Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking
Loading...
Date
2022-06-27
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
John Cook Wilson is an important predecessor of contemporary knowledge first epistemologists: among other parallels, he claimed that knowledge is indefinable. We reconstruct four arguments for this claim discernible in his work, three of which find no clear analogues in contemporary discussions of knowledge first epistemology. We pay special attention to Cook Wilson’s view of the relation between knowledge and forms of thinking (like belief). Claims of Cook Wilson’s that support the indefinability of knowledge include: that knowledge, unlike belief, straddles an active/passive divide; that, rather than entailing belief, knowledge excludes belief; and that understanding forms of thinking other than knowledge (such as belief) depends on understanding knowledge. Reflecting on Cook Wilson’s framework highlights underappreciated concerns relevant to any attempt to define knowledge.
Description
Table of contents
Keywords
John Cook Wilson, Oxford realism, Knowledge, Thinking, Belief, Entailment thesis, Exclusion thesis