Incentivizing efficient utilization without reducing access: The case against cost-sharing in insurance

Fels, Markus

Incentivizing efficient utilization without reducing access: The case against cost-sharing in insurance

dc.contributor.author	Fels, Markus
dc.date.accessioned	2021-07-29T08:11:59Z
dc.date.available	2021-07-29T08:11:59Z
dc.date.issued	2020-04-22
dc.description.abstract	Cost-sharing is regarded as an important tool to reduce moral hazard in health insurance. Contrary to standard prediction, however, such requirements are found to decrease utilization both of efficient and of inefficient care. I employ a simple model that incorporates two possible explanations—consumer mistakes and limited access—to assess the welfare implications of different insurance designs. I find cost-sharing never to be an optimal solution as it produces two novel inefficiencies by limiting access. An alternative design, relying on bonuses, has no such side effects and achieves the same incentivization. I show how the optimal design can be deduced empirically and discuss possible impediments to its implementation.	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2003/40347
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-22222
dc.language.iso	en	de
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Health economics;Vol. 29. 2020, issue 7, pp 827-840
dc.subject	Cost-sharing	en
dc.subject	Insurance rebates	en
dc.subject	Limited access	en
dc.subject	Moral hazard	en
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.subject.rswk	Krankenversicherung	de
dc.subject.rswk	Fürsorge	de
dc.subject.rswk	Kosten	de
dc.subject.rswk	Bonus	de
dc.title	Incentivizing efficient utilization without reducing access: The case against cost-sharing in insurance	en
dc.type	Text	de
dc.type.publicationtype	article	de
dcterms.accessRights	open access
eldorado.secondarypublication	true	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitation	Health economics. Vol. 29. 2020, issue 7, pp 827-840	en
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifier	https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4023	de

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