Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wimmer, Simon	-
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-10T15:06:18Z	-
dc.date.available	2022-03-10T15:06:18Z	-
dc.date.issued	2021-12-16	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2003/40779	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-22636	-
dc.description.abstract	Are there any dispositions one must have if one believes p? A widespread answer emphasizes the role of beliefs in reasoning and holds that if one believes p, one must be disposed to treat p as true (rely on p/use p as a premise) in one’s reasoning. I argue that this answer is subject to counterexamples.	en
dc.language.iso	en	de
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Synthese;Vol. 199. 2021, pp 14975–14991	-
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	-
dc.subject	Belief	en
dc.subject	Reasoning disposition	en
dc.subject	Philosophy of mind	en
dc.subject.ddc	100	-
dc.title	Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition	en
dc.type	Text	de
dc.type.publicationtype	article	de
dcterms.accessRights	open access	-
eldorado.secondarypublication	true	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primaryidentifier	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03451-7	de
eldorado.secondarypublication.primarycitation	Synthese. Vol. 199. 2021, pp 14975–14991	en
Appears in Collections:	Institut für Philosophie

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