Authors: Bredemeier, Christian
Title: Inattentive voters and welfare-state persistence
Language (ISO): en
Abstract: Welfare-state measures often tend to persist even when they seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the economic environment. This paper proposes an information-based explanation for this welfare-state persistence. I present a structural model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon implementations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare- state persistence arises from disincentive effects of social insurance on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private financial precautions and with it agents' attentiveness to changes in economic fundamentals. When welfare-state arrangements are pronounced, agents realize changes in economic fundamentals later and reforms have considerable delays.
Subject Headings: imperfect information
voting
welfare state
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2003/29383
http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-3289
Issue Date: 2012-03-07
Appears in Collections:Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823

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