Inattentive voters and welfare-state persistence

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dc.contributor.authorBredemeier, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-07T14:26:17Z
dc.date.available2012-03-07T14:26:17Z
dc.date.issued2012-03-07
dc.description.abstractWelfare-state measures often tend to persist even when they seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the economic environment. This paper proposes an information-based explanation for this welfare-state persistence. I present a structural model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon implementations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare- state persistence arises from disincentive effects of social insurance on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private financial precautions and with it agents' attentiveness to changes in economic fundamentals. When welfare-state arrangements are pronounced, agents realize changes in economic fundamentals later and reforms have considerable delays.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2003/29383
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-3289
dc.language.isoende
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper / SFB 823 ; 11/2012en
dc.subjectimperfect informationen
dc.subjectvotingen
dc.subjectwelfare stateen
dc.subject.ddc310
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.ddc620
dc.titleInattentive voters and welfare-state persistenceen
dc.typeTextde
dc.type.publicationtypeworkingPaperde
dcterms.accessRightsopen access

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Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823