Authors: | Dyballa, Katharina Kraft, Kornelius |
Title: | Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation? - An empirical analysis for listed companies in Germany |
Language (ISO): | en |
Abstract: | Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid excessive risk taking and short-run orientated decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis. |
Subject Headings: | Executive Compensation Hausman-Taylor Corporate Governance Principal-Agent Theory Codetermination |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2003/34152 http://dx.doi.org/10.17877/DE290R-7883 |
Issue Date: | 2015 |
Appears in Collections: | Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB) 823 |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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DP_2215_SFB823_Dyballa_Kraft.pdf | DNB | 242.7 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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