Workers’ participation in wage setting and opportunistic behavior

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dc.contributor.authorFranke, Jörg
dc.contributor.authorGurtoviy, Ruslan
dc.contributor.authorMertins, Vanessa
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-26T14:42:09Z
dc.date.available2014-03-26T14:42:09Z
dc.date.issued2014-03-26
dc.description.abstractOur study analyzes the consequences of workers’ participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified gift-exchange game where the degree of workers’ involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers’ participation leads actually to a decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some recently observed positive effects from workers’ participation in experimental labor markets into perspective and are more in line with the ambiguous results from empirical studies.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2003/33002
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-13428
dc.language.isoende
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper / SFB 823;10/2014en
dc.subjectparticipationen
dc.subjectreciprocityen
dc.subjectpersonnel economicsen
dc.subjectgift-exchange gameen
dc.subjectlabor marketen
dc.subject.ddc310
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.ddc620
dc.titleWorkers’ participation in wage setting and opportunistic behavioren
dc.title.alternativeEvidence from a gift-exchange experimenten
dc.typeTextde
dc.type.publicationtypeworkingPaperde
dcterms.accessRightsopen access

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Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823