|Title:||The role of selection effects in organizational change: Empirical evidence on worker participation and human resource management practices in Germany|
|Abstract:||This dissertation tries to obtain a better understanding of how selection effects can affect the analysis of human resource management practices or employee participation. The effects of works councils and selected personnel measures in German firms are analysed, where selection on observable and unobservable factors is controlled for by using matching techniques and difference-in-differences. Chapter 2 shows that works councils are rather implemented in firms where employees are afraid of losing their job but also in firms with relatively high wages. The introduction of a works council has no effect on several outcomes like wages, employee turnover and overtime work, but a positive effect on workers’ perceived job security. Thus, the aim of works councils seems to be rent protection rather than rent seeking. In Chapter 3 the effects of profit sharing on productivity are analysed. As profit sharing means that wages directly depend on the firm’s performance, incentive effects are expected. The study shows that – although profit sharing positively affects productivity - effects are overestimated if selection is not taken into account. Profit sharing can also affect different outcomes, e.g. investments in human capital, which is analysed in Chapter 4. The results indicate that firms which introduce profit sharing have a higher increase in training intensity compared to firms without profit sharing. However, this is only the case if the majority of employees participate in profits. Chapter 5 shows how training can affect workers’ labour market success. Older and younger workers have different aims when participating in training which also reflects in different effects. Younger participants profit from training by an increase in wages whereas older participants experience an increase in perceived job security.|
|Subject Headings (RSWK):||Gewinnbeteiligung|
|Appears in Collections:||Lehrstuhl Volkswirtschaftslehre (Wirtschaftspolitik)|
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