Synergies, cooperation and syndication in venture capital game, portfolio optimization with genetic algorithms and asset auctions: essays in finance
| dc.contributor.advisor | Posch, Peter | |
| dc.contributor.author | Radak, Vladislav | |
| dc.contributor.referee | Pott, Christiane | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2021-02-26 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-26T08:01:12Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-03-26T08:01:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis looks at all scientific phenomenon of financial decision-making from both the empirical and theoretical side, with empirical trying to strengthen theoretical assumptions or even to expand it. In chapter 2, we propose a two-stage financing model with three players that consider the output elasticities of all parties using the Cobb-Douglas utility function. Theoretical findings in chapter 2 suggest that a higher complementary coefficient between players on both stages can lead to a higher level of effort from all three players, taking game dynamics away from the moral hazard problem and causing higher exit stage payoffs. Previous track record of the angel and VC and output elasticity of the entrepreneur, combined with the company’s shares offered the angel and VC, impact the three-player game dynamic, causing some players to reduce their efforts after specific funding rounds. Our empirical results show that VC syndication increases the average amount of funding offered to entrepreneurs as well as that syndicated ventures have a higher number of funding rounds, resulting in a higher number of possible entry-points provided by those start-ups. Our results in chapter 4 suggested that a two-point GA that minimized the risk for a given level of expected return slightly outperformed the results of the SPEA2. Compared with the previous industry standard for risk measure—Value-at-Risk, we show that both frontiers differed, especially at the low return side. The converted Value-at-Risk solutions were not evenly distributed along the efficient frontier and even inadequate for some ES values. In chapter 5, we use the game theory approach to examine the first-price package auction design for illiquid asset auctions. Our theoretical work suggests that every case that can be presented as a two or three asset game, as well as longer games that can be presented as two and three asset subgames, has a strong equilibrium if the bidders’ budgets and utilities for every asset are common knowledge. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/40108 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-21985 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | de |
| dc.subject | Venture capital game | en |
| dc.subject | Portfolio optimization | en |
| dc.subject | Genetic algorithms | en |
| dc.subject | Asset auctions | en |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | |
| dc.title | Synergies, cooperation and syndication in venture capital game, portfolio optimization with genetic algorithms and asset auctions: essays in finance | en |
| dc.type | Text | de |
| dc.type.publicationtype | doctoralThesis | de |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | |
| eldorado.secondarypublication | false | de |