Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Wimmer, Simon | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-08T08:34:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-08T08:34:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023-06-13 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/42638 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-24475 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that ϕ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that ϕ, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’ | en |
dc.language.iso | en | de |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Canadian journal of philosophy;52(8) | - |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | de |
dc.subject | knowledge | en |
dc.subject | primitivism about knowledge | en |
dc.subject | epistemology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 | - |
dc.title | Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle | en |
dc.type | Text | de |
dc.type.publicationtype | Article | de |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
eldorado.secondarypublication | true | de |
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifier | https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.16 | de |
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitation | Wimmer S. Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2022;52(8):777-788. doi:10.1017/can.2023.16 | de |
Appears in Collections: | Institut für Philosophie |
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reductive-views-of-knowledge-and-the-small-difference-principle.pdf | DNB | 161.06 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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