Authors: Polattimur, Hamza
Title: Housing, collateral constraints, and fiscal policy
Language (ISO): en
Abstract: This paper studies the preferential tax treatment of housing that can be observed in many industrialized countries. It provides a rationale for it by means of an optimal taxation approach taking into account an important feature of housing, namely its usage as collateral. In a borrower-lender framework where private loans are assumed to be non-enforceable and have to be collateralized by housing, optimal fisscal policy should disburden constrained borrowers by subsidizing their housing.
Subject Headings: Collateral Constraints
Housing
Optimal Fiscal Policy
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2003/30404
http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-5477
Issue Date: 2013-06-20
Appears in Collections:Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823

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