Authors: Dyballa, Katharina
Kraft, Kornelius
Title: The impact of disclosure obligations on executive compensation - A policy evaluation using quantile treatment estimators
Language (ISO): en
Abstract: This empirical study analyses the effects of the introduction of strongly increased disclosure requirements in Germany on the level of executive compensation. One innovative aspect is the comparison of companies which voluntarily followed a recommendation of the German Governance Code before the relevant law was implemented and published detailed information on executive compensation with other firms which did not. Conditional and unconditional quantile difference-indifferences models are estimated. The companies which refused to publish data before it became mandatory show a reduction in compensation levels for the upper quantiles. Hence, the mandatory requirement to publish detailed information reduced the higher levels of executive compensations, but did not affect executive compensation at lower or medium levels.
Subject Headings: executive compensation
quantile treatment effect
policy evaluation
corporate governance regulation
disclosure obligations
Subject Headings (RSWK): Vorstandsmitglied
nichtparametrische Statistik
Issue Date: 2016
Appears in Collections:Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823

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