Ways to knowledge-first believe
dc.contributor.author | Wimmer, Simon | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-04-12T13:18:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-04-12T13:18:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-05-28 | |
dc.description.abstract | On a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief, to believe p is to Φ (e.g. treat p) as if one knew p. I challenge this view by arguing against various regimentations of it. I conclude by generalizing my argument to alternative knowledge-first views suggested by Williamson and Wimmer. | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/41330 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-23173 | |
dc.language.iso | en | de |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Erkenntnis.;Volume 88. 2023, pp 1189–1205 | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 | |
dc.title | Ways to knowledge-first believe | en |
dc.type | Text | de |
dc.type.publicationtype | article | de |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | |
eldorado.secondarypublication | true | de |
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitation | Erkenntnis. Vol. 88. 2023, pp 1189–1205 | de |
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifier | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00398-6 | de |