Authors: | Polattimur, Hamza |
Title: | Housing, collateral constraints, and fiscal policy |
Language (ISO): | en |
Abstract: | This paper studies the preferential tax treatment of housing that can be observed in many industrialized countries. It provides a rationale for it by means of an optimal taxation approach taking into account an important feature of housing, namely its usage as collateral. In a borrower-lender framework where private loans are assumed to be non-enforceable and have to be collateralized by housing, optimal fisscal policy should disburden constrained borrowers by subsidizing their housing. |
Subject Headings: | Collateral Constraints Housing Optimal Fiscal Policy |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/30404 http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-5477 |
Issue Date: | 2013-06-20 |
Appears in Collections: | Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823 |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
DP_2313_SFB823_Polattimur.pdf | DNB | 273.97 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is protected by original copyright |
This item is protected by original copyright rightsstatements.org