a spatial planning and environmentalist led response to avoid urban sprawl (Downs, 2005; Duany, *et al.*, 2010). Furthermore, “SG” is a design-oriented and business-friendly concept that represents the visible expression of the much-vaunted term “growth management,” which developed some highly restrictive connotations (Hamin, *et al.*, 2006). “SG” literature provides considerable acknowledgment to link urban planning and transportation as a theory that aims at directing and concentrating growth in the center of a city as the mainstay to “SG” activities; and advocates compact, transit-oriented, walk-able, bicycle-friendly land use, including mixed-use development with a range of housing choices, along with other constellations of elements (Downs, 2005: 368). The next section presents the major principles of “SG”.

5.3.2. Principles of “Smart Growth”

Generally speaking, the principles of “SG” are widely acceptable ideas about the desirable form and character of communities. The Smart Growth Network (2003) provides the most exhaustive list of ten “SG” principles that would provide robust “SPSSs” to curb urban sprawl, amongst other wicked urban challenges. The promoted ten principles of “SG” are not on par in terms of scope and level of intervention, as per the physical, socio-cultural and ecological goals of sustainability. Table (5.2) categorizes these ten principles according to their sustainability’s goals, keeping in mind that these

principles are interrelated and organically connected. It is important to acknowledge that every aspect (i.e. physical, socio-cultural or ecological) of this localization of the “SG” principles has its repercussions on the other aspects. In other words, the three binding physical principles of mixed land-uses, compact design, and provision of a variety of transportation choices, for instance, could be conceived as the structural framework that would enable the adoption of the other related ecological (namely, preserve open spaces) and socio-cultural principles, and *vice versa*. Therefore, the ten principles should be adopted as a bundle in the adoption of robust “SPSSs”.

Table (5.2): Taxonomies of the Principles of “Smart Growth”, based on their Sustainability’s Goals

Ecological	
Principle 1	Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas
Physical	
Principle 2	Mixed land-uses
Principle 3	Compact design
Principle 4	Provide a variety of transportation choices
Principle 5	Strengthen and direct development toward existing communities
Socio-cultural	
Principle 6	Create a range of housing opportunities and choices
Principle 7	Create walk-able communities
Principle 8	Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong sense of place
Principle 9	Make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective
Principle 10	Encourage community and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions
Source: Edited by the Author from Smart Growth Network (2003).	
<i>Note: The principles of “SG” as presented here slightly differ from those presented in the original source, only to ensure consistency in terms of presentation in respect to the adopted taxonomy.</i>	

Hamin, *et al.* (2006: 55) note that though achieving these goals as have been formulated focus largely on regulation, it still requires much more focus on implementation, preferably based on better municipal planning. Based on an extensive review of “SG” definitions from a range of several organizations, with different uses and apparent implementations, Ye *et. al.*, (2005: 312) have found how malleable the term is in practice, as the basic principles each organization at different level seeks to ascribe to the term can easily shift with the political imperatives of different communities at stake. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily entail that the term has become totally meaningless, rather the more plausible argument would suggest that future analysis of the impact of such policies and practices must involve detailed examination of the nuances of implementation in their quest to adumbrate to the core of urban problems, which is urban sprawl. Therefore, this doctoral research aims at examining the interrelated principles of “SG” in the context of Bethlehem to identify relevance and prioritize level of interventions (Chapter 7).

In an initial exposition of the relation of “SG” with the three key variables of spatial strategy-making, namely: object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation, one could conclude that the term is seemingly doomed with fuzziness and that the chances of adopting a robust “SG” agenda are dim indeed, if it is only based on one spatial strategy-making perspective (i.e. mono-rational). To elaborate more, though “SG” is best understood as an attempt to restrain sprawl, through a variety of land-use control mechanisms (i.e. being object-oriented, e.g. see principle 2 & 3 in Table 5.2) it is still focuses on initiating collaborative decision-making too (i.e. being subject-oriented,

see principle 10 in Table 5.2). Notwithstanding that citizen participation in planning processes may be able to shape the real meaning in practice of the currently amorphous term of “SG” still it seems to be not able to provide a politically astute position to the truism of citizen participation (Ye, *et al.*, 2005: 313). Baum (2004: 17) assures that when talking about implementing “SG”, practitioners of the field ignore the prevailing organization of community groups and the apparently different deep interests of organizations that often lead to covert contest, but might incorporate overt occasional involvement for individuals in some carefully structured processes that might lead participants to comply with “SG” principles in specific situations. The Smart Growth Network (2012) presents a representative statement of this view:

“Citizen participation can be time-consuming, frustrating and expensive. On the other hand, encouraging community and stakeholder collaboration can lead to creative, speedy resolution of development issues and greater community understanding of the importance of good planning and investment. “Smart Growth” plans and policies developed without strong citizen involvement will lack staying power. Involving the community early and often in the planning process vastly improves public support for “Smart Growth” and often leads to innovative strategies that fit the unique needs of a particular community.” (emphasis added by the author to the *text in italics*).

From another perspective, though “SG” values long-range and regional considerations of sustainability (Scott, 2007), empirical evidences have shown that the related principles with regional focus and non-local implications most of the time do not generate the needed tepid support for implementation, unlike the principles with neighborhood focus that have primarily local implications, which are most likely to be implemented (See Garde, 2004: 158 & Downs, 2005: 373). Scott (2007: 31) indicates that in the discussion of “SG”, paradigmatic change and structural persistence coexist in the production of regional space, as well as local urban outcomes. Therefore, it seems that a great gulf exists between “SG” theoretical proposition and implementation in terms of government-governance tendency.

To this end, it seems that so much potential in “SG” are not being tapped, and the current practice would promise to carry tepid support for the common good. As Ye, *et al.* (2005: 309) put it, *“It is clear that the combination of an explicit “Smart Growth” objective and reliance on one of the recognized “Smart Growth” implementation tools does not constitute a basis for classifying a policy as “Smart Growth”.”* Therefore, there is a crucial need to revisit “SG” in the context of research to unfold the associated potentials, but first it is important to elaborate a sustainable development definition that is responsive to the Palestinian context. Needless to say, there is an intrinsic relationship between “SG” and sustainable development in which the latter provide the incubator for future interventions based on the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability, and promulgated in an agenda of controlled population growth and efficient management of resources, which are unequivocally scarce and limited in the context of Bethlehem, and present Palestine, at large (Figure 5.6).




Figure (5.6): Generic Dialectical Relation between “Smart Growth” and Sustainable Development
 Source: Edited from (Sadaqa, 2009: 49)

Baum (2004: 16) defines “growth” as a quantitative concept, measuring an aggregation of individuals, and it refers most often to an increase in *population*, sometimes to dwelling units or built-up parcels on a certain *land*. Thus, “SG”, as the recent coinage of “SPSSs” that strives to work as an implementation tool to achieve long-term resources management deals primarily with two dependent factors, namely: *land* (static) and *population* (dynamic) (Figure 5.6). Nonetheless, in the context of present Palestine, land could be considered also as a dynamic factor due to the situated geo-political conditions (See Section 2.42.4, Chapter 2), but for research purposes it is considered to be of a static nature (See Section 1.2, Chapter 1). Overall, land is a multi-dimensional sub-theme to the triple bottom-lines of sustainability (i.e. economy, environment and socio-politics). In this regard, the sub-theme of land could be affiliated to: economic intervention when considered as a demand for infrastructural networks; environmental intervention when discussing the preserved quota (e.g. sensitive landscape); socio-political intervention when discussed from accessibility and capacity building point of view.

5.3.3. Revisiting Sustainability: A Double-tiered Approach – Need & Right-based Approaches to Palestinian Urban Spatial Development

As articulated in the Brundtland’s Report of 1987, sustainability is defined as a need-based approach that focuses on meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of coming generations to fulfill their own needs (Section -, Chapter 5). Despite the fact that there are common basic needs for all people that traditionally include food, water, and shelter, and modernly developed to include sanitation, education, and healthcare, there remain other specific needs (in terms of type and level of intervention), which different countries acknowledge, each according to its situation and context. Acknowledging sustainability as a doctrine of policy orientation that derives meaning by what people expect from it, is therefore important. Roo & Geoff (2007: 8) hence calls for studying sustainability and

its implementation from an academic perspective based on this acknowledgment, i.e. defining sustainability beforehand would narrow down the scope of analysis, by prejudging its meaning.

The UNHABITAT, as the supranational sovereignty legitimate aura mandated to promote socially and environmentally sustainable cities, had taken on its shoulder the task of bridging the urban divide by widening the definition of sustainability to include a right-based approach to the current need-based approach, and have adapted recent related policy, accordingly (UNHABITAT, 2010). The main motive for broadening the definition is because of the futile outcomes associated with the conventional definition of sustainability as a need-based approach that failed to ensure a harmonious urbanization, especially in cases where large sections of cities population are deprived from basic needs while others live in opulence. Needless to say, this case has exacerbated with the recent emergent problems, chiefly: climate change (UNHABITAT, 2010: 19).

Sustainability, as a right-based approach is not newness, but actually based on revolutionary urban ideals, as articulated in the concept of the “Right to the City”. The “Right to the City” as a concept was first coined by the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre in 1968. In his book “Writings on Cities,” Lefebvre has touted the concept with the thesis that there is a pressing need to redefine the social needs (that of anthropological foundation) inherent to urban society, which are somewhat parsimoniously taken into account by planners (Lefebvre, 1996: 147) (Section 6.2.2, Chapter 6). These social needs are formulated in right-based terminologies, and conceived as a mechanism to induce a “paradigm change” against marginalization and discrimination that are rampant in cities today, vouching that the opportunities that cities offer are accessible to all inhabitants. In this sense, the “Right to the City” provides an adequate platform for action, as well as a framework for human rights enforcement, as it promotes respect, protection, and realization of civic, political, economic, cultural, and environmental rights that are secured in the regional and international instruments of human rights. Nevertheless, the “Right to the City” should not be viewed as a new legalistic right, but rather an articulation of the deep yearnings of city dwellers to institutionalize multiple human rights within city spaces (UNHABITAT, 2010: 5).

Within the context of present Palestine, the articulation of sustainability, as a right-based approach has recently gained concurrency in the debate of spatial and environmental planning and management (See Alfasi & Fenster, 2014; ARIJ, 2011; Davis & Hatuka, 2011; IPCC, 2009; and Adalah, 2006). This is attributed to the situated geo-political conditions that add layers of complexity in the quest to achieving sustainability. The main thread between the related discussions of sustainability within the context of present Palestine could be distilled by laying-out a double-tiered approach to urban spatial development towards sustainability (Figure 5.7), where in the *status quo* that is characterized by a deep urban enfranchisements due to the Israeli policy of separation and fragmentation (UNOCHA, 2011), a right-based approach concurred with the prevailing need-based approach is needed to advocate for the rights of indigenous Palestinians enriched by International Human Law, including, right of freedom to movement, right to worship, right to education, right to safe water, to name a few, bearing in mind that these rights, amongst others are interrelated and dependent (e.g. COHRE, 2008; El-Atrash, 2012). Nevertheless, the dominant and founding principle of sustainability as a need-based approach is always foreseen, especially in the case of an emergent independent Palestinian statehood. Said differently, within the Palestinian context, the Lefebverian social needs that should be redefined as articulated in the concept of the “Right to the City” are regulated in terms of advocating for the right of freedom of

movement, right to safe water, and right to education, amongst others. To this end, sustainable development within the context of present Palestine means:

“....developing the ability to fulfill basic human needs and improve living standards for Palestinians, in spite of the Israeli Occupation and its practices. In this challenging context, a responsive and adaptive concept of development that articulates the sense of “ownership” among Palestinians in the [Occupied Palestinian Territory] could be adopted: this concept reflects the determination of the Palestinian people to remain on their land and continue to pursue their livelihoods, not succumbing to the pressures placed upon them by the Israeli Occupation. It is also a concept that refers to the transition from unviable development under military Occupation, to development for endurance and survival” (ARIJ, 2011: 7).




Figure (5.7): A Double-tiered Approach to Sustainability – Need & Right-based Approaches to Palestinian Urban Spatial Development

Therefore, sustainability in the prevailing spatio-temporal case of present Palestine that is characterized by a state of prolonged military occupation and a stagnant interim period of lack of jurisdiction and control over land and natural resources entails that the main challenging need of this period is to plan concurrently for the current situation and for the situation of an established independent Palestinian statehood. By the same token, it is crucially needed that the Palestinian people devise their own strategies, based on geo-political considerations and developments that take into consideration the competing Israeli planning aspirations, and ensuring that the Palestinian rights to land and natural resources are reserved (MoPIC, 1998: 9).

To this end, introducing a right-based approach to sustainability, in tandem to the prevailing need-based approach in present Palestine is mainly meant to act as a mechanism to institutionalize the multiple human rights, including: right of freedom to movement, right to education, right to safe water, to name a few that the Palestinians lack in light of the situated geo-political context. The conceptual or institutional framework for this approach is based on the Lefebverian ideals of the “Right to the City” or in a more mundane terms the “Human Rights in the City” and is presented herein as Spatial Planning Rights (“SPR”). “SPR” is an academic non-esoteric notion of a system-based definition of human sustainability that integrates the principles, standards, and goals in purist to sustainability into the day-to-day practices and activities related to local planning processes of spatial development. Alternatively, Alexander (2007: 121) defines general “Planning Rights” as the “institutional rights of actors and affected parties in a particular planning system; institutional rights are claims acknowledged in the relevant institution”. It is

argued that this would provide a more realistic approach to anchor spatial development activities, especially in the prevailing geo-political context of present Palestine.

Although, Lefebvre (1996) provides a wide perspective on the “Right to the City,” that is unequivocally conceived and acknowledged here as a notoriously elusive concept (Section 6.2.2, Chapter 6), some scholars assume that the “Right to the City” is mainly based on two rights:

- *Right to participation*: It entails that inhabitants are entitled to play a central role in a adumbrating of decisions related to the production of urban space.
- *Right to appropriation of space*: It entails that inhabitants are entitled to use urban space in their day-to-day life practices at the present and future, as well.

However, critical readings of Lefebvre in volatile geo-political contexts, more specifically in present Palestine (See Jabareen, 2006; Adalah, 2006) shows that the concept is composed of more than merely these two rights. It could be inductively decomposed by encompassing new rights, chiefly:

- *Right to urban citizenship*: It entails that all inhabitants must have a *right to participation* (see above) regardless of nationality. Needless to say, this is no more than the principle aspect of governance that is democracy, but it remains quite important in a geo-political context where most of planning decisions are still made by means of military orders (Section 3.2.4, Chapter 3). Kunzmann (2000: 260) makes it clear that there is an “enlightened stance” in strategic spatial planning that considers access to information (hence also on spatial planning, at large) as a civil right.

Overall, “SPR” is shorthanded in the *right of urban self-determination* that entails (re-)production of all facets of urban life, beyond the planning of physical places in the city. The above three mentioned rights are dependent and it is assumed that the dialectical relation among them (Figure 5.8) entails that “SPR”, AKA *right of urban self-determination* would become less idealistic and more pragmatic if the basic *right to participation* is functioning well within the whims of the adopted conceptualization for “SPSSs”, i.e. it would be endorsed in the legitimate arenas of articulation of the state structure, and not in competition with it (Sorensen & Sagaris, 2010) (Chapter 6). It bears mentioning that the *right to participation* is not advanced here as rhetoric of spatial planning policy, rather as a fundamental human right that to be universally protected. Article 27 (1) of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights dictates that: “Everyone has the **right freely to participate** in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” (UNGA, 1948).




Figure (5.8): Dialectic of Spatial Planning Rights

Source: Edited by the author from (Lefebvre, 1996); (Jabareen, 2006); and (Adalah, 2006)

To close, sustainability within the context of present Palestine will always be a need-based approach, but in the situated geo-political context and to ensure the basic human rights of Palestinians – that they generally lack at the time being – are met, it is suggested to adopt in tandem a right-based approach, formulated in the notion of “SPR” that is shorthand by the collective prior *right to participation*. This should be realized, as promulgated in the adopted conceptualization for “SPSSs” that calls for integration and actualization of these practices in the prevailing formal arenas of articulation as regulated in the current state of Palestinian planning apparatus (Section 3.4, Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the *right to participation* that is translated into the rubric of public participation within the adopted conceptualization for “SPSSs” is central, and actually it stands as the shorthand of the intertwined other spatial strategy-making perspectives, namely: object-subject orientation and government-governance tendency. Furthermore, “SG” that stands as the operational concept to “SPSSs” and theme under study within this doctoral research considers public participation as a key principle towards achieving sustainability. Therefore, the next chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the truism of public participation in present Palestine that would lead to the articulation of an expert-consulting model, where the level of intervention for the public is outlined based on the presumed role of planners as interpreted in the recent planning models or school of thoughts that dominated the field of spatial planning with a special attention to the context of research. Beforehand, the next section concludes the conceptual framework.

5.4. Concluding the Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework at hand is best understood as defined by Jabareen (2009: 57) “... as a network, or “plane,” of linked concepts that together provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon. a conceptual framework [is] constructs in which each concept plays an integral role.... they provide an interpretative approach to social reality.”

The phenomenon studied at hand is sustainability, and the concepts that invoke this understanding are the socio-politics, economic, and environment that being constructed by three spatial strategy-making perspectives (key variables), namely: object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation. The proposed interperative approach to the realization of the phenomenon of sustainability within the context of present Palestine is the double-tiered (need & right-based) approach to sustainability (Figure 5.9).

The conceptual framework is composed of three interrelated parts, namely: past, present, and future. This compartmentalization is based on Perloff’s (1980) thesis that the future is not the end of a single historical timeline, rather planners should realize the distinction between “*the past, present, and future components of the future,*” as have been cited by Myers & Kitsuse, (2000: 225), who argue that the planner’s first task is to establish a baseline of continuity between the three components if they are to effectively shape the future, nevertheless with a particular attention to the future component of the future, where the planner’s distinctive contribution is expected. To put it simply, the future should not be treated as mistakenly being done nowadays as a discontinued end-state that exists only in the future; rather the future should be viewed as a continues unfolding in time that is rooted in both the past and present. Needless to say, this comes in conformity with Friedmann’s (1987: 11) definition of planning as “*a forward looking activity that selects from the past those elements that are useful in analyzing existing conditions from a vantage point of the future.*”

The *past* component of the future stands as the legacy or the inherited elements that the planners have to deal with in the future. It includes both tangible and intangible elements. The tangible elements include the built environment, in terms of houses, roads, etc., and the intangible elements include the air quality conditions, and demographic patterns, amongst others.

The *future* component of the future stands as the new elements (also tangible and intangible) that the planners seek to materialize through their plans or proposed interventions to upgrade the status or conditions of the elements inherited from the past. It is the vision (i.e. sustainability) that one need to translate on the ground, and mostly planners use all the available techniques of projection, forecasting, and scenarios, amongst others to visualize this future.

The *present* component of the future is the area where planners mediate and reconcile both the past and future components of the future. In Myers & Kitsuse (2000: 225) terms it is “*the locus of our state of consciousness and our decision-making power.*” In practice terms, this component is indeed ephemeral and is continously shifting from future to past, but still it acts as a filter for thinking and decisions about the future, therefore this component needs to be actively managed.

Said differently, the status of sustainability that is presented as the area of overlap between the three bottom-lines of sustainability, namely: socio-politics, economic, and environment (past component of future) is to be upgraded, i.e. the area of overlap to be increased (future component of future) through the conceptualization of “SPSSs” (present component of future) as an interrelated outer, medium, and inner spaces that overall is conceived through a triple helix of spatial strategy-making perspectives of object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation (Figure 5.9). This conceptualization promises to amalgam the tangible and intangible elements of sustainability in a medium space dimension that is composed of an outer space dimension that is content-related and focusing on object, and will be translated into the notion of systemness of the city: physical, socio-economic, and environmental (Chapter 2), along with an inner space dimension that is actor-related and focusing on subject, and will be translated into the notions of local knowledge and the prevailing policy processes (Chapter 3). This conceptualization for “SPSSs” in present Palestine is grounded by a double tiered approach to sustainability, where the unique spatio-temporal case at hand instigate planners to advocate for the collective human rights of indigenous Palestinians, in tandem to the conventional needs for food, housing, safe water, etc.

As the foremost mode of “SPSSs”, “SG” is presented as an operational concept to be decomposed analytically and empirically in the case study of Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well. Evidently, “SG” is conceived within the proposed conceptualization for “SPSSs” to be situated in the medium space dimension. The assessment of the principles of “SG”, and their associated policies is foreseen to identify the associated prospectus and challenges of adopting them in the context of present Palestine, at large.

Generally speaking, it is to be acknowledged that this rationalization of the phenomenon of sustainability in the context of present Palestine betrays some limitations and difficulties, such as the fact that different conceptual frameworks for sustainability might be out there, as an outcome of different rationalizations of different researchers and scholars. Also, the holism of this conceptualization requires a great deal of hard data (tangible and intangible) to be operationalized in an efficient manner. Nevertheless, this conceptualization for “SPSSs” is still considered flexible and easily adaptable, i.e. can be re-conceptualized and modified as a result of finding new data that were not available at the time the framework was first developed, or due to new constructs on the ground that might change how sustainability is conceived by researchers and scholars. Most importantly, it should always be remembered that this conceptualization for “SPSSs” aims at understanding rather than predicting the phenomenon of sustainability in the practices of spatial planning in the context of present Palestine.




Figure (5.9): Conceptual Framework

Chapter 6: An Expert-Consulting Model

“A word with which to escape responsibility.”

(Watson, 2004: 321)

Chapter 6: An Expert-Consulting Model

6.1. Abstract

This chapter is a continuation of the discussion started in the previous chapter of theoretical framework that concluded the doctrine of sustainability in present Palestine as a double-tiered approach of need & right-based approaches. At the heart of this conceptual deduction, the rubric of public participation is hereinafter tailored into an expert-consulting model that is theoretically informed and practice related. The proposed model defines the responsibility of planners and the degree of public participation that would be afforded in terms of efficiency, and tellingly legitimate in terms of venues of articulation. As resulted, the tailored expert-consulting model to the context of present Palestine is based on the mixed-scanning approach that is the result of the conceptual amalgamation between the technical rational approaches and communicative rational approaches, maximizing the associated strengths in each approach, and minimizing the associated weaknesses, as well. Said differently, an expert-consulting model is envisaged to scaling-up and institutional anchoring of strategic “development” planning to the prevailing physical “statutory” planning at the regional and national level, since the ongoing practice is only realized at the local level in the means of the S-M-DIP that is still nascent, and is very early to evaluate its sustainability outcomes. All of all, this is translated into a balanced approach in terms of its focus on object vs. subject and government vs. governance to suit the spatio-temporal case of present Palestine. At the outset, this chapter, provide basic theoretical reflections of the truism of public participation in “SPSSs”, also it discusses its power connotations in the context of present Palestine, enabling the discussion for an extended exposition of the role of planners in the many planning models to highlight the areas of strengths in each, and to understand the reasons that led to adapt the role of planners throughout the recent history. This helped in identifying the suitable approach that would satisfy a reasonable degree of efficiency against the three spatial strategy-making perspectives, namely: object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation within the adopted conceptualization for “SPSSs”. To substantiate the basis for the proposed expert-consulting model, some generic reflections as grounded in sociological theory is presented and adapted to the discussion of present Palestine. Finally, the model is presented as an indicative and generic spatial strategy-making tool that inevitably needs more concerted efforts to ensure the robustness and institutional settings of the approach, before its implementation. Needless to say, the deduction of this model has been done theoretically, since basically the Palestinian planning experience lacks enough empirical physical plans at the regional and national level that could substantiate the proposal for such a planning model.

6.2. The Truism of “Public Participation”

6.2.1. Prelude

The immense body of literature about public participation in spatial planning practices appears under the umbrella of citizen participation, civic engagement, collaborative governance, and inclusion and representation in democracy, amongst others. Definitely, a detailed exposition of this literature is beyond the scope of this doctoral research, nevertheless, a quick scanning of the related literature shows that despite the differences associated with the different planning models (See Section 6.2.2, below) there is a bottom-line consensus that the methodology of public participation is important and key (Quick & Feldman, 2011: 272-273). The main assumption here is that the more public participation in decision-making processes, the more anticipated is the social acceptance and hence the more sustainable the

anticipated outcomes (Aitken, 2010: 249). Acknowledging this fact, Hartmann (2012: 10) argues that the creation of a participative planning process would be the easiest approach to correspond to all rationalities in a planning process. Basically, rationality is no more than a sophisticated word for reason (Alexander, 2000: 242), and indeed this is the case in “SPSSs”. It is intrinsic to notice that planning is rational and cannot be otherwise; irrational planning is an oxymoron. This conclusion is unavoidable acknowledging rationality for what it is: *“the application of reason to turn beliefs into knowledge, turn knowledge into decisions, and translate ideas into action in rational planning”* (Alexander, 2000: 252).

Indeed, public participation is conceived to be a tangible, process-oriented, and problem-solving exercise (Davis & Hatuka, 2011: 244). Nevertheless, participatory approaches to planning are fraught with difficulties and challenges. More germane, a particular concern is raised regarding the over-emphasis placed on planning process; it has been referred to *“...that the focus on interaction directs attention away from the justice and sustainability of the material outcomes of planning interventions”* (Healey, 2003: 110). Within the course of this doctoral research, *public participation* is more specifically, conceived to increase input oriented primarily to the content of programs and policies, by *“inviting many people to participate, making the process broadly accessible to and representative of the public at large, and collecting community input and using it to influence policy decisions”* (Quick & Feldman, 2011: 274), and this is not to be misinterpreted with *public inclusion*. As enhancing the related participatory practices would enrich the input received, while enhancing the related inclusive practices would build the capacity of the community to tackle related issues and better implement the decisions. It is believed that the mandate of decision-making and implementation should only be endowed with the government and not the mass public (Wegener, 2010). Said differently but in generic terms, planning is *in* politics (it is about making choices) and it cannot escape politics (it must make values and ethics transparent), but it is *not* politics (it does not make the ultimate decisions) (Albrechts, 2005: 263).

Thus, it is a question of citizen empowerment to participate in the planning process, and this is indeed a question of power as first identified in the famous “ladder of citizen participation” of Arnstein (1969), where eight possible levels of citizen participation are indicated. The lower rungs of the ladder reflect degrees of non-participation, such as: manipulation and therapy, where the middle rungs of the ladder reflect a stance of tokenism (providing information, consulting, placation), where the higher rung of the ladder reflects a normative stance of citizens’ control. In the context of present Palestine, this notion is much complicated due to the situated geo-political conditions that introduce different actors mandated to initiate the practices of public participation, namely: Israeli occupation and PNA (Table 6.1). Arguably, and following a rough assessment, the Palestinian case could be characterized to be at a “placation” rung, or maybe a “partnership” rung, at best.

Table (6.1): The Ladder of Arnstein for Citizen Participation in Present Palestine			
Ladder Step	Ladder of Arnstein	Characterization of the Context of Present Palestinian	Actors
1	Manipulation	The Palestinian citizens of present Palestine were manipulated by the Israeli occupation authorities since 1967.	Israeli Military Occupation
2	Therapy	The Israeli occupation authorities tried to calm the Palestinian citizens, but the Palestinians were granted no participation rights whatsoever.	
3	Information	The Israeli occupation authorities informed the Palestinian citizens after the decisions have been made. This act is mainly documented in the issued Israeli military orders.	
4	Consultation	The Palestinian citizens were occasionally consulted, only when the Israeli occupation authorities decide it is necessary for propaganda purposes.	
5	Placation	After the inception of the PNA, the Palestinian citizens were given the chance to express their views that in certain occasions have influenced the final decision made by the PNA.	Palestinian National Authority
6	Partnership	The Palestinian civil society organizations started to fill in the gap and better enhanced the cooperation mechanisms between Palestinian citizens and authorities, where both are seen as equally concerned. This is realized due to the fact that present Palestine is significantly a donor-driven community.	
7	Delegated Power	This is a step of advanced cooperation mechanism, where the Palestinian citizens would become more concerned and ultimately enjoy practicing veto-right.	
8	Citizen Control	This is an idle step, where the Palestinian citizens would become in a role of principal.	
Source: Edited by the author from (Arnstein, 1969)			

Nevertheless, what stands to be of greater importance here is not the level of citizen participation, but the definition and the role of planners (referred to as actors in Table 6.1), who are seemingly in a dynamic continuum of ever rapid changing situation, which allow them to deal with the issue of public participation mostly as a luxury, a “lip-service,” or a no-harm policy, at best only to enable the environment for the materialization of future spatial developments. Said differently, Connelly (2010: 349) states that if the principles of participation of the North are naïve about power (e.g. Sorensen & Sagaris, 2010: 298) and the political context of the South, then they need to be adapted, by fostering of state officials. Yiftachel (2006 a: 212) assures that it is a professed need to start conceptualizing from the South to avoid the pitfalls of false and domineering universalism, and to reach more plausible generalizations to better guide and inspire both scholars and practitioners. Therefore, the remaining of this chapter is dedicated to tailor an expert-consulting model that suits the case of present Palestine, based on a thorough review of the literature to define the role of planners in the different planning models as articulated from the many schools of thoughts that dominated the field of spatial planning in the recent history.

6.2.2. Role of Planners in Planning Models

Planning theories provide a plethora of planning models that have evolved and developed as a response to the changing dynamics of modern societies. Herein, a scant overview on the planning models of the second half of the 20th century is revisited with a focus on the role of the planner in each to provide a context to the field and try to highlight the main drives that led to the advancement of planning theory. This is helpful in the sense of understanding how concrete planning activities would be when organically connected to the needs of people. Nevertheless, it is worthy to highlight that the advancement of planning theory as presented here is the outcome of improved planning practices.

Friedmann (1995) believes that planning theory is all about good practice, unlike most theories in the social sciences, which is conceived as more explanatory or predictive. Therefore, it is indeed a normative mode of theorizing that tend to improve the practice of planning by thinking systematically about what planners actually do. In conformity with Friedmann's (1995) belief, Fainstein (2005) describes the distinction between theorizing planning and its spatial milieu (e.g. urban) as "not intellectually viable," because planning has always been dependent on a vision of the city (Just City in her terms), and simply is not a method to be deployed to arrive at prescriptions, which nevertheless is indeed contingent to the context. Connelly (2010: 333) through his investigation of "participation in a hostile state" in the South concludes that planners play a key role in mediating the influence of the volatile socio-political context in which public participation takes place; nevertheless this role remains significantly under-researched. Therefore, this section tries to fill in the gap, and explore how public participation is shaped by the interplay between the values that the planners embrace regarding public participation and the constraints under which they plan and act. It is worthy to highlight that in the discussion of planning theory that follows, planning is used in the generic sense of spatial public policies and practices that inevitably contain certain zoning and development controls of urban and regional land-use.

In an initial exposition, as Yiftachel (2006 a: 213) rightly notes, the bulk of theories coined in the North have shed lights more on *planners rather than planning* itself, and this is unquestionably problematic in the context of the South, where decision-making is generally characterized by lack of transparency and organization, in a more uncompromising development environment of "creating facts on the ground," as in the case of Bethlehem, in specific and present Palestine, in general (See Section 2.4, Chapter 2).

The first generation that mainstreamed planning theory in the second half of the 20th century was the *rational model* (AKA, synoptic and rational-comprehensive). The rational model sees the planner as an expert, who should follow a scientific approach to problem solving that would provide an extensive analysis of afflicting factors, as well as alternatives to solving the endemic problem under study (Hostovsky, 2006). Classically, Meyerson & Banfield (1955: 315-322) described the essential steps of this model simply, as follows: (1) Analysis of the situation; (2) End reduction and elaboration by establishing goals; (3) The design of courses of action to achieve those goals; and (4) The comparative evaluation of the consequences of these actions. Theoretically, this model results in the "optimal" solution since it takes into account the widest variety of variables. Nevertheless, practically the processes it engenders can be overly complex, and expensive, since it is indeed time-consuming. To put it brief, the objectivity and complexity of the rational comprehensive model represent its greatest strength and its greatest weakness, at the same time (See Dalton, 1986; and Schönwandt, 2008). More specifically, the rationalist thinking of the "public" as an undifferentiated, homogenous group in which,

for example, social, ethnic, or gender differences were seen as unimportant has proven to be wrong. Therefore, the rationalist model was reproached and discredited for its overweening **technocracy** in the sense that it has blind faith in science and technology and less in socio-cultural dynamics, and **apolitical** in the sense that it coexists with the *status quo* and supports the current political establishment (Schönwandt, 2008: 5).

As a response, the *advocacy model* of planning emerged as an alternative to the overly “top-down” approach of planning associated with the rational model. More heed was paid to the “public”, which is extolled in the crux of the advocacy model as different interest groups. The advocacy model argues that the technical expertise and dexterity that planners have to offer should be tamed and the planner should act as an advocate in the sense of defending the interests of the disadvantaged/marginalized strata. Furthermore, the planner should be engaged in developing a plural (i.e. several) plan rather than the conventional unitary (i.e. master-) plan associated with the rational model. Davidoff (1965) believes that utilizing plural plan would better inform the public of alternative choices; also it would increase the quality of the work generated by the public sector, which will be forced to compete with outside organizations that develop their own alternatives. Nevertheless, in actual practice, it is argued that this is a lofty ideal, and advocacy planners were accused of obstructing planning projects rather than offering useful alternatives, thus exacerbating the latent conflict (See Goodman, 1972). Some theorists went further and coined the advocacy model as a manipulation model (Peattie, 1968). In generic terms, such critics assented with Faludi’s (1996: 71) thesis that “*The idea of objective rationality is wrongly imputed to advocates of rational planning by their opponents.... so, by claiming that rationality purports to transcend conflict, its critics have created a straw man.*”

This has challenged planning theorists to amend the advocacy model in pursuit to more concrete planning models. This has resulted in the emergence of the *model of equity planning* that called for the planner to take the overriding responsibility of an expert once again like in the rational model, but this should happen through coalitions with like-minded politicians. Schönwandt (2008: 11) call planners who follow this doctrine as “*....communicators and indefatigable propagandists.... [who are] speaking truth to power,*” and he argues that German and American planners were the main proponents of this model. Not far since adoption, this model fall short since equity-oriented planners themselves were easily get rid of by the “like-minded politicians,” when the system changed.

In the same vein, but maybe in a more radical manner the *(neo)Marxist model* emerged as an outcome of analyzing the structural relations between planning and the capitalist society. This model foreseen the planner role as a handmaiden of capital or as described by Castells (1978: 88) as “*.... a revealer of contradictions, and by this an agent of social innovation.*” This model developed with an accentuation on the importance that the system should be changed in order for the planning initiatives to materialize. The most prominent movement in this field was the Lefebvrian (1974) concept of the “Right to the City” that was meant to transcend “*far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. The [Right to the City] is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization*” (Harvey, 2008: 23). Nevertheless, Purcell (2003) through critical readings to the “Right to the City” concludes that it is not a panacea to the urban enfranchisements associated to our cities, though it is helpful in opening a new urban politics. This comes in alignment with Schönwandt (2008) belief that in general the value of the (neo)Marxist model is more evident in theoretical critique rather than on concrete planning as proclaimed.

As an accumulation from the gained experiences and based on the Habermasian concept of *communicative action* (See Bolton, 2005) a new planning paradigm has emerged that tends to bring about conflicting views and aspirations into a state of compromise through an epistemology of social learning between planners and client groups or in other words through the connotations between knowledge and action (Friedmann, 2003). Alternatively, this paradigm is known as “reflective practice” (Schön, 1983), “communicative planning” (Forester, 1989), or “collaborative planning” (Healey, 1997). The theoretical premise for this model is based on the “critical theory” of the Frankfurt School (See Brenner, 2009) that considers an associated myopia within the prevailing scientific methodology in pursuit to truth that arguably should be pragmatically attained as an unconstrained communicative or ideal conversational context (i.e. the ideal speech conditions) where as many actors as possible could be engaged; this is ontologically defined as the communicative rationality. The role of the planner in this model is seen as a mediator, who recognizes the value of local knowledge that is helpful not only in defining the needs of the people, but also in incorporating their knowledge in the planning process through sharpening the participants attentiveness.

Huxley & Yiftachel (2000) have thoroughly reviewed the related communicative literature and found that issues of state’s power and political economy are largely underplayed. This opens the floor to the most formidable challenge associated with this model, especially in geo-political contexts like in present Palestine, where cities are best described by Taraki (2008) as “Enclave Micropolis” due to the spatial doctrine that is characterized as bantustanization, cantonization, enclavization, and ghettoization. To elaborate more, one of the most prominent proponents of this model, Patsy Healey tirelessly argues that the result of such a planning model is an increase in trust, keeping in mind that a minimal degree of trust is a precondition to initiate a collaborative strategy-making process (See Healey, 1997: 53 & 200 & 267). This comes in conformity with the belief of many planners that “...*trust is essential to the work of planners. Without trust, all will collapse*” (Stein & Harper, 2003: 137). Nevertheless, Healey (1997) is seemingly claiming that collaborative practices are able to cope with “fragmented societies” as referred in her *magnum opus* “Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies,” but it is questionable if she really addresses such deeply disenfranchisement found in present Palestine or in other areas of volatile geo-political context. Though, she is aware of the role of conflicts and even claims that “*a constantly reiterated effort at reflective confrontation can challenge stereotypes about*” (Healey, 1997: 56), but one could never find an answer on what to do in cases where people are not interested or in a position to challenge their stereotypes that they find a constituent to their identity (See Gaffikin, *et al.*, 2005).

From the same school of thought of collaborative planning, but more as an emancipatory movement the *radical model* of planning has emerged. This model calls for avoiding conventional methods and governmental procedures, and calls for working outside the system. In theoretical terms, Friedmann (1987: 75) sees that there are two broad forms of planning: planning as societal guidance and planning as social transformation. The former is orchestrated by the state and is chiefly concerned with systematic change, whereas the latter is mobilized by the people, and this is what is called by radical planning. The role of planner as laid out by Friedmann is to be a mediator of radical practice, and thus must be committed to both the daily and immediate practice s/he is engaged in, as well as the larger goal of human emancipation.

Beard (2003) points out that this model differs than other forms of bottom-up planning in its oppositional element, or what Friedmann (1987: 287) refers to as “conflict strategies” that can take a

variety of forms: nonviolent or violent, reform or revolution, or political or extra-political struggle. Miraftab (2009) and Liggett (2009) argue that a more recent movement in radical planning scholarship known as *insurgent planning* works to transcend the role of planners beyond its professionalized borders as articulated by other planning models (more specifically, advocacy, equity, and communicative planning), where planners are seen as professionals who reach out to citizens for communication and sometimes for inclusion (perhaps through redistribution), but unfortunately remain outside the society. This planning scholarship is largely widespread between new generation of planners in state and not-state organizations of developing communities (e.g. peace movements and green movements). The role of insurgent planner is thus, “to rework radical planning to reflect the selective definition and celebration of civil society and citizen participation and the challenges it poses to socially transformative planning practices in the specific context of neoliberal global capitalism” (Miraftab, 2009: 43).

The radical model of planning (including the new trend of insurgent planning) still betrays several weaknesses. Fundamentally, “one gets little sense of how a repressed community will gain the skills, experience, and power to initiate a radical planning process. Neither is it clear how this normative model will work in those socio-political contexts that admonish political activism, nor where there exists a pervasive sense of fear of violent retribution” (Beard, 2003: 18). In this sense, it is imaginative and tries to recover idealism for a just society (Miraftab, 2009: 46).

The recent evolved model of *liberalistic planning* maybe stands as the dominant model in today’s societies. The bottom line of this model is to have a *laissez faire*-enabled planning, i.e. give reign to the free market, where state institutions do little planning as possible, and only as much planning as necessary, and that is the ultimate role of planners. Schönwandt (2008: 16) puts it like this: “Instead of relying on planning to protect people, nature etc., the proponents of this model place their trust in individual (property) rights, the interests of individuals to maximize their own well-being, and the power of contracts that people enter into amongst themselves.” But, the most challenging question that faces this model is how much this “free market” is free? The idea here is that this market is only free to those who could satisfy certain initial preconditions, like a feasible financial capacity or requisite knowledge, amongst other. Therefore, the goal of protecting the rights of the individuals is only conditionally realized; entailing that while this model values the concept of “freedom”, it devalues concepts like “equality”.

This has motivated Harper & Stein (2006) to develop a new trend of this model called *dialogical planning*, as a planning approach that amalgams liberal-democratic values with pragmatic philosophical practices. According to Harper & Stein (1995: 242) this planning approach is normatively characterized to be pragmatic, incremental, liberal, and critical. *Pragmatic* in two aspects: first, its amalgamation of the pros of both modernism (emancipation, accountability, hope for the future) and post-modernism (recognition and encouragement of many voices and discourses – empowerment and inclusivity), and second in its acknowledgment that all planning methods are dependent of the context under study. *Incremental* since it recognizes “common shared background” as the one and only legitimization for change. *Liberal* in its commitment to the ideal of free individuals at both thought and action levels; keeping in mind that complete consensus is rarely realized, and consensus seeking needs “procedural mechanisms” that are crucial in pluralistic societies. Nevertheless, the needed “procedural mechanisms” make the approach highly *critical* since it is open for critique and change of the prevailing socio-economic, geo-political, and legal institutions, nevertheless this critique should be articulated through

the legitimate democratic formal channels. Alexander (2008: 108) coming from a school of thought that is skeptical about normative planning approaches that categorically define some universal “good” planning and prescribe what all planners should do, he thinks that the dialogical model is futile and problematic. The main problem in his view is that dialogical planning is underspecified.

To this end, different planning models with different rationalities have been discussed. All, *technocratic* (rational model), *structuralism/modernism* (advocacy, equity, (neo) Marxist), and *post-structuralism/post-modernism* (communicative, radical, and liberalistic models) have significant practical consequences. For instance, while, rational model leads towards a technocratic bureaucracy, post-modernism models in general leads towards fragmentation and disempowerment. To sum up, the conceived role of planners in *technocratic models* is to predict future development trends as a basis for controlling and creating order/producing blueprints. In *structuralism/modernism* the planners are advocates, community activists, defending “spaces of places” against “space of flows,” producing alternative “people’s plans,” and in *post-structuralism/post-modernism* role of planners is conceived to explore shared notion of place and common understanding of space through consensus seeking (Davoudi & Strange, 2009: 40-41).

Against this background, maybe what’s needed is a hybrid “trans-modern” paradigm (Boelens, 2010) that conceptually amalgams technocratic, modernism, and post-modernism models by allowing planners to do what they know they should do (Harper & Stein, 1995). This is referred to within this doctoral research as an expert-consulting model. Recent experiences that assure the successful juxtaposition of different conceptual foundations in spatial strategy-making are many and are based firmly within devolved contexts (See Harris & Thomas, 2009), and arguably this is the case also in present Palestine. Within this vein, an expert-consulting model is proposed, keeping in mind that this model does not aim to encompass the whole range of planning approaches, from rational to liberalistic practice, but aims to realize a practical approach to emergent urban problems in such a geo-political context, of course only at the conceptual level, as testing such a model is beyond the capacity of this doctoral research.

6.3. An Expert-Consulting Model

6.3.1. Rationale for An Expert-Consulting Model

Etzioni (1967) while trying to answer the questions: to what extent can actors engaged in spatial planning activities decide what their course of action will be? and to what extent they have to follow this course of action? has ended up advocating for a newness model to spatial decision-making called “mixed-scanning.” Mixed-scanning is the conceptual amalgamation or compromise between the *rationalistic model* (AKA, rational-comprehensive model) that focuses on goals or outputs and the *incrementalistic model* that focuses on processes. While the rationalistic model tends to posit high degrees of control over the spatial decision-making environment, the incrementalistic model, alternatively assumes much less command over the environment. Etzioni (1986: 8) defines a mixed-scanning as a hierarchical mode of decision-making “that combines higher order, fundamental decision making with lower order, incremental decisions that work out and/or prepare for the higher order ones.” Tellingly, the term “scanning” is used to refer to search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information, along with to drawing of conclusions, all elements in the service of decision-making.

The shortcomings in both models (i.e., rationalistic and incrementalistic) are many and makes the associated efficiency in each relatively low. According to Etzioni (1967: 385-386), the rationalistic model is unrealistic and undesirable because it is inapplicable to distinguish between values and facts, along with means and ends. Also, decision-makers simply do not have always the resources (mainly assets and time) to collect the ample information needed for a rational choice. In the incrementalistic model, there is a kind of power connotation, as the made decisions most likely would reflect the interests of the most powerful. In addition, decisions reached are designed to meet challenges only at the short run and hence would induce limited variations from past policies, at best, entailing that the basic societal innovations would be jeopardized. In the words of Etzioni (1967: 388-389), the mixed-scanning approach in spatial planning would provide *“both a realistic description of the strategy used by actors.... and the strategy for effective actors to follow.”*

For the operationalization of a mixed-scanning approach, Etzioni (1986: 10) assures that it is important to distinguish between fundamental (rational or comprehensive) and incremental decisions, which he believes is not a difficult task. He proposes two ways to differentiate between fundamental and incremental decisions. One way is to consider *relative size*; as a rule of thumb he suggests that *“10% or less is marginal to show that many of the actual decisions made were non-incremental”* (Etzioni, 1986: 10). The second way is to check for a *nestling relationship*; *“if an incremental decision requires or draws on a contextual decision, this is the fundamental one”* (Etzioni, 1986: 10). To put it simple, incremental decisions should be contextualized and they should consume 10% or less of whatever unit is being consumed, e.g. budget, time, manpower, etc.

Nevertheless, there seems an inevitable duality entrusted with actors (more specifically, planning experts in our case) to plan for both fundamental and incremental decisions, and this is provided by mixed-scanning that allows for incremental decision-making to fill in the gap when fundamental ones are missing, thus drifting action without directing them. Said differently, incremental decisions would enable the environment for fundamental decisions, and once these fundamental decisions are reached, incremental decisions will accordingly work them out. To elaborate more, once fundamental decisions are taken by actors based on her/his conception of goals (but details are ignored to ensure that an overview is feasible), incremental decisions are elaborated within the framework of these fundamental decisions. Thus, *“incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, and contextualizing rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives”* (Etzioni, 1967: 390). In such an approach, planning for spatial development related decision-making is conceived as making the best of the limited available knowledge and choice in devising policy making actions, which nevertheless depends upon the overall formulation strategy.

Smith & Stupak (1994: 378) recommends improving the mixed-scanning model by the addition of a third lens (to the existing two) through which the inputs to the decision should be viewed. This will increase the insight of the decision-makers by providing guidance for the evaluation of the already available information, without the accumulation of unnecessary additional information. Ultimately, this would improve the ability of decision-makers to evaluate alternatives and their consequences more objectively. In other words, while an incrementalistic model focuses on processes, and a rationalistic model focuses on outputs, a more dynamic version of mixed-scanning model, is advised to have an input focus, thus the mixed-scanning model would focus mainly on three lenses, or phases, namely: input, process, and output.

Apparently, an expert-consulting model that would be in conformity with the legitimate mandate entrusted with decision-makers to take decisions, and at the same time achieves a more applicable approach to work out these decisions, is needed as elaborated in the mixed-scanning model. Tellingly, the designated expert-consulting model is concerned with managing the role of actors during the planning process by emphasizing certain level of analysis based on a set of criteria for certain situations, and the model is not concerned by any mean at controlling the participation of actors in the spatial planning process, as this should always be regulated by the prevailing laws and by-laws that tend to make the process of public participation as wide and feasible as possible. Barakat (1993) outlines the concept of “controlled decentralization” especially fit to deal with the problems of reconstructions, as a halfway solution particularly in places where centralization is a strong culture, arguably as in the case of present Palestine that experienced years of despotism due to the prolonged military occupation that ruled over the country (Section 3.2, Chapter 3).

An interesting point raised by Etzioni (1967: 391) relevant to the context of present Palestine is about the role of crises that is of great significance in his rationalization. He argues that in relatively less passive democracies, crises would help achieving agreement for overdue major changes of directions, like desegregation (Section 2.4, Chapter 2). In other words, in such developing societies that possess low control capacities tend to favor much more planning, while they have to do with a relatively high degree of incrementalism, in comparison to developed societies that are much more able to have control over the environment and tend to plan less. This renders a mixed-scanning strategy as formulated in an expert-consulting model in such a geo-political context, which is arguably not that rationalistic as the totalitarian societies attempt to pursue and not that incremental as the ideal democracies advocate, a suitable and feasible instrument towards the implantation of “SPSSs”. Or as in the words of Wimberley & Morrow, (1981: 506): “*Etzioni’s mixed-scanning approach is most suitable for the full range of decisions, in that it discriminates between types of decision-making, and applies a strategy appropriate to the situation*”.

6.3.2. ABC’s of An Expert-Consulting Model

The search for integration in a trans-modern paradigm, such as the proposed expert-consulting model could be best understood as an effort to shift policy attention into suitable modes of articulation and synthesis, not as some grand mental synthesis. It aims at providing a spatial strategy-making tool that is theoretically informed and practice related. Unfortunately, due to the time limitations, it is not within the capacity of this doctoral research to make this tool empirically grounded, as well.

It has always been the main task of planning theory to analyze, compare, develop, and apply scientific theories and methods that can support the planning process in practice, which is ultimately confronted with problems. Rittel & Webber (1973) compartmentalized planning theory into two sets from a problem-solve perspective. The first is dealing with “tame” problems, where the second tries to confront “wicked” (AKA, ill-defined/structured) problems.

Schönwandt (2008: 19-22) elucidates the difference between “tame” and “wicked” problems by describing the “tame” problems as a game of chess, where the task at hand, the admissible avenues by which one can reach a solution, as well as the objective one hopes to obtain are all defined clearly and unequivocally. But, the so-called “wicked” problems behave differently, in terms of uniqueness; provisional description; characteristics of solutions that are best described as better/worse than

right/wrong and have a one-shoot operation. Rittel & Webber (1973: 160) conclude that planning problems are indeed wicked problems. Confronting wicked problems to achieve better results need a prudent approach.

Barton & Plume (2008) suggest when dealing with wicked problems, adopting an object-oriented approach that provides a consistency for measuring change and facilitating both qualitative and quantitative analysis through communicating 3-d space and time-based system that can present an array of factors to spatial decision-making. Barton & Plume (2008) called the solutions attained using such an approach *elusive* solutions. Following a distinctively different approach embedded in the premise of Cultural Theory, Hartmann (2012: 9) recommends adopting a poly-rational approach in the compartmentalization of planning-type problems, i.e. wicked ones, and he called the attained solutions *clumsy* solutions.

In the context of present Palestine, that is characterized by a unique case of spatio-temporality it is argued that the needed solutions to be attained are simply called *suitable* solutions. The rationale for this argument is based on the fact that the PNA does not have a full control over land and natural resources that renders its efforts to adopt a highly centralized planning system for the time being inefficient. At the same time, the PNA does not have the appropriate level of financial and technical capacity to adopt a devolved (de-centralized) planning system. And, since Palestinians lose more land and resources every day, because of the prolonged Israeli military occupation practices, what remains needed is to function a mix of both systems to provide the *suitable* solution (Figure 6.1). In other words, in the context of present Palestine, there should be a management for the public participation process by adopting an expert-consulting model that is neither purely content related, nor actor related, i.e. in such a context the attainment of *optimal* solution as resulted from technical planning model is not feasible, also the attainment of an *ideal* solution as resulted from communicative planning model is not affordable. Rather, what is needed is the attainment of *suitable* solution that could maintain a reasonable degree of efficiency (Table 6.2).

For Wimberley & Morrow (1981: 497), the *optimal solution, or optimization* is defined as the “*selection of the very best possible alternative from among a full range of alternatives*”, whereas the *ideal solution, or consensus* is defined as the “*mutual agreement among decision-makers regarding an alternative selected from a set of alternatives (without necessarily agreeing that the alternative selected is the best possible choice)*”. Therefore, if a planner commits oneself to “*optimization as a decision rule, then consensus constitutes a demand for limiting the range of alternatives to be searched, and thereby constitutes a threat to the search for the “best alternative”*” (Wimberley & Morrow, 1981: 500).

Needless to say, the types of *suitable* solutions that present themselves depend, of course, on how the situation is comprehended, or simply how the problem is defined. In the four captioned planning processes (i.e., technical, scenario, actor-consulting, and communicative) in Figure (6.1), none of the planning models starts the planning process, with defining the problem, but they start rather by assessing facts/issues/proposals/initiatives. The diagnosis of the phenomenon at hand is quite important, but is arguably not enough if not resulted in defining the wicked problems clearly, as this could be fraught with much deficiency. Said differently, the thesis of “*there are no problems, only solutions*” (Catton, 1982: xiii) is quite encouraging and optimistic, but not practical to say.

Aside from the problem definition dilemma, the four planning models are mostly dealing with different processes either content related (technical and scenario models) or actor related (actor-consulting and communicative models), and only, the scenario model incorporates a separate evaluation module, but still this separate evaluation module is not interrelated to the different planning steps.




Figure (6.1): Anticipated “Suitable” Solution of Planning Processes (Content/Actor-related)

Source: Edited by the Author from Roo & Geoff (2007: 148)

Regardless of whatever a composite solution is called in the practice of spatial planning in present Palestine (*suitable* or another), the planning process is anticipated to result in novel ideas and solutions. This is to say that the planner’s creativity plays a role here. Albrechts (2005: 249) defines creativity as an “*individual - or preferably social - process that stimulates the ability to view problems, situations and challenges in new and different ways and to invent and develop original, imaginative futures in response to these problems, situations and challenges. ‘Ability’ focuses more on ‘how’ one thinks rather than on ‘what’ one thinks.*” Throughout the course of selecting the *suitable* solution, the strategy by which to carry out the planning process occupies the bulk of the attention here. For Albrechts (2005: 247), the scenario model turns out to be an excellent tool for conceiving creative possible futures and their processes; what must be changed first and what next.

Nevertheless, in an extended discussion of the four planning processes in terms of efficiency against the three spatial strategy-making perspectives, namely: object-subject orientation, government-governance tendency, and public participation within the adopted conceptualization for “SPSSs” some similar conclusion to Albrechts (2005) is attained. Table (6.2) summarizes an admittedly rough thematic analysis by suggesting a planning model matrix that aims at assessing the efficiency of planning processes and slated outcomes, according to a set of related efficiency characteristics enfolded within three spatial strategy-making perspectives, as follows:

- **Object-subject orientation**, in terms of adopted planning rationality and slated deliverables.

The planning rationalities identified here are:

- Instrumental rationality (searching for the best way to solve problems);
- Strategic rationality (adopting a clear and explicit strategy);
- Value rationality (searching for alternative future); and
- Communicative rationality (focusing on involving as many actors as possible) (See Albrechts, 2004: 753).

Whereas, the slated deliverables include having a contract/agreement; a common frame of reference; or a vision.

- **Government-governance tendency**, in terms of the notion of legitimacy and democratization, and the time needed for planning processes.
- **Public participation**, in terms of the transformative power as elucidated in Arnstein's (1969) "ladder of citizen participation," along with the associated evaluation nature.

This admittedly rough analysis is subjective as it fails short of providing hard data to illustrate the associated efficiency within the different planning approaches. Nevertheless, to tame this subjectivity a scale of 3 points is established for each specific related efficiency criterion, as follows:

- 1 stands for a relatively low level of efficiency;
- 2 stands for a relatively moderate level of efficiency, and
- 3 stands for a relatively high level of efficiency.

It is important to highlight that this assessment deals with each of the investigated evaluation criterion separately (i.e., *ceteris paribus* – all other things being equal). For example, and as simple as it could be, the faster the time needed for a planning process to elapse the higher the given score is.

Table (6.2): Planning Model Matrix - Assessing the Efficiency of Planning Processes and Expected Outcomes

Spatial Strategy-making Perspective	Characteristics of Efficiency	Technical Model			Scenario Model			Actor-consulting Model			Communicative Model		
Object/Passive-Subject/Conscious Orientation	Planning Rationality (i.e. ontology)	Instrumental rationality			Strategic rationality			Value rationality			Communicative rationality		
	Score	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	2	<u>3</u>	1	2	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	2	3
	Slated Deliverables	Contract/Agreement (physically & politically oriented)			Contract/Agreement (socially & politically constructed)			Common frame of reference (culturally produced)			Vision (imaginary-oriented)		
	Score	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	2	<u>3</u>	1	<u>2</u>	3	<u>1</u>	2	3
Government-Governance Tendency	Legitimacy & Democratization	Through performance and conformity of local authorities			Through negotiations and bargaining			Through addressing mutual concerns			Through consensus building and framing		
	Score	1	2	<u>3</u>	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	<u>2</u>	3	<u>1</u>	2	3
	Time for Planning Process	Fast			Relatively fast			Relatively slow			Slow		
	Score	1	2	<u>3</u>	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	<u>2</u>	3	<u>1</u>	2	3
Public Participation	Transformative Power	Manipulation-Therapy-Information			Consultation-Placation			Partnership			Delegated Power-Citizen Control		
	Score	<u>1</u>	2	3	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	2	<u>3</u>
	Evaluation	Selective & self-motivated			Separate and iterative phase			Embedded in the process			Embedded in the process		
	Score	<u>1</u>	2	3	1	2	<u>3</u>	1	<u>2</u>	3	1	<u>2</u>	3
Total Score		12			15			13			9		
Source: Efficiency characteristics were compiled from (Roo, 2007) and (Olesen, 2010)													

The matrix of planning model in Table (6.2) provides a tentative assessment of the efficiency of the different planning processes that is based on a short and fragmented synopsis of literature review of the planning models and not on empirical findings or extensive field work. Admittedly, the inherited subjectiveness could be tamed as more evidence is reached through providing more hard data. As resulted from the assessment, the final score for each of the planning processes is the sum of these scores that is presented at the bottom, which entails that both the scenario model (15 points) and the actor-consulting model (13 points) received the highest scores, respectively. The communicative approach received the lowest score (9 points).

In a broader sense, Roo (2007: 147-148) argues that the choice of which planning approach is more appropriate depends on three interdependent factors:

- (1) The *complexity* of a planning issue;
- (2) The *perception* of the planning issue's complexity is just as important; and
- (3) The *context* of the issue that relates the planning issue with the categories of spatial strategy-making.

Therefore, simply in a *context* that is *perceived* with high level of *complexity*, like in the case of present Palestine, none of the abovementioned planning approaches could stand alone as an efficient approach to the prevailing wicked planning problems in present Palestine. The conceptual amalgamation between the scenario-based model and the actor-consulting model that both scored high in terms of efficiency against the other planning processes could provide the suitable approach that would satisfy a reasonable degree of efficiency (Figure 6.2).




Figure (6.2): ABC's of An Expert-Consulting Model

6.3.3. Sociological Grounds of An Expert-Consulting Model

The proposed expert-consulting model could be mildly recognized to be part of a family of organizational theory interested in structuring problem-bounded methods. It is a model-based spatial strategy decision support within a context unequivocally perceived with complexity. Needless to say, the contextual situation in which the research is trapped in helps colouring the conceived perceptions, and this in turn would help colouring the acquired knowledge.

To substantiate the basis for the proposed expert-consulting model, this section is dedicated to provide some generic reflections as grounded in sociological theory, which would help raising important questions at critical moments about what relevant knowledge is available. For example, sociological theory makes it clear that actors (especially, experts) must be acquainted with a pre-definition or pre-interpretation of whatever problem-solving exercise they are engaged in before delving in the process itself (Scott, 1995: 101, cited in Roo, 2007: 135).

Giddens (1984) argues that actors have some kind of “positionality” regulated within certain groupings that make-up the whole of society, and that any analysis of interaction must recognize this relative positioning of the actors. Yiftachel (2006 a: 214) states that “positionality” is central to the production of knowledge, i.e. roles that reflect these “positionality” would contribute to a sense of social structure. This entails more or less the reorganization of the welfare state, including its organizations such as national governments (Boelens, 2010: 32). Roo (2007: 136) thinks that this argument is important to understand the social structure of actors involved, how these actors are positioned relative to one another, and the role each actor is playing or is willing to play, importantly in this case at an official level.

Bryson *et al.* (2009: 179) draw on Actor-Network Theory by referring to *actors* as anything that modifies a state of affairs by making a difference, bearing in mind that actors may include subjects, primarily key individuals and groups, but may also include objects like maps that affect the course of action. Boelens (2010: 40-41) argues that this definition contains imperfections, and to be realistically encountered with the practical problems of spatial planning, the focus should not be on actors as to say in the broad sense of all affected parties, but the focus should be on *leading actors* (whether within the public, civic, or business society), who are primarily encountered in daily practice for any course of action. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the focus only on leading actors (experts, hereinafter) embraces subjectivity and contain certain power connotations, nevertheless in principle this remains a shortcoming even with the communicative or collaborative planning approaches (Newman, 2008: 1375-1382).

Literature traces back the construct of “selectivity” in social structuring activities to the Enlightenment. In the Protestant Ethic, for instance, Barbalet (2008: 173) cites Weber saying that present-day capitalism “*educates and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a process of economic survival of the fittest*” (Weber, 1920 [1991]: 55), bearing in mind the inherited limitation in the concept of selection here, because what is selected has an origin prior to its being selected that the principle of selection itself cannot explain, nevertheless, what survives in society, not how it came about in the first place is more important to consider.

From another perspective, Weber (1920 [1991]) argues that the expanding alienation from nature produces diverse reactions across different stratum of the class system. When a change in a societal

structure occurs, as in the case of geo-political conflicts and when the change affects the role of nature as a source for producing goods, those classes who are forced to be de-attached from their means of production are the ones to protest, resist, and challenge the forces of change. Anani (2007: 128) provides a polemic argument related to the context of present Palestine, by stating that the Palestinian values of their agrarian landscape has been transferred in an *ad hoc* manner through the articulation of the notion of modernity in a non-contingent leap towards capital oriented values and a producer-receiver end. Ultimately, this could be considered as a motivation to participate in spatial planning activities, and more specifically this might implicitly refer to the possible actors who might retain the planning process a success story. Nevertheless, Weber (1919 [1958]) in “politics as a vocation” contends that stratagems needed to circumvent inclusionary processes should be minimal and maybe rare, and should only be used when necessary (Fainstein, 2005: 126).

To knock on effects on the importance of politics and integration within the prevailing planning apparatus, Newman (2008: 1372-1373) through a detailed analysis of the related literature (especially the work of Albrechts and Healey), concludes that the dominant conceptualization or theoretical provenance for the strategic orientation in spatial planning strategies towards sustainability, or what is referred to as “SPSSs” within this doctoral dissertation has a clear political aim and normative direction, but it fails to find concrete evidence in practice for its robustness, mainly due to the associated normative direction and the inability to establish strong theoretical underpinnings with contemporary urban and regional governance. He suggests paying less concern to meet the normative ideals of the approach and concentrate on short-terms ambitions for the participant actors by using tactics, and paying attention also to the perception of planners about the institutional and political constraints and opportunities. In doing so one could realistically encounter with the political processes, thus agreeing with Stone (2005: 258) that in order to better understand the whims of contemporary urban and regional governance and the associated democratic processes in a delved context “...*scholars would be well advised to keep politics front and center....*”. To put it simple, there is a need to give more attention and a high profile to the ordinary politics of planning in the context of present Palestine. Keeping in mind what Albrechts (2005: 263) reminds us about planning being engaged *in* politics (it is about making choices) and it cannot escape politics (it must make values and ethics transparent), but it is *not* politics (it does not make the ultimate decisions).

6.3.4. Putting it Together: Tailored Expert-Consulting Model

This model aims at directing, but before inspiring the work of planning experts in the context of present Palestine. This generic model does not take its outset in a specific mandate, strategy or policy of an organization (MoPAD or MoLG, to name), and has been deduced from a thorough review of planning models. Nevertheless, it should be systematically synthesized in the future with the prevailing hierarchy system of spatial planning in present Palestine, in order to be a functional model. In other words, the model is tailored to re-orientate the views and redirect the perspectives of Palestinian planners towards an outside-inward approach or in the words of Albrechts (2005: 263) “*to look at the prospects of ‘breaking-out-of-the-box’.*” This would involve setting-out the framework of an expert-consulting approach that start by corresponding with the key spatial planning problems under question (See Boelens, 2010: 30). It is argued that the more organizations flock to this approach and adopt this model, and through the course of practice or ex-post evaluation, the efficiency of the model will be enhanced.

Acknowledging the futility of a single planning model standing alone, one can advance the enquiry by adopting a contingent approach that could frame the current “statutory” and “development” spatial planning practices in present Palestine. A tailored expert-consulting model to the context of present Palestine is grounded by the conceptual amalgamation between the scenario-based model and the actor-consulting model. This entails that it is theoretically balanced in terms of its focus on object vs. subject and government vs. governance (Figure 6.2). The designated model is mainly consisted of three interrelated phases, namely: input, process, and output (Figure 6.3).




Figure (6.3): Tailored Expert-Consulting Model for the Context of Present Palestine

Source: Based on Etzioni's (1967; 1986) Mixed-Scanning Approach

Following is a concise description of the three phases with a focus on the role of planners vs. public in each, keeping in mind that this description is indicative and generic, and much work is still needed to substantiate the robustness of the approach and anchors its institutional settings.

- **Phase (1): Input**

This phase is mainly based on the contribution of planners as experts, who delve into the problem being studied with a focus to the special context of present Palestine. Since the focus is on developing “SPSSs”, the result of this contextualization is anticipated in the form of a set of scenarios that prioritize the slated intervention to confront with the wicked spatial planning problem under question. Nevertheless, the planner is advised to make use from the many prevailing tools and methods related to “SPSSs”, for example: the SWOT, or Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats analysis, in order to be well acquainted with the local knowledge and policy processes that would inform the task of problem analysis. This entails that the key stakeholders should be identified and accordingly solicited. Furthermore, the planner is recommended to use the available scientific methods of trade-off analysis (multi-criteria evaluation) to summon one proposal of the many developed scenarios based on a set of pre-defined sustainability indicators (socio-politics, economic, and environmental impacts and implications).

- **Phase (2): Process**

In this phase the planner is anticipated to present the proposal attained from the work of group of experts, who delved into the contextualization of the problem at hand, and would initiate a wide public participation process with the aim to reach an “agreement” or in the terms of communicative planners a “consensus” on the planner’s proposal. Consensus is best understood in this context as “... a fragile, incomplete and contestable outcome, which may or may not have enduring effects in structuring subsequent relations” (Healey, 2003: 114). In practice terms, an agreement is resulted in the formulation of acceptable vision and mission statements. This entails that the result of the agreement activity might be positive, and hence the planner could commence in materializing the output, or it could be negative, which would mean that the planner should get the feedback of the public, or key stakeholders on the initial proposal, and start on developing amended scenarios that would lead to a new proposal. The planner within this phase could make use of the many public participation techniques available at her/his disposal, e.g. charrettes, hearings, or plebiscites (referendum, only in extreme cases) that aim at invoking collective rather individual participation.

- **Phase (3): Output**

In this phase the planner is entitled to include the feedback attained from the public participation in developing an action plan. The rationale for developing an action plan stems from the associated characteristics of such a plan against other types (Annex 4). An action plan is strategic-oriented and implementation-based to solving problems at local and national levels with public participation that has an emphasis on the needed time at the short-to-medium run (See Polat, 2009). In other words, it is a set of “SPSSs”, including multi-sectorial actions that are linked with prospectus actors or key stakeholders and potential resources that would make the implementation sub-phase an affordable one in the context of present Palestine. A separate, but an integrative sub-phase is the evaluation of the implemented action plan by the planner and based on a contribution from the public in the form of satisfaction and perception about the outcomes of the plan. This sub-phase is compartmentalized at two levels, namely: developing new proposals and developing and appraising new scenarios in terms of their impacts on sustainability (See Wegener, 1978: 55).

The outlined responsibilities in the three interrelated phases are expected to be realized at the regional/national level as opposed to those responsibilities outlined in the S-M-DIP at the local level (See Figure 3.11, Chapter 3).

To close, in such a context that is characterized with high levels of complexities, it is quite plausible to conclude that full control on spatial planning activities become futile, entailing that the planners should be willing to consider a wide participation to the public, as an informal planning tool that to be grounded with the adopted factual-based approach. This means that in complex situations, which is the case here in present Palestine, planners should consider accordingly a change in planning approach that does not need to be complex itself in nature, but will nevertheless be different, involving a change in focus from an object-oriented or subject-oriented towards an inter-hybrid perspective. When relating this to the ongoing theoretical debate on planning it would mean a shift towards a “trans-modern” or in the terms of Alexander (2013) a “post-postmodernist” approach that conceptually amalgams both technical rational approaches and communicative rational approaches, maximizing the associated strengths in each approach, and minimizing the associated weaknesses, as well. As such, the role of the Palestinian spatial planner as an expert will be more mundane – but still challenging: a knowledgeable and skilled practitioner of spatial planning. When relating this to the ongoing practice of spatial planning in present Palestine (as elaborated in Chapter 3) it would mean an amalgamation between the physical “statutory” practices and the strategic “development” practices not only at the local level as being realized at present, but also at the regional/national level. Most importantly to remember is that the present realization of this amalgamation for the two practices (i.e., “statutory” and “development”) at the local level in present Palestine is still nascent and lacks concrete evaluation, in terms of sustainability outcomes (See Musleh, 2012).

It is hoped that this model will be seen as groundwork for future interventions in present Palestine to test the usefulness of the proposed contingent model, or even in developing new alternatives to correspond to the question: In spatial planning practices in present Palestine, who does what, when, how, and to what effect?

Chapter 7: Evaluating “Smart Growth” Policies: Implications for Bethlehem

“What Is “Smart Growth?” - Really?”

(Ye, Mandpe, & Meyer, 2005: 301)

Chapter 7: Evaluating “Smart Growth” Policies: Implications for Bethlehem

7.1. Abstract

The chapter at hand presents an analysis to the “SG” principles, and their associated policies as resulted from extensive semi-structured interviews with planning experts from the policy community of the case study. The analysis was based on a designated evaluation sheet (opinion survey for planning experts) that filters the entire set of the 100 “SG” policies, and pinpoints the relevant policies to the context of Bethlehem city-area and city-region, as well. Accordingly, the compliance of “SG” policies in terms of presence and implementation (action-orientation) is documented. A scant, but substantial analysis for the associated policies is contextualized to Bethlehem case study, in the sense of what affect is beget from a given cause. The chapter is concluded by exploring the applicability of “SG” in a relatively small community like Bethlehem city-area that is in turmoil geo-political context. All of all, the results of analysis and findings attained in this chapter are translated into a set of policy recommendations, or “SPSSs” in Chapter (8) that follows, which stands as the *status quo* scenario for Bethlehem. It bears mentioning that “SG” as a concept is touted in the context of spatial planning in present Palestine at large as a framework for assisting Palestinian communities achieve a better built environment. In other words, “SG” is conceived as a new urban approach (or “SPSSs”), and the analysis provided hereinafter should only be acknowledged in the context of the Palestinian spatial planning efforts to achieve more sustainable communities within the prevailing geo-political context, which entails that “SG” in this context represents a broad agenda of spatial planning policies to strategically promote for sustainable planning, and to use land in more efficient ways at the city and city-region levels.

7.2. Evaluation Background

7.2.1. Scope of Evaluation

Studies evaluating sustainability in spatial planning practices are many, but somehow remain generic and fragmented in nature, mainly due to the inexorable relationships between the three pillars of sustainability, namely: socio-politic, economic, and environment. Berke & Conroy (2000) after examining the compliance and adherence of a set of comprehensive plans in USA to the main principles of sustainability have founded that those plans that did not use sustainability principles as an organizing framework have no substantial difference than those did. More importantly, within the course of their evaluation, the plan that was ranked first in terms of promoting sustainability actually did not adopt or acknowledge sustainable development as an organizing framework. The sensible interpretation to this finding is that the doctrine of sustainability is perceived as highly relevant to the initial attempts of LGUs – arguably like in the case of Bethlehem city-area – to integrate sustainability as a vision for a new planning agenda for spatial planning practices, therefore the findings should not be surprising also in the context of present Palestine (Chapter 2 & 3). Said differently, sustainability is widely touted and accepted as a public idea, but the task, as defined by Campbell (1996: 304) is “*simply to work out the details and to narrow the gap between theory and practice,*” and as in the case of different Palestinian LGUs, the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area are now embracing the concept, but it is argued that this remains at the level of policy rhetoric with weak indication to an operational definition. The LGUs of Bethlehem city-area and their groups of interest may be skeptical and consider sustainability in the broad sense only another fad of spatial planning, mainly due to the geo-political conditions (See Musallam, 2012).

Likewise, but maybe more specific to the evaluation of “SG” planning, Nelson (2002: 83-101) tries answering the question: “*How Do We Know Smart Growth When We See It?*” by using a group of generally accepted “SG” principles in the evaluation of different communities and regions. Within the same framework, this chapter furthers the exploration into planning evaluation of “SG” by tackling the significance of “SG” as an axiom or a progeny of sustainability in the context of Bethlehem city-area, since such a concept is considered helpful for Palestinian planners in rescuing the limited available resources (Musallam, 2012: 138; ARIJ, 2009: 53; and Sadaqa, 2009: 48-54). This chapter tries to move from the symbolic rhetoric of sustainability and its related axioms to hard and relevant data and information. This is useful in evaluating in practical terms the performance of plans and implementation efforts towards achieving sustainability, thus improving the ability and legitimacy of spatial planners in promoting the more holistic concept of sustainability (See Berke & Conroy, 2000: 31; and Leigh & Hoelzel, 2012). And since spatial planners play a key role in shaping and influencing the discussion about conceiving concrete public policy solutions related to “SG”, the analysis provided hereinafter is based on extensive semi-structured interviews with planners from the policy community of Bethlehem (henceforth referred to as, respondents).

Since planners acknowledge the indispensable and organic relation between plans, and their implementation, and their anticipated outcomes (and their sustainability) (or what have these plans accomplished?), it is important to highlight that this evaluation exercise is shortly focusing on the overall practice of spatial planning in terms of “SG”, as a new urban approach of sustainability in the context of Bethlehem city-area. In other words, this evaluation is concerned with “planning for the plans,” but generally it touches occasionally on the implementation tools in-situ (e.g. zoning codes) and the overall outcomes (e.g. do we’ve walk-able communities?), as well.

7.2.2.Evaluation Method

Based on the assessment framework for “SG” plans developed and tested by Edwards & Haines (2007) to investigate on the ability of relatively small communities to embrace “SG” principles, a designated evaluation matrix has been developed and implemented on the case study area (See Annex 5). Specific to this assessment, the degree of “relevancy” and proposed “scoring” for each of the “SG” policies is of crucial importance. Both the degree of “relevancy” and “scoring” had triadic values, namely: 0, 1, and 2. When, the degree of “relevancy” was set to “0” by the respondents, more information was collected about the reason for this evaluation. More specifically, has it been due to socio-cultural constraints; geo-political constraints; administrative constraints; capacity constraints; and physical constraints, amongst others. In the same vein, the “scoring” rationale was set as follows: (0) entails “not present”; (1) entails “present but not action-oriented”; and (2) entails “present and action-oriented.”

The evaluation at hand is not comprehensive in terms of reviewing the massive “SG” principles, and their associated policies posited in literature, rather the most exhaustive list of policies promulgated under the recurrent label of “SG” by the Smart Growth Network has been used (Smart Growth Network, 2003). This list pinpoints 100 policies, evenly distributed between 10 cardinal principles that are further compartmentalized into three groups, based on their theme-related tendency to the three pillars of sustainability (Section 7.3, below). All of all, these policies should be regarded together as a bundle, and not in isolation from one another (Baum, 2004).

This evaluation should merely be regarded as a first step in the efforts to parse the different principles of “SG” currently in circulation within the Palestinian context, in general, and Bethlehem city-area, in specific. In this respect, it is important to notice that the identification of a continuous change in a policy context tends to rely on what could be referred to as “dichotomous classifications” that prove weak evidence to success of growth management programs in general in cities with history of success in attracting new residential population (Dawkins & Nelson, 2003: 393), therefore analysts would always find it a quintessential challenge to highlight the impact of spatial planning policies and practices (Ye, Mandpe, & Meyer, 2005: 313), as in our case.

7.2.3. Profile of Respondents

The respondents sample was selected using an *expert sampling* technique, which is a type of purposive (non-probability) sampling techniques. The rationale for selecting such a specific study unit is to work with the respondents that will refer to the most relevant and plentiful data, given the specific topic of study (Yin, 2011: 88; Patton, 2002: 230). As there is a lack of empirical evidence, coupled with high levels of uncertainty about the useful adoption of sustainability (more specifically, “SG”) as an organizing framework for spatial development in present Palestine, it was important to glean knowledge from certain individuals that have particular expertise (Given, 2008: 698).

According to Yin (2011: 89) there is no formula for defining the desired number of instances for data collection in a mixed research method (or, q-squared method). Nevertheless, the larger the number of instances the better because the confidence in a study’s findings could be greater. Within the course of this planning evaluation exercise for “SG” in the context of Bethlehem, an extensive consultation with 12 planning experts have been conducted. In average each consultation interview lasted for 2 hours. Half of the interviewees are women, and two-thirds (i.e., 8 out of the 12) are affiliated to the related spatial planning competent authorities; only 3 of which represents the broader level, namely: MoLG, MoPAD, and MDLF, the remaining 5 represents the narrow level, namely: Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, MoLG-Bethlehem Directorate, and Ubiedyeh (east of Beit Sahour). The other one-third (i.e., 4 out of the 12) are affiliated to the academia, NGOs, UN, and the private sector (Figure 7.1).




Figure (7.1): Respondent’s Affiliation and Representitiveness

7.3.Discussion of Results

Results are distinctly mixed, with some findings highlighting the strength of some “SG” policies in the context of research, others highlighting unclear or narrowly focused policies, and some highlighting the failure to address specific policies at all. The below presented results are divided into 3 main sections, which are further chaptered into 10 sub-sections as per the 10 principles of “SG” as totuted by the Smart Growth Network (2003).

At the risk of sounding tautological, it is important to mention once again that the term “SG” as stipulated in the set of below analyzed policies stands for the planning efforts to achieve “sustainability” in the generic term for all the respondents, but it has been decided to keep the term as it is here in the analysis to acknowledge the original narration as published by the Smart Growth Network (2003). Furthermore, it is important to mention that the policies marked with a star (*) in the Figures (7.3, 7.4, 7.6, 7.8–7.11, 7.13, 7.15, & 7.16) highlight the “relvent” policies to the context of research, as identified by the respondents; when the policy scored 6 and above out of the 12 respondent’s feedbacks it was regarded as a “relevant” policy (Figure 7.2).




Figure (7.2): Ir/relevancy of “Smart Growth” Principles in the Context of Bethlehem City-area

Figure (7.2) shows that only 37 out of the 100 “SG” policies are considered relevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area; 17 of which are socio-cultural related policies (including the economic policies); 13 of which are physical related policies; and the remaining 7 are ecological related policies. The highest number of relevant policies is identified in principle (1) that encourages the preserveness of open spaces, which indicates on the overall ill-ecological conditions in the context of research. On the other side of the scale, the lowest number of relevant policies is identified in principle (4) that calls to provide a variety of transportation choices, which might indicates that the proposed policies do not suit the needs or the context of Bethlehem city-area. The 63 irrelevant policies could be classified into two groups. The first are irrelevant policies to the context of Bethlehem city-area in terms of suitability. The second group is irrelevant in terms of priority/need. The analysis of the respondent’s feedback shows that 55 policies out of the 63 irrelevant policies (i.e. more than 87% of irrelevant policies) fall within group 2, i.e., are not a priority, or not needed at present (See Annex 6).

Furthermore, among the 63 irrelevant policies only 7 get a score of zero in terms of irrelevancy; 4 policies are considered irrelevant due to socio-cultural constraints like the need to make retail centers distinctive and attractive destinations; 2 are considered irrelevant due to physical constraints, namely: encourage infill development by adopting innovative storm-water regulations and practices, and revitalizing the waterfront; and the last policy was considered irrelevant due to capacity constraints, which is integrating goods movement and delivery into “SG”. Notably, none of these 7 policies is regarded irrelevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area due to geo-political constraints. This might be interpreted because “SG” concentrates on governmental policies and incentives to promote change at the municipal level (Section 5.3.2, Chapter 5), and as noted the direct geo-political constraints are beyond the municipal boundary of Bethlehem city-area, but their repercussions are indeed of a high profile within the municipal boundary (Section 2.4, Chapter 2). At this very early stage of analysis, and at the risk of being remiss, one could notice how such an agenda of “SG” neglect the special characteristics of such a context in Bethlehem city-area.

7.3.1. Ecological Principles

- Principle 1: Preserve Open Space, Farmland, Natural Beauty, and Critical Environmental Areas

Generally speaking, there is no specific definition for open space in the planning practice in present Palestine. Remarkably, 7 out of the 10 related policies to this principle have been regarded relevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area, scoring the highest percentage of relevancy for the associated policies among the 10 principles (Figure 7.3). This implies the high concern among the planners to the ecological considerations of spatial development. None of the three irrelevant policies are present and action-oriented in the planning practice of Bethlehem city-area. To elaborate more, policy (2) related to the usage of land management techniques to protect drinking water sources is irrelevant because all the drinking water sources are ground water. Also, policy (8) related to the allowance of land trust to compete for a conservation fund is irrelevant because in principle there is no land trusts or conservations funds existed. Similarly, the respondents did not find policy (10) related to the usage of innovative permitting approaches a relevant policy to protect critical environmental areas, though 7 out of the 12 respondents think that such permitting approaches are present, but need activation in the local planning practice.

Only, 3 out of the relevant 7 policies are considered not present and action-oriented by the respondents. Policy (1) that indicates on the paradigm of comprehensive planning in city development was an indication to the existence of another paradigm of strategic and sector-based planning that provides more flexibility to plan for spatial development in a dynamic environment like Bethlehem city-area. Nevertheless, this has repercussions on developing an integrated and comprehensive vision for the future of the area. Likewise, policy (3) indicates that there are no financing techniques to preserve the open space, despite the crucial need for such mechanisms. Similarly, policy (6) that asks for taking advantage of nature’s eco-services, such as: water filtration, carbon sequestration, and plant pollination, and to giving these services a monetary value in the conducted Environmental Impact Assessments for the related spatial developments is not present and action-oriented. Importantly, the respondents gave these three policies lower priority, in comparison to other policies.

The remaining 4 out of the relevant 7 policies are regarded by a number of the respondents as present and action-oriented. Policy (4) that recommends establishing priority-setting criteria for open space acquisition, like GIS is considered present and action-oriented, but only at the academic or research level with poor applications at the professional level. In the case of policy (5) that asks for incorporating land conservation into transportation planning, the respondents confirm that in most of the cases the transportation planning comes after the land-use planning, and this has repercussions on the preserverness of the open space, such as in the case of Solomon’s pools southwest of Bethlehem city. Nevertheless, in the case of policy (7) that supports tree preservation through public-private partnerships it is considered relatively present and action-oriented not only for its ecological benefits, but also because of its economic and political benefits. Economically, this would increase property values and decrease the costs of related air and water remediation actions to reverse the associated environmental damages. Politically, many related initiatives on this regard are considered a way to counter the Israeli occupation practices and to help the indigenous Palestinian population to stay on their lands, especially in area C. Unanimously, all the respondents find policy (9) that encourages the investment in the rural economy to preserve working lands a priority and the related initiatives on this regard should be increased both in the eastern and western parts of Bethlehem city-region.




Figure (7.3): Preserveness of Open Space

7.3.2. Physical Principles

- *Principle 2: Mixed Land-Uses*

There is a considerable planning culture in present Palestine in terms of mixed land-uses (Suisman, 2005: 12). Only 4 out of the 10 related policies are considered irrelevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 7.4). For instance, although 6 out of the 12 respondents think that there are some enhanced zoning techniques present but not action-oriented (such as reducing set-backs to increase building heights), there is no need in principle to use such techniques to achieve a mix of land-uses (policy 2), such as using floating zones (where zone is defined but not yet used) to plan in advanced for certain types of yet undetermined uses (policy 8), because the degree of mixed land-uses are already high in Bethlehem city-area (El-Atrash, 2009: 82-88). In the same token, there is no need to provide designated regional planning grants for projects to increase mixed land-uses (policy 3), or encouraging the redevelopment of single uses into mixed-use developments (policy 4). In other words, such policies are not a priority to achieve more degrees of mixed land-uses.




Figure (7.4): Mixed Land-uses

The remaining 6 policies are considered relevant to the context of research. As in policy (1), Bethlehem city-area as in other LGUs in present Palestine adopt formal codes (comprehensive) and performance standards (sub-area) that provide a fertile environment of mixed land-uses; policies (6) & (7) that encourage ground-floor trade (shops) and upper-level residential (houses) uses, and encourage locating neighborhood stores and groceries in residential areas to increase the decentralization of social services, respectively are good examples on this regard. Notably, both policies indicate a strong compliance in terms of presence and action-orientation in the context of Bethlehem city-area. Nevertheless, such policies, especially policy (6) needs more enhancements in terms of management to link with a wider perspective. More specifically, there is a need to organize and manage a variety of land-uses not only vertically, but also horizontally (policy 9), and unfortunately according to the respondents this is not a valid argument in the context of Bethlehem city-area, as only 3 out of the 12 respondents think that such a policy is present and action-oriented.

More particular to the context of research is policy (5) that encourages the reuse of closed, decommissioned, or obsolete public uses such as military bases. A successful example on this regard is Ush Gurab, east of Beit Sahour that was subverted from an Israeli military base into a recreational public space serving the inhabitants of the area and beyond (Figure 7.5). Nevertheless, the respondents still think that such initiatives are not institutionalized and need to be more action-oriented in the city planning of Bethlehem city-area. As per policy (10), the respondents encourage the development of mixed-use university districts, or more generally educational institutions, especially in the eastern and western parts of the city-region of Bethlehem, and not directly in Bethlehem city-area.



Figure (7.5): Ush Gurab Brown-field, East of Beit Sahour City
 Source: (POICA, 2010)

- **Principle 3: Compact Design**

Compact design entails higher densities, and this is the typical case of Bethlehem city-area (El-Atrash, 2009: 82-88), likewise the other Palestinian cities that in the general terms are considered a fertile environment to conceive a more compact city approach as an alternative for future spatial development (Shaheen, 2009: 82). 6 out of the related policies are considered irrelevant to the context of research by the respondents (Figure 7.6). In principle, there is no need to organize a compact development endorsement program (policy 1), since there is already high levels of compactness. Tellingly, some policies, more specifically, policy (6), policy (7), policy (8) are not needed and not present (vacant warehouses, big box stores, corporate campuses, respectively) in planning practice of Bethlehem city-area. Likewise, policy (2) that encourages the adoption of a cottage housing development zoning ordinance is not relevant as cottage development is not a time-honored housing type in present Palestine. Nevertheless, most of the respondents have indicated that the similar type of single housing in present Palestine has been diminished in the recent years mainly due to the shortages in land available for development, but they have also recommended exploring various remedies to stop the diminishing rate of single house developments. As per policy (5) that vouches more secure neighborhoods using compact design, only 5 out of the 12 respondents have found it a relevant policy. The other did not because they think that the notion of security has been undermined with the many Israeli invasions to Bethlehem city-area, the most outrageous to name was the attack dubbed “Operation Defensive Shield” in the year 2002.




Figure (7.6): Compact Design

The remaining 4 related policies that are regarded relevant to the context of research indicate a mix results in terms of compliance. For instance, policy (3), policy (9), and policy (10) have been considered as a priority, but unfortunately are not action-oriented. To elaborate more, there is a need to link the concept of compactness with onsite best management practices to improve environmental outcomes such as buffer zones and tree planting (policy 3), also there is a need to manage the transition between higher and lower density neighborhoods (policy 10). Maybe, more important in the perspective of respondents, is the strategic need to reduce minimum lot size requirements (policy 9), which are outdated in the current by-laws. As per policy (4), in the context of Bethlehem city-area there is a rich tradition of higher density habitations, from traditional “hosh” to a range of courtyard buildings and urban apartment dwellings (Figure 7.7), nevertheless, the modern neighborhood design is not enough present and action-oriented on this regard.



Figure (7.7): A “Hosh” in A’natra Quarter at the Old City Center of Bethlehem

- ***Principle 4: Provide A Variety of Transportation Choices***

Within the framework of this principle, only 1 out of the 10 policies is regarded relevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 7.8). This particular policy encourages on consultation early with emergency respondents (e.g. police, fire, ambulances, etc.) concerning transportation planning activities (policy 3). This might be interpreted due to the volatile natural (mainly, seismic active area) and anthropogenic (mainly, Israeli invasions and incursions) conditions in the context of research (See El-Atrash & Salem, 2008). Nevertheless, none of the respondents find such a policy present and action-oriented in Bethlehem city-area. An example on joint cooperation and consultation with emergency respondents is that the use of smaller emergency respondents might be a savvy investment, especially in the old city cores of Bethlehem city-area.

From the remaining irrelevant policies, 4 are regarded not present at all in Bethlehem city-area, namely: transportation models and surveys that accurately reflect all modes of transportation and ensure compliance with air-quality regulations (policy 2); use pay-as-you-drive insurance policy (policy 4), as the conventional vehicle insurance rates are determined at the beginning of an annual policy and are set without regard to actual driven distances, nevertheless, one should wary on the difference between urban and rural communities on this regard, where the vehicles in the rural communities generally have higher actual driven distances, but most of the time the vehicle’s users have less income rates than the users of vehicles in the urban communities of Bethlehem. In the same vein, policy (5) recommends on

considering transportation when developing rating systems for green buildings and programs, more specifically the building location should be considered not only the building structure and materials in such systems, like in the case of the famous LEED, or Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design. As per, policy (8) that recommends on providing riders with customized transit information on the layout of the routes and facilities, most of the respondents believe that this is nesseray to relax congestion, but not a priority at this level, in comparison to other related transportation needs, mainly: transportation infrastructural lines and needed energy.

Policy (7) that encourages on having a frieght-friendly transportation environment is the only policy among the related 10 policies that is regarded present and action-oriented. Nevethless, the repondents assures that this is done in a chaotic manner and substantially contributes to the congestion problems in Bethlehem city-area. This might be the sensible interpretation for considering policy (6) of transforming park-and-ride lots into multiuse facilities as not present in Bethlehem city-area, thus further complicating the related congestion problems. The remaining 3 policies are considered promising ones by the respondents, but not a priorty in the meanwhile. Policy (1) that encourages carpooling; policy (9) that encourages bicycling; and policy (10) that encourages introducing value pricing to control congestion in peak travel hours through toll-ring roads are all welcomed policies in linking transportation, workplace, and housing together, but all contain challanging constraints, in socio-cultural, physical, and geo-political terms, respectively.




Figure (7.8): Transportation Choices

- ***Principle 5: Strengthen and Direct Development Toward Existing Communities***

The Bethlehem city-area has developed as a one spatial unit due to the socio-cultural commonalities, coupled with the geo-political conditions that made it compulsory to develop within the same urban fabric (El-Atrash, 2009: 80-82).

This last physical related principle includes only two relevant policies to the context of Bethlehem city-area according to the respondents (Figure 7.9). The first relevant policy is policy (1) that encourages the creation of a business improvement district as a tool for revitalization and investment in targeted areas. 7 out of the 12 respondents believe that this policy is present in the context of Bethlehem city-area, but only 4 indicate that it is action-oriented. The second relevant policy is policy (8) that encourages increasing transit-oriented development by adding infill stations on existing transit lines and retrofitting existing ones, nevertheless all the respondents assure that such a policy is not present.

Out of the 8 irrelevant policies, only 3 have action-orientation. These 3 policies are finance related policies, but all in all are not present in the context of Bethlehem city-area. Policy (2) emphasizes on defining priority funding areas to direct development toward existing communities, keeping in mind that the private sector is indeed a latent potential in the context of Bethlehem city-area, but mainly depends on the public sector to provide the needed infrastructural lines. Likewise but a bit differently, policy (5) encourages the creation of a development finance insurance program to minimize the associated risks without sacrificing or undermining big amounts of public resources through establishing a source of capital to protect private lenders based on the related MoLG’s regulations (PNA, 2009 b). As per the third policy, policy (9) encourages developing a revolving loan fund to support local businesses, as a last resort for lenders in high risk-transaction, such as in the context of Bethlehem city-area.

Policy (4) that encourages establishing a land bank authority is indeed irrelevant and not present in the context of Bethlehem city-area, but the respondents still find that the onerous time requirements to transfer title is an arduous task, and this is relevant in lien cases, especially in area C that is under the Israeli jurisdiction.

Policy (3) that encourages offering home equity assurance programs is considered irrelevant only in terms of priority. Nevertheless, all the respondents emphasized on the importance to curb the tide of middle-class, especially in areas such as Bethlehem city-area that faces a transition phase, especially after building the Segregation Wall, more specifically among the Christian community who have left Bethlehem city-area in alarming rates (Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2; Principle 8, below).

Policy (7) and policy (10) are irrelevant and not present in the context of Bethlehem city-area. Policy (7) that encourages infill by adopting innovative storm water regulations and practices is simply not the case in Bethlehem city-area. In the same token, designating a vacant-properties coordinator to use code enforcement, provide incentives, and develop partnerships to minimize and abate vacant properties (policy 10) is not needed since there already exists a city engineer and a planning officer at the local and regional levels mandated with such duties. Nevertheless, the respondents emphasized on the need to revamp codes in a holistic manner and develop a designated data base and a self-help guide (See MoLG, 2011 a). For instance, developing asset-driven market analysis to encourage commercial and retail investment in underserved communities (policy 6) could be accomplished using such designated guides and manuals in the future.




Figure (7.9): Direct New Development toward Existing Development

7.3.3.Socio-cultural Principles

- *Principle 6: Create A Range of Housing Opportunities and Choices*

On the top of the related socio-cultural principles, principle (6) that advocates for creating a range of housing opportunities and choices for varying demographic groups with different income levels is considered central, but generally speaking not a priority. 2 out of the related 10 policies are considered relevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area, namely: policy (1) and policy (2). Policy (1) encourage establishing an employer-assistant housing program to help employees buying existing houses and increase the available housing stock in Bethlehem at large (Figure 7.10). Some of the respondents think that such a policy is present and action-oriented to the context of Bethlehem city-area, and they think that the prevailing paradigm of such housing programs is more religious and faction oriented and not professionally oriented. Nevertheless, 5 out of the 12 respondents still think that such a policy albeit present, it is not action-oriented. The other relevant policy is policy (2) that recommends streamlining the development review process when units include affordable housing by using sophisticated tools, such as: GIS remains considerably not present, or present but not action-oriented.

The remaining 8 irrelevant related policies could be divided into two groups. The first group is considerably not present in the spatial planning culture in Bethlehem city-area, and calculates 6 policies. The second group that includes the remaining 2 policies is considered present in the planning culture of Bethlehem city-area.

The first group of not present policies includes policy (3) that strives for a fair-share partnership through creating a regional program to encourage all communities to include affordable and moderate-range housing. The respondents believe that this should be at the national level, and should be mandated to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, and not MoLG. In the same vein, this group includes policy (10) that encourages creating a housing trust fund to help carrying out the related mandates trusted in policy (3). The respondents believe that the Palestine Mortgage and Housing Corporation that was founded in 1997 is a pioneer, but not successful example on this regard. Within the same framework, as per policy (6) that encourages integrating “SG” and housing program by using incentives in the zoning process is not present. Also, policy (8) that recommends developing “SG” funds to promote development in underserved areas is not present mainly due to financial shortages. But, policy (4) that calls for using transportation funds as an incentive to provide housing near transit is not present only because of the financial shortages, but also because of the lack of integrated approach to spatial development. As per policy (7) that recommends adopting property tax exemption programs for mixed-income developments and low-income homeowners is not present because it is not allowed by the related laws. Nevertheless, an exemption to the building permissions is possible in certain cases, such as the families of the Palestinian prisoners and martyrs.

The second group of present policies includes policy (5) and policy (9). Policy (5) is present but not chiefly action-oriented, because the revitalized housings are used for public purposes as the funds for revitalization initiatives is delivered by the donor community and not the competent authorities. Nevertheless, almost all the respondents encourage using the revitalized houses for both private and public purposes, and to mix between residential and commercial functions to enliven the downtown and old city cores through housing projects as this will engender a 24/7 utility. As per policy (9) that calls for using different builders on contiguous blocks of land to ensure a diversity of housing styles it is sufficiently present and action-oriented as this is required by the related laws and by-laws (See MoLG, 2011 a). Nonetheless, the respondents have highlighted the difficulties incurred with high construction costs of residential houses in Bethlehem city-area, and the need to develop a national housing strategy that tackles such difficulties amongst other policy formulation choices in embracing the concept of “adequate housing” in present Palestine, at large (UNHABITAT, 2003: 22 & 58).




Figure (7.10): Range of Housing Choices

- *Principle 7: Create Walk-able Communities*

Relatively speaking, Bethlehem city-area is not a walk-able-friendly environment due to the physical nature and the weak pedestrian infrastructure. Making an area a walk-able-friendly environment entails more than establishing walking paths, but making walking an attractive option to local residents for completing daily tasks. All of the related policies to this principle are considerably not present at all (Figure 7.11). Half of these policies are considered relevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area based on the feedback of the respondents. The relevant policies are explicable by their own, and include the following: policy (1) Develop a pedestrian master plan; policy (2) Design communities so that kids can walk to school (Figure 7.12); policy (3) Use trees and other green infrastructure to provide shelter, beauty, urban heat reduction, and separation from automobile traffic; policy (4) Encourage safe pedestrian routes to transit; and policy (5) Develop walking awareness and promotion programs. The last policy is considered very important and crucially needed. However, the respondents had different views on the appropriate tools that need to be adopted towards the implementation of the awareness plan. Some of the respondents look to the “Media” as a key factor to tickle the public awareness, where other respondents also believe that “Publications” would be also one of the tools to raise such awareness, leaving the remaining with believes that direct reaction with the mob such as: “workshops and educational seminars” would be also efficient tools.




Figure (7.11): Walk-ability



Figure (7.12): Pupils Heading to School in Beit Sahour (Left) and Ubiedyeh (Right)

Among the remaining irrelevant policies, only policy (10) that recommends retrofitting superblocks and cul-de-sac street networks is somehow considered action-oriented. The remaining policies are majorly not present. This includes policy (6) that encourages the use of modern technology to increase pedestrian

safety, which is helpful but not a priority. Also, policy (7) that encourages using visual signals and design elements to indicate pedestrian rights of way and minimize conflicts is considered helpful but not a priority, too. Likewise, policy (9) that recommends making places walk-able for aging populations is irrelevant because the Bethlehem city-area is mainly a young community just like the case across present Palestine, nevertheless this should not be understood to neglect this group in the city planning activities. Finally, situating parking will not drastically enhance the pedestrian environment and facilitate access between destinations (policy 8) in the context of Bethlehem city-area due to the lack of designated spaces and the physical constraints in the area. Nevertheless, car parks/lots are needed to manage the traffic demands in Bethlehem city-area.

- ***Principle 8: Foster Distinctive, Attractive Communities with A Strong Sense of Place***

This principle is indeed an elusive attribute to the overall “SG” principles, but remains of high importance for Bethlehem city-area, in commensurate with the liminal and shattered sense of place incarcerated in all aspects of every-day life for the people living in Bethlehem city-area (e.g. Saleh, 2012), especially with the alarming immigration rates among Christians that disturbs the cosmopolitan character of Bethlehem city-area (See Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2).

Within this principle, 6 out of the 10 related policies are regarded irrelevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area, 3 out of which is totally not present in the planning culture of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 7.13). For instance, all the respondents confirm that policy (2) that vouches for creating community green is unfortunately not present at all, despite the humble initiatives done here and there that acknowledges the uncultivated property value that would increase once such a policy is adopted. Due to the financial shortages, the use of transportation enhancements funds to create places of distinction, such as facilities for pedestrians and bicyclists is not possible (policy 10). As per policy (8), that envision revitalizing the waterfront is regarded irrelevant simply because there is no surface water in Bethlehem city-area at all. The remaining 3 irrelevant policies include policy (3) that recommends turning underused highways into boulevards, despite the fact that some boulevards already exists as in Beit Jala city, for instance (Figure 7.14). Likewise policy (7) and policy (9) that both encourage using asset-based tools to reflect community values, and making trade or retail centers distinctive to boon for the residents, consumers, and tourists, respectively, are also regarded irrelevant, or in other words and more specifically they are not a priority in the context of Bethlehem city-area.

The relevant policies include policy (4) that encourages developing a comprehensive way finding system in the city center and beyond to help at the first place tourists to find their destinations, especially to the holy sites in Bethlehem city-area during the pilgrims trips. At the same importance, there is a crucial need to use distinctive public transit to increase the attractiveness of places that are considered unique and of revered features especially for the tourists and pilgrims (policy 5). Likewise, there is a need to establish revolving loan funds for historic preservation with favorable interest rates for relatively long repayment terms (policy 1). Nevertheless, the respondents acknowledge the invaluable efforts exerted during Bethlehem 2000 Project, where the old city cores in Bethlehem city-area were revitalized and curated by local expertise like the Center for Cultural Heritage Preservation (CCHP). In the same vein, other activities that would highlight the cultural assets through public art and event nights should be increased in terms of quantity and improved in terms of quality, as well (policy 6).




Figure (7.13): Sense of Place



Figure (7.14): An Overview of Beit Jala Boulevard Road

- ***Principle 9: Make Development Decisions Predictable, Fair, and Cost-Effective***

Generally speaking, spatial development is considered an investment opportunity that offers developers from public and private sectors alike a diverse range of investment options to choose from brown-fields, transit-oriented projects, etc. (Smart Growth Network, 2003: 81). Nevertheless, the fiscal status of LGUs in Bethlehem city-area is considerably weak, and is subject to political and administrative constraints (See Section 3.4.3, Chapter 3). But, fiscal improvements are on the tide in accordance with international standards and good practices. The cardinal principle in pursuing the reform of local government finance in Bethlehem city-area, in accordance to the national plans is to secure financial sustainability of LGUs (PNA, 2009 b: 14).

According to the feedback of respondents, 2 out of the related 10 policies to this principle are regarded relevant to the context of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 7.15). The first relevant policy is policy (1) that calls for educating elected leaders and public officials about sustainable spatial development, and the respondents recommend designing and implementing structured educational programs, furthermore a designated article within the LGUs by-laws should be outlined in order to institutionalize such activities. The second relevant policy is policy (8) that foresees implementing GIS-based planning into the development process. The respondents believe that this policy is already present and much has been done on this regard, but still more action-oriented initiatives are needed to add certainty by using development performance measures and accelerate the approval process.

Among the 8 irrelevant policies, two tackle related financial issues. The respondents do not believe that creating investment funds by designating a seasoned professional (policy 10), or creating an “incentive expert” for developers and businesses (policy 7) could make the related spatial development decisions more predictable and cost-effective, especially that such policies are not present in the planning culture of Bethlehem city-area.

Some of the remaining irrelevant policies are not suitable to the context of Bethlehem city-area because they contradict with the prevailing planning system. For instance, there is no need to establishing state/regional level “smart growth cabinet” (policy 6), since there is already a local, regional, and national planning committees dealing with the related spatial planning activities.

Policy (3) and policy (4) that call for creating pattern books to streamline construction and enhance project marketability, and making zoning codes and other land development regulations easy to read and simple to use, respectively are considered by the respondents irrelevant in the sense of priority. In other words, the respondents believe that the used zoning codes are already simple and explicable; also they do not believe there is a need to creating pattern books to enhance project marketability at present.

Paradoxically, policy (2) that calls for directing development along corridors to create stronger districts by linking city centers through transit stops: boulevards (intra-city) or avenues (inner-city) is regarded by the respondents irrelevant, despite the fact that they have considered policy (10) of managing the transition between higher and lower-density neighborhoods in the principle (3) of compactness a relevant policy (Principle 3, above). Nevertheless, it is worthy to mention that the respondents also regarded policy (3) of turning underused highways into boulevards in the principle (8) of sense of places irrelevant too. The point that needs to be raised here is that such policies are regarded irrelevant here only in terms of priority like in other designated policies. In the same token of paradoxicality, policy (5) that asks for creating multi-municipal planning strategy to provide for development in rural markets

while maintaining rural character is regarded irrelevant by 8 out of the 12 respondents on a scale of 1, in comparison to the remaining 4 on the scale of 2. Nevertheless, 10 out of the same respondents regarded policy (9) of investing in the rural economy to preserve working lands in principle (1) of preservation of open space a relevant policy to the context of Bethlehem city-area. This might be interpreted to the narrow vision of planning experts of seeing the rural market as a profitable source, though they acknowledge its ecological value in harmonizing the rural-urban development.

Finally, policy (9) that recommends on streamlining brown-field redevelopment approval processes is regarded irrelevant, nevertheless 2 out of the 10 respondents think that this policy is present and action-oriented, most likely acknowledging the Ush Gurab brown-field redevelopment process (Figure 7.5).




Figure (7.15): Development Decisions

- ***Principle 10: Encourage Community and Stakeholder Collaboration in Development Decisions***

Community collaboration or participation in development decisions is crucial in increasing transparency, accountability of LGUs management, and of streamlining the sense of ownership among the citizens in related development projects. Furthermore, the involvement of citizens can increase the likelihood that LGUs make decisions and deliver services in line with the needs and preferences of citizens. This understanding of the importance of public participation has encouraged MoLG, as the authorized body to oversee LGUs, to formulate and adopt a policy paper in line with the MoLG’s strategic plan for (2010-2014), and as a critical step towards achieving its vision of “*good local governance able to achieve sustainable development with effective community participation*” (MoLG, 2011 b: 1). Public participation as conceived in this policy paper is promoted as an informal planning instrument, and “*does not provide the public with the authority to assume the responsibilities and exercise the authorities of LGUs granted by law*” (MoLG, 2011 b: 3).

Based on the respondent’s feedback, 4 out of the related 10 policies are regarded relevant (Figure 7.16). It is to the conviction of the respondents that introducing third-party groups to ensure a range of stakeholder views is expressed (policy 1) is highly relevant though 10 out of the 12 respondents believe that such policy is present, but not action-oriented in the Bethlehem city-area. A good example of third-party groups is non-profit groups that could be used as consultants (policy 2), keeping in mind that such a tool is present, but not action-oriented. A point to be raised here is that the third-party groups should be rooted in the community based on certain project criteria, and this include the academic and research institutions. Another relevant policy that is largely not present is policy (3) that recommends using a “kick the tires” trip to take LGUs officials and residents, as well to witness exemplary projects, along with checking the sites of development on the ground, as actual projects could debunk common myths and misunderstanding about urban problems. The last relevant policy is policy (7) that instigates developing community indicators to make sure that development is meeting community goals. This last policy has the lowest points of non-presence and the highest points of relevancy at the same time among the other related policies within this principle.

The remaining 6 irrelevant policies could be grouped into two classes in terms of priority: low priority, and lowest priority. The first group of low priority includes policy (4), policy (5), and policy (6). Policy (4) recommends establishing context-sensitive design training courses that focus on community-involvement strategies for traffic engineers, and this policy is not only majorly not present but it is the only policy among the related policies to this principle that has no action-orientation. As per policy (5) that calls for using quick-response teams to gain approvals in spatial developments is largely present but not action oriented. In other words, the related emergency interventions for planning teams of LGUs is considered of a high profile, but still need structuring and linking with the overall spatial development process. The last irrelevant policy that is of low priority is policy (6) that requires conducting place audits (like walk-audits) to determine barriers and opportunities.

The second group of irrelevant policies of lowest priority includes policy (8) of using color-coded maps to establish a planning and zoning framework for future planning decisions; policy (9) of using photographs and imagery to illustrate complex concepts; and policy (10) of creating and distributing free videos to illustrate local planning goals. Nevertheless, these three policies do have an action-orientation in the Bethlehem city-area.




Figure (7.16): Stakeholder Collaboration

7.4. Recap: “Smart Growth” Scores and Empirical Reflections

In a recap, Table (7.1) shows the scores for “SG” goals, as resulted from the semi-structured interviews with the respondents. The highest score could be achieved is 120; this represents the idle case, where the 12 respondents would refer to each of the related 10 policies as present and action-oriented in the Bethlehem city-area. The range of scores is distinctively large and striking, but in average is extremely low in terms of inclusion of “SG” policies. So, it seems that “SG” is not that SMART in the context of Bethlehem city-area. The lowest and highest scores are recorded in the relevant physical policies, where the lowest score is 0.00 for the provision of a variety of transportation choices, and the highest score is 34.00, for the mixed land-uses. Nevertheless, the relevant policies in the socio-cultural goal of creating walk-able communities scored also 0.00.

The overall average score is 7.50. The highest mean scores is recorded for the physical goals (11.00 points), followed by the ecological goals (8.00), and the lowest mean scores is recorded within the socio-cultural goals (4.60). Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is no difference statistically between the related ecological, physical, and socio-cultural policies. To prove that a null hypothesis (i.e., the two sets of data are similar) is valid here, a t-test was performed between the related physical and socio-cultural policies, since they are the largest groups. The t-test probability value is 0.63, which is by far larger than the conventional critical value of 0.05.

Table (7.1): Rating of “Smart Growth” Goals				
“Smart Growth” Goals	No. of Relevant Policies	Score (out of 120)	Average Score	Standard Deviation
Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas	7	8	1.14	1.21
Mean Scores of Ecological Goals		8		
Provide a variety of transportation choices	1	0	0	NA
Strengthen and direct development toward existing communities	2	4	2	2.83
Compact design	4	6	1.5	1.73
Mixed land-uses	6	34	5.67	3.39
Mean Scores of Physical Goals		11		
Create walk-able communities	5	0	0	NA
Make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective	2	2	1	0
Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong sense of place	4	5	1.25	0.96
Create a range of housing opportunities and choices	2	7	3.5	0.71
Encourage community and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions	4	9	2.25	0.5
Mean Scores of Socio-cultural Goals		4.6		

As a corollary, the “SG” goals in the context of Bethlehem city-area could be ranked in terms of scoring, as follows:

- (1) Mixed land-uses
- (2) Encourage community and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions
- (3) Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas
- (4) Create a range of housing opportunities and choices
- (5) Compact design
- (6) Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong sense of place
- (7) Strengthen and direct development toward existing communities
- (8) Make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective
- (9) Create walk-able communities
- (10) Provide a variety of transportation choices

Evidently, the Bethlehem city-area pays a lip service to “SG” goals that stand here in this analysis as an axiom to the symbolic rhetoric of the Western definition to sustainability. A worthwhile observation

from the findings of this analysis is the overall lackluster support for specific policies to implement “SG” agenda in the Bethlehem city-area. The current transportation means and infrastructure, along with the associated side effects of traffic congestion and air pollution remains all as a prominent challenge to Bethlehem city-area (score 10). This is organically connected to the challenge of creating walk-able communities, despite the relatively hard geographic nature of the Bethlehem city-area (score 9). The prevailing geo-political conditions put high uncertainties at stake, which make development decisions difficult to be predictable, fair, and cost-effective (score 8). Despite the fact that there is no planning jurisdiction for Palestinians over the areas in the peripheries of the city centers, the directional spatial development toward existing communities is not organic and is resulted in a chaotic form of sprawled neighborhoods (score 7). Based on the findings, an equally important, but with less priority goal is fostering a strong sense of place in the Bethlehem city-area (score 6). The high immigration rates from Bethlehem city-area to the Diaspora is an indicator to the social apathy and the deteriorated connection, especially among the young generations with their country of origin, Palestine.

The remaining set of “SG” goals raise exclamation marks that makes one ponders in examining the results of the findings. The urban form of Bethlehem city-area is characterized by high levels of compactness, but still the overall analysis shows that this remains a priority in the spatial development of Bethlehem city-area (score 5). Most likely, this proves the result of listing the need for directional spatial development toward existing communities as score (7). The question of housing in Bethlehem city-area remains important in terms of quality more than in terms of quantity (score 4). The ecological notion of preserving open space and other critical environmental areas is listed as score (3), despite the overall ill-ecological conditions in the Bethlehem city-area. The respondents believe that there is no need for further mobilization to encourage stakeholder collaboration in development decisions (score 2), and this could be interpreted due to the ongoing paradigm of action planning in the Bethlehem city-area that foresees public participation as an indispensable tool. Lastly, the strong planning culture of mixed land-uses in the Bethlehem city-area resulted in listing mixed land-uses at the bottom of scores (score 1).

As such, the average overall scoring per each aspect of “SG” goals (ecological = 33.9% (8 points); physical = 46.6% (11 points); and socio-cultural = 19.5% (4.6 points), overall totaling 100% (23.6 points) – Table (7.1)) would read that the associated conflict against Campbell’s (1996) planner triangle (Figure 7.17) is a property conflict that elucidates the contention between the socio-cultural and physical goals of spatial development, arguably as resulted from the *de facto* Israeli geo-political constructs that impede the local Palestinian spatial development in the context of Bethlehem (Sections 2.3 & 2.5, Chapter 2). The long-standing Israeli policy of confiscation and appropriation of Palestinian properties (land, buildings, etc.) is indeed considered the crux of the colonial project in Bethlehem and the West Bank, at large (Section 2.4, Chapter 2). Within the same framework, the resource conflict that stands for the associated contention between the physical and ecological goals of spatial development towards sustainability in the context of Bethlehem comes in the second place after the property conflict. In the context of Bethlehem, the depletion of natural resources as resulted from the Israeli colonial project on the ground and the weak carrying capacity stands as a wicked challenge to the current spatial planning practices towards sustainability (Sections 2.5 & 2.6, Chapter 2). More circumspectly, the development conflict that stands as the contention resulted between socio-cultural and ecological goals of spatial development towards sustainability remains the most elusive aspect in the context of Bethlehem (Sections 2.3 & 2.6, Chapter 3).




Figure (7.17): Triangular Graphing for the Average Scoring of “Smart Growth” Goals in the Context of Bethlehem, against Campbell’s (1996) Planner Triangle

To this end, the attained findings from the semi-structured interviews with planning experts raise many questions. Does the overall low-scoring mean that Bethlehem city-area is not planning or growing smartly? Are the local plans considered to be ineffective, or do these plans address the local needs that may not fall under the Western definition of “SG”? Should Bethlehem city-area abide by the principles of “SG” to embrace smart planning? These are some of the questions that should be pondered in examining the findings of the attained analysis. Nevertheless, before touching base with such questions, there is a need to cross-reference and triangulate the attained results from the semi-structured interviews with other secondary data sources.

In 2008, a Palestinian think-tank, ARIJ published the findings of an extensive visioning process for Bethlehem city-area within the framework of Bethlehem 21 Project, whereby the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area were engaged to develop and implement a local Agenda 21 towards sustainability for and with their communities (Please, visit <http://bethlehem21.arij.org>, for more elaborations). The visioning process resulted in outlining the following goals, as distilled in Table (7.2) for local sustainability action strategy in Bethlehem city-area (2009-2019):

Table (7.2): The Goals for the Local Sustainability Action Strategy for Bethlehem City-area (2009-2019), as Outlined in Bethlehem 21 Project			
Goal No.	Bethlehem City	Beit Jala City	Beit Sahour City
(1)	Vitalize the City and its Citizens Economically	Vitalize the City and its Citizens Economically	Empower and Sustain Local Economic Activities
(2)	Protect the Environment and Promote the Prudent and Efficient Use of Natural Resources	Develop the Domestic and Inbound Tourism	Create a Socially Just Community and Promote the Individual’s Role in Social Development
(3)	Develop and Empower Local Community	Develop the Infrastructure	Improve the Quality of Life
(4)		Protect the Environment and Human Health	Develop the Infrastructure and Protect the Urban Environment
(5)		Develop and Empower Local Community	
Source: Edited from (ARIJ, 2008)			

As shown in Table (7.2) the three twin cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour listed the need for vitalizing the city economically as a top priority. Beit Jala city has even extended a second goal to develop the tourism sector further to boost the economic conditions in the city. While Bethlehem city has prioritized the related environmental and social conditions, respectively, Beit Jala did the same, but has indicated the need to develop the infrastructure beforehand. Most probably, Bethlehem city did not make a reference to the infrastructure sector in this plan, because the city’s infrastructure was substantially developed during the new Millennium project of Bethlehem 2000, when the city welcomed the visit of the Vatican Pope John Paul II, keeping in mind that the city has experienced different Israeli invasions and destructions afterwards. Beit Sahour city has indicated the need to improve the social conditions then concentrating on the infrastructure and environmental conditions concurrently.

By means of triangulating the findings of the overall analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the experts, along with the findings of Bethlehem 21 Project, the following empirical reflections as denoted in reference to the abovementioned questions related to how smart city planning in Bethlehem city-area are:

- (1) The attained findings from the conducted semi-structured interviews are relatively acceptable, since the economic issue, for instance has been listed among the top three priorities, keeping in mind that the economic conditions has witnessed some improvements in the recent years with more national-led interventions making use of donor assistance, especially during the Christmas season.
- (2) There is a concern to enhance the environmental conditions, but before that there is a call for more interventions to upgrade the social conditions and tackle the social apathy associated with life under occupation. Such notions were absent from the agenda of city planners some years ago.

- (3) Each of the three twin cities continue to plan alone, but there remains many commonalities in addressing the spatial development challenges, simply because a line of causality for the common problems could be easily drawn in the analysis of the context of the three cities.
- (4) The use of ready-made recipes or copy/paste of “best practice” like the “SG” policies in the context of Bethlehem city-area would not result in a crucial change of the course of city planning. It is most likely that the adoption of sustainability’s goals in the generic sense as reflected in broad policy statements coupled with the non-existence or weak policies would suggest that Bethlehem city-area may only be paying lip service to such ready-made recipes because simply they are outlined in the local policy agenda as such.
- (5) It is argued that ready-made recipes like the “SG” policies do not reflect key characteristics of Bethlehem, such as: population size; area of planning jurisdiction; economic base; social attitudes and traditions, amongst others. Therefore, lip service may provide part of the explanation for the attained findings results (Point 4, above), but also Bethlehem city-area would not embrace a “SG” agenda because the associated policies are not applicable or necessarily useful, as Bethlehem city-area is after all, a relatively small urban area.
- (6) In generic terms, part of the intellectual challenge to realize sustainable development is how to deal with many problems at once, and develop a deep understanding of how to operationalize the principles of sustainable development, which might be best, viewed with increasing optimism.
- (7) The temporal difference between Bethlehem 21 Project and the conducted interviews with experts plays a significant factor, especially in such a context of many uncertainties and rapid developments on the ground.

Chapter 8: Main Policy Recommendations – “SPSSs” – and Concept Plans

*“Strategic planning is selective and oriented to issues that really matter. As it is impossible to do everything that needs to be done, ‘strategic’ implies that some decisions and actions are considered more important than others and that much of the process lies in making the tough decisions about what is most important for the purpose of producing fair, structural responses to problems, challenges, aspirations, and diversity. Strategic planning relates to implementation. **Things must get done!** This is seen as the pattern of purposes, policy statements, plans, programs, actions (short, medium, and long term), decisions, and resource allocation that defines what a policy is in practice, what it does, and why it does it - from the points of view of various affected publics.”*

(Albrechts, 2004: 751-752)

Chapter (8): Main Policy Recommendations – “SPSSs” – and Concept Plans

8.1. Abstract

This penultimate chapter presents a set of general policy recommendations or “SPSSs” in the context of Bethlehem, as resulted from extensive semi-structured interviews with spatial planning experts from the policy community of Bethlehem and the West Bank, at large. The proposed “SPSSs” are believed to be the suitable solutions to the wicked problems and challenges that are inimical to sustainable spatial planning in Bethlehem that aims at satisfying the current needs and help achieving the local aspirations and rights, as well. The proposed “SPSSs” as presented in the geo-political context of Bethlehem serve as a blueprint for a future comprehensive spatial plan towards sustainability. The proposed “SPSSs” are translated into concept plans, the prioritized in the format of an action plan that defines the key stakeholders and the indicative time frame needed for the implementation of these “SPSSs”, keeping in mind that an action plan is arguably the most suitable type of plans to help make a change on the ground at the short-to-medium level, since it is strategic oriented and implementation based to solving problems at multi-levels (See Section 6.3.4, Chapter 6). Importantly to mention that such an action plan should be strategically updated based on the emergent local spatial development priorities. The set of “SPSSs” presented in this chapter best serve the prevailing geo-political context of the *status quo*, while the following Chapter (9) unfold other scenarios that envision the geo-political fate of Bethlehem in respect to Jerusalem, maybe in different ways, but at least contributing to the same goal: towards sustainability.

8.2. Ecological-related “SPSSs”

8.2.1. Preserve Open Space, Farmland, Natural Beauty, Valuable Cultural Landscape with Aesthetic Significance, Water Resources, and Critical Environmental Areas in Bethlehem

- Support tree preservation and cultivation through public-private partnerships, especially inside Bethlehem city-area, and along certain routes that would emphasis the link between the existing green areas and already agricultural areas (especially permanent crops) (Figure 8.8). An organized campaign with schools’ pupils and peace activists could be helpful to support the LGUs to realize this priority.
- Preserve and increase the agricultural working lands by investing in the rural economy in order to bolster local agricultural economies. This is a priority in the Western zone of Bethlehem city-region that stands as the food basket for Bethlehem (Figure 8.5).
- Plan for and ensure minimum green open spaces within the master-plans at the local level, and link such designations at the regional level (Figure 8.8).
- Preserve the available open space by deploying an array of financing techniques. More importantly here is to realize the support from the local businesses, along with the provision of adequate governmental subsidies to the LGUs of Bethlehem city-region, at large.
- Protect and improve the quality of ground water (e.g. rehabilitation of the Roman wells and existing springs in the Southern zone of Bethlehem city-region; and constructing a central wastewater treatment plant) (Figure 8.6).
- Establish and adopt multi-criteria based on pre-defined priority-settings in the acquisition of open space. Deploying knowledge in GIS techniques could be a good example on this

regard, especially in light of the already adopted plans by the LGUs to functioning GIS applications as a decision-support system in city planning, at large.

- Emphasize the use of natural drainage patterns, and capture surface water runoff by constructing domestic and agricultural rainwater harvesting cisterns and dams. Experts propose a location for the water dam south of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 8.6). Needless to say, there is a need to conduct environmental and social impact assessments to the exact location as a prerequisite to the construction of the dam.
- Incorporate land conservation into transportation planning. This truism is important in the city planning of Bethlehem city-area at large, but more specifically inside the old cores of Bethlehem city-area.
- Preserve the local biodiversity (flora and fauna) by establishing an inventory database that lists the endangered species and provide a reference to experts and lay persons alike to raise awareness about how special and important these species are. An example on this regard is the endangered, yet famous Bethlehem Star Flower (Figure 8.1).
- Link land conservation with other sustainability-related principles to ensure comprehensiveness. This is indeed a general and elusive policy, but an important one to accentuate on the importance of land conservation as a prerequisite to any future “SPSSs”.



Figure (8.1): The Bethlehem Star Flower
Source: (HUJ, 2006)

8.3.Physical-related “SPSSs”

8.3.1. Sustain Mixed Land-Uses in Bethlehem

- The quantum of permissible mixed use activities (e.g. professional-related activities such as: doctor, architect, lawyer) as outlined in the prevailing building’s by-law should be reviewed and accordingly should be specified in the detailed plans before approval. This is more important inside the old city cores of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 8.7).
- Enforce restriction of development on prime agricultural soils, especially in the Western zone of Bethlehem city-region (Figure 8.8).
- Maintain neighborhood stores in residential areas to ensure service delivery decentralization, and thus relaxing dependency on the Central Business District (CBD) based on a new vision, as outlined in Figure (8.5).
- Vide and amend building’s by-law to allow for touristic-related functions to be regulated. This is more related to the touristic hotels inside Bethlehem city-area, as the current building’s by-law surprisingly does not has specific regulations for the touristic- related functions.
- Provide incentives by minimizing the license fees for mixed uses of ground-floor trade (shops) and upper-level residential (houses) purposes in existing and future spatial development to spur the creation and mix between residential and commercial uses, especially along the structural corridors, AKA Rural-to-Urban Transect (Figure 8.5).

- Update the master-plans and detailed plans that spur mixed land-uses. This is a crucial need for the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area that should consider expanding the current layout of master-plans, by adopting a single master-plan for Bethlehem city-area, at large.
- Manage and consolidate a variety of sets and typologies of land uses vertically and horizontally. The vertical dimension is to be realized at specific sites inside Bethlehem city-area, and the horizontal dimension is to be realized along the structural corridors that link the rural and urban centers together (Figure 8.5).
- Relocate light-to-medium industries (e.g. hand-made mother pearls and olive wood) into newly developed mixed-use industrial districts at the outskirts of the urban centers, whereas heavy industries should be aggregated, but separately from the light-to-medium industries. The proposed location to the heavy industrial district is to the east-west of Bethlehem city-area, acknowledging that this project already enjoys the financial support from the French government (Figure 8.6).
- Establish a clear priority-setting policy to convert all stone mining operations in the future into a sound natural setting (e.g. constructing sanitary landfill for domestic solid waste). This is an important policy to be realized at the medium-to-long run, especially in Beit Fajjar area south of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 8.6).
- Accommodate the reuse of future decommissioned, abandoned, or obsolete public structures (especially the Israeli military bases and settlements). There is a need to envision the future of such areas and their relation to the current Palestinian spatiality within the framework of the (flagship) state-building project. A successful example on this regard is Ush Ghurab (Shadema) Military Base east of Beit Sahour city that was partially evacuated by the Israeli military in 2006, and since after has been used by Beit Sahour municipality as a recreational site for Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, at large (Figure 8.2).



Figure (8.2): Former Ush Ghurab (Shadema) Military Base East of Beit Sahour City
Source: Picture to the Right (After) (The Ramallah Lecture, 2008)

8.3.2. Take Advantage of Compact Spatial Development in Bethlehem

- Use onsite best management practices to improve environmental outcomes in new compact developments. Examples of onsite best management practices include using small-to-medium wastewater treatment plants for irrigation purposes.

- Enforce a buffer zone around the old historic cores in Bethlehem city-area (Figure 8.7). This buffer zone has been adopted by the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area, but not yet enforced. The proposed buffer zone is almost 3 times the old city cores in the Bethlehem and Beit Jala cities, but almost 4 times of the old city core of Beit Sahour taking into consideration the less hilly topography nature of Beit Sahour city in comparison to Bethlehem and Beit Jala cities.
- Strategically reduce minimum lot size requirements by amending the outlined setbacks of buildings in the building’s by-law especially for the touristic-related buildings and facilities.
- Increase the permissible vertical density (i.e. number of floors) along the proposed structural corridors (Figure 8.5), without sabotaging the skyline of the old city cores in Bethlehem city-area.
- Steer infill development (i.e. densification) within the urban fabric of Bethlehem city-area to restrain urban sprawl, especially at the inner periphery of the planning jurisdiction zone.
- Strategically manage the transition between higher- and lower-density neighborhoods, along the proposed structural corridors, or urban-to-rural transects (Figure 8.5).
- Use and maintain traditional neighborhood design, such as “hosh”, arches, etc. especially inside the old city cores of Bethlehem city-area.
- Educate the community about the importance of abiding with the outlined zoning regulations that regulate compact building design through organized campaigns in schools, universities, mosques, and churches, with the support of the academia, NGOs, private sector, and national political leaders.
- Educate engineers and planners about sustainable building design standards that cope with disaster mitigation especially in cooperation with the Engineers Association and Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture in universities.
- Maintain relatively low amount of impervious surface in the rural areas, especially the Western rural zone to increase the amount of infiltrated rain water to the groundwater aquifers of Bethlehem city-region.

8.3.3. Provide a Variety of Transportation Choices and Improve the Roads Infrastructure in Bethlehem

- Prepare a comprehensive traffic management plan that link Bethlehem city-area to Bethlehem city-region and beyond. A special attention is to be paid to the planning jurisdiction of Bethlehem city-area in and around the old city cores to encourage public transportation and pedestrian movements (Figure 8.7).
- Maintain an updated database on the roads infrastructure, traffic rates, vehicles types and numbers to help transportation experts to develop designated traffic models to project the future traffic needs and accordingly plan for them.
- Encourage the use of public transportation by managing a premium bus service, AKA, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and shared taxis as outlined in Figure (8.7). This entails that designated lanes for the BRT should be realized (Figure 8.3).
- Provide incentives for public transportation by adopting a subsidized tariff system especially for students, and adopt a monitoring system to the regulation of prices.




Figure (8.3): Proposed Bus Rapid Transit Line Linking Bethlehem and Beit Jala Cities

- Improve roads infrastructure conditions, especially street manholes and pumps, and adopt a regular maintenance system, which should be linked with designated database on the roads infrastructure.
- Provide convenient (in terms of space) sidewalks for pedestrians. This is an important aspect that needs special attention from urban designers, especially along the proposed primary and secondary pedestrian routes (Figure 8.7).
- Protect the right-of-way and adopt a taxation/fine policy against violators. This should be coupled with a firm executive body (mainly police) to ensure the removals of violations.
- Manage the supply of vehicle parking by rationalization of parking fees to make it commercially viable, and adopt a fine policy against violating drivers.
- Maintain a close cooperation and early consultation with emergency responders when developing city-related plans, including Civil Defense and Emergency Departments. This aspect is more complicated inside the old city cores of Bethlehem city-area.
- Develop a recreational bus route that links Bethlehem city-area to the biblical landscape at the eastern slopes of Bethlehem city-region ending at the Dead Sea for the local and international pilgrims and tourists. This should be linked with the proposed local BRT system at the long run.

8.3.4. Strengthen and Direct Spatial Development Toward Existing Communities in Bethlehem

- Activate the Joint Service Council of Bethlehem city-area to perform joint planning functions. This would be the first step towards the development of a consolidated master-plan for Bethlehem city-area.
- Revisit the current hierarchy of social services (e.g. health, education) to ensure that such facilities would usher the spatial development in the suitable land (Section 2.5.2, Chapter 2), as outlined along the proposed structural corridors in Figure (8.5).
- Settlements of land disputes among the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area, and clearing the land registration for private and public ownership in Bethlehem city-region to protect the future spatial development initiatives.
- Improve the fresh water network to minimize losses, and upgrade the wastewater network. This would include the installation of small wastewater treatment plants at the household level in the un-served rural areas.
- Adopt utilities extension policy that would ensure that the extensions of water and sewer networks are consistent with the master-plans and other adopted policies (Figure 8.6).
- Create and maintain structural corridors (rural-to-urban transect) to link Bethlehem city-area with the Eastern, Western, and Southern zones of Bethlehem city-region, respectively (Figure 8.5).
- Develop a clear prioritization of spatial growth alternatives plan in Bethlehem city region (urban revitalization–urban infill–urban extension–new neighborhood on existing infrastructure, etc.). Such a plan would be callously dubbed in terms of land availability and suitability in Bethlehem city-region at large to ensure sustainable spatial development (Section 2.5, Chapter 2). Importantly to mention that the *Masha’* land should be readdressed as a potential urban extension site, especially in the south of Bethlehem city-area (Section 3.2.5, Chapter 3).
- Initiate transit-oriented development, and establish a connected network of infill stations, as outlined in Figure (8.7).
- Provide incentives, such as density bonuses, to encourage development in the suitable land for future spatial development (Section 2.5.2, Chapter 2) in order to realize efficiencies from infrastructure and service investments.
- Support the establishment of business improvement districts, as a tool to encourage revitalization and investment in the suitable land for future spatial development (Section 2.5.2, Chapter 2).

8.4.Socio-cultural-related “SPSSs”

8.4.1.Provide a Range of Housing Opportunities for Residential and Public Uses in Bethlehem

- Enhance and develop the basic health care services facilities in terms of quantity and quality. The new locations of basic health services should follow the proposed hierarchy for social services in Figure (8.5). A special attention is to be dedicated to the Western rural zone, which suffers from the Segregation Wall.
- Upgrade the existing educational facilities, especially the vocational and athletic education and training. Likewise, the location of any new needed educational facilities should follow the proposed hierarchy in Figure (8.5).

- Establish a licensed sanitary slaughterhouse to serve Bethlehem city-region in the heavy industrial zone (Figure 8.6). Nevertheless, the relocation of the current slaughterhouse should be further negotiated with the health-related competent authorities.
- Provide incentives, such as: license fees exemption to housing projects targeting vulnerable groups, especially martyr’s and prisoner’s families. The location of these housing projects should be considered based on the suitable land for future spatial development (Section 2.5.2, Chapter 2).
- Establish a housing committee that focuses on public education and to investigate and recommend to realistic solutions for low-income housing schemes.
- Update and improve the relevant housing laws, legislations, and regulations, and accordingly develop necessary standards to encourage partnerships between the public and private sectors.
- Maintain and encourage employer-assisted and cooperative housing programs in order to increase the available housing stock in the community.
- Setting a credit policy for financing and encouraging the banking sector to support housing by covering a portion of interest and profit of vulnerable groups.
- Give a priority for low-income housing in the development review process, and facilitate the preparation of land parcellation plans dedicated to low-income housing schemes, especially in case of inherited and common lands (*Masha*’).
- Encourage the use of modern technology and environment friendly building specifications (i.e. non-traditional materials) and refurbishment of existing buildings as well, including: the use of solar heating for hot water, and the installation of photovoltaic panels for lighting.

8.4.2. Make Bethlehem a Walk-able Environment

- Increase the green areas and maintain clean streets and public plazas, as well as enhancing night lighting at streets and public plazas.
- Develop a master pedestrian facilities plan that focuses attention on improvement to pedestrian traffic, including the identification and clear mapping of pedestrian tourism routes, especially inside Bethlehem city-area.
- Ensure and encourage safe pedestrian routes to transit, especially for elderly and youngsters at street’s main crosses, and for tourists and pilgrims at the touristic sites, like the Manager Square in the old core of Bethlehem city center.
- Provide design solutions that encourage and protect pupils to walk to school. This is a professed need that should be addressed especially inside Bethlehem city-area through a set of measures, like safe-pedestrian paths (Figure 8.4).
- Use green infrastructure and trees in the design of new spatial developments along the proposed structural corridors as a beautification element and to provide shelter and separation from vehicle traffic, and to contribute to urban heat reduction (Figure 8.5).



Figure (8.4): Proposed Safe-Pedestrian Path at Souq Al-Sha’b in Beit Sahour City

- Develop walking awareness and promotion programs to bring insight to the fruitions of walking among the youngsters and elderly alike.
- Organize walking tours for citizens, tourists, and pilgrims to visit the historical and religious sites in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well. The proposed walking tours should be linked with the historic and religious background of Bethlehem by the means of a designated processional and ceremonial routes concept plan. Such a concept plan would have multi-faceted social benefits, as it would improve pilgrim and touristic experience and improve the quality of life for the inhabitants who feel they are living in a jail-like city due to the Segregation Wall.
- Develop and adopt walk-ability standards designed to accommodate pedestrian connectivity and safety that do not only includes establishing walking trails, but also designing a designated signage system.
- Furnish streetscapes with chairs, along with artistic and informative items to make walking a pleasant journey for local citizens and tourists alike.
- Develop gateway detailed corridor plans for major entrance ways into city centers, which covers pedestrian facilities, signage, landscaping and appearance, in respect to the proposed structural corridors (Figure 8.5).

8.4.3.Foster a Strong Sense of Place to Bethlehem

- Develop an easy-to-use way finding system in city centers designated for citizens, tourists, and pilgrims to find direction and connect to local history and identity. The proposed application of way finding system should be of an open source version and easily accessible via internet.
- Adopt a conservation plan for the natural and built cultural heritage assets, including the tangible assets like old historic city cores of Bethlehem city-area, and the intangible elements like the traditional processional routes and festivals, all of all aiming at safeguarding and enhancing the general awareness of the Palestinian identity for inhabitants and tourists/pilgrims, alike.
- Preserve the archeological and cultural heritage sites and stimulate the cultural activities among the youth through a series of activities including scout groups and summer schools.
- Establish revolving loan funds to LGUs and NGOs for historic preservation dispersed with favorable interest rates and up to long periods of time reaching 20 years repayment terms.
- Rehabilitate and use the old historical buildings, especially in the rural areas. Recent cooperation with local NGOs in the rehabilitation efforts has been rewarding, therefore a strong partnership with non-profit organizations is expected to further increase the fruitions for the overall conservation of heritage buildings in the context of Bethlehem.
- Engage the youth in the collaboration of development decisions at the local level to increase the public engagement and sense of ownership for developmental projects.
- Spot lights on the valuable cultural assets through public art and special events that boon for citizens, tourists, and pilgrims, and accordingly become as a centerpiece for the local community, such as the famous festivals that celebrate the products characteristic of local villages, including: the annual olive festival in Bethlehem city; apricots in Beit Jala; fakkus (cucumber-like) in Beit Sahour; grapes in Al Khader; aubergines (eggplant) in Battir; and lettuce in Artas, amongst others.
- Organize community awareness and educational campaigns to farmers and youth about sustainable agriculture practices by introducing and promoting a set of measures, including: organic agriculture and farming (olive oil, almonds, etc.); vocational training and transfer of new irrigation techniques reducing water consumption; market locally produced organic products on a weekly basis in certain seasonal markets; support agro-industry facilities to help increasing food security.
- Use distinctive public transit to ease the access and increase the attractiveness of neighborhoods, along the proposed structural corridors (Figure 8.5).
- Strengthen relations and joint cooperation between local citizens and Palestinian expatriates in the Diaspora, thus aspiring to air a variety of perspectives and eventually bring insight to the planning for a more sustainable future for Bethlehem city-area and beyond.

8.4.4.Encourage Local Businesses and Make Spatial Development Decisions Fair and Cost-Effective in Bethlehem

- Educate elected leaders, public officials, and private sector about sustainability-related policies (including “SPSSs” at hand).
- Ensure that information regarding permits and development projects are publicly announced and easily accessible.

- Educate the public about the regulations that they should abide with, related to development projects. A designated booklet on this regard would be a commendable work.
- Encourage local businesses to invest in growing local organic agricultural products. This will boost the local economy and increase the level and scope of intervention of the private sector, thus a decrease in the overall high public administration services would be achieved.
- Establish small-to-medium sized traditional industries projects targeting women, such as: embroidery, in order to empower the women groups and increase their contribution in the local GDP.
- Designate the rangelands as nature reserves and regulating grazing to ensure fair prices for local cattle products, especially the famous seasonal dairy products in the Eastern rural zone of Bethlehem city-region.
- Provide technical and financial assistance to small businesses, including vocational training courses.
- Implement GIS-based planning into the development process to add certainty by using certain development performance measures against sustainability principles.
- Invest in green energy production, such as: implementing solar energy projects as an alternative energy source, e.g. in the use of the proposed BRT system in Bethlehem city-area.
- Adopt an after-care plan that focuses on identifying and removing barriers that may undermine the benefits of development projects to make sure that such benefits accrue to all segments of the society.

8.4.5. Encourage Stakeholder Collaboration in Spatial Development Decisions in Bethlehem

- Develop a local action plan for the operationalization of the “National Policy Paper: Promoting and Institutionalizing Public Participation in Local Government Units’ Affairs” endorsed by MoLG in 2011 (See MoLG, 2011 b).
- Organize local public awareness campaigns on the importance of public participation in development decisions as national duty and a codified right, as well.
- Use third-party groups to ensure that a range of stakeholder views is expressed. The third-party groups should include the academic institutions and national figures in the marketing and branding of new flagship spatial development initiatives.
- Use nonprofit groups, as well as academic and research institutions as sustainable development consultants to increase society engagement in spatial development initiatives.
- Establish “citizen committee” for the local development projects to promote sense of local ownership. The process of establishing such “citizen committees” should be elaborated based on the local action plan for stakeholder collaboration.
- Conduct periodic meetings to educate and inform the public about planning initiatives and new developments.
- Maintain visual contact by organizing trips to accompany LGU’s officials and residents of Bethlehem to visit related sustainable development projects in order to debunk common myths and misunderstanding about urban problems.
- Develop community indicators and criteria to monitor if development is meeting community goals.
- Ensure transparency by the announcement of evaluation results for development projects based on certain project’s criteria, as developed by planning experts in consultation with the local community.

- Coordinate the work of NGOs, Community-based Organizations (CBOs), and donors related to public participation activities in development projects to ensure efficiency (measure of time and cost) and effectiveness (measure of quality).

8.5. Main Concept Plans

The set of the above-listed “SPSSs” should be read as interrelated and interconnected strategies and policies. For instance, though the ecological-related strategies as presented are specified in ten specific points only, it is indeed related to other socio-cultural and physical strategies, and could never be realized as such alone. Said differently, the intended futuristic comprehensiveness nature of these “SPSSs”, as presented is unavoidable and inevitable towards achieving a more sustainable spatial development in the geo-political context of Bethlehem. These “SPSSs” serve as a blueprint that would inform the agenda of policy planners towards achieving a more sustainable future for spatial development in Bethlehem city-region. Nevertheless, the strategic orientation of these “SPSSs” should be always emphasized on by the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area by revisiting and redefining the priority of these strategies/policies in terms of time horizon and involved key stakeholders within the adopted action plan (Section 8.6, below). As such, the proposed “SPSSs” at hand are the encumbrance of Bethlehem context, i.e. exclusively customized to Bethlehem; keeping in mind that copy/paste of “best practice” is an inappropriate technique, in general for determining policies of longer-term strategic plans (See Hillier, 2011).

Accordingly, the proposed “SPSSs” are translated into four main concept plans or diagrams (Figures 8.5-8.8). Monmonier (1996: 77) defines a *concept plan* (or diagram) as “*a schematic, somewhat stylized map intended to demonstrate the general layout and functional relationship of a plan’s main elements.*”

The four main concept plans are:

1) Hierarchy of Services Concept Plan – Structural Corridors (Rural-to-Urban Transects)

This concept plan outlines a new hierarchy of urban-rural centers at Bethlehem city-region scale (Figure 8.5). In principle, the dependency on the main social services concentrated at the urban center zone of Bethlehem city-area is proposed to be relaxed by strengthening three structural corridor development, or urban-to-rural-transects, namely: the Eastern rural zone with Al ‘Ubeidya as the center; the Western rural zone with Husan as the center; and the Southern rural zone with Janata as the center. The latter structural corridor is a new, but important one, especially when considering the proposed infrastructure and utilities in this area, such as: heavy industrial zone, landfill dumping site, water dam, etc. (see concept plan 2).

Nevertheless, a special attention should be paid to the weak and deteriorated structural corridor between Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem by upgrading and enhancing the sense of arrival for tourists and pilgrims by a set of measures including: improving the historic and religious procession routes, especially Christmas Eve Procession Route that annually starts from Jerusalem and end in Bethlehem; addressing the empty lots adjacent to the Segregation Wall by creating green terraces and encouraging professional graffiti on the Segregation Wall.

2) Infrastructure and Utilities Improvement and Extension Concept Plan

This concept plan aims at providing a holistic spatial dimension to the proposed infrastructure and utilities initiatives (Figure 8.6). This concept plan translates many of the proposed “SPSSs” into concrete infrastructure and utilities initiatives with the spatial location in mind, acknowledging that many of these locations are separately planned by the LGUs of Bethlehem. Thus, this concept plan tries to provide a comprehensive reading to the many proposed location of the related infrastructure and utilities initiatives and projects, in order to realize a more realistic vision by defining the intrinsic relation between these projects. An example on this regard is the trajectory of the proposed heavy and light traffic ring roads that aims at one hand serving many of the proposed projects, such as the heavy industrial zone, and on the other hand the new ring roads aims at reducing the vehicular congestion inside Bethlehem city-area.

Importantly to mention is that the current layout of power network should be revisited in accordance to the proposed structural corridors (see concept plan 1).

3) Pedestrian and Public Transport Improvement and Extension Concept Plan

This concept plan outlines an improved and expanded pedestrian realm, especially in and around the old city cores and the proposed buffer zones by the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area (Figure 8.7). Concurrently, the proposed primary and secondary routes would serve pedestrian and buses. Needless to say, more detailed urban design plans are needed to realize the functioning of a BRT between the three cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour along the major intersections or BRT’s stations that should ensure safe pedestrian routes, as well, along the proposed primary and secondary routes.

4) Natural Landscape Improvement and Extension Concept Plan

This concept plan aims at increasing and improving the amount of available green open spaces, and ultimately this concept plan aims at linking the green open spaces and the available agricultural areas (mainly permanent crops) and terraces of outstanding value together and with the main green areas in Bethlehem city-region, namely: Krimzan, Al-Makhrou, Artas, and Khriton (Figure 8.8). This concept plan has three green fingers. The first green finger is to be realized at the short run between the three twin cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour, and also with the entrance of Jerusalem. The second green finger is to be realized at the medium run, by connecting the four main green areas of Krimzan, Al-Makhrou, Artas, and Khriton together. The third green finger is to be realized along the existing agricultural areas (mainly permanent crops) and beyond the main four green areas to connect the Eastern, Western, and Southern rural zones.

The proposed four concept plans are seemingly, but not exclusively pragmatic-oriented. For instance, realizing the green fingers at the medium and long run as proposed in concept plan number 4 would be impossible as such if the Segregation Wall is built as planned (Figure 8.8). In the same token, the proposed ring roads for light and heavy traffic in concept plan number 2 would be impossible to be realized, if the designated area C through which their trajectories are proposed would remain as such (Figure 8.6). Nevertheless, it is unavoidable to be associated with such an anticipated uncertainty in the proposed strategic concept plans due to the geo-political context that spawns Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well.

Importantly to mention here that the next chapter (i.e., Chapter 9), defines the 1967 border as the suitable spatial dimension within which the proposed “SPSSs” to be realized as a first step towards the resolution of the geo-political conflict. Therefore, couple of the presented concept plans has been projected on the Bethlehem city-region boundary, as demarcated by the 1967 borders (AKA, 1949 Armistice Line or Green Line).




Figure (8.5): Hierarchy of Services Concept Plan - Structural Corridors Rural-to-Urban Transect
 Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (8.6): Infrastructure and Utilities Improvement and Extension Concept Plan
 Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)




Figure (8.7): Pedestrian and Public Transport Improvement and Extension Concept Plan

Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

Note: The longest length between the intersections, along the primary route is between intersection 6 & 7 at 790 meters. And the longest length between the intersections, along the secondary route is between intersection 4 & 12 at 1,630 meters.




Figure (8.8): Natural Landscape Improvement and Extension Concept Plan
Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

8.6. Action Plan

This section presents the set of the proposed “SPSSs” in the format of an action plan, with details on the key stakeholders and the time frame. This action plan is tailored to provide the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area with strategic and integrated interventions towards achieving sustainable spatial development. The action plan is the result of a thorough discussion and collaborative process that incorporates the concerns of planning experts and addresses the most pressing urban problems and challenges in the context of Bethlehem. The result is an integrated cross-disciplinary action plan that strategically encourages pragmatic solutions towards achieving sustainable spatial development.

Following is a brief discussion on the two main elements of the action plan, i.e., key stakeholders and time frame.

6.1. Key Stakeholders

The respondents (See Annex 3) have proposed a long list of possible key stakeholders that would help the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area to implement the action plan. The proposed key stakeholders include different types of organizations, namely: governmental organization, non-governmental/non-profit organization, and profit organization, and have different administrative hierarchy, namely: local/regional and national levels. Table (8.1) presents the proposed key stakeholders in terms of organization type and administrative hierarchy.

Having analyzed the proposed key stakeholders (Table 8.1) to help the LGUs of Bethlehem city-area implement the action plan, the following issues are noticed:

- The distribution of the key stakeholders in terms of type of organization is balanced somehow, since nearly half of the proposed key stakeholders are governmental related, and the other half includes both non-governmental/non-profit organizations and private organizations, keeping in mind that the latter group is financially dependent on sporadic and dwindling funding from donors and philanthropies.
- Though, the action plan is locally based, the majority of proposed key stakeholders are functionally active at the national level. This is due to the prevailing hierarchy of spatial planning in present Palestine, which is characterized by high degrees of centralization. Furthermore, half of the proposed key stakeholders at the national level are affiliated to the governmental sector, and the other half is affiliated to non-governmental/non-profit organizations & private organizations, which means that the LGUs in Bethlehem city-area have to cooperate with many non-competent authorities to implement the action plan. Ultimately, the centralization of the proposed key stakeholders at the national level could be one of the pitfalls of the action plan.
- There is no clear direct relations and channels of cooperation among the proposed key stakeholders, especially among the governmental and non-governmental/non-profit organizations & private organizations, since the prevailing relations and channels of cooperation have been materialized by the LGUs of Bethlehem in the past on an *ad hoc* basis.

Table (8.1): Distribution of Proposed Key Stakeholders in the Action Plan, According to Type of Organization and Administrative Hierarchy				
	Governmental Organization	Non-Governmental / Non-Profit Organization	Private Organization	Total No.
Local/Regional	Ministry of Agriculture – Bethlehem Directorate; Ministry of Education and Higher Education – Bethlehem Directorate; Ministry of Health – Bethlehem Directorate; Ministry of Interior – Civil Defense; Ministry of Local Government – Bethlehem Directorate	*Bethlehem-based Churches and Islamic Centers	Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry	7
National	Ministry of Environmental Affairs; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Local Government; Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development; Ministry of Public Work and Housing; Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Ministry of Trade and Industry; Ministry of Transportation; Palestinian Land Authority; Palestinian Water Authority	Engineers Association; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Housing Council; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization; *Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture (proposed to be institutionalized); UNHABITAT	Palestine Investment Fund; Palestine Mortgage and Housing Corporation; Palestinian Banking System; Palestinian Contractors Union	20
Total No.	15	7	5	27
*To be established in the form of a working group				

6.2. Time Frame

The time frame is a subset of mainly two spans: short-to-medium run, and long run. This would help the LGUs of Bethlehem to prioritize the “SPSSs” according to the urgent needs and available financial resources. The distinction between the two spans: short-to-medium and long is relative and has been identified based on the local experts experience, who believe that the short-to-medium run should extend to a life span of 5 years up to the year 2018, whereas the long run should extend to a life span of 12 years up to the year 2030. Nevertheless, the proposed short-to-medium run and long run strategies/initiatives are not mutually exclusive, since decisions will predominantly and inherently be political (See Hillier, 2011: 508). Importantly to mention is that the proposed action plan should be strategically upgraded on a regular basis to meet the urgent needs and the new developments on the ground. Having said this, the action plan at hand would be better implemented if a detailed financial feasibility plan to the proposed “SPSSs” is prepared. Or in other words, the “action” is developed into a “strategic” plan (See Annex 4). Nevertheless, this is beyond the capacity of this doctoral research.

Table (8.2) presents the proposed action plan of the suitable “SPSSs” for implementation in the prevailing context of Bethlehem, with details on the proposed key stakeholders and the initial time frame for implementation. Furthermore, a remark on the originality of the “SPSSs” at hand in respect to “SG” strategies is provided to pinpoint the 37 relevant “SG” strategies (Section 7.3, Chapter 7), which are amended and adapted to the context of Bethlehem in the proposed action plan, along with the 63 newly proposed strategies/initiatives. Importantly to accentuate on the fact that the set of “SPSSs” presented in the following action plan are locally-contextualized policies for Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region that have been devised in close consultation with local planning experts, and therefore these “SPSSs” do not have their merit in the Western definition of sustainability, as touted in the “SG” principles, which has been only used as a reference point for analysis.

Table (8.2): Action Plan – 100 “SPSSs” for Implementation in the Context of Bethlehem

Remarks (Originality in respect to “SG”)		Strategies / Initiatives	Key Stakeholders	Time Frame	
				Short-to-Medium Run (up to 2018)	Long Run (up to 2030)
Amen-	Propo-	1. Preserve Open Space, Farmland, Natural Beauty, Valuable Cultural Landscape with Aesthetic Significance, Water Resources, and Critical Environmental Areas in Bethlehem			
√		1.1 Support tree preservation and cultivation through public-private partnerships	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
√		1.2 Preserve and increase the agricultural working lands by investing in the rural economy in order to bolster local agricultural economies	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry	√	
	√	1.3 Plan for and ensure minimum green open spaces within the master-plans at the local level, and link such designations at the city-region level	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
√		1.4 Preserve the available open space by deploying an array of financing techniques	Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Ministry of Local Government; Ministry of Finance	√	
	√	1.5 Protect and improve the quality of ground water (e.g. rehabilitation of the Roman wells and existing springs in the Southern zone of Bethlehem city-region; and constructing a central wastewater treatment plant)	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Palestinian Water Authority		√
√		1.6 Establish and adopt multi-criteria evaluation based on pre-defined priority-settings in the acquisition of open space (e.g. using GIS techniques)	Ministry of Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
√		1.7 Emphasize the use of natural drainage patterns, and capture surface water runoff by constructing domestic and agricultural rainwater harvesting cisterns and dams	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Palestinian Water Authority		√
√		1.8 Incorporate land conservation into transportation planning	Ministry of Transportation; Ministry of Public Work and Housing		√
	√	1.9 Preserve the local flora and fauna by establishing an inventory database	Ministry of Environmental Affairs		√
√		1.10 Link land conservation with other sustainability-related principles to ensure comprehensiveness	Ministry of Environmental Affairs; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
Amen-	Propo-	2. Sustain Mixed Land-Uses in Bethlehem			
	√	2.1 The quantum of permissible mixed use activities (e.g. doctor, architect, lawyer) outlined in the building’s by-law should be reviewed and accordingly should be specified in the detailed plans before approval	Ministry of Local Government; Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	

	√	2.2 Enforce restriction of development on prime agricultural soils	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Ministry of Local Government	√	
√		2.3 Maintain neighborhood stores in residential areas to ensure service delivery decentralization and thus relaxing dependency on the CBDs	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
	√	2.4 Vide and amend building’s by-laws to allow for touristic-related functions to be regulated	Ministry of Local Government; Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities	√	
√		2.5 Provide incentives by minimizing the license fees for mixed uses of ground-floor trade (shops) and upper-level residential (houses) purposes	Ministry of Local Government		√
√		2.6 Update the master-plans and detailed plans that spur mixed land-uses	Ministry of Local Government; Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
√		2.7 Manage and consolidate a variety of sets and typologies of land uses vertically and horizontally.	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
√		2.8 Relocate light-to-medium industries (e.g. hand-made mother pearls and olive wood) into newly developed mixed-use industrial district at the outskirts of the urban centers, whereas heavy industries should be aggregated but separately from the light-to-medium industries	Ministry of Ministry of Trade and Industry; Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry		√
	√	2.9 Establish a clear priority-setting policy to convert all stone mining operations in the future into a sound natural setting (e.g. constructing sanitary landfill for domestic solid waste)	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Ministry of Environmental Affairs		√
√		2.10 Accommodate the reuse of future decommissioned, abandoned, or obsolete public structures (especially the Israeli military bases and settlements)	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development		√
Amen-	Propo-	3. Take Advantage of Compact Spatial Development in Bethlehem			
ded	sed				
√		3.1 Use onsite best management practices to improve environmental outcomes in new compact developments	Ministry of Environmental Affairs; Engineers Association; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations	√	
	√	3.2 Enforce a buffer zone around the old historic cores in Bethlehem city-area	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities	√	
√		3.3 Strategically reduce minimum lot size requirements (i.e., amend the outlined setbacks of buildings in the building’s by-law)	Ministry of Local Government		√
	√	3.4 Increase the permissible vertical density (i.e. number of floors), without sabotaging the skyline of the cities of Bethlehem city-area	Ministry of Local Government		√
	√	3.5 Steer infill development (i.e. densification) within the urban fabric of Bethlehem city-area	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
√		3.6 Strategically manage the transition between higher- and lower-density neighborhoods	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
√		3.7 Use and maintain traditional neighborhood design (e.g. hosh)	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities;		√

			Engineers Association; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		
	√	3.8 Educate the community about the importance of abiding with the outlined zoning regulations that regulate compact building design	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
	√	3.9 Educate engineers and planners about sustainable building design standards that cope with disaster mitigation	Engineers Association; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture		√
	√	3.10 Maintain relatively low amount of impervious surface in the rural areas, especially in the Western rural zone of Bethlehem city-region	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Ministry of Environmental Affairs		√
Amen-	Propo-	4. Provide a Variety of Transportation Choices and Improve the Roads Infrastructure in Bethlehem			
ded	sed				
	√	4.1 Prepare a comprehensive traffic management plan that link Bethlehem city-area to Bethlehem city-region and beyond	Ministry of Transportation; Ministry of Public Work and Housing	√	
	√	4.2 Maintain an updated database on the roads infrastructure, traffic rates, vehicles types and numbers	Ministry of Transportation	√	
	√	4.3 Encourage the use of public transportation by managing a premium bus service, AKA, BRT and shared taxis	Ministry of Transportation	√	
	√	4.4 Provide incentives for public transportation by adopting a subsidized tariff system	Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Local Government; Ministry of Transportation; Municipal Development and Lending Fund	√	
	√	4.5 Improve roads infrastructure conditions, especially manholes and pumps	Ministry of Transportation; Municipal Development and Lending Fund		√
	√	4.6 Provide convenient (in terms of space) sidewalks for pedestrians	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
	√	4.7 Protect the right-of-way and adopt a fine policy against violators	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
	√	4.8 Manage the supply of vehicle parking by rationalization of parking fees to make it commercially viable	Municipal Development and Lending Fund		√
√		4.9 Maintain a close cooperation and early consultation with emergency responders when developing city-related plans	Ministry of Interior - Palestinian Civil Defense		√
	√	4.10 Develop a recreational bus route that links Bethlehem city-area to the biblical landscape at the Eastern slopes of Bethlehem city-region ending at the Dead Sea for the local and international pilgrims and tourists. To be linked with the local BRT.	Ministry of Transportation; Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities		√
Amen-	Propo-	5. Strengthen and Direct Spatial Development toward Existing Communities in Bethlehem			
ded	sed				

	√	5.1 Activate the Joint Service Council of Bethlehem city-area to perform joint planning functions	Ministry of Local Government	√	
	√	5.2 Revisit the current hierarchy of social services (e.g. health, education) to ensure that such facilities would usher the spatial development in the suitable areas	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development	√	
	√	5.3 Settlements of land disputes among the LGUs of Bethlehem city-region, and land registration for private and public ownership	Ministry of Local Government; Palestinian Land Authority	√	
	√	5.4 Improve the fresh water network to minimize losses, and upgrade the wastewater network (e.g. installations of small wastewater treatment plants at the household level in the un-served rural areas)	Palestinian Water Authority	√	
	√	5.5 Adopt utilities extension policy that would ensure that the extensions of water and sewer networks are consistent with the master-plans and other adopted policies	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
	√	5.6 Maintain structural corridors (rural-to-urban transect) to link Bethlehem city-area with the Eastern, Western, and Southern zones of Bethlehem city-region, respectively	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
	√	5.7 Develop a clear prioritization of spatial growth alternatives plan in Bethlehem city region (urban revitalization-urban infill-urban extension-new neighborhood on existing infrastructure, etc.)	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
√		5.8 Initiate transit-oriented development, and establish a connected network of infill stations	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Ministry of Transportation		√
	√	5.9 Provide incentives, such as density bonuses, to encourage development in suitable areas in order to realize efficiencies from infrastructure and service investments	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
√		5.10 Support the establishment of business improvement districts, as a tool to encourage revitalization and investment in suitable areas	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry		√
Amended	Proposed	6. Provide a Range of Housing Opportunities for Residential and Public Uses in Bethlehem			
	√	6.1 Enhance and develop the basic health care services facilities	Bethlehem Directorate for Health	√	
	√	6.2 Upgrade the existing educational facilities, especially the vocational and athletic education and training	Bethlehem Directorate for Education	√	
	√	6.3 Establish a licensed sanitary slaughterhouse to serve Bethlehem city-region	Bethlehem Directorate for Health	√	
	√	6.4 Provide incentives, such as: license fees exemption to housing projects targeting vulnerable groups, especially martyr’s and prisoner’s families	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
	√	6.5 Establish a housing committee that focuses on public education and to investigate and recommend to realistic solutions for low-income housing	Ministry of Public Work and Housing; UNHABITAT; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture; Palestinian	√	

			Housing Council; Palestinian Contractors Union; Palestine Mortgage and Housing Corporation; Palestine Investment Fund		
	√	6.6 Update and improve the relevant housing laws, legislations, and regulations, and accordingly develop necessary standards to encourage partnerships between the public and private sectors	Ministry of Public Work and Housing; Palestinian Housing Council	√	
√		6.7 Maintain and encourage employer-assisted and cooperative housing programs in order to increase the available housing stock in the community	Palestinian Housing Council; Palestinian Contractors Union; Palestine Mortgage and Housing Corporation; Palestine Investment Fund		√
	√	6.8 Setting a credit policy for financing and encouraging the banking sector to support housing by covering a portion of interest and profit of vulnerable groups	Palestine Mortgage and Housing Corporation; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Banking System		√
√		6.9 Give a priority for low-income housing in the development review process, and facilitate the preparation of land parcellation plans dedicated to low-income housing projects, especially in case of inherited and common lands	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Land Authority		√
	√	6.10 Encourage the use of modern technology and environment friendly building specifications (i.e. non-traditional materials)	Engineers Association; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture		√
Amen-	Propo-	7. Make Bethlehem a Walk-able Environment			
ded	sed				
	√	7.1 Increase the green areas and maintain clean streets and plazas	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture	√	
√		7.2 Develop a master pedestrian facilities plan that focus attention on improvement to pedestrian traffic	Ministry of Transportation; Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
√		7.3 Ensure and encourage safe pedestrian routes to transit, especially for school students at street main crosses	Ministry of Transportation	√	
√		7.4 Provide design solutions that encourage and protect pupils to walk to school	Ministry of Local Government; Ministry of Education and Higher Education	√	
√		7.5 Use green infrastructure and trees in the design of new spatial developments along the proposed structural corridors as a beautification element and to provide shelter and separation from vehicle traffic, and to contribute to urban heat reduction	Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture	√	
√		7.6 Develop walking awareness and promotion programs	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Bethlehem Directorate for Education; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations	√	
	√	7.7 Organize walking tours for citizens, tourists, and pilgrims to visit the historical and religious sites in Bethlehem city-area and Bethlehem city-region, as well	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Engineers Association; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	

	√	7.8 Develop and adopt walk-ability standards designed to accommodate pedestrian connectivity and safety (not only establishing walking trails)	Engineers Association; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture		√
	√	7.9 Furnish streetscapes with chairs, along with artistic and informative items to make walking a pleasant journey for local citizens and tourists alike	Engineers Association; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture		√
	√	7.10 Develop gateway corridor plans for major entrance ways into city centers, which covers pedestrian facilities, signage, landscaping and appearance	Engineers Association; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture		√
Amen-	Propo-	8. Foster a Strong Sense of Place to Bethlehem			
ded	sed				
	√	8.1 Develop an easy-to-use way finding system in city centers designated for citizens, tourists, and pilgrims to find direction and connect to local history and identity	Ministry of Transportation	√	
	√	8.2 Adopt a conservation plan for the cultural heritage sites, including old historic centers of Bethlehem city-area	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	8.3 Preserve the archeological and cultural heritage sites and stimulate the cultural activities among the youth	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Bethlehem Directorate for Education; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
	√	8.4 Establish revolving loan funds to LGUs and NGOs for historic preservation with favorable interest rates and long repayment terms (up to 20 years)	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Ministry of Local Government; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization; Palestinian Banking System		√
	√	8.5 Rehabilitate and use old historical buildings, especially in the rural areas	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Ministry of Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization; Palestinian Schools of Planning and Architecture		√
	√	8.6 Engage the youth in the collaboration of development decisions at the local level	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
	√	8.7 Spot lights on the valuable cultural assets through public art and special events that boon for citizens, tourists, and pilgrims to and become as a centerpiece for the local community	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities; Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	8.8 Organize community awareness and educational campaigns to farmers and youth about sustainable agriculture practices	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	8.9 Use distinctive public transit to ease the access and increase the attractiveness of neighborhoods	Ministry of Transportation	√	
	√	8.10 Strengthen relations and joint cooperation between local citizens and	Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization;		√

		Palestinian expatriates in the Diaspora in the planning for Bethlehem city-area	Bethlehem-based Churches & Islamic Centers		
Amen- ded	Propo- sed	9. Encourage Local Businesses and Make Spatial Development Decisions Fair and Cost-Effective in Bethlehem			
√		9.1 Educate elected leaders, public officials, and private sector about sustainability-related policies	Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Ministry of Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	9.2 Ensure that information regarding permits and development projects are publicly announced	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
	√	9.3 Educate the public about the regulations that they should abide with related to development projects	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	9.4 Encourage local businesses to invest in growing local organic agricultural products	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture; Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry		√
	√	9.5 Establish small-to-medium sized traditional industries projects targeting women, such as: embroidery	Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
	√	9.6 Designate the rangelands as nature reserves and regulating grazing to ensure fair prices for local cattle products	Bethlehem Directorate for Agriculture	√	
	√	9.7 Provide technical and financial assistance to small businesses	Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry		√
√		9.8 Implement GIS-based planning into the development process to add certainty by using predefined development performance measures	Ministry of Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations		√
	√	9.9 Invest in green energy production, such as: implementing solar energy projects as an alternative energy source, e.g. BRT	Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Engineers Association; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations		√
	√	9.10 Adopt an after-care plan that focuses on identifying and removing barriers that may undermine the benefits of development projects to make sure that such benefits accrue to all segments of the society	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government		√
Amen- ded	Propo- sed	10. Encourage Stakeholder Collaboration in Spatial Development Decisions in Bethlehem			
	√	10.1 Develop a local action plan for the operationalization of the “National Policy Paper: Promoting and Institutionalizing Public Participation in Local Government Units’ Affairs” endorsed by MoLG in 2011	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
	√	10.2 Organize local public awareness campaigns on the importance of public participation in development decisions	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	

√		10.3 Use third-party groups to ensure that a range of stakeholder views is expressed	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
√		10.4 Use nonprofit groups, as well as academic and research institutions as sustainable development consultants	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	10.5 Establish “citizen committee” for the local development projects to promote sense of local ownership	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization	√	
	√	10.6 Conduct periodic meeting to educate and inform the public about planning initiatives and new development	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
√		10.7 Maintain visual contact by organizing trips to accompany LGU’s officials and residents of Bethlehem to visit related sustainable development projects in order to debunk common myths and misunderstanding about urban problems	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
√		10.8 Develop community indicators and criteria to monitor if development is meeting community goals	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√
	√	10.9 Ensure transparency by the announcement of evaluation results for development projects based on certain project’s criteria as developed by the community	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government	√	
	√	10.10 Coordinate the work of NGOs, CBOs, and donors related to public participation activities in development projects to ensure efficiency (measure of time and cost) and effectiveness (measure of quality)	Bethlehem Directorate for Local Government; Municipal Development and Lending Fund; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization		√

Chapter 9: Envisioning the Geo-political Fate of Bethlehem – Scenarios for Spatial Development Towards Sustainability

“The unfettered ‘right to vision’ might help enable new ideas that in the long run would lead to transformative and socially just urban outcomes.”

(Davis & Hatuka, 2011: 243)

“Vision planning remains true to the “imagination of powerful possibilities” [that] creates opportunity for new voices, new conversations, new perspectives and new experiments.”

(Murray, 2013: 280)

Chapter 9: Envisioning the Geo-political Fate of Bethlehem – Scenarios for Spatial Development Towards Sustainability

9.1. Abstract

This closing scene chapter aims at envisioning the geo-political fate of Bethlehem, by studying its relation with Jerusalem city, the claimed capital for both Palestinians and Israelis. This is inescapable due to the longstanding history in which Bethlehem has been a constituent of Jerusalem till the Israeli occupation started in 1967. Jerusalem issue has been defined as a final negotiation item in the peace process talks between the Palestinians and Israelis. Silencing and deferring the discussion about key issues of the conflict, especially Jerusalem have prolonged and intensified the potency. The analysis and demystification of such a key issue, or the insurmountable obstacle for peace as perceived by many is considered important and timely. As such, envisioning the geo-political future of Bethlehem is based on contemplating and discussing a set of scenarios for the spatial development of Bethlehem towards sustainability. These scenarios are based on a multi-criteria evaluation containing qualitative and quantitative-oriented criteria. It is concluded that the two-state solution scenario is the most suitable scenario for conflict resolution at the short run. Nevertheless, the two-state solution scenario should be the first step in healing the deep injuries marring ethnic relations and building trust between the two sides to enable the environment to implement on the ground at the long run other ideal scenarios such as the one-state solution scenario or the three-state solution scenario, where both Palestinians and Israelis would equitably share the geo-political space, and live together in peace and security. Accordingly, Palestinian planners are advised to strategically revisit the “SPSSs” that they adopt in the form of action plans at the short-to-medium run that suit the *status quo* and the arguably the suitable solution of the two-state scenario (Chapter 8), while concurrently devising apposite “SPSSs” that foresees the one-state scenario as the best solution to the geo-political conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.

9.2. Introduction

In a context that has both a complex set of interacting problems (Chapter 2) and weak planning processes (Chapter 3), thus contributing to a more vague and unknown future, spatial planners are faced with the most challenging planning situations (Avin, 2007: 113). In such a case, building scenarios would be the suitable tool for planners to think about and influence the future towards more effective planning practices (Hopkins & Zapata, 2007: 9) (Section 6.3.4, Chapter 6). Importantly to mention here that there is a blurry line between scenarios and other future planning tools, namely: visioning and forecasting. First, a scenario is a possible future, but need not to be desirable, thus it is not a vision, nor likely, thus not a forecast. Nevertheless, scenarios should be discussed and evaluated both in terms of desirability (or impact) and likelihood, as focusing on only plausible futures without strongly considering desired futures is doomed to be unrealistic in current planning practices towards sustainability (Avin, 2007: 110). Second, a scenario is not just a point in the future; it emphasizes a process of change, or a way of thinking about future (Hopkins & Zapata, 2007: 9-10; Harwood, 2007: 143-145). As such, *scenario planning*, or *future-now* planning in general could be defined as “*that part of strategic planning which relates to the tools and technologies for managing the uncertainties of the future*” (Ringland, 2006: 2). Similarly, Hoch (2014: 6) puts it this way: “*among spatial planners scenarios offer plausible accounts of future events tied to current choices about cause and purpose*”. He adds: “*We do not inhabit the scenario we create, but create stories that help us compare what kinds of*

world we might make and then inhabit....spatial planners use scenarios to enliven imagined counterfactual story plots that study how different strategies might resolve anticipated uncertainties for the future of a place” (Hoch, 2014: 7).

Spatial planning in the tumultuous geo-political context of Bethlehem city-area is organically connected to the claimed Palestinian capital of Jerusalem, which became a mythical emblem for the national identity of Palestinians due to the protracted military occupation. Arguably, the geo-political future of Bethlehem city-area should be treated as continuous unfolding in time that can find traces and ground roots in the present and past, and not to be conceived as discontinued end-state that exists only in the future. Said differently, Bethlehem is to be conceived as the history of the future. This coincides with Friedmann’s (1987: 11) definition of planning as “*a forward looking activity that selects from the past those elements that are useful in analyzing existing conditions from a vantage point of the future*” (See Section 5.4, Chapter 5). As such, one could consider different scenarios for the future spatial development of Bethlehem city-area based on the evolution of spatial settings of Bethlehem city-area in respect to Jerusalem city and its environs (Figure 9.1).

The evolution of spatial settings for Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem city is characterized by a dynamic and changing character (El-Atrash, 2013: 84-88). During the Ottoman Turks epoch (1516-1917), Bethlehem city-area was a constituent of Jerusalem and tangible spatial relations were vivid and concrete, as reflected in socio-cultural and morphological developments. The British Mandate epoch (1918-1948) exhibited less tangible spatial relations between Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem in comparison with the Ottoman epoch, especially at the final days of the Mandate that exhibited high rates of Jewish immigrations to the city of Jerusalem, and due to the “modernization” project launched in the Palestinian historic centers like Bethlehem that made Bethlehem city-area less dependent on Jerusalem. Nevertheless, during the Jordanian Administration epoch (1948-1967) the spatial relations between Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem started to be intangible with the partitioning of Jerusalem city into West and East Jerusalem, where the people of Bethlehem city-area likewise other Palestinians had access only to the eastern part of the city of Jerusalem and during that period Bethlehem started to have for the first time some kind of separate administrative and planning boundary apart from Jerusalem. During the Israeli Military Occupation epoch (1967-1993) the gulf in terms of spatial relations between Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem city has been deepened and the relation became more elusive and intangible, also access to the eastern part of Jerusalem city became even more problematic. Ultimately, during the prevailing PNA administration (post-Oslo epoch since 1993), almost a total severance between Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem city is exhibited due to the *de facto* Israeli separation and fragmentation policy on the ground (Figure 9.1).

Based on the evolution of spatial settings and relations between Bethlehem city-area and the foreseen Palestinian capital of Jerusalem, the geo-political fate of Bethlehem city-area could be discussed within the framework of four main scenarios, namely: Scenario 0 – No-State Solution; Scenario 1 – Two-State Solution; Scenario 2 – Three-State Solution; Scenario 3 – One-State Solution. Importantly to mention is that the number of scenarios to consider is in fact quite important. Smith (2007: 99) and Ringland (2006: 133) assure that the number of four scenarios strikes a great balance between stretching to multiple futures without presenting an overwhelming number (five and more scenarios) and also steering the perspective away from traditional high/medium/low (three scenarios) or baseline-and-desired thinking (two scenarios).

Bethlehem – History of the Future*




Figure (9.1): Scenario's Building - Retrospective Outlook for the Spatial Relations of Bethlehem City-area with Jerusalem

* The title is inspired from a conference curated by the Institute of Jerusalem Studies in August 2009 at Birzeit University, West Bank. (Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2009)

Before the exposition of the four scenarios captioned in Figure (9.1), a set of assumptions is presented.

9.3.Scenario's Assumptions

For Smith (2007: 98) “*scenarios are hypothesis not plans,*” and ideally conversations and discussions in respect to these scenarios generate hope and cooperation, and similarly diminish division and pessimism through simple and open acknowledgment of difference and strife. As such, it is quite important to spell out the hypothesis or assumptions used in the generation of the four scenarios at hand. The scenario's assumptions could be briefly elaborated, as follows:

- (1) The borders between present Palestine and the Israel proper have a transitional character, where there should be a clear distinction between the physical aspect of border's construction and the reflections on the transitional character of borders on the associated socio-cultural, economic, political, and environmental aspects of both the Palestinian and Israeli societies.

In his efforts to chart a theoretical framework on the broad interactions between borders and power, Newman (2003: 14) defined border as a self-perpetuating and resistant to change institution, with one major function that is to act as a barrier. He assures that the process of bordering by which one determine what/who is included/excluded has more significance than the cartographic plotting of the lines of a border *per se*, since this particular “process” would define the role of the border either as creating a “borderland” of socio-spatial separation and segregation or a “transition zone” of socio-spatial cooperation and assimilation (Newman, 2003). To elaborate more, Anani (2009: 168) in his work on the Jordan Valley to advocate for a new common border space, as an abstract model for a more “just” cross-border cooperation in the context of imbalanced power relations between Israelis and Palestinians, referred to the work of the prominent German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who conceived the linearity of a border as an abstraction to a border region/zone or “Grenzraum,” as assembled in the German language. As such, the overlap area between present Palestine and the Israel proper in Figures (9.2-9.5) is best understood as the border region in which different scenarios of spatial organization and governance are discussed.

- (2) The border region in the four scenarios have the same basic or exterior planning perimeter or boundary, with Jerusalem city being the core of this border region, where the spatial development of the neighboring Israeli and Palestinian communities alike (including Bethlehem city-area) are aspired basically to be introverted towards Jerusalem city. Said differently, a common spatial territorial concept is used in the four scenarios (Figures 9.2-9.5). Nevertheless, a zoom-in area in each of the proposed scenarios on a different scale based on the historic planning boundaries referred to, will be used to provide more details in terms of hard data (quantitative) about certain aspects of spatial development, only for the purpose of parsing the current spatial conditions and arrangements inside these historic planning boundaries, which were used to delineate the *basic planning boundary* upon which the four scenarios are discussed.
- (3) Though a common spatial territorial concept is used in the four scenarios, different spatial organization or governance concepts are proposed in each of these scenarios. This entails that in certain scenarios, part of the current spatial developments either need to become under new planning jurisdictions or to be evacuated. More specifically, the illegal **Israeli settlements** in the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem will be maintained in terms of spatial territorial concept in some scenarios and will be dismantled in others, keeping in mind that the governance concept in each of the four scenarios would differ. For instance, within the no-state solution scenario, the Israeli settlements would remain under the Israeli planning jurisdiction, but under the two-state solution scenario the Israeli settlements would become under the Palestinian planning jurisdiction, if to be maintained. Alternatively, within the three-state solution scenario and the one-state solution scenario the Israeli settlements under question would be under an international or joint Palestinian-Israeli planning jurisdiction, respectively. Interestingly to notice that recent polling data shows that in Israel a substantial number (about four-in-ten) believes that the continued building of settlements in the West Bank hurts the security of Israel; an opinion that is held by nearly half of secular Jews (47%) and by a large majority of Arabs (84%) inside Israel (Pew Research Center, 2013). Nevertheless, the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) (2013) reported in a separate poll that the majority of Jewish Israelis (58%) would not support an agreement that included dispossession of settlements.

In the same token, in the discussion of the four scenarios, the repatriation of a large number, if not all of the Palestinians in Diaspora (*Shatat*) to their original places of residence inside Historic Palestine, or partly in present Palestine will not be tackled in details. Nevertheless, an assumed amount of **Palestinian refugees/returnees** will be considered in the evaluation of the four scenarios, thus acknowledging the Palestinian refugees right of return that has been affirmed by UN resolution 194 more than 135 times during the last 6 decades, more than any other resolution in UN history (Abu-Sitta, 2013).

9.4.Scenario's Building

This section outlines an abstraction to the four scenarios discussed within the framework of this chapter. This abstraction is inspired by the conceptual work of Yiftachel (2006 b: 279) that aimed at reintroducing the ancient Greek concept of the *demos* as a legitimate, inclusive, and stable geo-political space or administrative precinct covering a city or a group of communities together, in order to delineate a new political geography for a peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis.

It is worthy to mention that several other scenarios than the four prevalent scenarios discussed hereinafter no doubt exist, but arguably not with the same level of acceptance to large constituencies from both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. For instance, some Palestinians are advocating for a Greater Palestine scenario, while other Israelis are advocating for a Greater Israel scenario, by which both advocates deny the rightful needs and aspirations of the other side (See Falk, 2013). These scenarios, amongst others will not be discussed within the framework of this doctoral research, acknowledging that such scenarios would declare the demise of the Oslo model, and thus no legitimate *demos* would ever eventuate.

9.4.1.Scenario 0: No-State / Mini-State Solution (Fragmented City)

This scenario assumes that the *status quo*, or the *de facto* Israeli separation and fragmentation policy will continue, and thus Bethlehem city-area will continue to be perceived as a fragmented or hollow city (Figure 9.2).




Figure (9.2): No-State Solution – Fragmented City

In planning terms, Bethlehem city-area could be realized within the prevailing “Master-plans” for the year 2012 (Figure 9.6).

9.4.2.Scenario 1: Two-State Solution (Independent City)

This scenario assumes that the official Palestinian political position to the conflict resolution of the question of Palestine/Israel will be realized. Within this scenario the Green Line will delineate the border between the [will be] two independent states, with East Jerusalem (Al-Quds) the capital for the Palestinian state, and West Jerusalem (Yerushalayim) the capital for the Israeli state (Figure 9.3).




Figure (9.3): Two-State Solution – Independent City

In planning terms, Bethlehem city-area could be realized within the current administrative boundary of “Bethlehem Governorate/City-region” that was inherited from the Jordanian administration in 1967 (Figure 9.6).

9.4.3.Scenario 2: Three-State Solution (Spiritual City)

This scenario assumes that Jerusalem city and its environs, including Bethlehem city-area will be under an international administration. As such, Jerusalem, including Bethlehem city-area will be a landlocked sovereign city-state, but with open borders to the tourists and pilgrims to perpetuate its religious and cultural significance (Figure 9.4). Under such a scenario, Jerusalem, including Bethlehem could be

perceived as the spiritual or the holy city. A prominent example on this regard is the Vatican City State, which is the smallest internationally recognized independent state in the world, in terms of area and population.




Figure (9.4): Three-State Solution – Spiritual City

In planning terms, the flexible border for the proposed city-state could be realized as delineated by the UN proposed “*Corpus Separatum*” in 1947 (Figure 9.6).

9.4.4.Scenario 3: One-State Solution (Global City)

This scenario assumes a bi-national and multi-cultural one-state where Jerusalem city and its environs, including Bethlehem city-area are realized as a global city with no fixed boundaries, where socio-economic cooperation between both sides and beyond the region is inevitably favorable (Figure 9.5). As such, a joint/shared sovereignty over Jerusalem, including Bethlehem is proposed between both the Palestinian and Israeli sides.




Figure (9.5): One-State Solution – Global City

Nevertheless, in planning terms Bethlehem city-area could be realized within the historic “Village Boundary” that reflects the land ownership as delineated during the British Mandate in 1948 (Figure 9.6).




Figure (9.6): Historic Planning Boundaries for the Proposed Scenarios
Source: (ARIJ, 2013)

The historic planning boundaries for the proposed four scenarios could stand as precincts that define the political geography in which Bethlehem city-area would prosper. Having analyzed and demystified the four historic planning boundaries, an exterior or *basic planning boundary* could be defined that would stand as the area in which the four scenarios are discussed and evaluated (Figure 9.7-A-9.7-D).

The *basic planning boundary* has an area of more than 740,000 dunums, where some 1,129,000 capita reside at present-day (44.6% of which are Palestinians and the remaining 55.4% are Israelis) (Figure 9.7-A-9.7-D) (See Annex 7). While, the Israeli population resembles the majority within the *basic planning boundary* at present, it is worthy to mention that the historic land ownership pre-1948 within this boundary was less than 3%. The average gross population density within the *basic planning boundary* stands at 762 capita/km²; including in average 844 Israeli capita/km² and 680 Palestinian capita/km². As per the net population density within the *basic planning boundary* it stands at 5,944 capita/km²; including in average 5,100 Israeli capita/km² and 6,787 Palestinian capita/km².

The spatial conditions within the four historic planning boundaries that represent the four scenarios are quite different and provide a challenging reality on the ground. The remaining of this section will pay attention to parsing the spatial conditions in terms of population distribution, gross and net population densities of Palestinians and Israelis, along with the available and suitable land for future spatial development within the four historic planning boundaries to better understand the current predicaments.




Figure (9.7-A): No-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.7-B): Two-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.7-C): Three-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.7-D): One-State Solution Scenario

———— Basic (Exterior) Planning Boundary Green Line  City Planning Boundary

Figure (9.7): Demystification of the Historic Planning Boundaries for the Proposed Scenarios

The population distribution between Palestinians and Israelis is an important element to consider in this discussion, but it is equally important to concurrently analyze the gross population densities (total population per total area) and net population densities (total population per built-up area) for both sides, as well. Typically the values of net population densities are higher than the gross population densities.

Generally speaking, the use of both gross and net population densities is useful, since the gross population density helps better examining the population potentials in an area, and the net population density helps better describing the spatial patterns of population distribution (Eldridge, 1984: 23). Within the same framework, the carrying capacity in terms of available and suitable land for future spatial development is a decisive element to consider (Section 2.5, Chapter 2).

The prevailing master-plans for Bethlehem city-area (2012) is inhabited now by 55,901 Palestinian capita with gross and net population densities of 3,829 capita/km² and 7,997 capita/km², respectively. A comparison with the years 1997 and 2007 for the same planning jurisdiction entails that the rate of spatial development for the built environment soared to more than 2.5 times the rate of population growth, reflecting the leap-frog development that lead to urban sprawl and overcrowding (See El-Atrash, 2009: 92). Futhermore, the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability is relatively weak, since the available and suitable land dedicated for future spatial development within the prevailing master-plans for Bethlehem city-area are only 13.7% and 9.7% of the total area, respectively (Figure 9.8).




Figure (9.8): Current Spatial Conditions within the Bethlehem City-area Master-plans (2012)
 Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

The Bethlehem district boundary (1967) is inhabited now by 332,176 capita; 60% of which are Palestinians and the remaining 40% are Israeli settlers, entailing that the Palestinian-to-Israeli ratio is 1:0.67. In the year 1967, when this planning jurisdiction was first demarcated only 49,515 Palestinian

capita inhabited this jurisdiction with no Israeli settlers. Whereas, the current gross population densities for Palestinians and Israelis inside Bethlehem district boundary (1967) are 328 capita/km² and 218 capita/km², respectively, the net population densities are 9,301 capita/km² and 7,459 capita/km², respectively. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the majority of the available land within Bethlehem district boundary has been designated for a long time by the Israeli authorities as a “no-development” area for Palestinians, about 63.4% of the Bethlehem district boundary is considered as available land for future spatial development, keeping in mind that less than 5% of which fall under the current Palestinian planning jurisdiction (areas A & B). When, considering the ecological suitability that is the product of water sensitivity, slope, climatology, and soil types, only 14.5% of the Bethlehem district boundary is considered suitable for future spatial development (Figure 9.9).




Figure (9.9): Current Spatial Conditions within the Bethlehem District Boundary (1967)
 Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

The *Corpus Separatum* (1947) is inhabited now by 984,287 capita; 43% of which are Palestinians and the remaining 57% are Israelis, entailing that the Palestinian-to-Israeli ratio is 1:1.34, compared to a ratio of 1:0.95 for the year 1947 (105,000 Palestinians and 100,000 Israelis), when the *Corpus Separatum* was first proposed. It bears mentioning that the historic Jewish ownership at that time according to the survey of Palestine conducted by the British in 1947 was less than 9% of the 186 km² comprising the *Corpus Separatum* total area. The current gross population densities for Palestinians and Israelis inside the *Corpus Separatum* boundary (1947) are 2,266 capita/km² and 3,029 capita/km², respectively entailing an increase by 4 times and 5.6 times, respectively compared with the year 1947.

Likewise, the current net population densities for Palestinians and Israelis are 6,603 capita/km² and 5,231 capita/km², respectively entailing that the net population density for Palestinians is 1.23 times that for the Israelis despite the fact that the number of Israelis is 1.34 times that of the Palestinians. As per the carrying capacity, the analysis shows that while 45.4% of the *Corpus Separatum* is considered available land, only 15.1% is considered suitable for future spatial development (Figure 9.10).




Figure (9.10): Current Spatial Conditions within the *Corpus Separatum* (1947)

Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

The village boundary (1948) for Bethlehem city-area is inhabited now by 187,125 capita; 63% of which are Palestinians and the remaining 37% are Israeli settlers of Gilo, Har Gilo, and Har Homa. This entails that the Palestinian-to-Israeli ratio is 1:0.60. In 1948, the village boundary for Bethlehem city-area was inhabited by 19,626 Palestinian capita with no Israelis, while the historic Jewish ownership at that time was about 3% of the 53 km² comprising the total area of the village boundary of Bethlehem city-area. Whereas, the current gross population densities for Palestinians and Israelis inside the village boundary of Bethlehem city-area (1948) are 2,217 capita/km² and 1,329 capita/km², respectively, the net population densities are 10,610 capita/km² and 25,334 capita/km², respectively. In other words, the net population density for Palestinians is less than four-tenths that of the Israeli settlers, despite that the Palestinians form the majority of population at 63%. Only 28.3% of the village boundary for Bethlehem city-area is considered available land, and less than 15.3% is considered suitable for spatial development (Figure 9.11).




Figure (9.11): Current Spatial Conditions within the Village Boundary for Bethlehem City-area (1948)
Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

To this end, the analysis of the current spatial conditions of the four historic planning boundaries reflects the menacing complexity of the issue at hand. More specifically, two key perspectives could be highlighted. First: demography shapes geography. There is a lack of congruity between the administrative, planning, military, and security boundaries that have withered throughout the modern history of the spatial evolution of Bethlehem city-area in respect to Jerusalem. The main drive in the continuous changes of boundaries was to exercise a demographic hegemony. Second: linkage with Jerusalem. Whether being part or apart from Jerusalem, the current predicaments on the ground have created some kind of fearsomely Kafkaesque reality characterized by formidable challenges impeding the sustainable spatial development of Bethlehem, and the West Bank, at large. Bethlehem, likewise other Palestinian communities of the West Bank face a total physical severance with Jerusalem from one side, and from the other side are faced with many physical obstructions that challenge the every-day interactions with other Palestinian communities (El-Atrash, 2013). As such, discerning the likely directions associated with envisioning the geo-political fate for Bethlehem, and peering into the future through contemplating scenarios for spatial development is difficult and highly speculative, but remains important and timely.

The *basic planning boundary* within which the four scenarios are discussed and evaluated based on the current spatial conditions is depicted in Figure (9.12), below.




Figure (9.12): Basic Planning Boundary for the Proposed Scenarios

Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

Accordingly, the four scenarios based on the current and anticipated spatial conditions could be introduced, as follows:

- **Scenario 0 – No-State / Mini-State Solution:** In the *status quo* it is anticipated that the Palestinian built-up area and Israeli settlements will be maintained, and the population within the *basic planning boundary* will be increased following the current rates of population growth for the West Bank (applicable to all scenarios). The available area for Palestinian future spatial development is restricted only to areas A & B.
- **Scenario 1 – Two-State Solution:** In this scenario it is anticipated that the Israeli settlements will be evacuated, and the settlers will be accommodated within the Israel proper. Also, it is anticipated that a considerable amount of Palestinian returnees will be accommodated within the *basic planning boundary* based on its carrying capacity in terms of land availability that will be increased since the Israeli settlements might be used to accommodate the Palestinian returnees.
- **Scenario 2 – Three-State Solution:** This scenario will maintain the same built environment for both Palestinians and Israelis, and no Israeli settlers will be evacuated or Palestinian returnees will be accommodated within the *basic planning boundary*, to confer that this area has a religious significance, *per se*. The Palestinian returnees would be accommodated within the Palestinian state. In this scenario, an international trusteeship is assumed.

- **Scenario 3 – One-State Solution:** In this scenario the Israeli settlements will be maintained, and it is anticipated that a considerable amount of Palestinian returnees will be accommodated within the *basic planning boundary*, based on its carrying capacity in terms of land availability. In this scenario, joint sovereignty between both sides is assumed.

9.5. Multi-criteria Evaluation of Scenarios

This evaluation was used to help the decision makers in the policy community of Bethlehem to pursue future plans, according to a set of related sustainability criteria that would avoid unwanted side-effects of unplanned spatial development from one side, and to accommodate the future spatial developmental priorities (needs) and aspirations (rights) of the local population. The deployed set of related sustainability criteria in the evaluation at hand contains two types of criteria, namely: qualitative and quantitative-oriented criteria, and could be presented in terms of sustainability aspects, namely: socio-cultural and economic aspects; environmental aspects; and physical and geographic aspects (Table 9.1).

Sustainability's Aspects	Main Criteria	Unit
Socio-cultural and Economic Aspects	(1) Ratio of Population Distribution (Palestinian-to-Israeli)	Unit less
	(2) Right to Movement: Access to Worship Places	Unit less
	(3) Economic Prosperity: Tourism Sector	Unit less
	(4) Social Cohesion and Willingness	Unit less
Environmental Aspects	(5) Rate of Consumption for Suitable Land: Water Sensitivity, Topography, Soil Type, and Climatology	Percentage
Physical and Geographic Aspects	(6) Rate of consumption for Available Land: Majorly, Open Space	Percentage

The related **socio-cultural and economic aspects** of sustainability criteria used in the multi-criteria evaluation at hand were based on information about the ratio of population distribution between Palestinians and Israelis, along with a qualitative discussion of pros and cons within the framework of the proposed scenarios in terms of accessibility to worship places; economic prosperity of the tourism sector; and the anticipated social cohesion and willingness of both Palestinians and Israelis to accept the proposed scenario that would ultimately achieve peace and security in Palestine/Israel, and the Middle East region, at large. As per the related qualitative-oriented criteria of right to movement and accessibility to worship places; economic prosperity, especially in the tourism sector; and social cohesion and willingness, they all share the same logic. It is anticipated that the impact on sustainability would be better if the worship places become more accessible, and consequently the tourism sector would be flourished. Likewise, the social cohesion and willingness of both sides to accept any of the scenarios would magnify the related socio-cultural and economic impacts on sustainability. More elaborated discussion is provided on these criteria in Section (9.5.1), below. As per the ratio of Palestinian-to-Israeli distribution it is argued that the more even the distribution is (i.e., 1:1), the better is the anticipated impact on the related socio-cultural and economic aspects of sustainability (Section 9.5.2, below).

The related **environmental aspects** of sustainability criteria used in the multi-criteria evaluation was mainly based on the conducted land suitability analysis as resulted from a designated GIS-based model (Section 2.5.2, Chapter 2). Simply, for the associated evaluation purposes, the higher the percentage of land suitable for future spatial development in each scenario the better it is conceived in terms of sustainability's impact (Section 9.5.2, below).

The related **physical and geographic aspects** of sustainability criteria used in the multi-criteria evaluation were based on the land availability analysis of current land use/land cover classifications in the context of Bethlehem (Section 2.5.1, Chapter 2). The significance of the related physical and geographic criteria in terms of sustainability's impact could be conceived in the same sense by which the related environmental aspects of sustainability criterion have been conceived. The percentage of land available criterion would follow the same logic that the percentage of land suitable criterion has been arbitrated against, i.e. the higher the percentage of available land the better is the anticipated impacts on sustainability (Section 9.5.2, below).

The assumed feedback relationships among the six criteria used in the multi-criteria evaluation (Table 9.1) of the four scenarios is captioned in Figure (9.13), below.




Figure (9.13): Assumed Feedback Relationships in the Multi-criteria Evaluation

It is important to mention that one of the limitations associated with the quantitative-oriented multi-criteria evaluation is that they are dependent. The more the population growth is, the more is the anticipated consumption rate of the available and suitable land (i.e., the less the available and suitable land would become) (Figure 9.13). Therefore, it is important to rule out other criteria which might

interfere in the multi-criteria evaluation exercise at hand, and to acknowledge that the projection and analysis provided henceforth are only valid for the comparison of the four scenarios as they are conceived, *ceteris paribus* – all other things being equal. The use of other independent criteria is advisable, but would be beyond the capacity of this doctoral research. The remaining of this chapter is dedicated to parsing the two types of criteria (conceptual and empirical), in order to rethink the future and prioritize and then rank the four scenarios in terms of sustainability's impact (desirability) and likelihood.

9.5.1. Qualitative-oriented Multi-criteria Evaluation of Scenarios

The related qualitative-oriented multi-criteria for the evaluation of the four scenarios are mainly part of the socio-cultural and economic aspects of sustainability deployed in the evaluation process. These criteria are mainly the right to movement as embodied by the access to worship places; economic prosperity, majorly in the tourism sector; and the anticipated social cohesion and willingness of both sides the Palestinians and Israelis to accept the proposed scenario, and accordingly achieve peace and security. The four scenarios are discussed against these three qualitative-oriented criteria mainly in terms of impact (desirability) and likelihood, as focusing only on plausible futures without strongly considering desired futures is doomed to be unrealistic in current planning practices towards sustainability (Avin, 2007: 110) (Section 9.2, above).

As per the prevailing **no-state/mini-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.14-A), the discussion of the three used criteria here would indicate that this scenario is indeed the least desirable in terms of impact, but unfortunately the most likely to persist on the ground in comparison to the other remaining scenarios. In terms of access to worship places in both Jerusalem and Bethlehem tourists/pilgrims, along with local population from both sides are faced with many physical obstructions that ultimately undermine the right to movement, especially for the local Palestinian population inside present Palestine. This has extremely negative implications on the tourism sector and the overall economic prosperity. Most importantly is that if the current situation of disintegration on the ground continue, the social cohesion among Palestinians from one side and the Israelis from another side would not be possible and this will continue to wreak havoc on both sides, thus reconciliation and resolution of the conflict would not be possible, and accordingly peace and security would not be achieved. In the same token, no state regime can eventuate under such a scenario at the long run, even for the Israeli side. Needless to say, experience from the last two decades since the inception of the PNA demonstrates that such a scenario would render a democratic rule improbable.

When considering the **two-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.14-B), more balanced results are attained in terms of impact and likelihood in comparison with the remaining proposed scenarios. In a two-state solution scenario, Palestinians would have better access to worship places especially inside East Jerusalem, and thus the economic prosperity as per the tourism sector for the Palestinians would be much better than in the no-state/mini-state solution scenario, nevertheless it would not be better than the anticipated economic prosperity in terms of tourism sector in the three-state solution and one-state solution scenarios. As per the social cohesion criteria, it is anticipated that the level of assaults and confrontations would drastically decrease among Palestinians and Israelis, but the social cohesion between both sides might not be the best, since the day-to-day activities would be relatively restricted if compared with the three-state solution and one-state solution scenarios, keeping in mind that the two-state solution scenario is more likely to happen compared with these last two scenarios. Nevertheless,

the two-state solution scenario could be the first step in healing the deep injuries marring ethnic relations in Palestine/Israel, by first ending of the belligerent military occupation of present Palestine, before implementing on the ground the more desirable three-state solution or one-state solution scenarios. As such, the two-state solution scenario stands as the suitable solution for conflict at both the political and public opinion levels in both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The overwhelming preponderance thinks that dividing the geo-political space and political power is what needed, to stop the cycle of claims and counter claims that have been lingering for the past six decades between the two sides.

As per the **three-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.14-C), the level of sustainability's impact is expected to be better than the two-state solution scenario. Since Bethlehem will be part of Jerusalem as an international independent corpus, access to worship places would be easier for tourists/pilgrims, along for local population from both sides, and thus the tourism sector would prosper and the economic fruits would be much better. It is expected that the social cohesion among Palestinians and Israelis would be better since Jerusalem and its environs including Bethlehem would act as a spiritual destination for the followers of the three monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Nevertheless, the likelihood that this scenario happens remains unfortunately lower than that in the no-state solution and two-state solution scenarios.

Arguably, the three-state solution scenario harbors severe difficulties especially in relation to day-to-day management of the area of jurisdiction that will be under international supervision. The scope and level of countenance cooperation between both the Palestinian and Israeli sides under the guise of international supervision needs more focused lenses to analyze the anticipated responsibilities for each side. Nevertheless, this scenario may alleviate the worries associated in the needed physical constructs, including border checkpoints and fences in the two-state solution scenario.

In terms of the **one-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.14-D), the expected level of sustainability's impact would be the highest in comparison with the other remaining scenarios. Tourists/pilgrims and local population in Jerusalem and Bethlehem along the entire Palestinian/Israeli communities would have an easy access to worship places, and consequently the tourism sector would be thrived and the economic income would be increasingly witnessed. All population from different ethnicities, religions, and social backgrounds would have equal rights since they will be governed within a liberal framework of governance, and theoretically this would achieve social cohesion. But by and large, this scenario is the least likely to happen in comparison with the remaining three scenarios, despite the fact that it is indeed the most desirable due to its high level impact on sustainability.

The one-state solution scenario serves as the ideal scenario, since it does not require substantial changes for the situation on the ground, but indeed it requires regulating immigration policy into something fair between rival ethnicities and religions, especially since the Palestinian fertility rates are much higher than those for the Israelis, who really fear this fact. Nevertheless, in light of the increasingly reciprocal violence and the decline in Palestinian and Israeli mutual trust, and due to the dominant way of thinking among policy makers on the future resolution of the conflict by partitioning the geo-political space, unfortunately this scenario is fraught with many difficulties as would be resulted from the rapid redistribution of resources, especially land. Therefore, this scenario standing alone is still perceived as an elusive and a dim possibility (Yiftachel, 2006 b: 260).




Figure (9.14-A): No-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.14-B): Two-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.14-C): Three-State Solution Scenario





Figure (9.14-D): One-State Solution Scenario

Figure (9.14): Articulations of the Related Socio-cultural and Economic Aspects of Sustainability's Impact (Desirability) and Likelihood to the Proposed Scenarios

Legend

- × Right to Movement: Access to Worship Places
- Economic Prosperity: Tourism Sector
- o Social Cohesion and Willingness



9.5.2. Quantitative-oriented Multi-criteria Evaluation of Scenarios

The related quantitative-oriented multi-criteria for the evaluation of the four scenarios include the three sustainability aspects, namely: environmental aspects; physical and geographic aspects; and socio-cultural and economic aspects (Table 9.1). This section is based on extensive data analysis and projection to three main criteria, namely: ratio of population distribution between Palestinians and Israelis; rate of consumption of available land for future spatial development; and rate of consumption of suitable land for future spatial development.

Having analyzed the land use/land cover of the West Bank and calculated the available land and defined the suitable land in terms of ecological criteria for future spatial development (Section 2.5, Chapter 2), one could contemplate different plausible futures, and provide hard data based on the anticipated population growth. The four scenarios are discussed in terms of ratio of Palestinian-to-Israeli population distribution at the long run by the year 2030 in comparison to the short-to-medium run by the year 2018. The short-to-medium run is not expected to witness radical changes with the purpose to serve as a transition period to enable the environment for the expected changes at the long run. Within the same framework, the four scenarios are also discussed in terms of the anticipated consumption rate for the available and suitable land for future spatial development. The rationalization for consumption here entails that if the current trend of spatial development that is characterized by sprawl persists, then the organic Palestinian rural communities (villages and towns) will be developed in a relatively short time into new urbanization centers, such as in the case of the new urbanization trend anticipated from the first Palestinian planned city of Rawabi city near Birzeit that has a gross population density of almost 6,349 capita/km². This would negatively afflict the prime agricultural and protected lands in the West Bank, at large. Ultimately, this analysis would help identify the scenario within which the related multi-criteria would score highest in terms of sustainability's impacts, and thus would help contribute towards more sustainable outcomes in the future.

It is important to mention that the attained results in this section are indicative, rough, and contain a sense of subjectivity, especially in the weighting of the ecological criteria to define the ecological suitability index. This is coupled with the fact that unfortunately sensitivity/uncertainty analysis was not conducted to test the robustness of the attained results. Furthermore, the results of the land use/land cover analysis are based on the available/accessible data that contain high degrees of anomalies and inconsistencies if compared with other data sources. Within the same framework, the used projection technique is quite simple and not sophisticated enough to capture details in the population changes by age, socio-economic conditions, gender, ethnicity, etc. Nevertheless, the attained results are not a conjecture rather they resoundingly and cogently indicate that conceiving sustainability is fraught with many difficulties, especially if the current paradigm of spatial development persisted.

- *Projection of Population and Consumption Rate in the Available and Suitable Land*

Within the **no-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.15-A), there are no evacuated Israeli settlers or accommodated Palestinian returnees, and the available and suitable lands are diminished to areas A & B, and calculate 29.15 km² and 12.75 km², respectively. As such, the projection for Palestinian and Israeli population, along with the rate of consumption for the available and suitable lands by the year 2030 are depicted in Table (9.2). The projection shows that the ratio of the Palestinian-to-Israeli population

distribution within the *basic planning boundary* in the no-state solution scenario will remain by the year 2030 as in the present-day: 44.6-to-55.4%, or 1:1.24. The gross population density within the no-state solution is expected to increase by 28% from 1,771 capita/km² in 2018 to 2,267 capita/km² in 2030. Furthermore, it is anticipated that at the short-to-medium run by the year 2018 the rate of consumption for the available and suitable lands would be 111.6% and 114.2%, respectively. At the long run by the year 2030 the rate of consumption for the available and suitable lands would further be increased to reach 142.9% and 146.2%, respectively.

Table (9.2): Projection of the Spatial Conditions within the No-State Solution Scenario

Year	Short-to-Medium Run			Long Run			
	2012	2015	2018	2021	2024	2027	2030
Palestinians (Thousands)	504	544	585	626	667	708	749
Israelis (Thousands)	626	676	727	778	829	880	931
Total Projected Population (Thousands)	1,129	1,220	1,312	1,404	1,496	1,588	1,680
Gross Population Density (Capita/Km ²)	1,524	1,647	1,771	1,895	2,019	2,143	2,267
Available Land (Km ²)	29.15	29.15	29.15	29.15	29.15	29.15	29.15
Suitable Land (Km ²)	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75
Projected Consumption of Available Land (Km ²)	711.84	769.20	827.21	885.13	943.11	1,001.06	1,059.02
Projected Consumption of Suitable Land (km ²)	728.24	786.92	846.27	905.52	964.84	1,024.13	1,083.42

Within the **two-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.15-B), it is anticipated that more than 288,000 Israeli settlers will be evacuated during 2019-2024, and about 37.5km² of settlements area will be added to the 454.8 km² of available land to accommodate about 438,720 Palestinian returnees during 2019-2024. As indicated at the beginning of Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1), the anticipated numbers of Palestinian returnees could culminate to 1,200,000 capita, most of which could be gradually absorbed from stateless camps/communities like in the case of the Lebanon-based refugees (Dumper, 2009: 580). The anticipated share of Palestinian returnees to be accommodated within the *basic planning boundary* has been estimated based on the percentage of the available land in Jerusalem and Bethlehem city-regions that stands at 36.6% of the available land in the West Bank territory. Accordingly, the available and suitable lands would be 492.29 km² and 108.57 km², respectively. As such, the projection for Palestinian and Israeli population, along with the rate of consumption for the available and suitable lands by the year 2030 within the two-state solution scenario are depicted in Table (9.3). The projection shows that the ratio of the Palestinian-to-Israeli population distribution within the *basic planning boundary* in the two-state solution scenario at the short-to-medium run by the year 2018 would be: 44.6-to-55.4%, or 1:1.24, but will be totally changed at the long run by the year 2030: 51.8-to-48.2%, or 1:0.93. The gross population density within the two-state solution is expected to increase by 32% from 1,771 capita/km² in 2018 to 2,335 capita/km² in 2030. The projection shows that the rate of consumption for the available land will increase from 39% in the year 2018 to 51.4% in the year 2030. In the same token, the rate of consumption for the suitable land would almost reach the saturation level (99.2%) at the short-to-medium run in the year 2018, and will further be stretched to reach 130.8% at the long run in the year 2030.

Table (9.3) Projection of the Spatial Conditions within the Two-State Solution Scenario

Year	Short-to-Medium			Run Long Run			
	2012	2015	2018	2021	2024	2027	2030
Palestinians (Thousands)	504	544	585	626	667	708	749
Israelis (Thousands)	626	676	727	778	829	880	931
Evacuated Israeli Settlers (288,588 Capita)	0	0	0	48,1	48,1	0	0
Projected Israeli Population (Thousands)	626	676	727	730	781	803	835
Palestinian Returnees (438,720 Capita)	0	0	0	73	73	0	0
Projected Palestinian Population (Thousands)	504	544	585	699	740	825	896
Total Projected Population (Thousands)	1,129	1,220	1,312	1,429	1,521	1,628	1,730
Gross Population Density (Capita/Km ²)	1,524	1,647	1,771	1,929	2,053	2,197	2,335
Available Land (Km ²)	492.29	492.29	492.29	492.29	492.29	492.29	492.29
Suitable Land (Km ²)	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57
Projected Consumption of Available Land (Km ²)	248.70	268.74	289.00	314.75	335.01	358.50	381.01
Projected Consumption of Suitable Land (Km ²)	632.42	683.38	734.92	800.38	851.90	911.64	968.89

Within the **three-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.15-C), no Israeli settlers will be evacuated and any anticipated Palestinian returnees will be accommodated outside the *basic planning boundary* within the Palestinian state to confer with the religious and spiritual significance of this model. This would allow conceiving a considerable representation for the believers and followers of the three monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The available and suitable lands for future spatial development within this scenario would be 454.78 km² and 108.57 km², respectively. As such, the projection for Palestinian and Israeli population, along with the rate of consumption for the available and suitable lands by the year 2030 within the three-state solution scenario are depicted in Table (9.4). The projection shows that the ratio of the Palestinian-to-Israeli population distribution within the *basic planning boundary* in the three-state solution scenario will remain as in the present-day: 44.6-to-55.4%, or 1:1.24. The gross population density within the three-state solution is expected to increase by 28% from 1,771 capita/km² in 2018 to 2,267 capita/km² in 2030; the same as in the no-state solution scenario since it follows the same trend as in the *status quo*. Furthermore, the projection shows that the rate of consumption for the available land will increase from 44.9% in the year 2018 to 57.5% in the year 2030. In the same token, the rate of consumption for the suitable land would almost reach the saturation level (99.2%) at the short-to-medium run in the year 2018, and it is projected to reach 127% at the long run in the year 2030.

Table (9.4): Projection of the Spatial Conditions within the Three-State Solution Scenario

Year	Short-to-Medium Run			Long Run			
	2012	2015	2018	2021	2024	2027	2030
Projected Palestinian Population (Thousands)	504	544	585	626	667	708	749
Projected Israeli Population (Thousands)	626	676	727	778	829	880	931
Total Projected Population (Thousands)	1,129	1,220	1,312	1,404	1,496	1,588	1,680
Gross Population Density (Capita/Km ²)	1,524	1,647	1,771	1,895	2,019	2,143	2,267
Available Land (Km ²)	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78
Suitable Land (Km ²)	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57
Projected Consumption of Available Land (Km ²)	286.21	309.27	332.60	355.89	379.20	402.50	425.80
Projected Consumption of Suitable Land (km ²)	632.42	683.38	734.92	786.37	837.89	889.38	940.87

Within the **one-state solution scenario** (Figure 9.15-D), it is anticipated that the same number of Palestinian returnees as in the two-state solution scenario of 438,720 capita will be accommodated within the *basic planning boundary*, but in this scenario unlike the two-state solution scenario, no Israeli settlers will be evacuated. This makes the available and suitable lands for future spatial development calculate 454.78 km² and 108.57 km², respectively. As such, the projection for Palestinian and Israeli population, along with the rate of consumption for the available and suitable lands by the year 2030 within the one-state solution scenario are depicted in Table (9.5). The projection shows that the ratio of the Palestinian-to-Israeli population distribution at the short-to-medium run by the year 2018 within the *basic planning boundary* in the one-state solution scenario will remain as in the present-day: 44.6-to-55.4%, or 1:1.24, like in the case of the no-state, two-state, and three-state solution scenarios. Nevertheless, at the long run by the year 2030, it is projected that the ratio of the Palestinian-to-Israeli population distribution would be changed into a more balanced distribution: 49.0-to-51.0 %, or 1:1.04. The gross population density within the one-state solution is expected to increase by 39% from 1,771 capita/km² in 2018 to 2,465 capita/km² in 2030. Furthermore, the projection shows that the rate of consumption for the available land will increase from 44.9% in the year 2018 to 62.5% in the year 2030. In the same token, the rate of consumption for the suitable land would almost reach the saturation level (99.2%) at the short-to-medium run in the year 2018, and it is projected to reach 138% at the long run in the year 2030.

Table (9.5): Projection of the Spatial Conditions within the One-State Solution Scenario

Year	Short-to-Medium Run			Long Run			
	2012	2015	2018	2021	2024	2027	2030
Palestinians (Thousands)	504	544	585	626	667	708	749
Projected Israeli Population (Thousands)	626	676	727	778	829	880	931
Palestinian Returnees (438,720 Capita)	0	0	0	73	73	0	0
Projected Palestinian Population (Thousands)	504	544	585	749	790	903	995
Projected Population (Total)	1,129	1,220	1,312	1,477	1,569	1,704	1,826
Gross Population Density (Capita/Km ²)	1,524	1,647	1,771	1,994	2,118	2,300	2,465
Available Land (Km ²)	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78	454.78
Suitable Land (Km ²)	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57	108.57
Projected Consumption of Available Land (Km ²)	286.21	309.27	332.60	374.42	397.73	431.95	462.89
Projected Consumption of Suitable Land (km ²)	632.42	683.38	734.92	827.32	878.83	954.44	1,022.81




Figure (9.15-A): Available Land in the No-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.15-B): Available Land in the Two-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.15-C): Available Land in the Three-State Solution Scenario




Figure (9.15-D): Available Land in the One-State Solution Scenario

Figure (9.15): Available Lands in the Scenarios

Source: Shape-files from (ARIJ, 2013)

9.5.3. Standardization and Relative Weighting of Criteria

The results of the related quantitative criteria or scores of projection for the four scenarios are summarized in Table (9.6).

Scenario	Ratio of Population Distribution (Palestinian-to-Israeli)	Consumption Rate in Available Land (%)	Consumption Rate in Suitable Land (%)
Scenario 0: No-State Solution	1:1.2422 (44.6-to-55.4%)	142.9	146.2
Scenario 1: Two-State Solution	1:0.9317 (51.8-to-48.2%)	54.4	138.3
Scenario 2: Three-State Solution	1:1.2422 (44.6-to-55.4%)	57.5	127
Scenario 3: One-State Solution	1:1.0392 (49.0-to-51.0%)	65.9	145.5

It is assumed that the more even the population distribution between Palestinians and Israelis the better is the anticipated impact on the related socio-cultural and economic aspects of sustainability. As, depicted in Figure (9.16), the population distribution in scenario 3: one-state solution scenario is the most significant to sustainability in comparison to the remaining scenarios. Therefore, the direct ranking of scenarios based on the results of population distribution criteria alone would be, as follows (descending): one-state solution scenario; two-state solution scenario; and three-state & no-state solution scenarios.




Figure (9.16): Ratio of Population Distribution in the Scenarios

As per the rate of consumption of available and suitable land, it is assumed that the less the rate of consumption is by the year of 2030 (at the long run), the better is the anticipated impact on the related physical and environmental aspects of sustainability. Therefore, the ranking for the scenarios based on the rate of consumption for the available land would be, as follows (descending): two-state solution scenario; three-state solution scenario; one-state solution scenario; and no-state solution scenario. In the same token, the ranking for the scenarios based on the rate of consumption for the suitable land would be, as follows (descending): three-state solution scenario; two-state solution scenario; one-state solution scenario; and no-state solution scenario.

Since the related quantitative-oriented & qualitative-oriented multi-criteria for evaluation have different scaling/measurement units (e.g. Unite-less, Ratio, and Percentage), a standardization or normalization step is needed. Standardization is the transformation of the various criterion score into one comparable measurement unit, by arranging them from 0 to 1. There are various methods available to standardize

scores, including linear and non-linear value-function approaches. In this exercise a linear scale transformation method or value-function, referred to as “maximum standardization” formula has been deployed. Simply, the deployed value-function “maximum standardization” formula is:

$$X_i (0 < \text{score} \leq 1) = X_i / \text{Max. } X \dots\dots\dots (i)$$

The significance of using a “maximum standardization” formula is that the scores are pulled apart and a clear divergence between the lowest and highest scores is witnessed, and thus the comparison between the criteria would be much easier (Ruiter, *et al.*, 1998: 157).

As such, using a direct rating method (See Bottomley, *et. al.*, 2000), the ranking of the scenarios as per each criterion could be done by assigning a ranking order 1, 2, 3, or 4 for each scenario as per each criterion, keeping in mind that the higher the assigned ranking order the better is the anticipated impact on sustainability per criterion. Nevertheless, since the maximum score in each of the three related quantitative criteria represents the least desirable or least significant on sustainability (e.g. higher the consumption rate of available land = less significant), a conversion to the scores is needed for the related quantitative criteria, so that a higher score would also mean a greater significance on sustainability. For example, as per the rate of consumption of available land, the higher the consumption rate is, the lower is the positive impact on sustainability, therefore, the ranking of two-state solution scenario; three-state solution scenario; one-state solution scenario; and no-state solution scenario were assigned with 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. The same rational was followed for the related quantitative criteria. As per the related qualitative criteria the ranking order was simply the same for each criterion, and the ranking of one-state solution scenario; three-state solution scenario; two-state solution scenario; and no-state solution scenario were assigned with 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively (Table 9.7).

To emphasis on the relative importance of each of the used quantitative criterion in respect to each other, and on the ultimate impacts on sustainability, a weighted scheme based on a Delphi technique (Section 4.4.3, Chapter 4) for the three main related quantitative-oriented multi-criteria for the evaluation of the four scenarios has been adopted based on the solicitation of a group of experts from the policy community of Bethlehem. In total, 15 planning experts were solicited (6 at the national level and 9 from the local and regional level). The planning experts represent different types of organizations: 7 from academia and NGOs (including UN & Society for International Cooperation (GIZ)); 2 from the private sector and donors; and 6 from the competent authorities (Annex 3). It is important to mention that the experts were asked first to propose a weighting scheme for five criteria to be used in the related quantitative criteria evaluation, including the three used criteria in this exercise (**population distribution** and rate of consumption in **available** and **suitable** land), plus another two criteria, namely: net population density and historic land ownership. Nevertheless, it was decided later on to drop the last two criteria in the evaluation. Therefore, the average weights for these two criteria were evenly distributed on the main three criteria used within this academic exercise. The result of the related quantitative criteria weighting scheme is depicted in Figure (9.17). In average, the largest weight was given to the rate of consumption for the suitable land at 38%.




Figure (9.17): Proposed Weighted Scheme for the Evaluation of the Quantitative Criteria

Ultimately, the related quantitative criteria had only 50% of the total weight, whereas the remaining 50% were given to the related qualitative criteria, which were given equal shares of the weight (i.e. 33% for each criterion). As such, the ultimate weighting scheme for the criteria was, as follows:

Qualitative Criteria (50%)	{	Right to Movement: Access to Worship Places = $0.5 \times 0.33 = \mathbf{0.165}$
		Economic Prosperity: Tourism Sector = $0.5 \times 0.33 = \mathbf{0.165}$
		Social Cohesion and Willingness = $0.5 \times 0.33 = \mathbf{0.165}$
Quantitative Criteria (50%)	{	Ratio of Population Distribution (Palestinian-to-Israeli) = $0.5 \times 0.33 = \mathbf{0.165}$
		Rate of Consumption for Suitable Land = $0.5 \times 0.38 = \mathbf{0.190}$
		Rate of Consumption for Available Land = $0.5 \times 0.29 = \mathbf{0.145}$

The evaluation matrix that summarizes the scores, standardization, conversion, and weighting of criteria for the four scenarios is depicted in Table (9.7).

Table (9.7): Evaluation Matrix – Weighted Standardized Scoring of Scenarios by the Year 2030								
Scenario	Quantitative Criteria			Qualitative criteria			Total	Rank
	Ratio of Population Distribution (Relative Value)	Consumption Rate in Available Land (Relative Value)	Consumption Rate in Suitable Land (Relative Value)	Right to Movement (Relative Value)	Economic Prosperity (Relative Value)	Social Cohesion (Relative Value)		
Scenario 0: No-State Solution	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Scenario 1: Two-State Solution	2	4	3	2	2	2		
Scenario 2: Three-State Solution	1	3	4	3	3	3		
Scenario 3: One-State Solution	3	2	2	4	4	4		
Standardization $= (X/X_{max})$								
Scenario 0: No-State Solution	0.3333	0.2500	0.2500	0.2500	0.2500	0.2500		
Scenario 1: Two-State Solution	0.6667	1.0000	0.7500	0.5000	0.5000	0.5000		
Scenario 2: Three-State Solution	0.3333	0.7500	1.0000	0.7500	0.7500	0.7500		
Scenario 3: One-State Solution	1.0000	0.5000	0.5000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000		
Weighted Standardization	50%			50%			1	Rank
	0.165	0.145	0.190	0.165	0.165	0.165		
Scenario 0: No-State Solution	0.0550	0.0363	0.0475	0.04125	0.04125	0.04125	0.2625	4
Scenario 1: Two-State Solution	0.1100	0.1450	0.1425	0.0825	0.0825	0.0825	0.6450	3
Scenario 2: Three-State Solution	0.0550	0.1088	0.1900	0.1238	0.1238	0.1238	0.7250	2
Scenario 3: One-State Solution	0.1650	0.0725	0.0950	0.1650	0.1650	0.1650	0.8275	1

As a result from the weighted standardized process, the ranking of the four scenarios is as depicted in Figure (9.18). The results show that the one-state solution scenario is the suitable scenario for the conflict resolution in the context of Bethlehem.




Figure (9.18): Total Standardized Scores Per Scenario (Ranking) by the Year 2030

If one considers evaluating the results of the projection for the four scenarios by the year 2050, the ranking of the scenarios would differ, and the three-state solution scenario would be at the first rank. As evidenced from these results, in light of the current trend of spatial development, the anticipated number of Palestinian returnees would influence the ranking of the scenarios more than any other factors, since the main difference between the one-state solution scenario (rank 1 by the year 2030) and the three-state solution scenario (rank 1 by the year 2050) in the related quantitative-oriented multi-criteria evaluation of scenarios, is the accommodation of Palestinian returnees within the *basic planning boundary*. This entails that there is a need to carefully plan for the absorption of the anticipated Palestinian returnees, based on the proposed “SPSSs” that need to be revisited by considering the accommodation of Palestinian returnees (Chapter 8).

To this end, the results of the multi-criteria evaluation foresees the one-state solution scenario as the most suitable solution scenario at the long run for the resolution of the geo-political conflict in Bethlehem and present Palestine, at large.

9.6. The Way Forward

The results of the thorough multi-criteria evaluation for the four scenarios actually challenge the mainstream thinking voiced among many policy makers not only between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, but also beyond in the sense that the multi-criteria evaluation foresees the one-state solution scenario as the most suitable solution for the conflict resolution unlike the mainstream thinking that foresees the two-state solution as the suitable solution to the wicked problems associated with the prevailing geo-political conflict. Many of the brokered regional and international peace plans consider the partitioning of the geo-political space based on the two-state solution scenario a necessity, such as: the US President Bill Clinton's Plan of 2000; the Saudi Arab Peace Initiative of 2002; the Road Map of the Quartet (UN, Europe, USA, and Russia) of mid-2003; the Palestinian/Israeli Geneva Initiative of end-2003; and the US President George W. Bush Road Map of 2007, amongst others (Isaac, *et al.*, 2010: 106-117).

Nevertheless, it is to the conviction of the author that there is no zero-sum solution to the conflict resolution. Therefore, the two-state solution scenario is to be considered the suitable solution at the short-to-medium run; as such an interim period could serve as the vehicle towards achieving the ideal solution of the one-state solution scenario or maybe three-state solution scenario at the long run.

Actually, other academics and intellectuals from both sides of the conflict are mainstreaming this proposal, including Oren Yiftachel's (2006 b: 279) *gradual bi-nationalism* scenario in which he amalgamates between the two-state scenario and the one bi-national state on a gradual phased basis. Slight differently, Mick Dumper (2011: 673) proposes an alternative model, *two-state plus* scenario to maintain Jerusalem and its environs (including Bethlehem) as an integrated urban system, arguing that an agreement over Jerusalem as an integrated urban system would facilitate and ensure an inevitable inter-state cooperation and cooptation between the Palestinians and Israelis that supersedes a conventional bi-lateral cooperation agreement. Likewise, the Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh (2011) argues in his book entitled: "*What is a Palestinian State Worth?*" that the two-state solution would be a cul-de-sac to Palestinian patriotism, and he believes that the one-state solution is the way forward as it resembles an overarching affinity with the land and its multifaceted religious history for Palestinians and Israelis, alike.

Ultimately, the one-state solution scenario or maybe the more ominously (at present) three-state solution scenario would reaffirm the spiritual significance for Jerusalem, as the cradle of the three monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism at the city, city-region, national, territorial, and global levels (Figure 9.19). More specific to this doctoral research is that the long established socio-cultural, economic, and above all spiritual lifelines between the Bethlehem city-area and Jerusalem at the city level would be revived and maintained, and thus more sustainable outcomes would be realized (El-Atrash, 2013).




Figure (9.19): Proximity Mapping for the Spiritual Significance of Jerusalem

In this regard, the two-state solution scenario stands as the suitable solution to the wicked problems at the short-to-medium run, keeping in mind that this would emphatically lead to unsustainable outcomes if the prevailing planning strategies and policies remain as they are now, especially in light with the high urbanization rates that would exponentially increase due to the anticipated Palestinian returnees.

To conclude, it is quite clear that peering into the future provides insights that could substantiate the policy agenda of Palestinian spatial planners in many ways. Ultimately, one should be candid in admitting that the current trend of spatial development would lead to unsustainable outcomes, even if one considers alternatives of decolonizing and effacing the Israeli architecture. Therefore, the carrying capacity, which could be callously dubbed in terms of land availability and suitability, would be stretched to a limit. The anticipated high gross population densities for the huddled Palestinian cities in apartheid-like cantons at present, which are characterized by overcrowding, should be dealt with as a potential rather than a challenge. This could be done by the adoption of the devised “SPSSs” that would encourage intensification and densification of built-up area vertically, before considering the extension of the urban fabric horizontally. Nevertheless, this should be compounded with other socio-cultural, economic, and ecological-related policies to satisfy the needs of Palestinians at present, without compromising the future aspirations and rights. Said differently but succinctly, a renaissance of “SPSSs” in Bethlehem and present Palestine, at large is needed (Chapter 8).

9.7. Epilogue

A feeling of impotence exists among many academics with the ever-elusive scepter of peace slips further from reach in light with the prolonged stalemate in negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Actually, recent polling results jointly done by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute (HTRI) for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah in June 2013 show that the majority of Israelis (68%) and Palestinians (69%) are pessimistic in regards to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years (HTRI & PCPSR, 2013). Like Israelis, Palestinians have less optimism that the latest chapter of the decades-long saga of on-going, off-again peace negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides would bring in peace; only 6.2% of Palestinians strongly believe that the on-going negotiations would lead to peace in the coming years (PCBO, 2013), and only 18% of Jewish Israelis believe that the new round of negotiations have a high chance of succeeding (IDI, 2013). Nevertheless, exploring how such a vicious circle can be converted into a virtuous circle remains the important and current query for those from the scientific bent at both the Palestinian and Israeli sides, alike.

It might be perceived as a pipe dream at present, but hopefully the public opinion in both the Palestinian and Israeli sides would be less enamored of what politicians deem attainable within a *horizon of feasibility* given the geo-political artifacts on the ground by the repartition of the geo-political space as the one and only solution for conflict resolution in Historic Palestine. Hopefully, both sides would be more empathetic at the long run about the unavoidable coexistence between the Palestinians and Israelis through the one-state solution scenario or the three-state solution scenario, especially since the longstanding history of this region indicates that a huge reservoir of tenacity in terms of socio-cultural assimilation have existed between the people from different religious backgrounds who inhabited this patch of land, despite the dismal constructs and social apathy associated with every-day life practices during the past six decades of conflict. And as Reicher & Awadallah (2010: 6) profoundly put it in the general terms of spatial planning through intercultural dialogue, “diversity” if existed would enrich the composition of people; or at least it should do. But, domination and hegemony if existed would curtail “diversity” and thus restrict improvement and prosperity. As such, it is to the conviction of the author that the two-state solution scenario standalone would be an act of imprudent optimism especially if not coupled with a set of apposite “SPSSs” that would ultimately enable the environment to conceive a *horizon of hope and desire* where a one-state solution or a three-state solution would eventuate.

The no-state/mini-state solution scenario, or the *status quo* extended scenario harbors severe difficulties and indeed it would further exacerbates the conditions on the ground and undermine any prospectus for prosper and safe future for both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Under this scenario or game plan, the Palestinians are supposed to first acquiesce in Israel’s interest in finalizing the annexation of the Israeli settlements and the isolated lands behind the Segregation Wall in exchange to conceive their interest within a *horizon of possibility* of having some kind of mini-state, where Palestinians could indirectly put forward a claim to sovereignty by calling for a confederation of the West Bank with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and leaving the Gaza Strip with no choice other than being eventually annexed to Egypt. Importantly to mention that Palestinians within this context should never perceive “autonomy” as tantamount to “sovereignty”. It is a glaring result from the past two decades of peace negotiations that any concrete development on the ground is restricted to a trickle, nevertheless there is nothing preventing Palestinians to develop a vision and devise apposite strategies for the inaccessible areas due

to the Israeli geo-political constructs at present, such as in the case of area C. Therefore, those involved in policy making at the Palestinian side need to be vigilant of whose definition and interpretation dominates, keeping in mind that in the domain of sustainable spatial development there are empirical evidences demonstrating that a gap between policy rhetoric and outcomes on the ground still exists within the prevailing Palestinian context.

In the conclusion of this doctoral research, and as a response to the main research question of *how to plan for sustainability in terms of spatial development, under such an evolved geo-political context*, the following generic reflections as per the deployed research hypothesis are outlined to substantiate the policy agenda in present Palestine towards achieving the national flag-ship project of building the statehood:

- There is a need to address and analyze the endogenous and exogenous driving forces afflicting the place-making of spatial development in present Palestine. The murky environment, in terms of socio-economic, geo-political, physical, and environmental aspects of sustainability needs to be holistically taken into consideration when addressing the future spatial planning initiatives related to every-day life practices (needs) and to the overarching goal of self-determination through state-building related practices (rights).

Based on the factual analysis and evidences provided within the framework of this doctoral research, it is crystal clear that if the *status quo* persists the repercussions of spatial development in present Palestine would be catastrophic and would undermine the sustainability of the foreseen Palestinian statehood. As per the physical aspects of spatial development, the carrying capacity in terms of land availability and suitability for future spatial development is indeed stretched to a limit. Also, the socio-economic aspects of spatial development are characterized by ever increasing pressures in light of the demographic changes that spur the urbanization trends, especially in the prevailing context of economic dependency and social services underdevelopment, as resulted from the geo-political constructs on the ground, epitomized by the Israeli settlements and their host of physical obstructions, including the Segregation Wall and the Israeli controlled roads, to name a few. Likewise, the environmental aspects of the natural and built environment are negatively affected through the fragmentation of landscape and depletion of natural resources, especially the water resources.

- There is a need to address the potential changes in terms of scale and forms of the prevailing spatial planning policy processes by encouraging public participation through the legitimate and democratic venues of articulation of state-building. This entails that functional planning expert-consulting measures should be advocated for among scholars, researchers, and policy makers, amongst others.

Based on the detailed analysis to the prevailing planning policy processes, coupled with the conducted thorough theoretical analysis to the related planning theories, it is recommended to amalgamate the compulsory-“statutory”-physical and voluntary-“development”-strategic approaches to maximize the associated benefits posited in each approach, and thus facilitate, encourage, and above all regulate public participation in the related planning experts practices, to help better advise the decision-making process.

- There is a need to unfold the associated potentials for planning at the city-region level, as a functional spatial structure to localize the suitable solutions to the prevailing wicked problems with a focus to the strategic orientation of place-making of spatial development, or “SPSSs” that stand as a local-based blueprint plan for future spatial development in the prevailing geo-political context that spawns present Palestine, at large.

Based on the conducted multi-criteria evaluation for different scenarios to the conflict resolution of the geo-political conflict in Palestine/Israel, in close consultation with planning experts and policy-makers from the policy community of present Palestine, it was concluded that the two-state solution scenario (based on the repartition of the geo-political space between the Palestinian and Israeli sides) is the suitable solution at the short-to-medium run, arguably to work as a vehicle towards an ideal solution scenario where all would coexist in peace and security within a democratic and well-fare statehood for all its inhabitants. This entails that the Palestinians should consider planning accordingly at the city-region level as a functional spatial structure within the ambit of the touted “SPSSs” at the short-to-medium run.

– THE END –

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Annexes

Annex (1): Assigned Factors to the Land Suitability Criteria

Soil Type Criterion	
Soil Type - West Bank	Assigned Factor
Solonchaks	1
Terra Rossas Brown Rendzinas	1
Dark Brown Soils	2
Grumusols	2
Loessial Arid Brown Soils	2
Loessial Serozems	2
Pale Rendzinas	2
Alluvial and Brown Soils	3
Bare Rocks and Desert Lithosols	3
Brown Randzinas and Pale Rendzinas	3
Calcareous Serozems	3
Regosols	3
Sandy Regosols and Arid Brown Soils	3
Brown Lithosols and loessial Arid Brown Soils	4
Brown Lithosols and Loessial Serozems	5
Soil Type - Gaza Strip	Assigned Factor
Dark Brown Soil	2
Grumusols	2
Pale Rendzinas	2
Regosols	3
Sand Dunes	3
Sandy Regosols	3
<i>Note: For a detailed mapping and description of the characteristics and uses of each of the mentioned soil types, refer to ARIJ (2007: 4-6).</i>	

Slope Criterion	
Slope Degree - West Bank & Gaza Strip	Assigned Factor
0-5%	5
5-10%	4
10-15%	3
15-20%	2
>20%	1
<i>Note: For a detailed mapping and description of the of the mentioned slope degrees, refer to (ARIJ, 2000: 74).</i>	

Climatology Criterion	
Climate Zone - West Bank	Assigned Factor
Hot dry summer, mild winter	1
Hot dry summer, temperate winter	2
Hot semidry, temperate winter	3
Warm sub-humid summer, temperate winter	4
Warm sub-humid summer, cold winter	5
Climate Zone - Gaza Strip	Assigned Factor
Arid Zone	1
Semiarid Loess Plains	2
Sub-humid Coastal Zone	3
<i>Note: For a detailed mapping and description of the of the mentioned climatology classes, refer to (ARIJ, 2000: 103)</i>	

Water Sensitivity Criterion	
Water Sensitivity - West Bank	Assigned Factor
Extreme Sensitivity	1
High Sensitivity	2
Medium Sensitivity	3
Least Sensitivity	5
Water Sensitivity - Gaza Strip	Assigned Factor
Low Sensitivity	4
<i>Note: For a detailed mapping and description of the of the mentioned water sensitivity, refer to (NSP, 2012).</i>	

Annex (2): Contents of “Statutory” (Physical) Plans in the Context of Bethlehem

Plan Type	Plan’s Contents (As Codified by Law No.79 for the Year 1966)
National Level	
National Spatial Plan (Not Regulated)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Site description (topography, geology, etc.) ▪ Climatology (temperature degree, wind, humidity, etc.) ▪ History of urban evolution ▪ Land uses (residential, commercial, industrial, etc.) ▪ Land ownership ▪ Land value ▪ Public utility services (water, sewer, electricity) ▪ Transportation means (roads, airports, traffic volume, railway tracks, etc.) ▪ Communications (telephone, telegraph, wireless, etc.) ▪ Public facilities (schools, worship places, stores, cinema, public parks, governmental buildings) ▪ Population (gender, age, income, employment) ▪ Existing resources (natural, economic, human, animals, etc.) ▪ Other related issues
Regional Level	
Regional Plan (Regulated, but not action-oriented)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Location of cities and new towns ▪ Expanding or restricting the growth of existing cities and towns ▪ Industry, including factories, workshops, and storages ▪ Commerce and administration, and includes public and private offices, and car parks ▪ Residential areas, and includes regulations concerning the area of lands, and building set-backs ▪ Public facilities, and includes markets, shops, schools, worship places, public halls, theater, cinema, and parks, in accordance to the size of the served population ▪ Buildings and other facilities, and includes supervising the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - areas, heights, and dimensions - construction lines, set-backs, and area of floors - design, color, types of construction materials - number of buildings that can be built - works that need to be licensed - number of houses per building - number of rooms per houses and buildings - provision of water wells - shelters - places for car parking ▪ Public and private yards, including beautification and gardening, parks, natural protected areas, landscape, cemeteries, and mines ▪ Preservation of caves, buildings, facilities, and antiquities that of historical, architecture and cultural value ▪ Transportation means, including land, water, and air aviation routes

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Roads, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protected lands and right of way - Closure and detours of existing roads and the management of the right of public and private access - Construction of new roads and upgrading the existing roads - Roads width, dimension, and type for existing and new ones - Complementary works, including curbs, bridges, lighting, etc. - Communications, and includes telephone, wireless, and telegraph - Services of public utilities, including water, electricity, sewer, drainage, wastes, slaughterhouses, etc.
Local Level	
<p style="text-align: center;">Master-plan (Regulated, and action-oriented)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sewer system ▪ Water network ▪ Land use designations (residential, commercial, industrial, etc.) ▪ Conditions and restrictions concerning construction activities ▪ Designation of public and protected natural areas, including agricultural lands, parks, plazas, cemeteries, and mines ▪ Designation for public service locations, including airports, bus stations, car parks, schools, hospitals, etc. ▪ Demolition of old, contested, or unsuitable neighborhoods and re-planning, re-building, and improving them according to the new plans ▪ Approval of corporate, association, or organization related housing projects ▪ Protection of the right of way, and the public right to build the public service networks in private properties
<p style="text-align: center;">Detailed Plan (Regulated, and action-oriented)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Location of shops, markets, schools, worship places, cinema, and parks ▪ Location of roads car parks, bus and tram stations, along with public and private facilities ▪ Location of buildings with details on the dimensions, set-backs, shape, along with car parks locations ▪ Designation of specific architectural styles, in terms of external shape, and used construction materials ▪ Designation of no-development areas ▪ Designation of lands to be expropriated for the public usufruct
<p style="text-align: center;">Land Parcellation Plan (Regulated, and action- oriented)</p>	

Annex (3): List of Participants - Key Informants and Decision Makers in the Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Group Discussion

No.	Name	Affiliation	Job Title	Contacts (E-mail Address)	1 st Round of Interviews (20.08-17.09.2012)	2 nd Round of Interviews (17.01-09.04.2013)			Focus Group Discussion
					“Smart Growth” Evaluation	Action Plan	GIS Weighing Scheme	Expert-Consulting Model	
1.	Dr. Ahmad Saleh	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MoPAD)	Head of the Palestinian National Spatial Plan	ahmadsaleh@nsp.pna.ps ; ahmad202@yahoo.com	√				
2.	Arch. Fida’ Abed Al-Latif	Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF)	Institutional Development & Technical Assistance Department Manager	fida@mdlf.org.ps	√				
3.	Eng. Anwar Shbaneh	Ministry of Local Government-Bethlehem Regional Directorate	Head of Engineering and Regulation Directorate	anwar_shabaneh@hotmail.com	√		√	√	√
4.	Eng. Hannan Manoly	Beit Sahour Municipality	Head of Project and Public Relations Department	h_manoly@yahoo.com	√	√	√		√
5.	Eng. Jonny Bassil	Bethlehem Municipality	City Engineer	j_bassil@yahoo.com	√	√	√		
6.	Arch. Samia Zeit Khalilieh	Beit Jala Municipality	Head of Planning and Licensing Department	hop@beitjala-city.org ; samiaz2000@yahoo.com	√	√	√		√
7.	Ms. Hiyam Hazineh	Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ)	Research Associate	h_hazineh@hotmail.com	√	√	√		√
8.	Dr. Thawaba Salem	Birzeit University	Assistant Professor – Architecture Engineering Department	sthawaba@birzeit.edu	√	√	√		

9.	Eng. Ohood Enaia	Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF) & Ministry of Local Government (MoLG)	Strategic Planning & External Relations Department Manager	oenai@mdlf.org.ps	√	√	√	√	
10.	Arch. Issam Juha	Center for Cultural Heritage Preservation (CCHP)	Director	juha@cchp.ps	√				
11.	Dr. Sandi Hilal	UNRWA	Head Camp Improvement	s.hilal@unrwa.org	√				
12.	Eng. Ratib Ibyat	Ubiedyeh Municipality	City Engineer	ratib_ibayat@yahoo.com	√	√	√		
13.	Arch. George Bassous	Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC) - Palestine	General Manager – Convention Palace	gbassous@ccc.com.ps	√	√			
14.	Eng. Rani Daoud	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) – Ramallah Office	Local Governance Advisor	rani.daoud@giz.de			√	√	
15.	Dr. Mohammad Abed Al-Hadi	Birzeit University	Assistant Professor – Architecture Engineering Department	mohadi@birzeit.edu			√		
16.	Dr. Ali Abed Al-Hamid	An-Najah National University	Head of Urban and Regional Planning Center	abhamid2004@yahoo.com			√	√	
17.	Prof. Sameer Abu-Eisheh	An-Najah National University	Professor of Civil Engineering	sameeraa@najah.edu			√		
18.	Eng. Sami Murra	UNRWA	Coordinator – Camp Improvement Plan	s_mura@daad-alumni.de			√		
19.	Mr. Issa Zboun	ARIJ	Head of GIS Department	issa@arij.org		√	√		√

20.	Eng. Hamza Halaibeh	ARIJ	Research Assistant	hamza@arij.org			√		
21.	Dr. Jad Isaac	ARIJ	Director General	jad@arij.org					√
22.	Mrs. Vera Baboun	Bethlehem Municipality	Mayor	mayor@bethlehem-city.org					√
23.	Dr. Nael Salman	Beit Jala Municipality	Mayor	dr_nasalman@yahoo.com					√
24.	Mr. Hani Al-Hayek	Beit Sahour Municipality	Mayor	hanihayek@hotmail.com					√
25.	Mr. Rashid Awad	Ministry of Local Government- Bethlehem Regional Directorate	Director General	rashid_awad2000@yahoo.com					√
26.	Mrs. Mays Salsa'	CCHP	Public Relation and Public Awareness Officer	pr@cchp.ps					√
27.	Arch. Hatem Al-Joulani	UNRWA	Architect	h.al-joulani@unrwa.org					√
28.	Mr. Sulieman Al-Assa	Ubiedyeh Municipality	Mayor	s-alassa@yahoo.com		√			

Annex (4): Types of Plans

Plan Type	Time Span	Level of Implementation	Focus	Slated Output
Comprehensive Plan	Long-term	Local	Mediating socio-economic and environmental conditions and trends.	Addressing vision by outlining policies and guidelines
Regional or Development Plan	Long-term	Local/Regional	Serving as the framework for local government plans and special district plans, supplying unifying assumptions, forecasts, and strategies.	Guidelines for future interventions that might be linked with a land use plan
Structure Plan	Long-term	Regional/National	Highly generalized and flexible, as it partially covers socio-economic interventions.	Land use zones compounded with socio-economic measures.
Master-Plan	Long-term	Local or city-level	It is a formal plan that covers a designated administrative area by mediating socio-economic and environmental interventions.	Broad land use zones.
Local Land-Use Plan	Medium-term	Neighborhood level	It is a formal plan that covers a designated administrative area by mediating socio-economic and environmental interventions.	Detailed land use zones.
Action Plan	Short-to-Medium-term	Multi-level	It is strategic oriented and implementation based to solving problems at multi-levels alike with community participation and with an emphasis on the needed time.	A set of strategies and actions that are linked with prospectus actors and potential resources. This entails that it might not necessarily be linked spatially.
Informal Plan	Short-term	Local Level	Meant for negotiation rather than regulation. This entails that it lacks legal status.	It is a simple and sharply prepared <i>ad hoc</i> decision, focusing on specific issue or challenge.
Strategic Plan	Medium-to-Long-term	Multi-level	It reflects the process view and is characterized by inter-sectoral coordination and financial feasibility.	The output is not just a plan for land use but a set of interrelated strategies for land,

				infrastructure and financial and institutional development.
Urban Design Plans	Long-term	Neighborhood level	Focuses on design of the public realm, which is created by both public spaces and the buildings that define them.	Key elements of an urban design plan include the plan itself, the preparation of design guidelines for buildings, the design of the public realm.
Source: Compiled from Polat (2009: 92-93)				

Annex (5): Matrix of Evaluation Form for Assessing the Potentials of Adopting a Holistic “Smart Growth” Agenda in Bethlehem City-Area (Sample)

<i>Principle (2): Mixed land-uses</i>								
Designated Policies	Relevancy ¹			Scoring ²			Suggested Amendments	Notes
	0	1	2	0	1	2		
1. Adopt comprehensive plans and sub-area plans that encourage a mix of land uses								
2. Use enhanced zoning techniques to achieve a mix of land uses								
3. Provide regional planning grants for projects that produce mixed land use								
4. Encourage the redevelopment of single uses into mixed-use developments								
5. Accommodate the reuse of closed, decommissioned, or obsolete institutional uses								
6. Provide incentives for ground-floor retail and upper-level residential uses in existing and future development								
7. Locate neighborhood stores in residential areas								
8. Use floating zones to plan for certain types of undetermined uses								
9. Organize a variety of land uses vertically and horizontally								
10. Develop mixed-use university districts								
Do you have alternative policies on this regard?								

¹ If 0, Why? due to: (A) Socio-cultural constraints; (B) Geo-political constraints; (C) Administrative constraints; (D) Capacity constraints; (E) Physical constraints; and (f) Others, specify

² Scoring Rationale: (0) Not present; (1) Present but not action-oriented; (2) Present and action-oriented

Annex (6): Contextualizing of “Smart Growth” Policies in Bethlehem

Policies	Irrelevant		Relevant		
	Not Suitable	Not a Priority /Need	Not Present	Present but not action-oriented	Present and action-oriented
Ecological Principles					
I. Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas					
1. Link land conservation with other smart growth principles				√	
2. Use land management techniques and acquisition to protect drinking water sources	X				
3. Use an array of financing techniques to preserve open space			√		
4. Establish priority-setting criteria for open space acquisition				√	
5. Incorporate land conservation into transportation planning				√	
6. Take advantage of nature’s eco-services			√		
7. Support tree preservation through public-private partnerships			√		
8. Allow land trusts to compete for conservation funds		X			
9. Invest in the rural economy to preserve working lands				√	
10. Use innovative permitting approaches to protect critical environmental areas		X			
Physical Principles					
II. Mix land uses					
1. Adopt comprehensive plans and sub-area plans that encourage a mix of land uses					√
2. Use enhanced zoning techniques to achieve a mix of land uses		X			
3. Provide regional planning grants for projects that produce mixed land use		X			
4. Encourage the redevelopment of single uses into mixed-use developments		X			
5. Accommodate the reuse of closed, decommissioned, or obsolete institutional uses				√	
6. Provide incentives for ground-floor retail and upper-level residential uses in existing and future development					√
7. Locate neighborhood stores in residential areas					√
8. Use floating zones to plan for certain types of undetermined uses		X			

9. Organize a variety of land uses vertically and horizontally				√	
10. Develop mixed-use university districts			√		
III. Take advantage of compact building design					
1. Organize a compact development endorsement program		X			
2. Adopt a cottage housing development zoning ordinance	X				
3. Use compact development coupled with onsite best management practices to improve environmental outcomes			√		
4. Use traditional neighborhood design				√	
5. Use compact design to create more secure neighborhoods		X			
6. Subdivide vacant warehouse space into residential units	X				
7. Ensure that big box stores locating in existing urban centers are appropriately scaled and designed	X				
8. Create compact office parks and corporate campuses	X				
9. Strategically reduce or remove minimum lot size requirements			√		
10. Manage the transition between higher- and lower-density neighborhoods			√		
IV. Provide a variety of transportation choices					
1. Create programs and policies that support car sharing		X			
2. Make sure transportation models and surveys accurately reflect all modes of transportation		X			
3. Consult early with emergency responders when developing smart growth plans				√	
4. Change state insurance policies so that pay-as you- drive insurance can be implemented		X			
5. Consider transportation when developing rating systems for green buildings and programs		X			
6. Transform park-and-ride lots into multiuse facilities		X			
7. Integrate goods movement and delivery into smart growth		X			
8. Provide riders with customized transit information		X			
9. Create comprehensive bicycling programs		X			
10. Introduce value pricing		X			
V. Strengthen and direct development toward existing communities					
1. Encourage the creation of a business improvement district			√		
2. Use priority funding areas to direct development toward existing communities		X			
3. Offer home equity assurance programs		X			
4. Establish a land bank authority		X			
5. Create a development finance insurance program		X			

6. Develop asset-driven market analysis to encourage commercial and retail investment in underserved communities		X			
7. Encourage infill by adopting innovative storm water regulations and practices	X				
8. Increase transit-oriented development by adding infill stations on existing transit lines and retrofitting existing stations			√		
9. Develop a revolving loan fund to support local independent businesses		X			
10. Designate a vacant-properties coordinator to use code enforcement, provide incentives, and develop partnerships to minimize and abate vacant properties		X			
Socio-cultural Principles					
VI. Create a range of housing opportunities and choices					
1. Establish an employer-assisted housing program				√	
2. Streamline the development review process when units include affordable housing			√		
3. Create a regional program to encourage all communities to include a fair share of affordable and moderate-range housing		X			
4. Use transportation funds as an incentive to provide housing near transit		X			
5. Use housing to engender 24-hour cities in revitalization plans		X			
6. Integrate smart growth and housing programs		X			
7. Adopt property tax exemption programs for mixed-income developments and low-income homeowners		X			
8. Develop smart growth funds to promote development in underserved communities		X			
9. Use different builders on contiguous blocks of land to ensure a diversity of housing styles		X			
10. Create a housing trust fund		X			
VII. Create Walk-able Communities					
1. Develop a pedestrian master plan			√		
2. Design communities so that kids can walk to school			√		
3. Use trees and other green infrastructure to provide shelter, beauty, urban heat reduction, and separation from automobile traffic			√		
4. Encourage safe pedestrian routes to transit			√		
5. Develop walking awareness and promotion programs			√		
6. Use modern technology to increase pedestrian safety		X			
7. Use visual cues and design elements to indicate pedestrian rights of way and minimize conflicts		X			

8. Situate parking to enhance the pedestrian environment and facilitate access between destinations		X			
9. Make places walk-able for aging populations in response to new demographics and special needs		X			
10. Retrofit superblocks and cul-de-sac street networks		X			
VIII. Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong sense of place					
1. Establish revolving loan funds for historic preservation			√		
2. Create community greens		X			
3. Turn underused highways into boulevards		X			
4. Develop a comprehensive way finding system in town centers			√		
5. Use distinctive public transit to increase the attractiveness of neighborhoods				√	
6. Highlight cultural assets through public art and event nights				√	
7. Use asset-based tools and resident engagement to reflect community values		X			
8. Revitalize the waterfront	X				
9. Make retail centers distinctive and attractive destinations	X				
10. Use transportation enhancements funds to create places of distinction		X			
IX. Make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective					
1. Educate elected leaders and public officials about smart growth			√		
2. Direct development along corridors to create stronger districts		X			
3. Create pattern books to streamline construction and enhance project marketability		X			
4. Make zoning codes and other land development regulations simple to use and easy to read		X			
5. Create a multi-municipal planning strategy to provide for development in rural markets while maintaining rural character		X			
6. Establish a state- or regional-level “smart growth cabinet”		X			
7. Create an “incentives expert” for developers and businesses when an area has been designated for development/redevelopment		X			
8. Implement geographic information system-based planning into the development process				√	
9. Streamline brown-field redevelopment approval processes		X			
10. Create investment funds for smart growth projects		X			
X. Encourage community and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions					
1. Use third-party groups to make sure a range of stakeholder views is expressed				√	
2. Use nonprofit groups as smart growth consultants				√	

3. Use a “kick the tires” trip to take local government officials and residents to visit smart growth communities			√		
4. Establish context-sensitive design training courses that focus on community-involvement strategies for traffic engineers		X			
5. Use quick-response teams to gain approvals for smart growth developments		X			
6. Conduct place audits to determine barriers and opportunities for smart growth		X			
7. Develop community indicators to make sure that development is meeting community goals				√	
8. Use color-coded maps to establish a planning and zoning framework for future planning decisions		X			
9. Illustrate complex concepts with photographs and imagery		X			
10. Create and distribute free videos to illustrate local planning goals		X			
Number of Policies	8	55	19	15	3

Annex (7): List of Palestinian/Israeli Population Inside the Historic Planning Boundaries

		Palestinian Community	Population (PCBS, 2012)	
Palestinian Population Inside Bethlehem District	Palestinian Population Inside Village Boundary	Jannatah ¹	6,130	
		Hindaza and Braid'ah ²	5,432	
		Za'tara ³	7,118	
		Wadi Rahhal ⁴	1,606	
		Dar Salah ⁵	3,818	
		Al Khas	446	
		Artas	4,146	
		'Ayda Camp	2,978	
		Palestinian Population Inside Bethlehem City-Area Master-plan	Beit Jala	13,308
			Beit Sahour	13,997
			Bethlehem	28,596
	Ad Doha		11,038	
	Ad Duheisha Camp		9,887	
	Al 'Aza Camp		1,731	
	Khallet al Haddad		461	
	Khallet al Louza		654	
	Khallet an Nu'man		196	
	Al Haddadiya		61	
	Al Jab'a		1,014	
	Al Khadr		11,062	
	Al Maniya		1,145	
	Al Manshiya		490	
	Al Ma'sara		909	
	Al 'Ubeidiya	12,170		
	Al Walaja	2,310		
	'Arab ar Rashayida	1,645		
Ash Shawawra	4,230			
Battir	4,490			

		Beit Fajjar	12,454
		Beit Ta'mir	1,391
		Bir Onah	761
		Husan	6,283
		Jubbet adh Dhib	183
		Jurat ash Sham'a	1,688
		Khallet Hamameh	1,601
		Khallet Sakariya	209
		Kisan	514
		Marah Ma'alla	775
		Marah Rabah	1,494
		Nahhalin	7,727
		Tuqu'	10,052
		Umm Salamuna	1,070
		Wadi an Nis	874
		Wadi Fukin	1,322
Total			199,466

Notes:

¹ Jannatah includes: Assakrah, khalet Alqaranin, Alaqab, Harmalah, Abu Nujeim, and Rakhme.

² Hindaza and Braid'ah include: khalet Abu zeid, Bureid'a, Dhahrat an Nada, Khallet Hamad, and Wadi Umm Qal'a.

³ Za'tara includes: Ras al Wad.

⁴ Wadi Rahhal includes: Khirbet an Nahla, Ath Thabra, and Al Beida.

⁵ Dar Salah includes: Gohdum, Umm Asalah, Al Hujeila, and Umm al Qasseis.

Palestinian Population Inside <i>Corpus Separatum</i>		
Governorate	Palestinian Community	Population (PCBS, 2012)
Bethlehem	Jannatah ¹	6,130
	Hindaza and Braid'ah ²	5,432
	Za'tara ³	7,118
	Wadi Rahhal ⁴	1,606
	Dar Salah ⁵	3,818
	Al Khas	446
	Artas	4,146
	'Ayda Camp	2,978
	Beit Jala	13,308
	Beit Sahour	13,997
	Bethlehem	28,596
	Ad Doha	11,038
	Ad Duheisha Camp	9,887

	Al 'Aza Camp	1,731
	Khallet al Haddad	461
	Khallet al Louza	654
	Khallet an Nu'man	196
	Ash Shawawra ⁶	4,230
Jerusalem (East Jerusalem / Part of J2)	'Anata	13,101
	Az Za'ayyem	3,699
	Al 'Eizariya	19,143
	Abu Dis	11,723
	Ash Sheikh Sa'd	2,119
	As Sawahira ash Sharqiya	6,306
	'Arab al Jahalin	784
Jerusalem (East Jerusalem / J1 - Except Beit Hanina and Kufir A'qab)	Shu'fat Camp	237,301
	Shu'fat	
	Al 'Isawiya	
	Sheikh Jarrah	
	Wadi al Joz	
	As Suwwana	
	At Tur	
	Jerusalem "Al-Quds"(Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Al-Joz, Bab Al-Sahira, As Suwwana, At-Tur, Ash-Shayyah, Ras Al- Amud)	
	Ash Shayyah	
	Ras al 'Amud	
	Silwan	
	Ath Thuri	
	Jabal al Mukabbir	
	As Sawahira al Gharbiya	
	Beit Safafa	
	Sharafat	
	Sur Bahir	
Umm Tuba		
Bab as Sahira		
Total		415,380
West Jerusalem	Abu Ghosh	5,809
Grand Total		421,189
Notes:		
¹ Jannatah includes: Assakrah, khalet Alqaranin, Alaqab, Harmalah, Abu Nujeim, and Rakhme.		
² Hindaza and Braid'ah include: khalet Abu zeid, Bureid'a, Dhahrat an Nada, Khallet Hamad, and Wadi Umm Qal'a.		

³ Za'tara includes: Ras al Wad.

⁴ Wadi Rahhal includes: Khirbet an Nahla, Ath Thabra, and Al Beida.

⁵ Dar Salah includes: Gohdum, Umm Asalah, Al Hujeila, and Umm al Qasseis.

⁶ Ash Shawawra includes: Al Koshnah, Fakht Al Goul, Abu Zaitoun, and Khallat Al Hdaidiah.

		Israeli Settlement	Population (ARIJ Database, 2011)	
Israeli Settlements Inside Bethlehem District		Allon Shevut	3,284	
		Avenat	119	
		Ayn Fashkhah	0	
		Betar 'Illit	39,736	
		Efrat	9,239	
		El David (Kfar Eldad)	285	
		El'azar	2,081	
		Geva'ot	66	
		Israeli Settlements Inside Village Boundary	Gilo	44,521
			Har Gilo	630
			Har Homa	25,000
			Hadar Betar	74
			Kfar Etzion--Hebron	910
			Mizpe Shalem	223
			Mshoki Dargot	87
			Neve Daniyyel	2,107
			Nokdim	1,461
		Rosh Zurim	730	
		Tekoa	2,157	
		Total	132,710	

Israeli Settlements Inside <i>Corpus Separatum</i>	
Israeli Settlement	Population (ARIJ Database, 2011)
Jewish Quarter	3,444
East Talpiot	17,000
Gilo	44,521
Giva't Shappira (French Hill)	10,017
Hebrew University (Har HaTzofim)	1,376
Kedar (Old Kedar)	1,069
Ramat Eshkol	11,457
Ras al A'mud (Ma'ale Ha zeitim)	746
Rekhes Shufat (Ramat Shlomo)	20,000
Har Homa (including Giva't Ha-Matos)	25,000
Har Gilo	630
Ramot	47,026
Ma'ale Adummim	43,408
Nof Zion	334
Mizpe Yedude (New Kedar)	NA
Total	226,028
West Jerusalem	337,070
Grand Total	563,098