# Trends in Malevolence



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**DIMVA** Germany July, 2010

### Jose Nazario, Ph.D.

- Arbor Networks, 2002-present
- o Interests
  - Botnets, DDoS, large scale trends and data, etc
- Head of ASERT
- Authored many publications in the field
- Ph.D. in Biochemistry




#### **Conclusions**

- Our community's tactical activities have created our current security mess
- We must think strategically to improve the situation




# **Mark Lombardi**



Actions have consequences

Are we breeding "superbugs"? Are we forcing evolution?





#### **The Current Situation**

- Rampant botnet populations
- Whole businesses devoted to underground economy
- DNS, IP space abuse rampant



#### **Botnet Growth Reasons**

- Crime pays
- Botnets go everywhere, hard to blacklist large and dynamic sources (spam)
- Kits, code reuse
- Most operators not writing their own



#### **Service Oriented Economies**

- Once coders detach ego from code, all bets are off
  - Allow for scaling via specialization
  - Carders, spammers, brokers, hosters, etc
  - Botnet herders more like project managers, general contractors
  - Emergence of cloud services
    - Packing, AV testing, stolen info testing, etc
- Has the law on criminal facilitation kept up?



# Rogue ASN

A *rogue ASN* is a network defined by its autonomous system number that caters to the criminal underground. This is a maturation of the bulletproof network concept.



# Troyak-AS Saga (Winter, 2010)

- Troyak-AS AS50215
- Eastern Europe/Russia (unclear)
- Roman Starchenko
- Considered "Bulletproof"
- Had various downstream customers



# **Troyak-AS's Nest**




Figure 2: The Cybercrime Infrastructure, and the ISPs that connect it to the Internet

#### Image Legend:

Bulletproof Networks where malware is actually hosted are marked in red with the Trojan horse's icon sign; Upstream Providers are orange-colored spheres;



# **Troyak-AS and SaintVPN**

- Winter, 2010 Identified as a Zeus haven
- March, 2010 Depeering begins
  - Troyak moves to St Petersberg Internet (PIN)
  - Finds upstreams in AS44051, AS29632
  - Moves to RT-COMM (Moscow), AS8342
  - CERT-RU involved
  - Depeered
- March 16, 2010 Routes move to AS50678
  SaintVPN
  - Still Starchenko
  - No routes advertised since March 20, 2010





# **Unintended Consequences of Better Security**


#### Pre-Windows XP SP2

- Massive number of Windows worms
- New RPC DCOM exploits appearing frequently
- XP SP2 introduced a default-on personal firewall
- Result: attacks shifted to the client
  - MS Word, Excel, PPT, Visio, Acrobat, Flash, IE, etc
  - New challenge: identifying novel attacks, defending



# Pressures force innovation
















#### IPv4 and IPv6

#### IPv4 oversubscription leads to

- Private CIDR trading
- High rate of address churn
  - Makes identifying bots very difficult

#### IPv6 promises more address

- Could lead to more stable addressing per client
- IPv6 more mobile-IP friendly


#### Possible benefits from IPv4 to IPv6

- True bot capture-recapture?
- Easier infected endpoint identification?



#### **IPv4 Address Exhaustion**

#### IPv4 Consumption Model (IANA Pool)





# **IPv6 Migration Challenges**

#### Network monitoring

- Not as rich as IPv4
- Flow, IDS, IPS, firewalls, etc
- Operators know this, worried (Arbor WSIR 2009)

#### IPv6 optional heads lead to ambiguity

- Expect a lot of bugs
- IPv6 reintroduces some classic IPv4 bugs and flaws
- NDP is just ARP, RH0 header, etc



# Rogue Network Fallout Effects on IPv4

#### IPv4 address space

- April, 2010: 14/8 and 223/8 allocated
- Less than 10% of IPv4 allocatable space remains
  - IANA reserved not yet touched

#### "Burned" space is difficult to recover

- Can't send mail, blacklisted forever
- May not be able to route due to ASPATH filters
- Cleanup?
  - Expect a future service from someone ...

#### Bad guys are burning precious IPv4 space



#### Whack-a-mole Fallout

- Rise of botnets
  - Source-IP blacklists can't keep up
- Dramatic increase in malware variations
  - Minor variations (MD5), tools have not kept up
- Fast flux domain names
- Domain generation algorithms
- End-user patch management
  - Made worse by some vendors' failure to remove old stuff properly (Adobe, Java)



# **New Technologies as Opportunities**

#### o Cloud

- Dramatic rise in cloud services
- Basic cloud services free


#### Social media

- Dramatic increase
- Large number of competing networks
- New communications layer



# August, 2009: Upd4t3 Microblogging Botnet









#### TwitterNet Botnet Kit

- Found and analyzed in May 2006
- Backdoored, version 2.0 removed that backdoor
- Much like IRC bots but uses Twitter instead









# Why the Cloud?

#### Hide in the noise

 Tremendous amounts of traffic in these sites


#### Uptime


Guaranteed by provider


#### o Price: Free

- Up to a point
- Success limiting

#### **Facebook Active Users (Millions)**







# **DNS Attacking Trends**

#### New avenues for attackers

- Hijack
- Poison
- Malicious DNS names

#### Attack the weak DNS infrastructure

- Registries
- Registrars
- DNS servers



# Twitter, Baidu DNS Hijack



Twitter's DNS administrator account was compromised at the registrar, redirected to new servers.


Same attack used against Baidu



#### **DNS TLDs**

#### New initiatives

- Registration crackdowns in .cn, .ru
- Proof of identity, statement of intent for use





#### **TLD Crackdown Results and Fallout**

- Dramatic effect on .cn
  - Massive decrease in rogue .cn TLDs registered
- No such long-term drop in .ru
  - Restored, largely
    - Why? False documentation business existed
- Shift to other TLDs
  - .com, .net
- Shift to attacking legitimate sites
  - Gumblar, Gootkit, etc
- Shift to dynamic DNS providers
  - 3332.org, etc



# **Conclusions From History**

- Our community's tactical activities have created our current security mess
- We have pressured attackers into innovating
- Failure to contain the problem has lead to unchecked growth



#### What Now?

- We must think strategically to improve the situation
- Evaluate the likely consequences of our actions
- Act in concert
- Act in the right order
- Develop, fund, launch such research programs



Dankë Arigato Thank you Gracias Grazie Dank u Merci Dank u Kamsahamnida





# "Cyber warfare"?

- Attacks appear to <u>follow</u> diplomatic issues, not lead
- Attack damage not on par with loss of life (GE, etc)
  - Inconvenience only
- Therefore, in general ...
  - We assume non-state actors
  - We assume "right wing" political motivations
  - We assume news reports stir public



#### **Elections - Intimidation**







# **Diplomatic Tensions - Support of One Nation**







