Housing, collateral constraints, and fiscal policy

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dc.contributor.authorPolattimur, Hamza
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-20T15:46:36Z
dc.date.available2013-06-20T15:46:36Z
dc.date.issued2013-06-20
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the preferential tax treatment of housing that can be observed in many industrialized countries. It provides a rationale for it by means of an optimal taxation approach taking into account an important feature of housing, namely its usage as collateral. In a borrower-lender framework where private loans are assumed to be non-enforceable and have to be collateralized by housing, optimal fisscal policy should disburden constrained borrowers by subsidizing their housing.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2003/30404
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-5477
dc.language.isoende
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper / SFB 823;23/2013en
dc.subjectCollateral Constraintsen
dc.subjectHousingen
dc.subjectOptimal Fiscal Policyen
dc.subject.ddc310
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.ddc620
dc.titleHousing, collateral constraints, and fiscal policyen
dc.typeTextde
dc.type.publicationtypeworkingPaperde
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
eldorado.dnb.deposittruede

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Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823