Education: optimal choice and efficient policy

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dc.contributor.authorRichter, Wolfram F.
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Kerstin
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-07T08:56:01Z
dc.date.available2022-04-07T08:56:01Z
dc.date.issued2021-08-11
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that it suffices to assume distortionary wage taxation to prove the efficiency of effective subsidization of education. The paper does not rely on considerations of equity and market failure to justify subsidies. Instead, the optimal subsidy reduces the social cost of distortive wage taxation. The theoretical approach assumes a Mincer-type earnings function, analyzes corner solutions of optimal schooling choice and derives the result of efficient subsidization in a Ramsey-type framework. Second-best policy is confronted with empirical evidence from OECD countries. The majority of countries are shown to subsidize tertiary education in effective terms.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2003/40842
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-22699
dc.language.isoende
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCan. J. Econ.;54(2)
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.titleEducation: optimal choice and efficient policyen
dc.typeTextde
dc.type.publicationtypearticlede
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
eldorado.secondarypublicationtruede
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitationRichter, W.F. and Schneider, K. (2021), Education: Optimal choice and efficient policy. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 54: 840-863. https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12518de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifierhttps://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12518de

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