



KIDS – Keyed Intrusion Detection System

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Agenda



- Introduction
- Related work
- Proposed detection method
 - Key introduction
- Testing
- Conclusion





Introduction



- Intrusion detection systems
 - Evolution and improvement ©
- => Attack improvement
 - => undetected ⊗
- Anomaly based NIDS
 - Detection method known
 - packet elements used to build model of normal
 - Mimicry attack
 - mimics normal packets in used elements





Related Work



- PAYL [Wango4,05]
 - Model single payload bytes frequencies
- Anagram [Wango6]
 - Model fixed length payload byte sequences (n-grams)
 - Simple (fast) anomaly score calculation
 - new n-gram/all n-gram in packet payload
- Language model ...[Riecko7]
 - Payload divided into words
 - byte sequence between delimiters
 - Comparable accuracy to n-grams
 - Smaller computational load





Proposed Detection Method



- Words based
- Word transitions, also
- Resistant to some attacks in training data
- Prevents mimicry
 - Introduce key
 - × Kerckhoffs' principle [Kerckhoffs, 1883]
 - × Shannon's maxim [Shannon, 1949]
 - Open design principle [Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975]





Set of Delimiters - Key



- Set of "normal" words depends on selection of delimiters
- Selected set of delimiters determines model of normal packet payload
- The same model creation method and different delimiters set => different model
- Set of delimiters Key
 - Method public
 - Set of delimiters secret





Learning

- 7
- Normal, attack free, payloads partitioned into words.
- Model of normal packet:
 - Word frequency distribution
 - Word transition frequency distribution
- Training phase
 - Appearance of any word is counted and stored
 - Appearance of any pair of words is counted and stored.





Detection

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Word based score

o k – number of words in payload

$$S_{w} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{1}{n(w_{i})}}{k}$$

- o n(w_i) number of appearances of the word w_i in learned model
- Tolerant to some attacks in training data

Transition based score

$$S_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m} \frac{1}{n(t_i)}}{m}$$

- o m number of word transitions in a payload
- o n(t_i) number of times transition t_i occurred during training

• Total score
$$S = S_w * S_t$$





Testing



- Used HTTP traffic and attacks
- Real university department traffic
 - Cleaned using Snort and manual inspection
- Metasploit for attacks





Initial Set of Delimiters

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From [Riecko7]

- Number of learned words
 - Levels after 96 hours of traffic
 - o Around 33000
- Number of transitions
 - o 33000 x 33000 matrix
 - Too much
 - Some words are very rare
 - Use only words that appear more than 10 times
 - o 80 times smaller matrix





Test attacks (part)


No.	Vulnerability / payload	CVE
1	Apache Chunked-Encoding / meterpreter-reverse_tcp	2002-0393
2	Apache Chunked-Encoding / shell-reverse_http	2002-0394
3	Apache mod_jk overflow / adduser	2007-0775
4	Apache mod_rewrite / shell-bind_tcp	2006-3748
5	Apache mod_rewrite /vncinject-reverse_tcp	2006-3749
6	IIS 5.0 IDQ Path Overflow / shell-reverse_http	2001-0501
7	IIS 5.0 IDQ Path Overflow / shell-reverse_tcp	2001-0502
8	IIS ISAPI w3who.dll / exec	2004-1135
9	IIS ISAPI w3who.dll / shell-reverse_tcp	2004-1136
10	Oracle 9i XDB HTTP PASS / shell-reverse_tcp	2003-0728
11	Xitami If_Mod_Since / shell-reverse_tcp	2007-5068
	Attacks with related vulnerability and used payload	





ROC curve

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Arbitrary Set of Delimiters



- Different sets of delimiters
- Different number of delimiters in set
 - 15, 20, 25, 30
- 30 different sets of each size
- Total of 120
- Random choice of delimiters
 - Function "rand" to generate number o 255





Results




- Number of learned words
 - o Levels after 96 hours of traffic (again)
 - 40000 50000 (20 to 50% increase)
- Number of transitions
 - O Again, some words are very rare
 - Use only words that appear more than 10 times
 - Matrix of managable size





ROC curves







Conclusion



- Implementation of open design principle
- Now HTTP others should work too
 - Protocol independent
- Key selection should be further tested
- Keyed IDS is the main idea
 - There might be better implementations





Questions

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