Essays on information economics, political economy and network goods
| dc.contributor.advisor | Zudenkova, Galina | |
| dc.contributor.author | Maxara, Dominik | |
| dc.contributor.referee | Buchheim, Lukas | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2025-09-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-09-26T08:46:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-09-26T08:46:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation explores the intricate interplay between signaling mechanisms in electoral contexts, the impact of misinformation on democratic polarization, and the dynamic improvement of quality in network goods, particularly within the gaming industry in three essays. The first essay models and analyzes the role of primary elections as a vital mechanism for voter learning. By employing a Bayesian game framework, I reveal how these electoral processes enable voters to discern candidates' true ideological positions and learn the true state of the world amidst uncertainty. This analysis not only fills a gap in existing literature concerning candidate signaling but also provides valuable insights into enhancing democratic representation. The second essay addresses a pressing contemporary issue: the rise of polarization driven by political failures and fake news which is overlooked in the literature and instead solely attributed to fake news. Through the combination of multi-armed bandit theory and fundamental political economy concepts, I illustrate how misinformation disrupts belief formation processes and erodes trust in media credibility. The findings underscore the necessity for restoring confidence in reliable information sources to stabilize democratic systems facing increasing extremism. The third essay investigates update cycles for network goods in a dynamic setup by deriving testable predictions through a trackable model embedded in the network good literature. We extend the existing literature by analyzing strategic quality improvements for network goods over time while navigating competitive pressures. To test the predictions from the model we provide empirical evidence from the gaming industry. The results highlight that maintaining user engagement relies heavily on continuous innovation and responsiveness to market changes. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/44004 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-25772 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Primary elections | en |
| dc.subject | Belief formation | en |
| dc.subject | Bayesian game theory | en |
| dc.subject | political representation | en |
| dc.subject | Electoral dynamics | en |
| dc.subject | Fake news | en |
| dc.subject | Network goods | en |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | |
| dc.subject.rswk | Vorwahl (Politik) | de |
| dc.subject.rswk | Spieltheorie | de |
| dc.subject.rswk | Desinformation | de |
| dc.subject.rswk | Repräsentation (Politik) | de |
| dc.title | Essays on information economics, political economy and network goods | en |
| dc.type | Text | |
| dc.type.publicationtype | PhDThesis | |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | |
| eldorado.dnb.deposit | true | |
| eldorado.secondarypublication | false |