Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGu, Yiquan-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-29T08:33:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-29T08:33:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010-03-29T08:33:59Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2003/26999-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-3144-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a two-stage union-oligopoly-council model of wage and employment determination wherein at the first stage wage is negotiated through collective bargaining and at the second stage employment in each firm is co-determined by the employer and its works council. We provide a full characterization of the model outcome for all parameter values of bargaining power and co-determination power. In particular, works councils always increase employment while their impact on wage can be non-monotonic. Overall, individual works councils’ pursuit of own workers’ interests may well harm the workers as a union. JEL-Classification: J50; J54; L13en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper / SFB 823;07/2010-
dc.subjectFirm-council co-determinationen
dc.subjectUnion-oligopoly bargainingen
dc.subjectWorkplace representationen
dc.subject.ddc310-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.ddc620-
dc.titleWage and employment effects of workplace representation: a "Right To Co-Manage" modelen
dc.typeTextde
dc.type.publicationtypereportde
dcterms.accessRightsopen access-
Appears in Collections:Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
DP_0710_SFB823_gu.pdfDNB1.17 MBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is protected by original copyright



This item is protected by original copyright rightsstatements.org