Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation? - An empirical analysis for listed companies in Germany
| dc.contributor.author | Dyballa, Katharina | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kraft, Kornelius | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-17T10:10:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-07-17T10:10:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid excessive risk taking and short-run orientated decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/34152 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-7883 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | de |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Paper / SFB 823;22/2015 | en |
| dc.subject | Executive Compensation | en |
| dc.subject | Hausman-Taylor | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.subject | Principal-Agent Theory | en |
| dc.subject | Codetermination | en |
| dc.subject.ddc | 310 | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 620 | |
| dc.title | Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation? - An empirical analysis for listed companies in Germany | en |
| dc.type | Text | de |
| dc.type.publicationtype | workingPaper | de |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access |