Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory
Loading...
Files
Date
2007-09-16T12:04:33Z
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a unified
description of all known natural forces. This article tries to demonstrate
that the fundamental structural and methodological differences that set
string theory apart from other physical theories have important
philosophical consequences. Focusing on implications for the realism debate
in philosophy of science, it is argued that both poles of that debate face
new problems in the context of string theory. On the one hand, the claim of
underdetermination of scientific theory by the available empirical data,
which is a pivotal element of empiricism, loses much of its plausibility. On
the other hand, the dissolution of any meaningful notion of an external
ontological object destroys the basis for conventional versions of
scientific realism. String theory seems to suggest an intermediate position
akin to Structural Realism that is based on a newly emerging principle, to
be called the principle of theoretical uniqueness.
Description
Table of contents
Keywords
ontology, scientific realism, string theory, structure, underdetermination