Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle

dc.contributor.author	Wimmer, Simon
dc.date.accessioned	2024-08-08T08:34:19Z
dc.date.available	2024-08-08T08:34:19Z
dc.date.issued	2023-06-13
dc.description.abstract	I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that ϕ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that ϕ, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2003/42638
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-24475
dc.language.iso	en	de
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Canadian journal of philosophy;52(8)
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	de
dc.subject	knowledge	en
dc.subject	primitivism about knowledge	en
dc.subject	epistemology	en
dc.subject.ddc	100
dc.title	Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle	en
dc.type	Text	de
dc.type.publicationtype	Article	de
dcterms.accessRights	open access
eldorado.secondarypublication	true	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitation	Wimmer S. Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2022;52(8):777-788. doi:10.1017/can.2023.16	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifier	https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.16	de

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