Why do U.S. banks contribute more to global systemic risk

dc.contributor.author	Bostandzic, Denefa
dc.contributor.author	Weiß, Gregor N.F.
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-02T12:08:50Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-02T12:08:50Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-02
dc.description.abstract	We show that U.S. banks are more exposed and contribute more to systemic risk in the global financial system than European banks. We find that banks become systemically relevant if they rely too strongly on non-interest income, less traditional lending and if the quality of their loan portfolio decreases. More stringent capital regulations and more independent supervisory agencies improve financial stability. As we match European and U.S. banks based on firm size and valuation, the differences we find in the banks’ systemic relevance cannot be explained by the too-big-to-fail or charter value hypotheses.	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2003/30829
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-5600
dc.language.iso	en	de
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion Paper / SFB 823;36/2013
dc.subject	bank regulation	en
dc.subject	capital regulation	en
dc.subject	financial crises	en
dc.subject	non-interest income	en
dc.subject	systemic risk	en
dc.subject.ddc	310
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.subject.ddc	620
dc.title	Why do U.S. banks contribute more to global systemic risk	en
dc.type	Text	de
dc.type.publicationtype	workingPaper	de
dcterms.accessRights	open access

Files

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1